
(2015) 03 JH CK 0076
In the Jharkhand High Court
Case No : Civil Review No. 02 of 2010

Daya Shankar Dayal Verma

APPELLANT

Vs

The State of Bihar and Others

RESPONDENT

Date of Decision : 09-03-2015

Acts Referred:

Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 — Section 22(3), 22(3)(f)
Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (CPC) — Order 40 Rule 1, Order 40 Rule 40, Order 47 Rule 1, Order 47 Rule 47, 114
Constitution of India, 1950 — Article 137, 145, 226

Citation : (2015) 3 AJR 582 : (2015) 3 JLJR 88 : (2015) LabIC 3560

Hon'ble Judges : Dhirubhai Naranbhai Patel, J; Pramath Patnaik, J

Bench : Division Bench

Advocate : Anil Kumar Sinha, Senior Advocate and R. Krishna, for the Appellant; Rishikesh Giri, J.C. to G.P.-II, Advocates for the Respondent

Final Decision : Dismissed

Judgement

Dhirubhai Naranbhai Patel, J.—This Civil Review has been preferred for review of an order passed by this Court in L.P.A. No. 216 of 2009 dated 10th November, 2009 mainly on the ground that this petitioner (appellant No. 4 in L.P.A. No. 216 of 2009) was appointed as Safety Officer with respondent Nos. 4 and 5 in the year 1990 in the lower scale of pay. In fact, pay scale should have been either E-I or E-II, but, certainly not pay scale L-VI mainly on the ground that this petitioner is a Safety Officer and as per Rule 62-B(3)(c) of the Bihar Factories Rules, 1950, he should have been given pay scale of Executive. This aspect of the matter has not been properly appreciated by the Division Bench of this Court while dismissing the L.P.A. No. 216 of 2009. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also placed reliance upon the decision rendered by Hon'ble the Supreme Court reported in Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Limited and Another Vs. Brojo Nath Ganguly and Another, AIR 1986 SC 1571 : (1986) 3 CompLJ 1 : (1986) LabIC 1312 : (1986) 2 LLJ 171 : (1986) 1 SCALE 799 : (1986) 3 SCC 156 : (1986) 2 SCR 278 : (1986) 2 SLJ 320

2. Having heard learned counsels for both the sides and looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, we see no reason to entertain this Civil Review mainly for the reason that the learned Single Judge has observed in paragraph 7 of the order dated 20th March, 2009 passed in C.W.J.C. No. 2007 of 1994(P) with C.W.J.C. No. 10350 of 1996(P) as under:

"7. From the rival submissions, the admitted facts which emerge, are as follows:-

(i) The petitioners were appointed some time in the year 1990 under the respondent BSL after inviting their names from the Employment Exchange. Such appointment was made by relaxing the qualification in respect of the experience, under exemption granted by the Chief Inspector of Factories under the provisions of Rule 62B of the Bihar Factory Rules.

(ii) At the time of their appointment, the petitioners were designated as Factory Inspectors and their scale of pay was fixed at Rs. 1550-53-1921-60-2341/- which the petitioners had accepted and on revision with effect from 01.01.1992, it was fixed at Rs. 2390-81-2957-90-2587/-.

(iii) As per chart (Annexure-3) submitted by the respondent BSL in respect of the pay structure of Executives under it, the scale of pay of executives of E-II Grade prior to 01.01.1991 was Rs. 3100-130-3750-140-5150/- and upon revision with effect from 01.01.1991, it was fixed at Rs. 3700-140-4400-150-5990/-.

The above facts are undisputed. The contention of the petitioners that at the time of their initial appointment, their scale of pay was equivalent to that of the executives of E-II Grade, does not appear to be correct."

