
(2021) 01 UK CK 0003

In the Uttarakhand High Court

Case No : Writ Petition Criminal No. 2242 Of 2020, Compounding Application
(CLMA No. 4742 Of 2020)

Kritika Pandey

APPELLANT

Vs

State Of Uttarakhand & Others

RESPONDENT

Date of Decision : 04-01-2021

Acts Referred:

Information Technology Act, 2000 — Sections 66(D)
Indian Penal Code, 1860 — Section 354
Code Of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — Section 320, 482
Constitution Of India, 1950 — Article 226

Citation : (2021) 01 UK CK 0003

Hon'ble Judges : R.C. Khulbe, J

Bench : Single Bench

Advocate : Sheetal Selwal, Siddharth Bisht, Sunny Kumar

Final Decision : Disposed Of

Judgement

R.C. Khulbe, J

1. By way of present writ petition, moved under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, petitioners seek to quash the impugned FIR No.0645, under

Sections 66(D) of the Information Technology Act, 2000 and under Section 354 of IPC, registered at P.S. Haldwani, District-Nainital.

2. The parties have filed the above-numbered compounding application to show that the parties have buried their differences and have settled their disputes amicably.

3. It is contended by learned counsel for the State that the offences punishable under Section under Sections 66 (D) of the Information Technology Act, 2000 and under Section 354 of IPC are non-compoundable offences.

4. The Apex Court has dealt with the consequence of a compromise in regard to non-compoundable offences in the case of B.S.Joshi and others vs.

State of Haryana and another, (2003) 4 SCC 675 and has held as below: -

“If for the purpose of securing the ends of justice, quashing of FIR becomes necessary, Section 320 Cr.P.C. would not be a bar to the exercise of

power of quashing. It is, however, a different matter depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case whether to exercise or not such a

power.”

5. Thus, the High Court, in exercise of its inherent power can quash criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint and Section 320 of Cr.P.C. does not

limit or affect the powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

6. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has permitted compounding of such offences in the decision of Nikhil Merchant v. CBI and another, (2008) 9 SCC

650.

7. Learned counsel for the parties also drew the attention of this Court towards the citation of Gian Singh v. State of Punjab and another, (2013) 1

SCC (Cri) 160, in which Hon’ble Supreme Court observed as below:-

“The position that emerges from the above discussion can be summarised thus: the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or

FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences

under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the guideline

engrafted in such power viz; (i) to secure the ends of justice or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court. In what cases power to quash the

criminal proceeding or complaint or F.I.R may be exercised where the offender and victim have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and

circumstances of each case and no category can be prescribed. However, before exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to the

nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly

quashed even though the victim or victim’s family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have

serious impact on society. Similarly, any compromise between the victim and

offender in relation to the offences under special statutes like Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity etc; cannot provide for any basis for quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and pre-dominatingly civil flavour stand on different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category of cases, High Court may quash criminal proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise between the offender and victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal case would put accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and complete settlement and compromise with the victim. In other words, the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim and wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above question(s) is in affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding.â??

8. The instant case is squarely covered by the above ruling of the Honâ??ble Supreme Court. The obvious reply to the question posed above is in the affirmative in view of the ruling of Honâ??ble Apex Court in Gian Singhâ??s case (supra).

9. Today parties are present before this Court and they are duly identified by their respective counsels.

10. Accordingly, compounding application is allowed. The entire proceedings, mentioned hereinabove, pending between the parties are hereby quashed qua the present petitioner on the basis of compromise arrived at between the parties.

11. Present petition stands disposed of, as above.

12. Pending application, if any, also stand disposed of accordingly.