

(2018) 08 J&K CK 0001

In the Jammu And Kashmir High Court

Case No : Habeas Corpus Petition No.35 Of 2018

Parvaiz Ahmad Najar @APPELLANT@Hash State Of Jammu & Kashmir & Ors

Date of Decision : 01-08-2018

Acts Referred:

Jammu and Kashmir Public Safety Act, 1978 — Section 8
Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 — Section 10, 13
Jammu and Kashmir State Ranbir Penal Code, 1989 — Section 506

Citation : (2018) 08 J&K CK 0001

Hon'ble Judges : M. K. Hanjura, J

Bench : Single Bench

Final Decision : Allowed

Judgement

1. By the dint of order bearing No. 164/DMB/PSA/2018 dated 27th of January, 2018, passed by the Respondent No.2/District Magistrate,

Baramulla, in exercise of the powers conferred in him under clause (a) of Section 8 of the J&K

Public Safety Act, 1978 (for short "The Act of 1978"), one Parvaiz Ahmad Najar S/o Abdul Rehman Najar R/o Najar Mohalla, Tujjer Sharief,

District Baramulla, has been detained and lodged in District Jail, Kuthua.

2. The detainee has challenged the said order of detention, chiefly, on the grounds that the detaining authority has failed to apply his mind to the fact

whether the preventive detention of the detainee was imperative, notwithstanding his custody in a substantive offence. To this, it has been added, that

the Respondent No. 2 has passed the order of detention on the dictates of the sponsoring agency, i.e. the Officer who has prepared the police dossier

and no attempt has been made by the Respondent No.2 to scan and evaluate it before passing the order of detention.

3. Counter has been filed by the Respondents, wherein it is stated that the grounds of detention have been furnished to the detainee. The detaining authority has complied with the requirement of Clause 5 of Article 22 read with Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The detainee has failed to avail the remedy prescribed under the Act. He has not filed the representation against the order of detention. It has also been stated that the detainee is involved in case FIR No. 19/2017, registered in Police Station, Sopore, for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 10-13 ULA (P) Act and case FIR No. 07/2018, registered in Police Station Bomai, for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 506 of RPC, 13 ULA Act. In the end, it has been urged that since the order of detention has been passed on justifiable grounds, therefore, the instant Habeas Corpus petition merits dismissal, and it may, accordingly, be dismissed.

4. Heard and considered.

5. The main plank of the argument of the learned counsel for the detainee is that since the detainee was in custody of the police authorities for a substantive offence therefore, there was no need to direct his preventive detention. It has been stated in the Counter Affidavit that the detainee is involved in case FIR No. 19/2017, registered in Police Station, Sopore, for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 10-13 ULA (P) Act and case FIR No. 07/2018, registered in Police Station Bomai, for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 506 of RPC, 13 ULA Act.

The arrest of the detainee in the said FIRs, at the time of the passing of the order of detention, has not been disputed.

6. Since the detainee was in the custody of the police at the time of passing of the order of detention, therefore, the question that arises for consideration is whether an order of detention could be passed on the face of such an eventuality? The answer to this question is an emphatic

“No”, taking into consideration the law laid down by the Apex Court of the country in paragraph No.24 of the judgment delivered in the case of

“Sama Aruna v. State of Telangana & Anr.”, reported in “AIR 2017 SC 2635”, which may be noticed :

“24. There is another reason why the detention order is unjustified. It was passed when the accused was in jail in Crime No. 221 of 2016. His custody in jail for the said offence was converted into custody under the

impugned detention order. The incident involved in this offence is sometime in the year 2002-03. The detainee could not have been detained preventively by taking this stale incident into account, more so when he was in jail. In

Ramesh Yadav v. District Magistrate, Etah and ors, this Court observed as follows:

“6. On a reading of the grounds, particularly the paragraph which we have extracted above, it is clear that the order of detention was passed as

the detaining authority was apprehensive that in case the detainee was released on bail he would again carry on his criminal activities in the area. If the

apprehension of the detaining authority was true, the bail application had to be opposed and in case bail was granted, challenge against that order in

the higher forum had to be raised. Merely on the ground that an accused in detention as an under trial prisoner was likely to get bail an order of

detention under the National Security Act should not ordinarily be passed.”

7. The same view has been repeated and reiterated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in paragraph No. 13 of the judgment delivered in the case of

“V. Shanthav. State of Telangana & Others”, reported in “AIR 2017 SC 2355”, that reads as under :

“13. The order of preventive detention passed against the detainee states that his illegal activities were causing danger to poor and small farmers

and their safety and financial well being. Recourse to normal legal procedure would be time consuming and would not be an effective deterrent to

prevent the detainee from indulging in further prejudicial activities in the business of spurious seeds, affecting maintenance of public order, and that

there was no other option except to invoke the provisions of the Preventive Detention Act as an extreme measure to insulate the society from his evil

deeds. The rhetorical incantation of the words “goonda” or “prejudicial to maintenance of public order” cannot be sufficient justification to

invoke the draconian powers of preventive detention. To classify the detainee as a “goonda” affecting public order, because of inadequate yield

from the chilli seed sold by him and prevent him from moving for bail even is a gross abuse of the statutory power of Preventive Detention. The

grounds of detention are ex facie extraneous to the Act.”

8. Testing the instant case on the touchstone of the law laid down above, the detainee could not have been detained after taking recourse to the

provisions of “the Act of 1978”, when he was already in the custody of the

police authorities in the cases, the details whereof have been given hereinbefore. His custody in police for the offence stated above, has been converted into the custody under the impugned detention order. May be the detaining authority might have been laboring under the belief that if the detainee applies for bail, he may succeed in seeking his release, but this apprehension of the detaining authority could have been guarded against by resisting and opposing the bail application. In the event of his release on bail, the State could have exercised its right to knock at the doors of a higher forum. This single infraction knocks the bottom out of the contention raised by the State that the detainee can be detained preventatively when he is already in custody and has not applied for bail. It cuts at the very root of the State action.Â The State could have taken recourse to the ordinary law of the land.Â

9. Life and liberty of the citizens of the State are of paramount importance. A duty is cast on the shoulders of the Court to enquire that the decision of the Executive is made upon the matters laid down by the Statute and that these are relevant for arriving at such a decision. A citizen cannot be deprived of personal liberty, guaranteed to him/her by the Constitution and of which, he/she cannot be deprived except in due course of law and for the purposes sanctioned by law.Â

10. In the backdrop of what has been said and done above, the instant Habeas Corpus petition is allowed, as a consequence of which, the order of detention bearing No. 164/DMB/PSA/2018 dated 27th of January, 2018, passed by the Respondent No.2/District Magistrate, Baramulla, is quashed, with a further direction to the respondents to release the person of Parvaiz Ahmad Najar S/o Abdul Rehman Najar R/o Najar Mohalla, Tujjer Sharief, District Baramulla, forthwith from the preventive custody, if not required in any other case.

11. The record, as produced by the learned Additional Advocate General, be returned to him with utmost dispatch.