

(2017) 11 GUJ CK 0015
In the Gujarat High Court
Case No : 20705 of 2017

JIGNESH SUMANTILAL MEHTA

APPELLANT

Vs

STATE OF GUJARAT & ORS.

RESPONDENT

Date of Decision : 17-11-2017

Acts Referred:

[Indian Penal Code, 1860](#), [Section 120B](#), [Section 120B](#), [Section 120B](#), [Section 420](#), [Section 420](#), [Section 420](#), [Section 471](#), [Section 471](#), [Section 471](#), [Section 467](#), [Section 467](#), [Section 467](#) - Punishment of criminal conspiracy - Punishment of criminal conspiracy - Punishment of criminal conspiracy - Cheating and dishonestly inducing delivery of property - Cheating and dishonestly inducing delivery of property - Cheating and dishonestly inducing delivery of property - Using as genuine a forged document - Using as genuine a forged document - Using as genuine a forged document - Forgery of valuable security, will, etc - Forgery of valuable security, will, etc - Forgery of valuable security, will, etc
[Gujarat Value Added Tax Act, 2003](#), [Section 11\(7\)](#), [Section 81\(1\)\(B\)\(C\)\(E\)\(F\)\(G\)](#), [Section 81\(1\)\(B\)\(C\)\(E\)\(F\)\(G\)](#), [Section 85\(2\)\(J\)](#) -
Gujarat Prevention of Anti Social Activities Act, 1985, Section 3(2), Section 3(2), Section 3(2), Section 2(c), Section 2(c), Section 2(c)

Citation : (2017) 11 GUJ CK 0015

Hon'ble Judges : S.G. Shah

Bench : Single Bench

Advocate : ATIT D THAKORE, ?EKANT G AHUJA,?MANAN MEHTA

Final Decision : Allowed

Judgement

1. Heard learned counsel for the parties.
2. This petition is directed against the order of detention dated 10.11.2017 passed by

respondent No.2, in exercise of powers conferred under section 3(2) of the Gujarat Prevention of Anti Social Activities Act, 1985 [for short "the Act"] by detaining the detenu as a "dangerous person" as defined under section 2(c) of the Act.

3. Learned advocate for the detenu submits that the order of detention impugned in this petition deserves to be quashed and set aside and the ground that the registration of two offences by itself cannot bring the case of the detenu within the purview of definition of "dangerous person" under Section 2(c) of the Act. Learned counsel for the detenu further submits that the illegal activity carried out as alleged, cannot have any nexus or bearing with the maintenance of the public order and at the most it can be said to be breach of law and order. Further, except statements of witnesses and registration of FIRs, no other relevant or cogent material is available on record connecting the alleged anti-social activities of the detenu with breach of the public order.

4. Learned counsel for the detenu, placing reliance on the decisions reported in the cases of [i] Ranubhai Bhikhabhai Bharwad [Vekaria] v. State of Gujarat reported in 2000[3] GLR 2696, [ii] Ashokbhai Jivraj @ Jivabhai Solanki v. Police Commissioner, Surat reported in 2000[1] GLH 393; [iii] Mustakmiya Jabbarmiya Shaikh v. M.M. Mehta, reported in [1995] 3 SCC 237; and [iv] Hitesh v. Commissioner of Police & Ors . reported in 2014 Cr.L.J. 4619, submitted that the case on hand is squarely covered by the ratio laid down in the aforesaid decisions. Learned counsel for the detenu further submits that it is not possible to hold in the facts of the present case that the activities of the detenu with reference to the criminal case/s had affected even tempo of the society, posing a threat to the very existence of the normal and routine life of the people at large or that on the basis of the criminal case/s, the detenu had put the entire social apparatus in disorder, making it difficult for whole system to exist as a system governed by the rule of law by disturbing the public order.

