

(2022) 10 TEL CK 0006

In the Telangana High Court

Case No : Writ Petition Nos. 31745, 31752, 31754, 31755 & 31765 Of 2022

K.Mamatha

APPELLANT

Vs

State Of Telangana And Others

RESPONDENT

Date of Decision : 11-10-2022

Acts Referred:

Constitution Of India, 1950 — Article 21, 22, 22(5), 22(3)(b)
Telangana Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Boot-leggers, Dacoits, Drug-Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders Land-Grabbers, Spurious Seed Offenders, Insecticide Offenders, Fertiliser Offenders, Food Adulteration Offenders, Fake Document Offenders, Scheduled Commodities Offenders, Forest Offenders, Gaming Offenders, Sexual Offenders, Explosive Substances Offenders, Arms Offenders, Cyber Crime Offenders and White Collar or Financial Offenders Act, 1986 — Section 2(g), 3(2)
Indian Penal Code, 1860 — Section 120B, 147, 148, 149, 302
Code Of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — Section 167(2), 167(2)(a)(i)
Tamil Nadu Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers, Drug Offenders, Forest Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders and Slumgrabbers Act, 1982 — Section 2(f)

Citation : (2022) 10 TEL CK 0006

Hon'ble Judges : Dr. Shameem Akther , J;E.V.Venugopal, J

Bench : Division Bench

Advocate : B.Mohana Reddy, S.Mujib Kumar

Final Decision : Allowed

Judgement

1. Though the petitioners in these five Writ Petitions are different, since the issue involved in these writ petitions is one and the same and since the detenus in these writ petitions are the accused in the same crime, all these Writ Petitions are taken up together and are being disposed of by this common order.

2. W.P.No.31745 of 2022 is filed by Mrs.K.Mamatha, who is the wife of the detenu, namely Kandela Srinivas, W.P.No.31752 of 2022 is filed by Mrs.Gangajala, who is the wife of the detenu, namely Vanam Shekhar, W.P.No.31754 of 2022 is filed by Mrs.Jamuna, who is the wife of the detenu,

namely Vanam @ Kedari Durgaiah @ Chinna Durgaiah, W.P.No.31755 of 2022 is filed by Mrs.V.Sarojana, who is the wife of the detenu, namely Vanam Chinna Gangaiah and W.P.No.31765 of 2022 is filed by Mr.Pochaiah, who is the father of the detenu, namely Vanam Durgaiah @ Durga Prasad, challenging the separate detention orders of the even date, dated 05.07.2022, passed by respondent No.2-Collector and District Magistrate, Jagtial District, vide Rc.No.C1/724-1/2022, Rc.No.C1/724-5/2022, Rc.No.C1/724-3/2022, Rc.No.C1/724-2/2022 and Rc.No.C1/ 724-4/2022 respectively, and the consequential confirmation orders of the even date, dated 06.09.2022, passed by the Secretary to Government, General Administration (Spl. (Law & Order)) Department, Government of Telangana, vide G.O.Rt.Nos.1702, 1706, 1704, 1703 and 1705 respectively. Vide impugned detention orders, the respective detenus were detained under Section 3(2) of the Telangana Preventive Detention Act, 1986 (Act 1 of 1986).

3. We have heard the submissions of Smt. B.Mohana Reddy, learned counsel for the petitioners in all these writ petitions, Sri S.Mujib Kumar, learned Special Government Pleader appearing for the learned Additional Advocate General for the respondents and perused the record.

4. The background facts of the case, in brief, is that by relying on a solitary crime registered against the detenus in these writ petitions in Crime No.22 of 2022 of Jagtial Rural Police Station, Jagtial District, registered for the offences under Sections 120B, 147, 148, 302 read with 149 of IPC, the respondent No.2-Collector and District Magistrate, Jagtial District, passed the impugned detention orders of the even date, dated 05.07.2022. According to the respondent No.2, the detenus are 'goondas', as they have indulged in brutal murder of three persons belonging to one family, in broad daylight, in public place, by inflicting fatal injuries with spears and knives in the limits of Jagtial Rural Police Station, creating large scale fear and panic among the general public, thereby adversely affecting the maintenance of public order, the impugned detention orders of the even date, dated 05.07.2022 were passed, which were confirmed by the Government by the orders of the even date, dated 06.09.2022. Hence, these writ petitions before this Court.