(emphasis supplied)

3. In paragraph 4 of order dated 10th November, 2009 passed in L.P.A. No. 216 of 2009 with L.P.A. No. 217 of 2009, the Division Bench of this Court has appreciated the observation given by the learned Single Judge while dismissing the Letters Patent Appeals. Paragraph 4 of the said order reads as under:

"4. Admittedly, the petitioners were appointed as Safety Inspector in the year 1990 in the pay scale of Rs. 1550-2341 and the scale of pay was mentioned in the appointment letter. The scale of pay on which the petitioners were appointed as Safety Inspector was of L-VI grade. The petitioners-respondents joined in the said post in the same scale of pay without raising any objection whatsoever. The learned Single Judge found that at the time of initial appointment, the scale of pay of the petitioners were not equivalent to that of the Executives of E-II grade. The learned Single Judge put reliance on the ratio decided by the Supreme Court in the case of B.H.E.L. and Another Vs. B.K. Vijay and Others, (2006) 108 FLR 1113 : (2006) 1 LLJ 1102 : (2006) 2 SCALE 195 : (2006) 2 SCC 654 : (2006) SCC(L&S) 411 : (2006) 1 SCR 1066 : (2006) 3 SLJ 407 . We fully agree with the view taken by the learned Single Judge holding that the status for the purposes of rule under Factory Act does not automatically place the petitioners in the Senior Executive cadre."

(emphasis supplied)

4. Upon conjoint reading of these two orders, one passed by the learned Single Judge and another passed by the Division Bench of this Court, it appears that on merit, the case has been decided by the Division Bench of this Court and there is consistent finding of both the Courts that this petitioner (appellant No. 4 of L.P.A. No. 216 of 2009) was not have proper qualification and experience for appointment of Safety Officer under Rule 62-B of the Bihar Factories Rules, 1950. The pay scale of the petitioner is not equivalent to that of Executives of E-II grade. The Division Bench has also observed that automatically Senior Executive grade pay scale cannot be given to this petitioner (appellant No. 4 of L.P.A. No. 216 of 2009). Thus on merit again this matter has been argued out that Rule 62-B(3)(c) of the Bihar Factories Rules, 1950 has not been properly appreciated. This argument is devoid of any merit. A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is reheard and corrected, but, lies only for patent error In fact, it has been appreciated by the learned Single Judge as well as by the Division Bench of this Court, as stated hereinabove and, hence, there is no scope of civil review. We are not sitting in appeal against the decision rendered by the Division Bench of this Court in the aforesaid Letters Patent Appeals.

5. It has been held by Hon"ble the Supreme Court in the case of Aribam Tuleswar Sharma Vs. Aribam Pishak Sharma and Others, AIR 1979 SC 1047 : (1979) 4 SCC 389 : (1979) 11 UJ 300 as under:

"3. The Judicial Commissioner gave two reasons for reviewing his predecessor's order. The first was that his predecessor had overlooked two important documents Exs. A-1 and A-3 which showed that the respondents were in possession of the sites even in the year 1948-49 and that the grants must have been made even by then. The second was that there was a patent illegality in permitting the appellant to question, in a single writ petition, settlement made in favour of different respondents. We are afraid that neither of the reasons mentioned by the learned Judicial Commissioner constitutes a ground for review. It is true as observed by this Court in Shivdeo Singh v. State of Punjab there is nothing in Article 226 of the Constitution to preclude a High Court from exercising the power of review which inheres in every court of plenary jurisdiction to prevent miscarriage of justice or to correct grave and palpable errors committed by it. But, there are definitive limits to the exercise of the power of review. The power of review may be exercised on the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence was not within the knowledge of the person seeking the review or could not be produced by him at the time when the order was made; it may be exercised where some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record is found; it may also be exercised on any analogous ground. But, it may not be exercised on the ground that the decision was erroneous on merits. That would be the province of a court of appeal. A power of review is not to be confused with appellate powers

which may enable an appellate court to correct all manner of errors committed by the subordinate court."

(emphasis supplied)

6. It has also been held by Hon"ble the Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Meera Bhanja Vs. Smt. Nirmala Kumari Choudhury, AIR 1995 SC 455 : (1994) 7 JT 536 : (1994) 4 SCALE 985 : (1995) 1 SCC 170 : (1994) 5 SCR 503 Supp as under:

"8. It is well settled that the review proceedings are not by way of an appeal and have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order 47, Rule 1, CPC. In connection with the limitation of the powers of the court under Order 47, Rule 1, while dealing with similar jurisdiction available to the High Court while seeking to review the orders under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, this Court, in the case of Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma v. Aribam Pishak Sharma, speaking through Chinnappa Reddy, J., has made the following pertinent observations: (SCC p. 390, para 3)

