

(2026) 02 BOM CK 1577

In the Bombay High Court, Aurangabad Bench

Case No : Writ Petition No. 12332 Of 2015

Prakash

APPELLANT

Vs

State of Maharashtra

RESPONDENT

Date of Decision : 04-02-2026

Acts Referred:

Constitution Of India, 1950 — Article 300(A)
Maharashtra Prevention of Fragmentation and Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1947 —
Section 19(1), 22, 31, 32, 35, 36

Citation : (2026) 02 BOM CK 1577

Hon'ble Judges : Abhay J. Mantri, J

Bench : Single Bench

Advocate : V.D. Hon, A.V. Hon, B.V. Virdhe, A.B. Kale

Final Decision : Dismissed

Judgement

Abhay J. Mantri, J

1. Heard. Rule. Heard finally at the admission stage with the consent of learned counsel for the respective parties.

2. The petitioner, son of the original owner of the land, Gut No. 1206, assails the order dated 09th July, 2015 passed by the Respondent No.1 – the State Minister (revenue), Government of Maharashtra in Appeal No. 3315/899/PK-197/J-6 whereby dismissed the Appeal, to correct the consolidation scheme of land Gut No.1206 at village Kashti, Tq. Shrigonda and the order/communication dated 15th July, 2014 of Respondent No.3 informing the Petitioner that his application was disposed of without any action. Also, the order/communication dated 3rd July, 2014 of Respondent No.2, thereby directed Respondent No.3 to scrutinise the scheme and inform the Petitioner accordingly, has preferred this petition.

3. Shorn of superfluities, the background facts of the case can be stated in brief, as follows :-

On 20th March, 1974, a consolidation scheme was implemented, whereby the

land survey Nos. 6/3, 6/6 and 6/7 of village Kashti, Tq. Shrigonda were converted into Gut Nos. 1212, 1206 and 1208, respectively, by following the due procedure of law. However, the Petitioner, being the legal heir of the original landowner, namely Narsing Pachpute, after a lapse of thirty-eight years, had filed the application/representation on 17th September, 2012, before the Respondent No.2 to rectify the area of the land owned by his father. By order/communication dated 15th July, 2014, the respondent No.3 informed the Petitioner that the said application was disposed of without any action being taken. Against the said order, the petitioner has preferred an appeal before the State Minister (Revenue), who, after considering the material on record, dismissed the appeal. Hence, the petitioner has preferred this petition.

4. Mr. Hon, the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner, during the arguments, took me through the Page Nos. 50 to 60 of the Petition and submitted that the learned authorities have committed an error while implementing the consolidation scheme and passing the order, thereby reducing the area of 39 R land belonging to the father of the petitioner. Therefore, the said orders are liable to be quashed and set aside. He specifically pointed out Clause Nos. 3 and 10 of the representation dated 05.03.2013, and the actual facts of the application, and submitted that the petitioner has rightly filed the application /representation for cancellation of the order passed while implementing the consolidation scheme.

5. He drew my attention to the report submitted by the Deputy Superintendent of Land Records to the District Superintendent of Land Records vide communication dated 16th December, 2013, below the table at Page Nos. 58 and 59, he has pointed out the observation of the learned Deputy Superintendent of Land Records that while implementing the consolidation scheme the total area of the land, Survey No.6 was reduced by 39 R. Therefore, the Deputy Superintendent of Land Records proposes that it would be appropriate to rectify the area of the land in respect of Gut No. 1206 as per the application/representation of the petitioner.

6. He has taken me through page Nos. 61 to 89 of the petition and propounded that the Hon'ble Minister has not considered the communication/report of Deputy Superintendent of Land Records, Shrigonda, whereby he has supported the application/representation of the petitioner, as proper. It further reveals that a defect occurred during implementation of the consolidation scheme for Survey No. 6; therefore, the authority itself supports the petitioner's application/representation. However, the State Minister has erred in observing that it has no jurisdiction to decide the objection that his father's signature was obtained on the possession receipt by playing fraud upon him after a period of forty years, nor has his father raised any objection within thirty days after the publication of the notice regarding the consolidation scheme. The State Minister has committed a mistake by putting the said statement into the Petitioner's mouth and has therefore erred in passing the order. Thus, the said finding is contrary to the facts on record.

7. Similarly, he submitted that, pursuant to this Court's direction, he has filed the Appeal with the Minister; however, the Minister erred in holding that he has no jurisdiction to determine the question of fraud. Hence, the passing of the dismissal of the Appeal is contrary to the facts on record. He drew my attention to the prayers made by him in the application (Page No. 82) and submitted that the petitioner has only prayed that the area shown in Gat numbers under the Consolidation Scheme be rectified as per old S. No. 6. During the arguments, learned Sr. Advocate informed that the Petitioner's father passed away in 2005. Thus, he submitted that the authorities must act upon the report of the Dy. Superintendent of Land Records, and not as the Petitioner prayed. As such, he urged that the passing of the impugned order by the State Minister is illegal and perverse, and therefore prayed that it be set aside.