5. Learned counsel for the petitioners in these writ petitions vehemently contended that the impugned detention orders are illegal, arbitrary, unconstitutional, improper, against the principles of natural justice and has been passed in a mechanical manner and without application of mind. The impugned detention orders were passed basing on a solitary crime. The alleged criminal activities of the detenus, in any event, would not satisfy the word 'goonda', as defined under 2(g) of the Telangana Act 1 of 1986. The detaining authority has not applied its mind to the facts and circumstances of the case, while passing the impugned detention orders. All the detenus were granted conditional statutory/mandatory bail under Section 167(2) of Cr.P.C., by the Court concerned in the solitary crime relied by the detaining authority and the detenus are complying the conditions imposed in the statutory/mandatory bail order. Further, there are

no criminal antecedents against the detenus. After the release of the detenus from judicial custody in the solitary crime, they have not indulged in any criminal activities and no fresh criminal cases have been registered against them. Under these circumstances, the apprehension of the detaining authority that there is imminent possibility of the detenus indulging in similar offences, which are prejudicial to the maintenance of public order and that the free movement of the detenus in the society would disturb the 'public order' and the even tempo of public life and that their presence in the society is not in the interest and safety of the society, unless they are prevented from doing so by an appropriate order or detention, is highly misplaced. Further, the solitary crime relied by the detaining authority does not add up to "disturbing the public order" and it is confined within the ambit and scope of the word "law and order". Since the offences alleged against the detenus are under Indian Penal Code, the detenus can certainly be tried and convicted under the Penal Code. Thus, there was no need for the detaining authority to invoke the draconian preventive detention law against the detenus. Hence, the impugned orders tantamount to colourable exercise of power. The subjective satisfaction recorded by the detaining authority in detaining the detenus is tainted and illegal. Preventive detention cannot be made a substitute to punitive detention. The detaining authority has to be extremely careful while passing the detention order, since the detention ipso facto adversely affects the fundamental right of personal liberty enjoyed by the people under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Thus, the impugned detention orders are legally unsustainable and ultimately, prayed to set aside the same and allow the writ petitions as prayed for. In support of her contentions, the learned counsel had relied on the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in *R.Kalavathi Vs. State of T.N. and others* (2006) 6 SCC 14 and a decision of this Court in *Mrs.T.Padmaja and others Vs. State of Telangana and others* Decided on 26.04.2019 in W.P.Nos.41946 & batch.

6. On the other hand, the learned Special Government Pleader appearing for the respondents, supported the impugned detention orders and submitted that the unlawful activities of the detenus squarely fall under the definition of the word 'goonda' defined under clause (g) of Section 2 of the Telangana Act 1 of 1986. In the solitary crime relied by the detaining authorities, the detenus have indulged in brutal murder of three persons belonging to one family, in broad daylight, in public place, by inflicting fatal injuries with spears and knives in the limits of Jagtial Rural Police Station, which created large scale fear and panic among the general public, which is prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. With a view to prevent the detenus from indulging in similar prejudicial activities, the impugned detention orders were passed. The subjective satisfaction reached by the detaining authority in preventively detaining the detenus is not tainted or illegal. Further, the Advisory Board, upon hearing the detenus and the concerned investigating officials and upon considering the entire material placed before it, rendered its opinion that there is sufficient cause for detention of the detenus. On considering the opinion of the Advisory Board and upon considering the entire

material, the Government confirmed the impugned detention orders, vide orders of the even date, dated 06.09.2022. Therefore, the detaining authority was legally justified in passing the impugned detention orders. Preventive detention is not to punish a person for his/her illegal activities, but to prevent him from doing so. An order of preventive detention may be made with or without prosecution and in anticipation or after discharge or even acquittal. Pendency of prosecution is not a bar to pass an order of detention and an order of preventive detention is also not a bar to the prosecution. All the mandatory provisions and the safeguards envisaged under the law were strictly followed, while passing the impugned detention orders and hence, the impugned detention orders do not suffer from illegality or impropriety and ultimately, prayed to dismiss the Writ Petitions. In support of his contentions, learned Special Government Pleader had relied on the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Abdul Sathar Ibrahim Manik Vs. Union of India and others (1992) 1 SCC 1.

