
(2012) 03 SC CK 0028

In the Supreme Court Of India

Case No : Civil Appeal No. 4990 of 2003

Mulchand Khanumal Khatri

APPELLANT

Vs

State of Gujarat and Others

RESPONDENT

Date of Decision : 27-03-2012

Acts Referred:

Land Acquisition Act, 1894 — Section 11, 11A, 11A(1), 28A, 28A(1)
Limitation Act, 1963 — Section 12

Citation : AIR 2012 SC 2525 : (2012) AIRSCW 2497 : (2013) 2 AJR 625 :
(2012) 4 AWC 3641 : (2012) 2 JCR 239 : (2012) 2 JLJR 243 : (2012) 4 MLJ
331 : (2012) 2 PLJR 365 : (2012) 5 SCC 365

Hon'ble Judges : R.M. Lodha, J;H.L. Gokhale, J

Bench : Division Bench

Advocate : Subrat Birla and S.C. Birla, for the Appellant; Hemantika Wahi, Jesal
and Rojalin Pradhan, for the Respondent

Final Decision : Dismissed

Judgement

R.M. Lodha, J.—The judgment and order dated December 26, 2002 passed by the Gujarat High Court is under challenge in this Appeal by special leave.

2. The Appellant claims to be joint owner of the land being Survey No. 11430 admeasuring 34 sq. mtr. at Palanpur, Gujarat. On April 1, 1980, a notification was issued u/s 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short, 'the Act') that proposed acquisition of the Appellant's land and some other land for the public purpose, namely, construction of Palanpur City and taluka Police Station. The said notification was published in the Government Gazette on January 8, 1981. Later on, Section 4 notification was revised and published in the Official Gazette on September 22, 1983. The declaration u/s 6 was published on January 5, 1984. The Appellant challenged the acquisition of his land through the above notifications in a Special Civil Application before the Gujarat High Court. An interim relief in the above matter was granted on April 18, 1984.

3. The Act was amended on September 24, 1984 by the Land Acquisition

(Amendment) Act, 1984 (for short, 'the Amendment Act') whereby Section 11A was brought in the statute book.

4. The Special Civil Application filed by the Appellant was dismissed on January 11, 1996. The Dy. Collector made the award on August 31, 1998.

5. Before the High Court, inter alia, the argument was canvassed on behalf of the Appellant that the award having been passed beyond two years from the date of the publication of the declaration u/s 6, by virtue of Section 11A of the Act, the entire acquisition proceedings had lapsed. The High Court, however, repelled the above argument and held as follows:

The submission of the Learned Counsel for the Petitioner was that their earlier petitions were dismissed and the stay granted earlier stood vacated by the Division Bench of this Court on 11.1.96. Therefore, the Authority was supposed to declare the Award within a period of 2 years from that day i.e. 11.1.96. The said period would expire on January 10, 1998 whereas Award u/s 11 came to be passed only in August, 1998 which is admittedly after a period of 2 years. It is no doubt true that the Division Bench of this Court earlier dismissed their writ petitions on 11.1.96 and vacated the interim relief, but the vacation of interim relief granted in favour of the Petitioners must be brought to the notice of the concerned Authority. Merely because they were represented through their counsel before the court would not be sufficient. Unless and until certified copy of the said judgment and order passed by the court is brought to the notice of the Authority, the Authority is not supposed to act. The period of 2 years would start only from the date of the notice. In reply affidavit it has been clearly stated that the copy of the judgment and order passed by this Court on 11.1.96 was received by them only 5.9.97.

In that view of the matter, admittedly the Award dt. 31.8.98 passed u/s 11 of the Act was within a period of 2 years.

6. From the above discussion, it is apparent that the High Court was of the view that unless and until certified copy of the judgment and order passed by the court 'was brought to the notice of the authority, the authority was not supposed to act and the period of two years u/s 11A of the Act would start only from the date of such notice and as the copy of the judgment and order passed by the High Court on January 11, 1996 was received by the competent authority on September 5, 1997, the Respondents were entitled to the benefit of the entire period from January 11, 1996 to September 5, 1997.

7. We are unable to accept the view of the High Court.

8. Section 11A of the Act reads as under:

11A. Period within which an award shall be made.-

(1) The Collector shall make an award u/s 11 within a period of two years from the date of the publication of the declaration and if no award is made within that

period, the entire proceedings for the acquisition of the land shall lapse:

Provided that in a case where the said declaration has been published before the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984, the award shall be made within a period of two years from such commencement.

Explanation.- In computing the period of two years referred to in this section, the period during which any action or proceeding to be taken in pursuance of the said declaration is stayed by an order of a Court shall be excluded.