"It is true as observed by this Court in Shivdeo Singh v. State of Punjab, there is nothing in Article 226 of the Constitution to preclude the High Court from exercising the power of review which inheres in every Court of plenary jurisdiction to prevent miscarriage of justice or to correct grave and palpable errors committed by it. But, there are definitive limits to the exercise of the power of review. The power of review may be exercised on the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence was not within the knowledge of the person seeking the review or could not be produced by him at the time when the order was made; it may be exercised where some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record is found; it may also be exercised on any analogous ground. But, it may not be exercised on the ground that the decision was erroneous on merits. That would be the province of a court of appeal. A power of review is not to be confused with appellate power which may enable an appellate court to correct all manner of errors committed by the subordinate court."

9. Now it is also to be kept in view that in the impugned judgment, the Division Bench of the High Court has clearly observed that they were entertaining the review petition only on the ground of error apparent on the face of the record and not on any other ground. So far as that aspect is concerned, it has to be kept in view that an error apparent on the face of record must be such an error which must strike one on mere looking at the record and would not require any long-drawn process of reasoning on points where there may conceivably be two opinions. We may usefully refer to the observations of this Court in the case of Satyanarayan Laxminarayan Hegde v. Mallikarjun Bhavanappa Tirumale wherein, K.C. Das Gupta, J., speaking for the Court has made the following observations in connection with an error apparent on the face of the record:

An error which has to be established by a long-drawn process of reasoning on

points where there may conceivably be two opinions can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record. Where an alleged error is far from self-evident and if it can be established, it has to be established, by lengthy and complicated arguments, such an error cannot be cured by a writ of certiorari according to the rule governing the powers of the superior court to issue such a writ.

15. In our view the aforesaid approach of the Division Bench dealing with the review proceedings clearly shows that it has overstepped its jurisdiction under Order 47, Rule 1 CPC by merely styling the reasoning adopted by the earlier Division Bench as suffering from a patent error. It would not become a patent error or error apparent in view of the settled legal position indicated by us earlier. In substance, the Review Bench has reappreciated the entire evidence, sat almost as court of appeal and has reversed the findings reached by the earlier Division Bench. Even if the earlier Division Bench's findings regarding C.S. Plot No. 74 were found to be erroneous, it would be no ground for reviewing the same, as that would be the function of an appellate court. Learned counsel for the respondent was not in a position to point out how the reasoning adopted and conclusion reached by the Review Bench can be supported within the narrow and limited scope of Order 47, Rule 1 CPC. Right or wrong, the earlier Division Bench judgment had become final so far as the High Court was concerned. It could not have been reviewed by reconsidering the entire evidence with a view to finding out the alleged apparent error for justifying the invocation of review powers. Only on that short ground, therefore, this appeal is required to be allowed. The final decision dated 8-7-1986 of the Division Bench dismissing the appeal from Appellate Decree No. 569 of 1973 insofar as C.S. Plot No. 74 is concerned as well as the review judgment dated 5-9-1984 in connection with the very same plot, i.e., C.S. Plot No. 74, are set aside and the earlier judgment of the High Court dated 3-8-1978 allowing the second appeal regarding suit Plot No. 74 is restored. The appeal is accordingly allowed. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs."

(emphasis supplied)

7. It has further been held by Hon"ble the Supreme Court in the case of Parsion Devi and Others Vs. Sumitri Devi and Others, (1998) 1 CTC 25 : (1997) 8 JT 480 : (1997) 6 SCALE 432 : (1997) 8 SCC 715 : (1997) 4 SCR 470 Supp : (1997) 2 UJ 820 as under:

"7. It is well settled that review proceedings have to be strictly confined to the ambit and scope of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. In Thungabhadra Industries Ltd. v. Govt. of A.P. (SCR at p. 186) this Court opined:

"What, however, we are now concerned with is whether the statement in the order of September 1959 that the case did not involve any substantial question of law is an "error apparent on the face of the record"). The fact that on the earlier occasion the Court held on an identical state of facts that a substantial

question of law arose would not per se be conclusive, for the earlier order itself might be erroneous. Similarly, even if the statement was wrong, it would not follow that it was an "error apparent on the face of the record", for there is a distinction which is real, though it might not always be capable of exposition, between a mere erroneous decision and a decision which could be characterised as vitiated by "error apparent". A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is reheard and corrected, but lies only for patent error."