5. Learned AGP for the respondent - State supported the detention order passed by the authority and submitted that the detenu is a dangerous person and sufficient material and evidence was found during the course of investigation, which was also supplied to the detenu, indicating that the detenu is in habit of indulging into activities as defined under Section 2(c) of the Act and considering the facts of the case, the detaining authority has rightly passed the order of detention and the detention order deserves to be upheld by this Court.

6. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and considering the facts and circumstances of the case, it appears that the subjective satisfaction arrived at by the detaining authority cannot be said to be legal, valid and in accordance with law inasmuch as the offences alleged in the FIRs cannot have any bearing on the public order since the law of the land i.e. Indian Penal Code and other relevant penal laws are sufficient enough to take care of the situation and that the allegations as have been levelled against the detenu cannot be said to be germane for the purpose of bringing the detenu as a dangerous

person within the meaning of section 2(c) of the Act and, unless and until the material is there to make out a case that the person concerned has become a threat and a menace to the society so as to disturb the whole tempo of the society and that the whole social apparatus is in peril disturbing public order at the instance of such person, it cannot be said that the detenu is a dangerous person within the meaning of Section 2(c) of the Act. Except general statement, there is no material on record which shows that the detenu is acting in such a manner which is dangerous to the public order. In view of the ratio laid down by the Hon"ble Supreme Court in the cases of [i] Ranubhai Bhikhabhai Bharwad (supra), [ii] Ashokbhai Jivraj @ Jivabhai Solanki (supra) and [iii] Mustakmiya Jabbarmiya Shaikh (supra), the Court is of the opinion that the activities of the detenu cannot be said to be dangerous to the maintenance of public order and at the most fall under the maintenance of "law and order".

7. In view of the above, I am inclined to allow this petition because simplicitor registration of FIR by itself cannot have any nexus with the breach of maintenance of public order and the authority can take recourse under the Indian Penal Code and no other relevant or cogent material exists for invoking powers under Section 3(2) of the Act.

8. If we peruse the citations, it becomes clear that even the Hon"ble Supreme Court has considered that detention is not permitted

even in the case of robbery and theft. The present is the case of sections 420, 467, 471, 120B of the Indian Penal Code and Sections 81(1)(B)(C)(E)(F)(G) and 85(2)(J), 11(7) of the VAT Act. Therefore, the Court has no option but to allow the petition.

9. The petitioner has argued on merits on FIRs, referring certain judgments. However, discussion of such facts, prima facie at this stage, is not warranted since it may otherwise prejudice the trial. FIRs u/ss.420, 467, 468, 471, 120B of the IPC and Sections 81(1)(B)(C)(E)(F)(G) and 85(2)(J), 11(7) of the VAT Act was registered way back in the year 2016, i.e. on 24.5.2016 and 20.10.2016 i.e. at least one year before the date of passing of order of detention and executed, and considering the fact that such order is not only passed and served after judgment and order dated 30.10.2017 in Criminal Misc. Application (for Regular Bail) No.23410 of 2017, prima facie it seems that applicant - petitioner is being unnecessarily harassed by detaining him as "Dangerous Person" though offences are under the Vat Act and even there is reference of some sections of IPC . I have reason to say so, because, at present, atleast two judicial authorities i.e. this court in Criminal Misc. Application (for

Regular Bail) No. 23410 of 2017 and concerned Addl.Sessions Judge in Criminal Misc. Application No. 5753 of 2017, observed that, there is no evidence in chargsheet, which is already filed against the applicant so as to prove that the applicant - petitioner has received any monetary benefit because of the

transactions for which such proceedings have been initiated.

10. However, since all such order/s are quashed on technical ground, the same shall not come in the way of the detaining authority to pass an appropriate order in future.

11. In the result, the petition is allowed. The order of detention dated 10.11.2017 passed by the respondent No.2 is quashed and set aside. The detenu is ordered to be set at liberty forthwith if not required in connection with any other case. Rule is made absolute accordingly. Direct service permitted.