

(2004) 09 KL CK 0047

In the High Court Of Kerala

Case No : O.P. No. 3787 of 1999 (A)

Branch Manager, Erattupetta Branch, Kerala State Financial Enterprises Ltd.

APPELLANT

Vs

Meenachil Co-operative Agricultural and Rural Development Bank Ltd. and Others

RESPONDENT

Date of Decision : 15-09-2004

Acts Referred:

Constitution of India, 1950 — Article 12, 226
Stamp Act, 1899 — Section 2(17)
State Financial Corporations Act, 1951 — Section 29
Transfer of Property Act, 1882 — Section 58

Citation : (2006) 132 CompCas 347

Hon'ble Judges : M. Ramachandran, J

Bench : Single Bench

Advocate : Antony Dominic, for the Appellant; Viju Abraham, for respondent No. 1, Thomaskutty, for respondent Nos. 2 and 3 and George Kutty Mathew, for the Respondent

Final Decision : Allowed

Judgement

M. Ramachandran, J.—By an order dated December 28, 1998 (exhibit 1 P8), the Joint Registrar of Co-operative Societies, Kottayam (third respondent herein) had overruled the objections of the petitioner in the matter of confirmation of sale of a landed property, admeasuring two acres and 98 cents of land with a building in Survey No. 341/4 of Thalapalam village. This was purported to be in exercise of powers u/s 21(3) of the Kerala State Co-operative Agricultural Development Bank Act, 1984 (Act 20 of 1984) (hereinafter referred to as "Act 20 of 1984"). The application was at the instance of the first respondent-the Meenachil Co-operative Agricultural and Rural Development Bank Ltd. The objector was the petitioner- Kerala State Financial Enterprises Ltd., represented by its branch manager, who had a claim that the property had been already mortgaged to them prior to the encumbrance created in favour of the first respondent-bank.

The fourth respondent was the owner of the properties, at the time when the properties had been mortgaged in favour of the petitioner, in the year 1994, by deposit of title deeds, as security in respect of kuri transactions. The original petition has been filed inter alia challenging the above order.

2. Respondents Nos. 4 and 5 had been subscribers to two kuries in Chitty No. 2 of 1994 and had been assigned Chittaly Nos. 30 and 25 respectively. When the kuries got prized, as required for the release of the prize amount, an equitable mortgage in respect of the property concerned had been created on July 4, 1994 and the title deeds in respect of the above land had been deposited with the petitioner-company. This is nowhere disputed.

3. There was default in the future remittances. The dues were quantified as Rs. 4,00,030 as on February 14, 1997. Being a notified establishment, u/s 71 of the Revenue Recovery Act, a requisition had been made to the District Collector, Kottayam for initiating action for recovering the amounts due from the said respondents. The petitioner refers to the certificates issued by the District Collector dated February 22, 1997 and February 24, 1997, A demand notice prior to attachment had been duly issued on March 12, 1997 by the Special Deputy Tahsildar (RR), Ernakulam, and the properties were attached on January 27, 1998.

4. It is stated that while these steps were in progress, a public notice had come to the knowledge of the petitioner, published by the first respondent-bank. The fourth respondent was therein shown as a defaulter and the sale notification included properties as aforementioned, as to be sold on February 11, 1998. It is further submitted that in spite of objections, the sale proceedings were carried on and since there were no bidders forthcoming, the first respondent-bank themselves had purchased the properties in auction. Such action under the provisions of Act 20 of 1984 required confirmation by the notified authority. Objections were filed before the Joint Registrar, in the above context, by the Kerala State Financial Enterprises. However, he was not prepared to see eye to eye with the claim of the petitioner. The order passed was to the following effect :

Whereas no application with deposit has been made under subsection (1) of Section 21 of the said Act and whereas the Sales Officer has duly applied to make an order confirming the sale, in exercise of powers conferred on me under Sub-section (3) of Section 21 of the said Act. I am inclined to confirm the sale of property of two acres and 98 cents in Survey No. 341/4 (Re-Sy 238/3) of Thalapalam Village which was sold in public auction by the Sale Officer, Meenachil Cooperative Agricultural and Rural Development Bank Ltd., Pala on February 11, 1998, and the sale shall become absolute and the property shall be deemed to have vested in the purchasers, viz., the Meenachil Co-operative Agricultural Development Bank Ltd. No. K. 197, Pala from the date and time of sale.