7. In view of the submissions made by both sides, the points that arise for determination in these Writ Petitions are as follows:

1. Whether the detenus can be termed as 'goondas' as defined in clause (g) of Section 2 of the Telangana Act 1 of 1986?
2. Whether the impugned detention orders of the even date, dated 05.07.2022 passed by the respondent No.2 and the consequential conformation orders of the even date, dated 06.09.2022, passed by the Secretary to Government, General Administration (Spl. (Law & Order)) Department, Government of Telangana, are liable to be set aside?

POINT No.1:-

8. Learned Special Government Pleader contended that the unlawful activities of the detenus squarely fall under the definition of the word 'goonda' defined under clause (g) of Section 2 of the Telangana Act 1 of 1986. Clause (g) of Section 2 of the Telangana Act 1 of 1986, reads as follows:-

"Goonda" means a person, who either by himself or as a member of or leader of a gang, habitually commits, or attempts to commit or abets the commission of offences punishable under Chapter XVI or Chapter XVII or Chapter XXII of the Indian Penal Code (Central Act 45 of 1860).

The word "habitually" used in the above provision of law is significant. The meaning of the words "habit" and "habitual" as given in Advanced Law Lexicon, (3rd Edn.) as "Habit.—Settled tendency or practice, mental constitution. The word 'habit' implies a tendency or capacity resulting from the frequent repetition of the same acts. The expression "habitual" would mean "repeatedly" or "persistently" and implies a thread of continuity, stringing together with similar repeated acts. The word "habitually" does not refer to the frequency of the occasions, but to the invariability of a practice and the habit has to be proved by totality of facts. It, therefore, follows that the complicity of a person in an

isolated offence is neither evidence nor a material of any help to conclude that a particular person is a "dangerous person", unless there is material suggesting his complicity in such cases, which lead to a reasonable conclusion that the person is a habitual criminal. A person is said to be a habitual criminal who, by force of habit or inward disposition, is accustomed to commit crimes. It implies commission of such crimes repeatedly or persistently and prima facie there should be continuity in the commission of those offences. In the instant case, the material placed on record reveals that the detenus have no criminal antecedents. They were detained basing on the aforementioned solitary crime registered against them. Further, nothing is placed on record to substantiate that after the release of detenus from judicial custody on statutory/mandatory bail on 26.04.2022 and till the date of passing of the impugned detention orders on 05.07.2022, the detenus involved in any criminal activity. Under these circumstances, the alleged criminal activities of the detenus, in any event, would not satisfy the word 'goonda', as defined under clause (g) of Section 2 of the Telangana Act 1 of 1986. In R.Kalavathi's case ((2006) 6 SCC 14 supra) relied by the learned counsel for the petitioners, the Hon'ble Apex Court, while dealing with the word 'goonda' as contained in Section 2(f) of the Tamil Nadu Preventive Detention Act (Tamil Nadu Act 14 of 1982), held as follows:

"In order to attract action in terms of Section 3(1) of the Act, the detenu must be one who is a "Goonda" as defined under Section 2(f) of the Act. Though in other preventive detention laws, even a single act which has the propensity of affecting even tempo of life and public tranquility would be sufficient for detention, being prejudicial to maintenance of public order. For the purpose of the Act the detenu has to be a "Goonda" as defined under Section 2(f) of the Act..."Goonda" means a person, who either by himself or as a member of or leader of a gang habitually commits, or attempts to commit or abets the commission of offence, punishable under Chapter XVI or Chapter XVII or Chapter XXII of the Indian Penal Code (Central Act XLV of 1860)... The expression "habitually" is very significant. A person is said to be a habitual criminal who by force of habit or inward disposition is accustomed to commit crimes. It implies commission of such crimes repeatedly or persistently and prima facie there should be continuity in the commission of those offences...The word 'habitually' does not refer to the frequency of the occasions but to the invariability of a practice and the habit has to be proved by totality of facts...From one single transaction though consisting of several acts, a habit cannot be attributed to a person."

