

(2024) 07 GUJ CK 0091

In the Gujarat High Court

Case No : Special Criminal Application No. 8804 of 2024

Nashirkhan @ Sanjay Nasimkhan Pathan Thro Nagmabano
Nashirkhan Pathan Versus

APPELLANT

Vs

Commissioner Of Police (Ahmedabad City) & Ors.

RESPONDENT

Date of Decision : 26-07-2024

Acts Referred:

Gujarat Prevention of Ant Social Activities Act, 1985 — Section 2(b), 2(c), 3, 3(1), 3(4)
Indian Penal Code, 1860 — Section 114, 294B, 323, 324, 325, 326, 337, 427, 452,
506(2)
Gujarat Police Act, 1951 — Section 135(1)

Citation : (2024) 07 GUJ CK 0091

Hon'ble Judges : Ilesh J. Vora, J;Vimal K. Vyas, J

Bench : Division Bench

Advocate : Kaushal N Dave, L B Dabhi

Final Decision : Allowed

Judgement

Ilesh J. Vora, J

1. The petitioner herein namely Nashirkhan @ Sanjay Nasimkhan Pathan came to be preventively detained vide the detention order dated 21.06.2024 passed by the Police Commissioner, Ahmedabad, as a "dangerous person" as defined under Section 2(c) of the Gujarat Prevention of Anti-social Activities Act, 1985 (herein after referred as 'the Act of 1985).

2. By way of this petition, the petitioner has challenged the legality and validity of the aforesaid order.

3. This Court has heard Mr.Kaushal Dave, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr.L.B. Dabhi, learned APP for the respondent State.

4. Learned advocate for the detenue submits that the grounds of detention has no nexus to the "public order", but is a purely a matter of law and order, as registration of the offence cannot be said to have either affected adversely or

likely to affect adversely the maintenance of public order as contemplated under the explanation sub-section (4) of Section 3 of the Act, 1985 and therefore, where the offences alleged to have been committed by the detainee have no bearing on the question of maintenance of public order and his activities could be said to be prejudicial only to the maintenance of law and order and not prejudicial to the maintenance of public order.

5. On the other hand, learned State Counsel opposing the application contended that, the detainee is habitual offender and his activities affected at the society at large. In such set of circumstances, the Detaining Authority, considering the antecedents and past activities of the detainee, has passed the impugned order with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order in the area of Ahmedabad.

6. Having considered the facts as well as the submissions made by the respective parties, the issue arises as to whether the order of detention passed by the Detaining Authority in exercise of his powers under the provisions of the Act of 1985 is sustainable in law?

7. The order impugned was executed upon the applicant and presently he is in Jail. In the grounds of detention, a reference of three criminal cases i.e. (I) for the offences punishable under Sections 324, 294B and 114 of the IPC and Section 135(1) of the Gujarat Police Act, (II) for the offences punishable under Sections 324, 325, 323, 294B, 506(2), 427 and 114 of the IPC and Section 135(1) of the Gujarat Police Act and (III) for the offences punishable under Sections 326, 452, 337, 294B, 427 and 114 of the IPC and Section 135(1) of the Gujarat Police Act registered against the applicant under the Indian Penal Code was made and further it is alleged that, the activities of the detainee as a "dangerous person" affects adversely or are likely to affect adversely the maintenance of public order as explained under Section 3 of the Act of 1985. Admittedly, in all the said offences, the applicant was granted bail.

8. After careful consideration of the material, we are of the considered view that on the basis of three criminal cases, the authority has wrongly arrived at the subjective satisfaction that the activities of the detainee could be termed to be acting in a manner 'prejudicial to the maintenance of public order'. In our opinion, the said offences do not have any bearing on the maintenance of public order. In this connection, we may refer to the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Piyush Kantilal Mehta Vs. Commissioner of Police, Ahmedabad, 1989 Supp (1) SCC 322, wherein, the detention order was made on the basis of the registration of the two prohibition offences. The Apex Court after referring the case of Pushkar Mukherjee Vs. State of Bengal, 1969 (1) SCC 10 held and observed that mere disturbance of law and order leading to detention order is thus not necessarily sufficient for action under preventive detention Act. Paras-17 & 18 are relevant to refer, which read thus:

"17. In this connection, we may refer to a decision of this Court in Pushkar

Mukherjee v. State of West Bengal, where the distinction between 'law and order' and 'public order' has been clearly laid down. Ramaswami, J. speaking for the Court observed as follows:

10. "Does the expression 'public order' take in every kind of infraction of order or only some categories thereof? It is manifest that every act of assault or injury to specific persons does not lead to public disorder. When two people quarrel and fight and assault each other inside a house or in a street, it may be said that there is disorder but not public disorder. Such cases are dealt with under the powers vested in the executive authorities under the provisions of ordinary criminal law but the culprits cannot be detained on the ground that they were disturbing public order. The contravention of any law always affects order but before it can be said to affect public order, it must affect the community or the public at large. In this connection we must draw a line of demarcation between serious and aggravated forms of disorder which directly affect the community or injure the public interest and the relatively minor breaches of peace of a purely local significance which primarily injure specific individuals and only in a secondary sense public interest. A mere disturbance of law and order leading to disorder is thus not necessarily sufficient for action under the Preventive Detention Act but a disturbance which will affect public order comes within the scope of the Act."

18. In the instant case, the detaining authority, in our opinion, has failed to substantiate that the alleged anti- social activities of the petitioner adversely affect or are likely to affect adversely the maintenance of public order. It is true some incidents of beating by the petitioner had taken place, as alleged by the witnesses. But, such incidents, in our view, do not have any bearing on the maintenance of public order. The petitioner may be punished for the alleged offences committed by him but, surely, the acts constituting the offences cannot be said to have affected the even tempo of the life of the community. It may be that the petitioner is a bootlegger within the meaning of section 2(b) of the Act, but merely because he is a bootlegger he cannot be preventively detained under the provisions of the Act unless, as laid down in sub-section (4) of section 3 of the Act, his activities as a bootlegger affect adversely or are likely to affect adversely the maintenance of public order. We have carefully considered the offences alleged against the petitioner in the order of detention and also the allegations made by the witnesses and, in our opinion, these offences or the allegations cannot be said to have created any feeling of insecurity or panic or terror among the members of the public of the area in question giving rise to the question of maintenance of public order. The order of detention cannot, therefore, be upheld."

9. For the reasons recorded, we are of the considered opinion that, the material on record are not sufficient for holding that the alleged activities of the detainee have either affected adversely or likely to affect adversely the maintenance of public order and therefore, the subjective satisfaction arrived at by the detaining

authority cannot be said to be legal, valid and in accordance with law.

10. Accordingly, this petition stands allowed. The order impugned dated 21.06.2024 passed by the respondent authority is hereby quashed. We direct the detainee to be set at liberty forthwith, if he is not required in any other case. Rule is made absolute accordingly. Direct service permitted.