

(2012) 04 AP CK 0107

In the Andhra Pradesh High Court

Case No : Writ Petition No's. 12661 and 12662 of 2001

A.P. State Textile Dev. Corpn. Ltd.

APPELLANT

Vs

The Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Guntur and others

 A.P. State Textile Dev. Corpn. Ltd. Vs G. Tatayya and
others

RESPONDENT

Date of Decision : 19-04-2012

Acts Referred:

Constitution of India, 1950 — Article 141
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 — Section 10, 33C(2)

Citation : (2012) 5 ALT 470

Hon'ble Judges : B. Chandra Kumar, J

Bench : Single Bench

Advocate : E. Ajay Reddy in W.P. Nos. 12661 and 12662 of 2001, 3072 and 3907 of 2009 and W.P. No. 12661 of 2011, for the Appellant; P. Govindarajulu and M. Pitchaiah for unofficial respondents G.P. for Labour for R1 G.P. for Industries for R12 in W.P. Nos. 12661 and 12662 of 2001, 3072 and 3907 of 2009 and W.P. No. 12661 of 2011, for the Respondent

Final Decision : Dismissed

Judgement

Honourable Sri Justice B. Chandra Kumar

1. Since the facts of the case, issues involved and the parties are one and the same and common arguments have been advanced by the learned counsel in all these writ petitions, they are being disposed of by this common order. W.P.No.12661 of 2001 has been filed challenging the order dated 12.07.2000 passed in M.P.No.95 of 1990 by the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Guntur. W.P.No.12662 of 2001 has been filed challenging the order dated 12.07.2000 passed in M.P.No.96 of 1990 by the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Guntur. W.P.No.3072 of 2009 has been filed challenging the order dated 16.11.2007 passed in M.P.No.6 of 2002 by the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Guntur. W.P.No.3097 of 2009 has been filed challenging the order dated 16.11.2007 passed in M.P.No.7 of 2002 by the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Guntur.

2. In all these matters, the petitioner is A.P. State Textile Development Corporation Limited and the respondents are its employees. The brief facts of the case, as narrated in W.P.No.12661 of 2001, are as follows:-

Respondents 2 to 11 filed an application u/s 33-C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 contending that A.P. Textile Development Corporation Limited is an undertaking of the Government of Andhra Pradesh operating projects in the name of Special Rehabilitation Projects in Krishna and Guntur districts. As per the requisition of the Project Officer and being sponsored by the concerned employment exchange, the respondents were recruited for the post of attenders in February, 1979 and they were working in different places in Krishna and Guntur Districts. The initial appointment order of one Mukamala Jaganmohan Rao is extracted below for the sake of convenience.

Proceedings of the Project Officer, Special Rehabilitation Project, Vijayawada
Present:- Sri G. Narayanaswamy, B.A., B.L., Project Officer R.C.No.19/78/SRP, dated 08.02.1979 Sub:-Appointment of Attenders - Orders - Issued. Ref:- Letter No.A1/53/79, dated 31.01.1979 of the District Employment Officer, Guntur

ORDER:-

Sri Mukkalama Jagan Mohan Rao, Sri Manchala Yesupadam and Sri Sk. Silar sponsored by the District Employment Exchange Officer, Guntur in the letter read above is appointed as Attenders in the Scale of Rs.165-5-190- 6-250 with usual allowances admissible to the staff of the Andhra Pradesh State Textile Development Corporation and posted to Phiramgipuram, Tenali and Mangalagiri Production Centres respectively.

His appointment is purely temporary and is terminable any time without notice and without assigning any reason. However, the post is likely to continue as long as the Special Rehabilitation Project Scheme continues which may be about two years hence.

He should report for duty before the Production Manager, Phiramgipuram, Tenali and Mangalagiri on or before 20.02.1979 failing which the appointment will be cancelled.

Sd/- xx 08.02.1979 G. Narayanaswamy, Project Officer.