8. Again, in *Meera Bhanja v. Nirmala Kumari Choudhury* while quoting with approval a passage from *Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma v. Aribam Pishak Sharma* this Court once again held that review proceedings are not by way of an appeal and have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC.

9. Under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC a judgment may be open to review inter alia if there is a mistake or an error apparent on the face of the record. An error which is not self-evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning, can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record justifying the court to exercise its power of review under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. In exercise of the jurisdiction under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC it is not permissible for an erroneous decision to be "reheard and corrected". A review petition, it must be remembered has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be "an appeal in disguise".

(emphasis supplied)

8. It has further been held by Hon^{ble} the Supreme Court in the case of *Haridas Das Vs. Smt. Usha Rani Banik and Others*, AIR 2006 SC 1634 : (2006) 2 CTC 321 : (2006) 3 JT 526 : (2006) 3 SCALE 287 : (2006) 4 SCC 78 : (2006) AIRSCW 1771 : (2006) 3 Supreme 125 as under:

"13. In order to appreciate the scope of a review, Section 114 CPC has to be read, but this section does not even adumbrate the ambit of interference expected of the court since it merely states that it "may make such order thereon as it thinks fit". The parameters are prescribed in Order 47 CPC and for the purposes of this lis, permit the defendant to press for a rehearing "on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the records or for any other sufficient reason". The former part of the rule deals with a situation attributable to the applicant, and the latter to a jural action which is manifestly incorrect or on which two conclusions are not possible. Neither of them postulate a rehearing of the dispute because a party had not highlighted all the aspects of the case or could perhaps have argued them more forcefully and/or cited binding precedents to the court and thereby enjoyed a favourable verdict. This is amply evident from the Explanation to Rule 1 of Order 47 which states that the fact that the decision on a question of law on which the judgment of the court is based has been reversed or modified by the subsequent decision of a superior court in any other case, shall not be a ground for the review of such judgment. Where the order in question is appealable the aggrieved party has adequate and

efficacious remedy and the court should exercise the power to review its order with the greatest circumspection. This Court in *Thungabhadra Industries Ltd. v. Govt. of A.P.* held as follows: (SCR p. 186)

"[T]here is a distinction which is real, though it might not always be capable of exposition, between a mere erroneous decision and a decision which could be characterised as vitiated by "error apparent". A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is reheard and corrected, but lies only for patent error....where without any elaborate argument one could point to the error and say here is a substantial point of law which stares one in the face, and there could reasonably be no two opinions entertained about it, a clear case of error apparent on the face of the record would be made out."

14. In *Meera Bhanja v. Nirmala Kumari Choudhury* it was held that:

"8. It is well settled that the review proceedings are not by way of an appeal and have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. In connection with the limitation of the powers of the court under Order 47 Rule 1, while dealing with similar jurisdiction available to the High Court while seeking to review the orders under Article 226 of the Constitution, this Court, in *Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma v. Aribam Pishak Sharma* speaking through Chinnappa Reddy, J. has made the following pertinent observations:

"It is true there is nothing in Article 226 of the Constitution to preclude the High Court from exercising the power of review which inheres in every court of plenary jurisdiction to prevent miscarriage of justice or to correct grave and palpable errors committed by it. But, there are definitive limits to the exercise of the power of review. The power of review may be exercised on the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence was not within the knowledge of the person seeking the review or could not be produced by him at the time when the order was made; it may be exercised where some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record is found, it may also be exercised on any analogous ground. But, it may not be exercised on the ground that the decision was erroneous on merits. That would be the province of a court of appeal. A power of review is not to be confused with appellate power which may enable an appellate court to correct all manner of errors committed by the subordinate court."" (SCC pp. 172-73, para 8)

15. A perusal of Order 47 Rule 1 shows that review of a judgment or an order could be sought: (a) from the discovery of new and important matters or evidence which after the exercise of due diligence was not within the knowledge of the applicant; (b) such important matter or evidence could not be produced by the applicant at the time when the decree was passed or order made; and (c) on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record or any other sufficient reason.