8. Mr. Kale, learned counsel for Respondent Nos. 5 and 6, has pointed out page nos. 50 to 52 and contended that the petitioner filed an application for the first time on 27th September, 2012, i.e. after forty years, wherein he stated the reasons for approaching the authority in the last paragraph of the application. Nowhere has he contended that he received less land than the actual land; instead, his grievance was that, under the said scheme, a thumb impression of one person was affixed to the possession receipts. The possession receipts do not bear the signatures. Therefore, the authority has erred in preparing the consolidation scheme; as such, the ground raised in the application appears to be different.

9. He further drew my attention to page nos. 44, 45, 53, 54 and 60 and submitted that in the statement no. 4, also no averment was found regarding receiving less land. On the other hand, the petitioner does not dispute the averment in the last paragraph of the said statement (page no.45) that "after consultation with each other and exchange of views, and taking into consideration the quality of the lands, the consolidation scheme was finalised", which itself indicates that the petitioner's father and the others had no grievances regarding the finalisation of the consolidation scheme. He further pointed out the possession receipt (page no. 48) and the petitioner's father's signature thereon. As such, he contended that the petitioner's father had not put a thumb impression but had signed the said possession receipt. Therefore, the averment in the application dated 27th September, 2012 (page no.52) was incorrect.

10. He showed the application dated 05th March, 2013 and clause nos. 3 and 4 of the same as well as paragraph no.15 and the last paragraph of the said application (page no.55), and canvassed that in the second application also, the petitioner has not raised the ground which he has raised in the petition, but vaguely averred that the officers of the consolidation scheme committed mistakes while preparing the scheme. Likewise, he has pointed out the last paragraph on page no. 60 of the report submitted by the Dy. Superintendent of Land Records, and argued that it does not reflect that the petitioner either made

an application or requested the correction of the statement in the consolidation scheme. Nevertheless, the Deputy Superintendent of Land Records, without the petitioner's request, prepared the report and submitted it. Therefore, the same cannot be taken into consideration.

11. He further pointed out communication dated 15th July, 2014, addressed to the petitioner by the District Superintendent of Land Records, wherein it was observed that the petitioner did not file any objection within thirty days after the publication of the scheme, and therefore, it would not be appropriate to take cognizance of the said complaint after a long period of sanction of the scheme. As such, the application was disposed of without any action. He further propounded that this Court, in Writ Petition No. 8228 of 2014, disposed of the petition filed by the petitioner, observing that an alternate remedy is available under the law. However, the authority and the petitioner have erred in interpreting the said order. This Court has only disposed of the matter. The said order was passed on 22nd September, 2014, but the petitioner did not approach the concerned authority until March 2015; thereafter, the petitioner filed an appeal before the Minister. He has taken me through the prayer clause of the said appeal memo and submitted that he did not seek any prayer for condonation of delay. He has also drawn my attention to the conclusion drawn by the Minister (page no.89) and submitted that the learned Minister has rightly observed that the contention of the petitioner regarding the determination of the question of the fraud allegedly committed against his father does not come within his purview/jurisdiction. Similarly, there is a delay in filing the application/ appeal. Therefore, the application/appeal is beyond the limitation, and it would not be appropriate to interfere with the order dated 15.07.2014. Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed.

12. He further drew my attention to Section 19(1) of the Maharashtra Prevention of Fragmentation and Consolidation of Holdings Act (for short, "the Act") and canvassed that, as per the mandate U/S 19(1), the aggrieved parties have to raise an objection within thirty days, however, the petitioner failed to raise any objection within the stipulated time. Alternatively, he argued that the petitioner's father had consented to the consolidation scheme and had signed the possession receipt. Therefore, the petitioner had no right to challenge the scheme as he is not concerned with it. He is a stranger to the said proceedings, and he has no right to raise the objection. Accordingly, he submitted that the learned Minister has rightly dismissed the Appeal.

13. He further pointed out Sections 35 and 36A of the Act, which read thus-

"36A. Bar of jurisdiction.— (1) No Civil Court or Mamlatdar's Court shall have jurisdiction to settle, decide, or deal with any question which is by or under this Act required to be settled, decided or dealt with by the State Government or any officer or authority.

(2) No order of the State Government or any such officer or authority made

under this Act shall be questioned in any Civil, Criminal or Mamlatdar's Court.