3. It is not in dispute that similar appointment orders have been issued to other employees. There was a revision of pay scales by virtue of G.O. (P) No.235 dated 17.09.1979. Thus the corporation issued a memo on 10.01.1980 to all its employees including the respondents to submit their option in the prescribed form. The respondents have opted for revised pay scales of the corporation. Before revision, the respondents were paid salaries on par with the corporation employees and the second respondent paid interim relief of Rs.25/- pending implementation of the revised pay scales. The first petitioner announced the adoption of revised pay scales on 10.01.1980 to all its employees. The Government of Andhra Pradesh passed G.O.Ms.No.54 dated 30.01.1981 and in

that annexure also in column No.8, the basic pay payable to the attenders is shown as 295-5-345- 10-425 working at Heat Setting Plant, Machilipatnam. Subsequently, the first respondent has converted the Project Centre into two districts of Krishna and Guntur into Cooperative Societies under Cooperative Societies Act and subsequently, after formation of Heat Setting Plant at Machilipatnam, the petitioners were posted at Heat Setting Plant at Machilipatnam. Thus, they became employees in the same cadre on 01.04.1981 and the Heat Setting Plant is directly controlled by the A.P. State Textile Development Corporation which also had adopted the implementation of the revised pay scales. The grievance of the respondents is that they were not paid the amount due to them towards arrears as per the revised pay scales. Then the respondents filed M.P.No.11 of 1982 for determination of the amounts due to them. Then the Labour Court, Guntur, passed orders in the said M.P holding that they are entitled to the amounts as claimed as per Government Orders and directed the petitioners to pay the same. Aggrieved by the inaction of the petitioners, the respondents also filed W.P.No.2490 of 1989 before this Court for implementation of the orders of the Labour Court, Guntur, and this Court disposed of the said Writ Petition on 19.06.1990 observing that the respondents may approach the Labour Court seeking the same relief. In the said writ petition, the respondents also claimed 12% interest per annum. Thus, the respondents claimed arrears of dues as per the revised pay scale on their pay fixed in G.O. (P).No.235.

4. The petitioner, i.e., The A.P. State Textile Development Corporation, Hyderabad, filed counter and stated that they are neither necessary nor proper parties to the petition. According to them, there is no relationship of master and the servant or employer and the employees between it and the respondents. The specific case of the petitioner is that the Project Officer of the Special Rehabilitation Project, Vijayawada, recruited persons through employment exchange to work in the project and that it is only releasing funds to the Project Officer, Special Rehabilitation Project, Vijayawada, from out of the funds distributed by the Director of Handlooms and Textiles from time to time in connection with the implementation on of the Scheme. It is also contended by the petitioner that the G.O. was issued in respect of the Government Employees specified therein and not to the employees of the Corporation. It is also their case that the centers were closed on 31.03.1981 and on closure of such centers, the Project Officer, Special Rehabilitation Project, Vijayawada, absorbed the employees and workers working in the said centers in the newly formed projects governed by the Cooperative societies in spite of retrenching them. Thus, the case of the petitioner is that the Corporation has absorbed the respondents in the Weavers Cooperative Societies which are independent and separate bodies under the Cooperative Societies Act.

5. The second respondent filed separate counter before the Labour Court contending that on the earlier occasion, the respondents filed W.P.No.11 of 1983 and, therefore, the other petition is not maintainable. It is also contended that

the Corporation has nothing to do with the appointment of the petitioners or with their claims and that the Corporation did not pay their salaries at any time.

6. On behalf of the workers, P.W.1 - V. Ananda Rao was examined and Exs.P.1 to 25 were marked. On behalf of the management, R.Ws.1 and 2 were examined and Exs.R.1 to R.7 were marked.