16. In *Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma v. Aribam Pishak Sharma* this Court held that there are definite limits to the exercise of power of review. In that case, an

application under Order 47 Rule 1 read with Section 151 of the Code was filed which was allowed and the order passed by the Judicial Commissioner was set aside and the writ petition was dismissed. On an appeal to this Court it was held as under: (SCC p. 390, para 3)

"It is true as observed by this Court in *Shivdeo Singh v. State of Punjab* there is nothing in Article 226 of the Constitution to preclude a High Court from exercising the power of review which inheres in every court of plenary jurisdiction to prevent miscarriage of justice or to correct grave and palpable errors committed by it. But, there are definitive limits to the exercise of the power of review. The power of review may be exercised on the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence was not within the knowledge of the person seeking the review or could not be produced by him at the time when the order was made; it may be exercised where some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record is found; it may also be exercised on any analogous ground. But, it may not be exercised on the ground that the decision was erroneous on merits. That would be the province of a court of appeal. A power of review is not to be confused with appellate powers which may enable an appellate court to correct all manner of errors committed by the subordinate court."

17. The judgment in *Aribam* case has been followed in *Meera Bhanja*. In that case, it has been reiterated that an error apparent on the face of the record for acquiring jurisdiction to review must be such an error which may strike one on a mere looking at the record and would not require any long-drawn process of reasoning. The following observations in connection with an error apparent on the face of the record in *Satyanarayan Laxminarayan Hegde v. Millikarjun Bhavanappa Tirumale* were also noted: (AIR p. 137)

"An error which has to be established by a long-drawn process of reasoning on points where there may conceivably be two opinions can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record. Where an alleged error is far from self-evident and if it can be established, it has to be established, by lengthy and complicated arguments, such an error cannot be cured by a writ of certiorari according to the rule governing the powers of the superior court to issue such a writ." (SCR pp. 901-02)

18. It is also pertinent to mention the observations of this Court in *Parsion Devi v. Sumitri Devi*. Relying upon the judgments in *Aribam* and *Meera Bhanja* it was observed as under: (SCC p. 719, para 9)

"9. Under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC a judgment may be open to review inter alia if there is a mistake or an error apparent on the face of the record. An error which is not self-evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning, can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record justifying the court to exercise its power of review under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. In exercise of the jurisdiction under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC it is not permissible for an erroneous

decision to be "reheard and corrected". A review petition, it must be remembered has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be "an appeal in disguise".

(emphasis supplied)

9. It has further been held by Hon"ble the Supreme Court in the case of Haryana State Industrial Development Corporation Ltd. and Others Vs. Mawasi and Others etc. etc., AIR 2013 SC 3874 : (2012) 4 CTC 554 : (2012) 6 JT 211 : (2012) 6 SCALE 60 : (2012) 7 SCC 200 : (2012) AIRSCW 4222 : (2013) AIRSCW 1612 : (2012) 8 Supreme 600 as under:

"26. At this stage it will be apposite to observe that the power of review is a creature of the statute and no court or quasi-judicial body or administrative authority can review its judgment or order or decision unless it is legally empowered to do so. Article 137 empowers this Court to review its judgments subject to the provisions of any law made by Parliament or any rules made under Article 145 of the Constitution. The rules framed by this Court under that article lay down that in civil cases, review lies on any of the grounds specified in Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 which reads as under:

Order 47 Rule 1:

"1. Application for review of judgment.--(1) Any person considering himself aggrieved--

(a) by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed, but from which no appeal has been preferred,

(b) by a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed, or

(c) by a decision on a reference from a Court of Small Causes, and who, from the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed or order made, or on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, or for any other sufficient reason, desires to obtain a review of the decree passed or order made against him, may apply for a review of judgment to the court which passed the decree or made the order.

(2) A party who is not appealing from a decree or order may apply for a review of judgment notwithstanding the pendency of an appeal by some other party except where the ground of such appeal is common to the applicant and the appellant, or when, being respondent, he can present to the appellate court the case of which he applies for the review.

Explanation.--The fact that the decision on a question of law on which the judgment of the court is based has been reversed or modified by the subsequent decision of a superior court in any other case, shall not be a ground for the review of such judgment."