Further, Section 2(f) of the Tamil Nadu Act 14 of 1982 is pari materia to Section 2(g) of the Telangana Act 1 of 1986. Thus, on this ground alone, the impugned orders of detention passed against the detenus herein are liable to be set aside.

Point No.2:-

9. In catena of cases, the Hon'ble Supreme Court had clearly opined that there is a vast difference between "law and order" and "public order". The offences committed against a particular individual fall within the ambit of "law and order"

and when the public at large is adversely affected by the criminal activities of a person, such activities of that person are said to disturb the public order. Moreover, individual cases can be dealt with by the criminal justice system. Therefore, there is no need for the detaining authority to invoke the draconian preventive detention laws against an individual. Hence, according to the Hon'ble Apex Court, the detaining authority should be wary of invoking the immense power under the Act.

10. In *Ram Manohar Lohia v. State of Bihar* AIR 1966 SC 740, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has, in fact, deprecated the invoking of the preventive law in order to tackle a law and order problem. It was observed that every breach of public peace and every violation of law may create a 'law and order' problem, but does not necessarily create a problem of 'public order'. The distinction has to be borne in mind in view of what has been stated in the grounds of detention.

11. In *Kanu Biswas v. State of West Bengal* (1972) 3 SCC 831, the Hon'ble Apex Court, while discussing the meaning of word 'public order,' held that the question whether a man has only committed a breach of 'law and order' or has acted in a manner likely to cause a disturbance of the 'public order', is a question of degree and extent of the reach of the act upon the Society.

12. In a recent judgment in *Banka Sneha Sheela Vs. State of Telangana* (2021) 2 Supreme Court Cases 415, the Hon'ble Apex Court held as follows:

32. On the facts of this case, as has been pointed out by us, it is clear that at the highest, a possible apprehension of breach of law and order can be said to be made out if it is apprehended that the Detenue, if set free, will continue to cheat gullible persons. This may be a good ground to appeal against the bail orders granted and/or to cancel bail but certainly cannot provide the springboard to move under a preventive detention statute. We, therefore, quash the detention order on this ground..."

13. In another recent judgment in *Mallada K Sri Ram Vs. State of Telangana* 2022 SCC Online SC 424, the Hon'ble Apex Court, while referring to its earlier decisions in *Banka Sneha Sheela's case* ((2006) 6 SCC 14 supra), *Sama Aruna Vs. State of Telangana* (2018) 12 Supreme Court Cases 150 and *Ram Manohar Lohia Vs. State of Bihar* AIR 1966 SC 740 held as follows:

"A mere apprehension of a breach of law and order is not sufficient to meet the standard of adversely affecting the "maintenance of public order..."

the personal liberty of an accused cannot be sacrificed on the altar of preventive detention merely because a person is implicated in a criminal proceeding. The powers of preventive detention are exceptional and even draconian. Tracing their origin to the colonial era, they have been continued with strict constitutional safeguards against abuse. Article 22 of the Constitution was specifically inserted and extensively debated in the Constituent Assembly to ensure that the exceptional powers of preventive detention do not devolve into a draconian and

arbitrary exercise of state authority. The case at hand is a clear example of non-application of mind to material circumstances having a bearing on the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority. The two FIRs which were registered against the detenu are capable of being dealt by the ordinary course of criminal law.”

14. In the instant cases, the detaining authority, basing on a solitary crime indicated above, has passed the impugned detention orders of the even date, dated 05.07.2022. We shall present it in a tabular form the date of occurrence, the date of registration of FIR, the offence complained of and its nature, such as bailable/non-bailable or cognizable/non-cognizable.

Sl. No.

Crime No.

Date of Occurrence

Date of registration of FIR

Offence

Nature

1.