7. The Labour Court referred to the earlier orders passed by this Court in W.P.No.4281 of 1993, wherein, it was held that the Principles of Res Judicata is not applicable to the petition filed by the petitioners before the Labour Court. The Labour Court also referred to the Writ Appeal No.1255 and 1259 of 1994 and finally held that the principles of Res Judicata are not applicable to the facts of the present case. The Labour Court, on appreciation of oral and documentary evidence, came to the conclusion that the petitioners joined in Special Rehabilitation Project, Vijayawada, and that the petitioners worked up to March, 1981, in the respective places under Special Rehabilitation Project, Vijayawada, and subsequently those projects have been converted into Cooperative Societies and the services of the petitioners have been continued in the respective cooperative societies and subsequently, they were transferred to the Heat Setting Plant at Machilipatnam in January, 1982. The Labour Court finally came to the conclusion that from the evidence of R.Ws.1 and 2, it is established that the Special Rehabilitation Project, Vijayawada, was started in the year 1979 as per the G.O. issued by the Government of Andhra Pradesh and the petitioners have been employed by the Project Officer, Special Rehabilitation Project, Vijayawada, and that the said Special Rehabilitation Project, Vijayawada, came to an end by 31.03.1981 and from 01.04.1981, the Weavers Cooperative Society has been formed and societies have been formed at different places and that the petitioners have been absorbed in those Societies and when Heat Setting Plant was started in the year 1982, the petitioners were transferred to Heat Setting Plant. The Labour Court also came to the conclusion that the Heat Setting Plant is the unit of the Corporation and the petitioners became the workers of the respondents from 1982 onwards. The Labour Court also came to the conclusion that since the pay scales of the Government as per G.O.Ms.No.235 is applicable to the petitioners and the said G.O. has been adopted by the Corporation. The Labour Court also came to the conclusion that under G.O.Ms.No.567, the Special Rehabilitation Project, Vijayawada, has been created (marked as Ex.R.2). The Labour Court also referred to Ex.R.2 which shows that posts have been sanctioned by the Government for Special Rehabilitation Project, Vijayawada, and for Heat Setting Plant at Machilipatnam. Referring to Ex.P.1 and Ex.R.1, the Labour Court also came to the conclusion that the petitioners have been appointed as Attenders by the Project Officer, Special Rehabilitation Project, Vijayawada in the pay scale of Rs.165-5-190-6-250 with usual allowances admissible to the staff of the Andhra Pradesh State Textile Development Corporation and, therefore, the pay scales of the petitioners were on par with the employees of the respondent corporation and the petitioners are granted regular increments by the Project Officer, Special Rehabilitation Project, Vijayawada.

Referring to Ex.P.3 to P.5, the Labour Court also came to the conclusion that the petitioners were also granted encashment of leave. Thus, the Labour Court finally came to the conclusion that the petitioners were absorbed in the Cooperative Societies with the same scale of pay and after formation of Heat Setting Plant at Machilipatnam, the petitioners have been transferred to the said Heat Setting Plant at Machilipatnam. The Labour Court also came to the conclusion that the Weavers Cooperative Societies were also under the control of the Project Officer, Special Rehabilitation Project, Vijayawada and that Heat Setting Plant at Machilipatnam is the unit of the respondents Corporation as admitted by R.W.1 and as per Ex.R.2, Heat Setting Plant at Krishna District was also under the Special Rehabilitation Project, Vijayawada, granted by the Government of Andhra Pradesh and thus, the Heat Setting Plant is also the unit of the Respondent Corporation and the Special Rehabilitation Project, Vijayawada is also the Project functioning under the respondent corporation and in view of the transfer orders, the Special Rehabilitation Project, Vijayawada, which is part of the Corporation is being run with the funds sanctioned by the Government of Andhra Pradesh and the funds are being utilized for Special Rehabilitation Project by the Corporation. Thus, the Labour Court came to the conclusion that denial of relationship is a mere camouflage. The Labour Court also came to the conclusion that the respondent corporation has adopted the revised pay scales of 1979 sanctioned by the Government to its employees.

8. Ex.P.8 is the G.O. prescribing the pay scales and it is at the request of the respondent that the petitioners have submitted their option forms and that the respondent corporation has fixed the pay of one P. Nagabhushanam working as Technical Assistant in the Special Rehabilitation Project, Avanigadda in the revised pay scales of 1979. It has to be seen that Ex.R.4 Agreement contains the stipulation that it is subject to the result of the litigation and without prejudice to the rights of the petitioners in M.P.No.11 of 1983.

9. As far as findings on facts by the Labour Court are concerned, there is nothing on record to say that the above findings are perverse or not based on evidence. Once there is no allegation that the findings of the Labour Court are perverse, the same have to be accepted. As seen from the affidavit filed in support of the Writ Petition, it is not in dispute that during February, 1979, the respondents 2 to 7, i.e., the petitioners before the Labour Court have been initially appointed by the Director of Handlooms and Textiles upon their sponsoring from the District Employment Exchange to temporarily work in the Project at Krishna and Guntur district as attenders. It is also not in dispute that the petitioner corporation issued Memo on 08.01.1980 basing on G.O. (P) No.235 wherein, all the permanent employees of the corporation were called upon to exercise their option in the matter of revised pay scales. If at all they were not the employees of the corporation, there was no need to seek option from respondents 2 to 11.