5. Want of deposit of the amounts specified in the proclamation of sale was thus pointed out as a reason for not acting upon the objections.

6. In the present original petition, the above order is challenged as also all the proceedings leading thereto. A declaration also has been sought for to the effect that the sale conducted ignoring the mortgage given in favour of the petitioner is illegal and void.

7. Sri Antony Dominic, on behalf of the petitioner, submits that the first respondent-bank as also the Joint Registrar of Co-operative Societies (third respondent) were in error to overrule the objections of the petitioner, whereby valid and legal rights of the petitioner have been practically set at naught. According to him, even if the bank was proceeding under a special enactment, rejection of the claims of the petitioner could not at all have been justified. Infirmities touching the root of the transaction had weakened the claims of the bank, to the advantage of the petitioner. The executive powers of the Governmental authorities have been exercised without full application of mind and overlooking the provisions of the statute and objections raised.

8. When the initial sale had been notified, the first respondent-bank had divulged certain further details to the petitioner, so as to assert the position that always they were in the driver's seat. According to them, Smt. Rosamma George, Muthupunnackal, Plassanal had taken three loans from the first respondent-bank as K. M. S. E3/95-96 for Rs. 50,000 ; PLMS E5/ 95-96 for Rs. 20,000 and RHE 88/94-95 for Rs. 3,00,000. The properties, referred to in the notice, namely two acres and 98 cents in her name and possession, were shown as security, and it was only after executing appropriate Gehans (Nos. G. 54 of 1995, G. 64 of 1995 and H. 39 of 1995) that loans were sanctioned and paid. She had done so along with her husband Sri M. K. George, who was the transferor and the title was impeccable. Sri M. K. George is the fourth respondent and Smt. Rosamma George (his wife) is the sixth respondent herein. It has presently come up that some time during 1995 Sri George had, by a registered document, transferred the properties in favour of his wife, which facilitated her to subject the properties to encumbrance for money received. The loans had been received and the default compelled the first respondent-bank to resort to coercive proceedings. These were the basic facts, which have to be adverted to, while disposing of this original petition.

9. By the counter-affidavit filed by the first respondent-bank, claims that they had entered into financial transactions with Rosamma George, in the normal course of business, and all precautionary measures had been taken and in view of the insulating provisions for safeguarding the transactions under Act 20 of 1984. Exhibit P8 was impeccably valid, and the petitioner could not have agitated any legally sustainable claims. Reference had been made by learned Counsel to Sections 10, 12, and 21 of Act 20 of 1984. Also, it was a case, where notices prescribed u/s 12 of the Act in respect of the transactions had been duly served with the village officer, Thalapalam on April 7, 1995, June 3, 1995 and July 12, 1995 (exhibits R1(a) to R1(c)). Therefore, when legal formalities, religiously had been complied with, and when there was default on the side of the loanees, it

would have been possible for them to put the properties on sale without intervention of the court. After the sale, only on deposit of the amounts due, it would have been possible for an objector to get the sale set aside. Since the application filed before the competent authority was defective, no interference could have been permissible. It had been pointed out that when the property was put to sale on February 11, 1998, the bank had bid the property for an amount of Rs. 4,35,000 and such sale alone has been confirmed.

10. Sri Antony Dominic submits that the provisions of Act 20 of 1984 normally would have come to secure the interest of the institutions like the first respondent, but, in the present case, the basic defects in the transactions exposed them to risks, as the property was already under equitable mortgage to them. At no point of time, the bank had any valid rights over the properties. Appropriation steps by them as per exhibit P8 were therefore inconsequential and the right of the petitioner was indefeasible. We may examine the issue in the aforesaid background.

