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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
NAGPUR BENCH : NAGPUR

CRIMINAL WRIT PETITION NO.566 OF 2026

Krushnamurti @ Dilip s/o Gokul Chaudhari,
C-(940), Aged – 56 Years,
(Presently at Open Prison, Morshi)
District Amravati.

.... PETITIONER

// VERSUS //

1. State of Maharashtra through its
Secretary of Home Department,
Mantralaya, Mumbai.
2. The Superintendent of Open Prison,
Morshi, District Amravati.

.... RESPONDENTS

Mr. A. Y. Sharma, Advocate for petitioner.
Mr. S. S. Doifode, APP for State.

CORAM : URMILA JOSHI-PHALKE AND
NIVEDITA P. MEHTA, JJ.
DATED : 03/08/2026

ORAL JUDGMENT : [Per : URMILA JOSHI-PHALKE, J.]

1. **Rule.** Rule made returnable forthwith. Heard finally
with the consent of the learned counsel for the petitioner and
learned APP at the admission stage.
2. By this petition, the petitioner is seeking quashing and
setting aside of the order dated 14.05.2026 passed by the
respondent No.1 i.e. Secretary of Home Department, Mantralaya,
Mumbai, categorizing the present petitioner under the category



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2(c) instead of category 2(b) as per the guideline dated 15.03.2010.

3. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner, who submitted that the petitioner was convicted for the offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to suffer for life imprisonment. The petitioner is aggrieved by order dated 14.05.2026, passed by the respondent No.1 thereby wrongly holding that the case of the petitioner for premature release has fallen under the category of 2(c) of the guideline provided by 15.05.2010. He submitted that, in fact, the case of the petitioner falls under the category of 2(b), which was not considered by the respondent No.1 and, therefore, the order of the respondent No.1 deserves to be quashed and set aside.

4. On the contrary, learned APP strongly opposed the said contention and submitted that considering the nature of the injuries, which was sustained by the deceased, who was the wife of the petitioner. Admittedly, this would covers under the exceptional violence and, therefore, the authority has rightly categorized him under clause 2(c) and, therefore, no interference is called for.



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5. On hearing both sides and on perusal of the impugned order as well as the judgment passed in **Sessions Case No.226/2014 [State of Maharashtra, Vs. Krushnamurti @ Deelip Gokul Chaudhari] dated 25.08.2015**, the fact of the case reveals that the deceased was the wife of the present petitioner and after 16 years of marriage, the deceased's death was caused by the present petitioner by giving multiple stab injuries on her person. Especially, the paragraph No.27 of the Judgment of the Sessions Court shows that evidence of the Medical Officer PW-7 discloses that 34 external injuries were found, out of that stab injuries were injury Nos.4, 5, 9, 19, 20, 21, 22, 24, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30 and 32 and cumulative effect of all the grievous injuries was sufficient to cause death. Due to the injuries, there was fracture to the sternum because of stab injury on the chest there was bilat haemothorax. The trachea was punctured because of the stab on the neck and both lungs were also punctured by stabbing. There was haemo-peritoneum and there were multiple left mesmeric tear. Liver was punctured from front side and there was bleeding. The nature of the injuries are also mentioned below the paragraph No.28. On perusal of the nature of the injuries, admittedly, clause 2 deals with offences relating to crime against woman and minor and clause 2(c) states about where the crime is committed with exceptional violence and or with brutality or death of victim due



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to burns. Whereas, clause 2(b) deals with where the crime as mentioned above committed with premeditation. Thus, as far as the present crime is concerned, wherein the involvement of the present petitioner was there and considering the injuries sustained by the deceased admittedly, it would be under the exceptional violence and with a brutality, therefore, the authorities have rightly considered the present petition under the clause 2(c) and, therefore, the contention of the petitioner that his case covers under clause 2(b) is not sustainable. In view of that, the petition being devoid of merits and liable to be dismissed. Accordingly, the petition is **dismissed**.

(NIVEDITA P. MEHTA, J)**(URMILA JOSHI-PHALKE, J)**