10. The main contention of the learned counsel for respondents is that the Labour Court has no jurisdiction to decide the entitlement of the workmen and

when the corporations have not disputed that the workmen are not entitled for the pay scales, the Labour Court committed a manifest error in entertaining the petition. As far as the above referred facts are concerned, the facts are not in the dispute. It is not in dispute that the petitioners were initially appointed by the Director of Handlooms and Textiles. It is also not in dispute that the options were taken from these employees as regards their pay scales. It is also not in dispute that subsequently, they have been absorbed in the Societies after formation of the Societies and they were transferred to work at Heat Setting Plant at Machilipatnam. What is required to be seen is that as per the directions and orders passed from time to time, the employees worked and as far as transferring them to the Heat Setting Plant at Machilipatnam is concerned, it is not as per the wish of the employees. The petitioner, being an instrumentality of the state and which has adopted the G.O.s issued by the Government from time to time, cannot say that the respondents are not entitled to the benefits of the G.O.s which they have adopted for their employees when the respondents have in fact worked under the petitioners. Merely because the name has been changed or a new society has been formed and the petitioners have been transferred to the Societies or that the Societies funds are separately sanctioned by the Government, the relationship does not cease to exist.

11. The wheel of the curtain has to be lifted. A Five-Judge Bench of the Apex Court, in case between The Central Bank of India Ltd. Vs. P.S. Rajagopalan etc., has dealt with this issue in detail and observed as follows:-

Let us then revert to the words used in s. 33C(2) in order to decide what would be its true scope and effect on a fair and reasonable construction. When subs. (2) refers to any workman entitled to receive from the employer any benefit there specified, does it mean that he must be a workman whose right to receive the said benefit is not disputed by the employer? According to the appellant, the scope of sub-s. (2) is similar to that of sub-s. (1), and it is pointed out that just as under sub-s. (1) any disputed question about the workman's right to receive the money due under an act can not be adjudicated upon by the appropriate Government, so under sub-s. (2) if a dispute is raised about the workman's right to receive the benefit in question, that cannot be determined by the Labour Court. The only point which the Labour Court can determine is one relation to the computation of the benefit terms of money. We are not impressed by this argument. In our opinion, on a fair and reasonable construction of sub-s. (2) it is clear that if a workman's right to receive the benefit is disputed, that may have to be determined by the Labour Court. Before proceeding to compute the benefit in terms of money the Labour Court inevitably has to deal with the question as to whether the workman has a right to receive that benefit. If the said right is to disputed, nothing more needs to be done and the Labour Court can proceed to compute the value of the benefit in terms of money; but if the said right is disputed, the Labour Court must deal with that question and decide whether the workman has the right receive the benefit as alleged by him and it is only if the Labour Court answers this point in favour of the workman that the next question

of making the necessary computation can arise. It seems to us that the opening clause of sub-s. (2) does not admit of the construction for which the appellant contends unless we add some words in that clause. The clause "Where any workman is entitled to receive from the employer any benefit" does not mean "where such workman is admittedly, or admitted to be, entitled to receive such benefit". The appellant's construction would necessarily introduce the addition of the words "admittedly, or admitted to be" in that clause, and that clearly is not permissible. Besides, it seems to us that if the appellant's construction is accepted, it would necessarily mean that it would be at the option of the employer to allow the workman to avail himself of the remedy provided by sub-s. (2), because he has merely to raise an objection on the ground that the right claimed by the workman is not admitted to oust the jurisdiction of the Labour Court to entertain the workman's application. The claim under s. 33C(2) clearly postulates that the determination of the question about computing the benefit in terms of money may, in some cases, have to be preceded by an enquiry into the existence of the right and such an enquiry must be held to be incidental to the main determination which has been assigned to the Labour Court by sub-s. (2). As Maxwell has observed "where an Act confers a jurisdiction, it impliedly also grants the power of doing all such acts, or employing such means, as are essentially necessary to its execution [Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes p. 350.]" We must accordingly hold that s. 33C(2) takes within its purview cases of workmen who claimed that the benefit to which they are entitled would be computed in terms of money, even though the right to the benefit on which their claim is based is disputed by their employers. Incidentally, it may be relevant to add that it would be somewhat odd that under sub-s. (3), the Labour Court should have been authorised to delegate the work of computing the money value of the benefit to the Commissioner if the determination of the said question was the only task assigned to the Labour Court under sub-s. (2). On the other hand, sub-s. 3 becomes intelligible if it is held that what can be assigned to the Commissioner includes only a part of the assignment of the Labour Court under sub-s. (2).