22/2022 of Jagtial Rural Police Station

20.01.2022

20.01.2022

Sections 120B, 147, 148, 302 r/w 149 of IPC

Sections 147 & 148: Cognizable/ Bailable Section 302: Cognizable/ Non-bailable

15. As seen from the material placed on record, the solitary crime relied upon by the detaining authority for preventively detaining the detenus relate to murder of three persons in broad day light at public place. The detenus were arrested in connection with the said crime on 23.01.2022 and remanded to judicial custody. Subsequently, the detenus moved three bail petitions in the subject crime, which were dismissed by the Court concerned. Thereafter, the detenus moved another petition under Section 167(2)(a)(i) of Cr.P.C. in the solitary crime relied by the detaining authority and the same were allowed by the Court concerned, vide order, dated 26.04.2022 passed in CrI.M.P.No.173 of 2022, granting statutory/ mandatory bail to the detenu, on certain conditions. So, it appears that the investigating officer had not completed investigation within the stipulated period. Therefore, the detenu was granted statutory/mandatory bail under Section 167(2)(a)(i) of Cr.P.C. It is a grave omission on the part of the investigating officer in not completing the investigation within the stipulated period. The very purpose of enacting the Section 167(2)(a)(i) of Cr.P.C., is to expedite the

investigation, so that the valuable material evidence is not lost and can be collected and produced before the Court. For the laches on the part of the investigating officer, it is not appropriate to invoke draconian preventive detention laws against the detenus. The relief granted to the detenu under Section 167(2)(a)(i) of Cr.P.C. cannot be scuttled by invoking the preventive detention laws. Further, in the statutory/mandatory bail order, conditions were imposed to the effect that the detenus shall execute personal surety bonds for Rs.10,000/- with two sureties for a like sum each to the satisfaction of the Court which granted conditional/statutory bail and that the detenus shall report before the SHO, Jagtial Rural Police Station, on every Sunday at any time between 10:00 AM and 12:00 Noon for a period of two months from the date of grant of statutory/mandatory bail or till filing of charge-sheet, whichever is earlier. Thus, by virtue of the conditions imposed in the statutory/mandatory bail orders, the detenus would be under the surveillance of the Court and the police. The detenus were granted statutory/mandatory bail under Section 167(2) of Cr.P.C., on 26.04.2022 and the impugned detention orders were passed on 05.07.2022. The detenus did not commit/attempt to commit any criminal act after being released from judicial custody. Under these circumstances, the apprehension of the detaining authority that since the detenus were granted bail by the Court concerned, there is imminent possibility of indulging in similar offences, which are prejudicial to the maintenance of public order and that the free movement of the detenus in the society would disturb the public order and the even tempo of public life and that their presence in the society is not in the interest and safety of the society, unless they are prevented from doing so by an appropriate order or detention, is highly misplaced. Further, a mere apprehension of 'breach of law and order' is not sufficient to meet the standard of adversely affecting the 'maintenance of public order'. In the instant case, if it is apprehended that the detenus, if set free, would continue to indulge in similar offences, that may be a good ground to appeal against the bail orders granted and/or to cancel bail, but certainly cannot provide the springboard to move under the preventive detention statute. Moreover, criminal law was already set into motion against the detenus. Since the detenus have allegedly committed offence punishable under the Indian Penal Code, the said crime can be effectively dealt with under the provisions of the Penal Code and there was no need for the detaining authority to invoke draconian preventive detention laws. The subject cases do not fall within the ambit of the words "public order" or "disturbance of public order". Instead, they fall within the scope of the words "law and order". Hence, there was no need for the detaining authority to pass the impugned detention order. Under these circumstances, the subjective satisfaction recorded by the detaining authority in detaining the detenus can be said to be tainted with malice. The personal liberty of an accused cannot be sacrificed on the altar of preventive detention, merely because a person is implicated in a criminal proceeding. Article 22 of the Constitution was specifically inserted and extensively debated in the Constituent Assembly to ensure that the exceptional powers of preventive detention do not devolve into a draconian and arbitrary exercise of state authority. The detaining

authority has to be extremely careful while passing the detention order, since the detention ipso facto adversely affects the fundamental right of personal liberty enjoyed by the detenus under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The detaining authority cannot be permitted to subvert, supplant, or substitute the punitive law of land, by ready resort to preventive detention.

16. Further, as held in *Vijay Narain Singh v. State of Bihar* (1984) 3 SCC 14, a single act or omission cannot be characterized as a habitual act because, the idea of 'habit' involves an element of persistence and a tendency to commit or repeat similar offences, which is patently not present in the instant case. In view of the facts and circumstances of the case, it is not a fit case to apply the preventive detention laws and detain the detenus, curtailing the liberty guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India.