27. The aforesaid provisions have been interpreted in several cases. We shall notice some of them. In *S. Nagaraj v. State of Karnataka*, this Court referred to the judgments in *Raja Prithwi Chand Lal Choudhury v. Sukhraj Rai* and *Rajunder Narain Rae v. Bijai Govind Sing* and observed: (*S. Nagaraj case*, SCC pp. 619-20, para 19)

"19. Review literally and even judicially means re-examination or reconsideration. Basic philosophy inherent in it is the universal acceptance of human fallibility. Yet in the realm of law the courts and even the statutes lean strongly in favour of finality of decision legally and properly made. Exceptions both statutorily and judicially have been carved out to correct accidental mistakes or miscarriage of justice. Even when there was no statutory provision and no rules were framed by the highest court indicating the circumstances in which it could rectify its order the courts culled out such power to avoid abuse of process or miscarriage of justice. In *Raja Prithwi Chand Lal Choudhury v. Sukhraj Rai* the Court observed that even though no rules had been framed permitting the highest court to review its order yet it was available on the limited and narrow ground developed by the Privy Council and the House of Lords. The Court approved the principle laid down by the Privy Council in *Rajunder Narain Rae v. Bijai Govind Sing* that an order made by the Court was final and could not be altered: (*Rajunder Narain Rae case*, MIA p. 216)

"... nevertheless, if by misprision in embodying the judgments, errors have been introduced, these courts possess, by common law, the same power which the courts of record and statute have of rectifying the mistakes which have crept in.... The House of Lords exercises a similar power of rectifying mistakes made in drawing up its own judgments, and this Court must possess the same authority. The Lords have, however, gone a step further, and have corrected mistakes introduced through inadvertence in the details of judgments; or have supplied manifest defects, in order to enable the decrees to be enforced, or have added explanatory matter, or have reconciled inconsistencies."

Basis for exercise of the power was stated in the same decision as under:

"It is impossible to doubt that the indulgence extended in such cases is mainly owing to the natural desire prevailing to prevent irremediable injustice being done by a court of last resort, where by some accident, without any blame, the party has not been heard and an order has been inadvertently made as if the party had been heard."

Rectification of an order thus stems from the fundamental principle that justice is above all. It is exercised to remove the error and not for disturbing finality. When the Constitution was framed the substantive power to rectify or recall the order passed by this Court was specifically provided by Article 137 of the Constitution. Our Constitution-makers who had the practical wisdom to visualise the efficacy of such provision expressly conferred the substantive power to review any judgment or order by Article 137 of the Constitution. And clause (c) of Article

145 permitted this Court to frame rules as to the conditions subject to which any judgment or order may be reviewed. In exercise of this power Order 40 had been framed empowering this Court to review an order in civil proceedings on grounds analogous to Order 47 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code. The expression, "for any other sufficient reason" in the clause has been given an expanded meaning and a decree or order passed under misapprehension of true state of circumstances has been held to be sufficient ground to exercise the power. Apart from Order 40 Rule 1 of the Supreme Court Rules this Court has the inherent power to make such orders as may be necessary in the interest of justice or to prevent the abuse of process of court. The court is thus not precluded from recalling or reviewing its own order if it is satisfied that it is necessary to do so for sake of justice."

28. In *Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos v. Most Rev. Mar Poulouse Athanasius*, the three-Judge Bench referred to the provisions of the Travancore Code of Civil Procedure, which was similar to Order 47 Rule 1 CPC and observed: (AIR p. 538, para 32)

"32....It is needless to emphasise that the scope of an application for review is much more restricted than that of an appeal. Under the provisions in the Travancore Code of Civil Procedure which is similar in terms to Order 47 Rule 1 of our Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, the court of review has only a limited jurisdiction circumscribed by the definitive limits fixed by the language used therein.

It may allow a review on three specified grounds, namely, (i) discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within the applicant's knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed, (ii) mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, and (iii) for any other sufficient reason.

It has been held by the Judicial Committee that the words "any other sufficient reason" must mean "a reason sufficient on grounds, at least analogous to those specified in the rule". (See *Chhajju Ram v. Neki*.) This conclusion was reiterated by the Judicial Committee in *Bisheshwar Pratap Sahi v. Parath Nath* and was adopted by our Federal Court in *Hari Sankar Pal v. Anath Nath Mitter*, FC at pp. 110-11. The learned counsel appearing in support of this appeal recognises the aforesaid limitations and submits that his case comes within the ground of "mistake or error apparent on the face of the record" or some ground analogous thereto."