12. A Full Bench of this Court, relying on the earlier Full Bench judgment in the case between Divisional Engineer, M.R.T. Operation City Circle, A.P.S.E. Board, Hyderabad Vs. Ikram Ahmed (1979) 1 Andh LT 87, also considered the same issue in the case between Mandegam Radhakrishna Reddy Vs. Sri Bharathi Velu Bus Service and Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Guntur, and held as follows:-

On the basis of the above referred decisions of the Supreme Court a Full Bench of this Court in Divisional Engineer : M.R.T. Operation City Circle, A.P.S.E.B. Board Hyderabad v. Ikram Ahmed 1979 A.L.T. 87, observed :

The mere denial of such an existing right by the employer does not take away the jurisdiction of the Labour Court to entertain a petition under S. 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. While the right itself should be an existing right for enabling a workman to maintain a petition under S. 33-C(2) it is not necessary

that this existing right should have been admitted by the employer. The denial of the existing right of the workman to receive money or the benefit does not oust the jurisdiction of the Labour Court to entertain a petition under S. 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act and require the reference of the Industrial Dispute raised for adjudication under S. 10 of the Act. The denial of this right would only require the Labour Court to enquire into the fact whether the right is existing. The Labour Court, has jurisdiction to decide and determine this jurisdictional fact. The enquiry under S. 33-C(2) in such cases would have to be preceded by an enquiry into the existence of the right and such an inquiry is incidental to the main determination which has been assigned to the Labour Court by sub-s. (2) It cannot, by an order under S. 33-C(2) however, create a new right....."

In such a case, if there was denial by the employer of the right of an employee to receive wages which he was entitled to under a statute, by such mere denial the jurisdiction of the Labour Court to enquire into the matter will not be excluded. What all the Labour Court to enquire into the matter will not be excluded. What all the Labour Court had to do in such a situation was to enquire into the question whether the workman had an existing right to wages or not.

13. A learned single Judge of this Court has also considered the same issue in the case between Ramesh Watch Company Vs. The Addl. Industrial Tribunal-cum-Addl. Labour Court and Ch. Bhagwan, wherein, it was held as follows:-

It is well settled that mere denial, of an existing right, by the employer does not take away the jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal/Labour Court to entertain a petition u/s 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. While the right itself should be an existing right for enabling a workman to maintain a petition u/s 33-C(2), it is not necessary that this existing right should have been admitted by the employer. The denial of the existing right of the workman to receive money or the benefits neither ousts the jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunals/Labour Courts to entertain a petition u/s 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act nor does it require reference, of the Industrial Dispute raised, for adjudication u/s 10 of the said Act. Denial of the right would only require Tribunals/Labour Courts to enquire into the fact whether the right is existing. The Labour Court, has jurisdiction to decide and determine this jurisdictional fact. The enquiry u/s 33-C(2) in such cases would have to be preceded by an enquiry into the existence of the right and such an enquiry is incidental to the main determination which has been conferred on the Labour Court u/s 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act.

14. Thus, it is clear that even mere denial of existing right of a workman does not oust the jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunalcum- Labour Court.

15. Sri Pitchaiah, learned counsel for the respondent has also relied on the judgment in the case between Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre Vs. State of Maharashtra and others (2011) 1 Supreme Court Cases 694, wherein it was held as follows:-

Now we deem it imperative to examine the issue of per incuriam raised by the

learned Counsel for the parties. In *Young v. Bristol Aeroplane Company Limited* (1994) All ER 293 the House of Lords observed that "Incuria" literally means "carelessness". In practice per incuriam appears to mean per ignoratium. English courts have developed this principle in relaxation of the rule of stare decisis. The "quotable in law" is avoided and ignored if it is rendered, "in ignoratium of a statute or other binding authority. The same has been accepted, approved and adopted by this Court while interpreting Article 141 of the Constitution which embodies the doctrine of precedents as a matter of law.