11. Since reliance has been placed by the bank on Section 12(2) of the Kerala State Co-operative Agricultural Development Bank Act, the provision could be extracted hereinbelow :

(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force, a Gehan created or mortgage or hypothecation executed in favour of the Agricultural Development Bank or a primary bank shall take precedence over any attachment or equitable mortgage over the properties, where, after publication of a notice in the prescribed form, the claim or interest under such attachment or equitable mortgage has not been notified to such bank within the time prescribed in the said notice.

12. Thus, it is submitted that if at all the petitioner initially had any claims, so long as they did not put up any such claims of equitable mortgage to them, after exhibits R1(a) to R1(c), the legal effect was that such claims automatically became subordinate to their rights over the property. Therefore, the petitioner had no enforceable legal rights and any claims become subservient to the rights of the bank.

13. As defined u/s 2(e) of the Act, a Gehan is a special charge on properties in favour of the lending bank. By a mere declaration in writing by the borrowers for securing payment of money advanced or to be advanced by way of a loan, it will have all the characteristics of a valid mortgage. Security of such loan is ensured by the Act. A loan u/s 9(3) of the Act is recoverable by the bank concerned in case of default of payment in the same manner as if they are arrears of public revenue due on land. Charge on movable or immovable property is ensured by expressly reserving in favour of the bank a right of sale without intervention of court, in case of default (see Section 10(1) of the Act). It is also provided that notwithstanding anything contained in the Registration Act, or any other law for the time being in force, it shall not be necessary to register any Gehan or

mortgage or hypothecation created or executed in favour of the Agricultural Development Bank or a primary bank, provided the Agricultural Development Bank or a primary bank, as the case may be, sends a copy of the declaration or instrument, whereby such documents, including Gehan had created to the Registering Officer of the area concerned within the stipulated time. The Registering Officer is expected to file a copy thereof in Book No. 1 kept under the Registration Act and thereupon it is deemed to create an interest in the property. The bank had complied with these formalities.

14. The argument of the respondent therefore was that in view of Section 12(2) of the Act and the publication of notice, the proceedings for sale became unimpeachable. The further submission was that the sale could have been annulled only as provided u/s 21 of the Act and since there was no deposit coming from the petitioner, which was a pre-condition, no rights remained to be adjudicated. Act 20 of 1984 was intended to facilitate a more efficient working of co-operative agricultural development bank in the State, and the special provisions as above were incorporated so as to ensure that the transactions entered into by the institution were fully protected and recovery steps were flawlessly efficient.

15. However, on an examination of the attending circumstances, as highlighted by the petitioner, it is evident that notwithstanding the watertight provisions in the Act, certain basic irregularities have effectively undermined the rights of the bank of an opportunity to assert the rights as against the claims of the petitioner. Even though in the counter-affidavit, the bank claimed that they were convinced that the applicant for the loan had valid and marketable title over the properties proposed to be mortgaged, and that the same is absolutely encumbered as on March 15, 1995, and that there was no third party interest over the properties, the facts appear to be otherwise. The dates of availing of the three loans respectively were April 20, 1995, June 7, 1995 and July 15, 1995. But well before that the fourth respondent had encumbered the property concerned in favour of the petitioner, in the year 1994. The title deed of the properties, as could be seen from the counter-affidavit filed by the bank, is having Registration No. 74 of 1995 of the Sub-Registrar's Office, Erattupetta. The loans had been applied for by Smt. Rosamma George (sixth respondent), after she got the rights by the said transaction. It is but evident that the fourth respondent-husband after encumbering the properties in favour of the petitioner in the year 1994 had transferred the properties in favour of his wife in the year 1995. Such a transfer, during the subsistence of the encumbrance, could not have validly conferred any rights on the sixth respondent to the detriment of the petitioner. Perhaps the first respondent-bank had bona fide intended to enter into transactions, but a lacuna was in fact there. The sixth respondent presented the documents and applied for loan, misrepresenting to the bank that she was having ownership and title over the properties, which she never had legally acquired. Therefore, the contention of the bank that there was proper scrutiny or that there was marketable title enjoyed by the sixth respondent is without basis. This erodes the substratum of

their stand.