17. We have gone through the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in *Abdul Sattar Ibrahim Manik's case* (3 supra) relied by the learned Special Government Pleader. In Paragraph 12(5) of the said decision, the Hon'ble Apex Court held as follows:

"When the detaining authority has merely referred to them in the narration of events and has not relied upon them, failure to supply bail application and order refusing bail will not cause any prejudice to the detenu in making an effective representation. Only when the detaining authority has not only referred to, but also relied upon them in arriving at the necessary satisfaction then failure to supply these documents, may, in certain cases, depending upon the facts and circumstances, amount to violation of Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India. Whether in a given case the detaining authority has casually or passingly referred to these documents or also relied upon them depends upon the facts and the grounds, which aspect can be examined by the Court."

Here, in the instant case, this Court is of the view that the alleged illegal activities of the detenus would not fall under the word 'Goonda' as defined under Section 2(g) of the Telangana Act 1 of 1986 and that the accusations against the detenus would not amount to "disturbance of public order" and are confined within the ambit and scope of words "law and order" and that they can be effectively dealt with under the provisions of the Penal Code and there was no need for the detaining authority to invoke draconian preventive detention laws. Further, the relief granted to the detenu under Section 167(2)(a)(i) of Cr.P.C. cannot be scuttled by invoking the provisions of Sections 3(1) and 3(2) of the preventive detention laws. Therefore, the cited decision is distinguishable from the case on hand and the same is not helpful to the respondents/State.

18. Before parting, it is apposite to observe that personal liberty is of the widest amplitude, covering a variety of rights. Its deprivation shall only be in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law, conformable to the mandate of the Supreme Law, i.e., the Constitution, more particularly, Article 21 thereof. Of all fundamental rights granted to the citizens under the Constitution, the right of personal liberty is the most cherished. A person is not to be deprived of this

right, except in accordance with the procedure laid down by law, even if he is a man of the most desperate character. Preventive detention is a serious invasion into the personal liberty of a person and as such, the safeguards provided to a person under the Constitution against the improper exercise of the power, must be jealously watched and enforced by the Court. Article 22(3)(b) of the Constitution of India, which permits preventive detention, is an exception to Article 21 of the Constitution. An exception cannot, ordinarily, nullify the full force of the main rule, i.e., right to liberty guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution. An exception can apply only in rare cases. The law of preventive detention can only be justified by striking the right balance between individual liberty on the one hand and the needs of an orderly society on the other. The power of preventive detention is a frightful power with drastic consequences, affecting personal liberty, which is the most cherished and prized possession of man in a civilized society. The said power has to be exercised with the greatest care and caution, and it is the duty of the Courts to ensure that this power is not abused or misused. To prevent misuse of this potentially dangerous power, the law of preventive detention has to be strictly construed and meticulous compliance with the procedural safeguards, however technical, is mandatory and vital.

19. For the foregoing reasons, the impugned orders are legally unsustainable and are liable to be set aside.

20. In the result, the Writ Petitions are allowed. The impugned detention orders of the even date, dated 05.07.2022, passed by the respondent No.2-Collector and District Magistrate, Jagtial District, vide Rc.No.C1/724-1/2022, Rc.No.C1/724-5/2022, Rc.No.C1/724-3/2022, Rc.No.C1/724-2/2022 and Rc.No.C1/724-4/2022 respectively, and the consequential confirmation orders of the even date, dated 06.09.2022, passed by the Secretary to Government, General Administration (Spl. (Law & Order)) Department, Government of Telangana, vide G.O.Rt.Nos.1702, 1706, 1704, 1703 and 1705 respectively, are set aside. The respondents are directed to set the detenus, namely, Kandela Srinivas, S/o. Gangaiah; Vanam Shekhar, S/o. Nagaiah; Vanam @ Kedari Durgaiah @ Chinna Durgaiah, S/o.Pochaiah; Vanam Chinna Gangaiah, S/o. Pochaiah; and Vanam Durgaiah @ Durga Prasad, S/o. Pochaiah, at liberty forthwith, if they are no longer required in any case.

Miscellaneous Petitions, if any, pending in these writ petitions, shall stand closed. There shall be no order as to costs.