In Halsbury's Laws of England (4th Edn.) Vol. 26: Judgment and Orders: Judicial Decisions as Authorities (pp. 297-98, para 578) per incuriam has been elucidated as under:

A decision is given per incuriam when the court has acted in ignorance of a previous decision of its own or of a court of coordinate jurisdiction which covered the case before it, in which case it must decide which case to follow (*Young v. Bristol Aeroplane Co. Ltd.* 1944 KB 718 : (1944) 2 All ER 293.

In *Huddersfield Police Authority v. Watson* 1947 KB 842: (1947) 2 All ER 193.; or when it has acted in ignorance of a House of Lords decision, in which case it must follow that decision; or when the decision is given in ignorance of the terms of a statute or rule having statutory force.

This Court in *Government of Andhra Pradesh and Another Vs. B. Satyanarayana Rao (Dead) by Lrs. and Others*, observed as under:

The rule of per incuriam can be applied where a court omits to consider a binding precedent of the same court or the superior court rendered on the same issue or where a court omits to consider any statute while deciding that issue.

A Constitution Bench of this Court in *Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community and Another Vs. State of Maharashtra and Another*, has observed that the law laid down by this Court in a decision delivered by a Bench of larger strength is binding on any subsequent Bench of lesser or coequal strength.

In our considered view the impugned judgment and order of the High Court declining anticipatory bail to the Appellant cannot be sustained and is consequently set aside.

16. Thus, it is clear that not only the judgment of Bench of larger strength is binding on any subsequent Bench of lesser or coequal strength.

17. Thus, admittedly, the decision rendered by the Apex Court in the case between *The Central Bank of India Ltd.*'s case (1 supra) is binding and the learned counsel for the respondent has not brought to my notice any other decision rendered by the 5 Judges Bench of Larger Bench superseding the same.

18. In the light of the law laid down by the Apex Court in *Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre*'s case (5 supra), I am of the considered view that the decision of the Apex Court in the case between *The Central Bank of India Ltd.*'s case (1 supra)

is binding on this Court and there is no other go except to follow the ratio laid down in the said judgment, though there are other judgments of the Apex Court. Even on facts, learned counsel for the respondents have mainly relied on the judgment in the case between Municipal Corporation of Delhi Vs. Ganesh Razak and another (1995) 1 Supreme Court Cases 235. The facts of that case are that the daily wage workers claimed wages on par with the regular employees. Whether the daily wage workers were entitled for the pay scales on par with the regular employees or not is the question that came up for consideration in that case. But as far as the case on hand is concerned, it is not in dispute that the workers were regularly appointed with pay scales attached to their post and, therefore, the decision of Municipal Corporation of Delhi's case (6 supra) is not applicable to the facts of the case. It has to be seen that what was the main point that came up for consideration in any decision before relying on the observations of the Court in that judgment. The context under which the observations have been made assumes much importance in any case.

20. Similarly, in the other two decisions rendered by the Division Bench of the Apex Court in cases between State of U.P. Vs. Brijpal Singh (2005) (2008) 7 SCC 22 SCC 58 and D.Krishnan and another Vs. Special Officer, Vellore Cooperative Sugar Mill and another⁸ also, the decision of the 5 Judges Bench of the Apex Court in The Central Bank of India Ltd.'s case (1 supra) seems to have not been cited or brought to the notice of their Lordships" while they hearing those matters.

20. In the light of the above decisions, I am of the view that the Labour Court has not committed any manifest error or it cannot be said that the Labour Court cannot decide the entitlement of the employees for the pay scales. Admittedly, when the Corporations have adopted the Government Orders issued by the Government from time to time, it is clear that all the employees employed in the corporation are entitled to the benefit of those Government orders. In view of the above discussion and for the foregoing reasons, I hold that all these writ petitions are devoid of merit and are liable to be dismissed. Accordingly, all the writ petitions are dismissed. It appears that by virtue of the interim orders passed by this Court, the petitioner has deposited the amount in fixed deposit. In view of the dismissal of the writ petitions, the petitioner is directed to deposit the said amount before the Labour Court within a period of four (04) weeks from the date of receipt of copy of this order. No costs.