9. Section 11A mandates that an award shall be made by the Collector u/s 11 of the Act within a period of two years from the date of the publication of the declaration. The non-adherence to this period results in entire acquisition proceedings being lapsed. The proviso that follows Sub-section (1) states that where the declaration u/s 6 has been published before the commencement of the Amendment Act the award shall be made within a period of two years from such commencement. The Explanation appended to Section 11A clarifies that the period during which any action or proceeding relating to acquisition taken pursuant to such declaration remains stayed by an order of the court, such period shall be excluded.

10. Insofar as present case is concerned, there is no dispute that the proviso that follows Sub-section (1) of Section 11A is attracted because the declaration u/s 6 was published before the commencement of the Amendment Act and the award was made after coming into force of Section 11A. The period of two years shall thus commence from September 24, 1984 when the amendment to the Act was notified. It is also not in issue that in computing the period of two years, the period during which the interim relief granted by the Gujarat High Court remained operative shall have to be excluded. The stay order of the High Court remained operative for the period September 24, 1984 to January 11, 1996. The question is, whether Section 11A of the Act permits exclusion of time that was taken in obtaining the certified copy of the judgment and order passed by the High Court and the period from the date the certified copy was obtained and it was brought to the notice of the authority.

11. The question with which we are concerned came up for consideration in Ravi Khullar and Another Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, In paras 54, 55 and 56 of the report, this Court stated as follows:

54. In the matter of computing the period of limitation three situations may be visualized, namely, (a) where the Limitation Act applies by its own force; (b) where the provisions of the Limitation Act with or without modifications are made applicable to a special statute; and (c) where the special statute itself prescribes the period of limitation and provides for extension of time and/or condonation of delay. The instant case is not one which is governed by the provisions of the Limitation Act. The Land Acquisition Collector in making an award does not act as a court within the meaning of the Limitation Act. It is also clear from the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act that the provisions of the Limitation Act

have not been made applicable to proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act in the matter of making an award u/s 11A of the Act. However, Section 11A of the Act does provide a period of limitation within which the Collector shall make his award. The Explanation thereto also provides for exclusion of the period during which any action or proceeding to be taken in pursuance of the declaration is stayed by an order of a court. Such being the provision, there is no scope for importing into Section 11A of the Land Acquisition Act the provisions of Section 12 of the Limitation Act. The application of Section 12 of the Limitation Act is also confined to matters enumerated therein. The time taken for obtaining a certified copy of the judgment is excluded because a certified copy is required to be filed while preferring an appeal/revision/review etc. challenging the impugned order. Thus a court is not permitted to read into Section 11A of the Act a provision for exclusion of time taken to obtain a certified copy of the judgment and order. The Court has, therefore, no option but to compute the period of limitation for making an award in accordance with the provisions of Section 11A of the Act after excluding such period as can be excluded under the Explanation to Section 11A of the Act.

55. Our conclusion finds support from the scheme of the Land Acquisition Act itself. Section 11A of the Act was inserted by Act 68 of 1984 with effect from 24-9-1984. Similarly, Section 28-A was also inserted by the Amendment Act of 1984 with effect from the same date. In Section 28-A the Act provides for a period of limitation within which an application should be made to the Collector for redetermination of the amount of compensation on the basis of the award of the Court. The proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 28-A reads as follows:

Provided that in computing the period of three months within which an application to the Collector shall be made under this Sub-section, the day on which the award was pronounced and the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the award shall be excluded.

56. It will thus be seen that the legislature wherever it considered necessary incorporated by express words the rule incorporated in Section 12 of the Limitation Act. It has done so expressly in Section 28-A of the Act while it has consciously not incorporated this rule in Section 11A even while providing for exclusion of time under the Explanation. The intendment of the legislature is therefore unambiguous and does not permit the court to read words into Section 11A of the Act so as to enable it to read Section 12 of the Limitation Act into Section 11A of the Land Acquisition Act.

12. We are in respectful agreement with the above legal position. The period prescribed in Section 11A is mandatory. The consequence of breach is provided in the provision itself viz., the entire acquisition proceedings get lapsed. Insofar as computation of the period is concerned, the period of two years commences from the date of the publication of the declaration. Where the declaration has been published before the Amendment Act, then the period commences from the commencement of the Amendment Act. The only period that is excludable is the

period during which the action or proceedings to be taken pursuant to the said declaration remains stayed under the order of a court and no other. Section 11A is a special provision for the purposes of the Act and the legislative intent being clear from the bare language of the explanation appended thereto, we find no justification to read the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 and particularly Section 12 thereof into it.

13. In view of the above legal position and the facts noticed above, we hold as we must, that the award having not been made within the period prescribed in Section 11A of the Act, the entire proceedings for the acquisition of the Appellant's land has lapsed. The High Court was clearly in error in excluding the period from January 11, 1996 to September 5, 1997. This period cannot be excluded under explanation appended to Section 11A of the Act.

14. In view of the above, Civil Appeal is allowed and the impugned judgment and order is set aside. The entire proceedings for the acquisition concerning the Appellant's land is declared to have lapsed. No costs.