29. In *Thungabhadra Industries Ltd. v. Govt. of A.P.*, another three-Judge Bench reiterated that the power of review is not analogous to the appellate power and observed: (AIR p. 1377, para 11)

"11....A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is reheard and corrected, but lies only for patent error. We do not consider that this furnishes a suitable occasion for dealing with this difference

exhaustively or in any great detail, but it would suffice for us to say that where without any elaborate argument one could point to the error and say here is a substantial point of law which stares one in the face, and there could reasonably be no two opinions, entertained about it, a clear case of error apparent on the face of the record would be made out."

30. In *Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma v. Aribam Pishak Sharma*, this Court answered in affirmative the question whether the High Court can review an order passed under Article 226 of the Constitution and proceeded to observe: (SCC p. 390, para 3)

"3....But, there are definitive limits to the exercise of the power of review. The power of review may be exercised on the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence was not within the knowledge of the person seeking the review or could not be produced by him at the time when the order was made; it may be exercised where some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record is found; it may also be exercised on any analogous ground. But, it may not be exercised on the ground that the decision was erroneous on merits. That would be the province of a court of appeal. A power of review is not to be confused with appellate powers which may enable an appellate court to correct all manner of errors committed by the subordinate court."

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32. In *Parsion Devi v. Sumitri Devi*, the Court observed: (SCC p. 719, para 9)

"9....An error which is not self-evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning, can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record justifying the court to exercise its power of review under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC... A review petition, it must be remembered has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be "an appeal in disguise."

33. In *Lily Thomas v. Union of India*, R.P. Sethi, J., who concurred with S. Saghir Ahmad, J., summarised the scope of the power of review in the following words: (SCC p. 251, para 56)

"56....Such powers can be exercised within the limits of the statute dealing with the exercise of power. The review cannot be treated like an appeal in disguise. The mere possibility of two views on the subject is not a ground for review. Once a review petition is dismissed no further petition of review can be entertained. The rule of law of following the practice of the binding nature of the larger Benches and not taking different views by the Benches of coordinated jurisdiction of equal strength has to be followed and practised."

34. In *Haridas Das v. Usha Rani Banik*, the Court observed: (SCC p. 82, para 13)

"13....The parameters are prescribed in Order 47 CPC and for the purposes of this lis, permit the defendant to press for a rehearing "on account of some

mistake or error apparent on the face of the records or for any other sufficient reason". The former part of the rule deals with a situation attributable to the applicant, and the latter to a jural action which is manifestly incorrect or on which two conclusions are not possible. Neither of them postulate a rehearing of the dispute because a party had not highlighted all the aspects of the case or could perhaps have argued them more forcefully and/or cited binding precedents to the court and thereby enjoyed a favourable verdict."

35. In *State of W.B. v. Kamal Sengupta*, the Court considered the question whether a Tribunal established under the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 can review its decision, referred to Section 22(3) of that Act, some of the judicial precedents and observed: (SCC p. 633, paras 21-22)

"21. At this stage it is apposite to observe that where a review is sought on the ground of discovery of new matter or evidence, such matter or evidence must be relevant and must be of such a character that if the same had been produced, it might have altered the judgment. In other words, mere discovery of new or important matter or evidence is not sufficient ground for review *ex debito justitiae*. Not only this, the party seeking review has also to show that such additional matter or evidence was not within its knowledge and even after the exercise of due diligence, the same could not be produced before the court earlier.

22. The term "mistake or error apparent" by its very connotation signifies an error which is evident *per se* from the record of the case and does not require detailed examination, scrutiny and elucidation either of the facts or the legal position. If an error is not self-evident and detection thereof requires long debate and process of reasoning, it cannot be treated as an error apparent on the face of the record for the purpose of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC or Section 22(3)(f) of the Act. To put it differently an order or decision or judgment cannot be corrected merely because it is erroneous in law or on the ground that a different view could have been taken by the court/tribunal on a point of fact or law. In any case, while exercising the power of review, the court/tribunal concerned cannot sit in appeal over its judgment/decision."

(emphasis supplied)

10. As a cumulative effect of the aforesaid facts, reasons and judicial pronouncements, there is no substance in this review application and, hence, the same is, hereby, dismissed.