16. Because, if that be the case, the notices sent to the village officer (exhibits R1(a) to R1(c)), as envisaged by Section 12 of Act 20 of 1984, did not thereby create any further rights than the bank received from the mortgage arrangement. The rights were defective and unenforceable. The notices, though purported to have been made u/s 12(2) of the Act, were incapable of creating any right because of the inherent defect. Even though the petitioner had overlooked/omitted to make an objection against exhibits R1(a) to R1(c), that did not place them under any special disability, since the sixth respondent's surrender was in respect of properties over which she had no legal rights. The exhibits produced indicated that Rossamma George was party to a Gehan about which notice was published in the village office. The petitioner had no relation or transaction with Rosamma George and were not expected to be alerted because of such notice, even though the property had been described. It became inconsequential as far as the petitioner's rights were concerned. Resultantly, the situation is that the bank had attempted to enforce the Gehan which was unenforceable. The rituals of publication, sale and consequent confirmation was not sufficient enough to clothe them with any specific advantage to the detriment of the petitioner.

17. u/s 11 of the Act, every person who applies for a loan from a primary bank was expected to make a declaration that the property on which Gehan is created as security in the loan transaction is free from encumbrances. Section 11(3) provides that a person who makes a false declaration shall be punishable with imprisonment. Also it is not as if such a contingency of fraud is overlooked by Act 20 of 1984, Section 11(2) of the Act speaks of the remedy. Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force, where a declaration given by a loanee is false or defective, the bank will have a first charge on all other movable and immovable properties of the applicant, and all such properties shall be deemed to have been included in the Gehan, mortgage or hypothecation created or executed by the applicant as security for the loan granted. Theoretically, at least it may be possible for the bank to proceed against the fourth respondent or the sixth respondent, at their option, in case they want to enforce their claims.

18. It is beyond dispute that mortgage by deposit of title deeds is a valid procedure, accepted under the Transfer of Property Act, for creating an encumbrance. u/s 58(a) of the Act, a mortgage is a transfer of interest in specific immovable property. This may be for the purpose of securing the payment of money advanced or to be advanced by way of a loan. It includes an existing or future debt over the performance of an engagement which may give right to pecuniary liability. It is undisputable that in respect of a kuri transaction the petitioner had entered into such an arrangement. The law recognises a mortgage by deposit of title deeds. When a person delivers to the creditor or the agent, document of title to immovable property with interest to create a security

thereon, the transaction is a mortgage by deposit of title deeds (Section 58(f) of the Transfer of Property Act). The petitioner claims that a mortgage deed as envisaged u/s 2(17) of the Indian Stamp Act is in existence. A mortgagor therefore is disabled from further encumbering the properties in any case without the junction of the mortgagee. It can well be presumed that a liability is automatically attached to the property and it is a burden imposed upon the land and the interest in the land, by the owner of the land.

19. Advertence may also be made to the dictionary meaning of the term "mortgage", see Black's Law Dictionary, 7th edition, by Bryan A. Garner. It is described as a conveyance of title to property that is given as security for the payment of a debt or the performance of a duty and that will become void upon payment or performance according to the stipulated terms. It is also "a lien against property that is granted to secure an obligation (such as a debt) and that is extinguished upon payment or performance according to stipulated terms. Thus, the mortgage presupposes a (notional) conveyance of title as such, though on limited terms and the mortgagor may continue the occupation of the property.

20. While dealing with creation of encumbrances, which did not amount to sale, as pointed out by Leonard A. Jones in A treatise on the Law of Mortgages, the chief distinction between a mortgage and a pledge is that by a mortgage the general title is transferred to the mortgagee, subject to be re-vested by performance of the condition ; while by a pledge the pledger retains the general title in himself, and parts with the possession for a special purpose. It can therefore be stated that by a mortgage, the title is presumed as transferred ; by a pledge, the possession alone is parted with. Therefore, if this Court does not step in, that may result in an illegality being perpetuated.

21. The inescapable conclusion is that the safeguards taken by the first respondent-bank, while advancing the loan to the fourth and sixth respondents, were inadequate. Their bravado by itself fails to bring in dividends, though in the first round they got a technical victory. Though there was appearance on behalf of respondents Nos. 4 and 6, they had not chosen to divulge their stand vis-a-vis the transactions. The loan had been obtained by the sixth respondent for investing in the property itself, for a building, and it is not for me to fathom the reasons which prompted them on such an adventure. A fraud apparently has to be ruled out, but I am not certain.

22. I find that while adjudicating the claims of the petitioner, the Joint Registrar had not taken notice of all legal aspects, which should have come within the scope of his enquiry. The notification followed by auction and confirmation, as could be seen from exhibits P1, P3 and P8, in so far as the properties mortgaged to the first respondent-bank are declared as invalid and irregular. They have not legally interfered with or unsettled the rights of the petitioner.

23. A contention had been raised by learned Counsel for the first respondent-bank that the original petition is not maintainable, since the petitioner's right

would have been only an appeal to the Government u/s 83(1)(j) of the Co-operative Societies Act. However, since the matter was pending for long, at this point of time, I do not think it is proper for me to relegate the parties to such course, as the delay may adversely affect the claims, obligations and rights of two institutions, as well as private parties. Therefore, I am not prepared to accept the objection.

24. During the pendency of these proceedings, by exhibit R1(e) the Deputy Collector (RR) had put the properties concerned for sale on April 29, 2003, in continuation of the proceedings initiated at the request of the petitioner. It will be open for the petitioner to get on with exhibit R1(e) proceedings. The first respondent too will be entitled to take independent steps for safeguarding their interests.

25. Notwithstanding this judgment, it will be open to the parties to negotiate among themselves and come to agreed settlements. The properties appear to be valuable, and the effort always should be to generate the maximum price, to benefit, if possible the fourth respondent also. I may refer to the observations of the Supreme Court in this regard, made in *S.J.S. Business Enterprises (P.) Ltd. v. State of Bihar* [2004] 121 Comp Cas 99 : [2004] 5 SC 485, which explicitly lays down the principles, in paragraph 17, as following for guidance (page 108 of 121 Comp Cas) :

17. We are of the view that the sale effected in favour of respondent No. 6 cannot be sustained. It is axiomatic that the statutory powers vested in the State Financial Corporation under the State Financial Corporations Act, must be exercised bona fide. The presumption that public officials will discharge their duties honestly and in accordance with the law may be rebutted by establishing circumstances which reasonably probabalize the abuse of that power. In such event it is for the concerned officer to explain the circumstances which are set up against him. If there is no credible explanation forthcoming the court can assume that the impugned action was improper : (see *Pannalal Binjraj Vs. Union of India* (UOI), . Doubtless some of the restrictions placed on State Financial Corporations exercising their powers u/s 29 of the State Financial Corporations Act, as prescribed in *Mahesh Chandra Vs. Regional Manager, U.P. Financial Corporation and others*, , are no longer in place in view of the subsequent decision in *Haryana Financial Corporation and Another Vs. Jagdamba Oil Mills and Another*, . However, in overruling the decision in *Mahesh Chandra Vs. Regional Manager, U.P. Financial Corporation and others*, , this Court has affirmed the view taken in *Chairman and Managing Director, SIPCOT, and Madras and others Vs. Contromix Pvt. Ltd.* by its Director (Finance) Seetharaman, Madras and another, , and said that in the matter of sale u/s 29, the State Financial Corporation must act in accordance with the statute and must not act unfairly, i.e., unreasonably. If they do their action can be called into question under Article 226. Reasonableness is to be tested against the dominant consideration to secure the best price for the property to be sold. "This can only be achieved when there is a maximum

participation in the process of sale and everybody has an opportunity of making an offer. Public auction after adequate publicity ensures participation of every person who is interested in purchasing the property and generally secures the best price.

26. This equally will be applicable to the petitioner, as any other statutory body, who comes within the purview of State under Article 12 of the Constitution of India.

27. The original petition will stand allowed. No order as to costs.