36B. Suits involving issues required to be decided under this Act.— (1)

.....

(2)

36C. Indemnity.—

14. To buttress his submission, he has relied on the following judgments:-

1. Manikrao Potanna Patil Vs. Chandar Satwaji (Deceased) By L.Rs. Narayan Chandar Chapale and Ors., Bombay High Court, Aurangabad Bench in Writ Petition No. 582 of 2019, Dt.10/11/2025;

2. Rangnath Nivrutti Dhavalshank Vs. State of Maharashtra and Ors., Bombay High Court, Aurangabad Bench in Writ Petition No. 11345 of 2015, Dt.21/09/2022;

3. Gulabrao Bhaurao Kakade (since deceased) By L.Rs. and Ors. Vs. Nivrutti Krishna Bhilare and Ors., 2001 (4) Mh.L.J. 31;

4. Suresh Babu Sankanna and Ors. Vs. State of Maharashtra and Ors., 2018 (4) Mh.L.J. 331;

5. M/s Aluwid Architectural Pvt. Ltd. And Ors. Vs. Housabai Jagannath Gavhane and Ors., Bombay High Court, Principal Seat in Writ Petition No. 12877 of 2022, Dt. 04/10/2023.

15. To respond to the law point, Mr. Hon, learned Senior Counsel, drew my attention to the order passed by the learned Minister (Pg.No.89) and submitted that the order passed by the Minister is contrary to the provisions of law. He further propounded that, as per Section 22, if the possession of the land had been taken from that date, the period of limitation would commence. However, in the case at hand, since no possession has been taken from the Petitioner's father or the Petitioner, and still the Petitioner is in possession of the same, the question of commencement of the limitation does not arise. Therefore, the judgments relied upon by learned counsel for the respondents are hardly of any assistance to him in support of his contention.

16. He has relied on the judgment of Tulsiram Shivram Dhondkar and Ors. Vs. State of Maharashtra and Ors. passed by this Court in Writ Petition No. 8737 of 2021 dated 12th October, 2023 and drew my attention to paragraph nos. 30, 31, 36, 37, 40, 41 and submitted that in the case in hand, no publication of the scheme came into force and due to non-compliance with the proper procedure, the question of limitation does not arise. Non-completion of the scheme would undoubtedly violate the petitioner's right under Article 300-A of the Constitution of India. He also argued that the possession receipt (Pg.No.48) is not a document to be considered in compliance with Section 22. Similarly, the document (Pg.No. 49) does not indicate that the scheme was implemented in

accordance with Section 22. Hence, he contended that the order passed by the Minister is illegal and liable to be quashed and set aside, and urged that the petition be allowed.

17. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and having gone through the impugned order/communications and record, the core issues that arise before me are as follows:-

(a) Whether the Application submitted by the petitioner before the authorities for reopening the consolidation scheme, which attained finality, could be said to be within the limitation or raising the grievance to modify/rectify the consolidation scheme, which attained finality, could be said to be within the limitation after a lapse of 38 years ?

(b) Whether any interference is required in the impugned order?

18. It is undisputed that on 20th March, 1974, the consolidated scheme was implemented in the village of Kashti and Survey Nos. 6/3, 6/6 and 6/7 were converted to Gut Nos. 1212, 1206 and 1208, respectively. The petitioner does not dispute that his father, Narsing Pachpute, was the owner of S. Nos. 6/3, 6/6 and 6/7, and when the consolidation scheme was implemented, his father was the owner of the said survey numbers. Also, Narsing Pachpute did not take the objection to the implementation of the said scheme during his lifetime.

19. Perused the application/representation dated 27th September, 2012 (Exh.'H', Pg. 50) of the Petitioner addressed to Respondent No.2 –

Deputy Director of Land Records, raising the grievance that the defects occurred while preparation of the consolidation scheme and in the division of lands, thereby causing inconvenience to him in the cultivation of his lands and therefore requested to rectify the said mistakes/errors. Accordingly, he has requested that the said errors be rectified. He further contended that no possession was taken by the authority, yet the Petitioner is in possession of the said land. However, due to the defective implementation of the consolidation scheme, it is inconvenient for him to cultivate his agricultural land. Therefore, he urged the authority to cancel the consolidation scheme implemented in 1974 and rectify the said error/defect. However, the learned authorities did not consider his contention and passed the order mechanically.

20. Undisputedly, the consolidation scheme was implemented in 1974. The petitioner filed an application/representation before Respondent No. 2 in 2012, i.e., 38 years after the scheme's implementation. It is also not in dispute that, from 1974, Narsing Pachpute, the Petitioner's father, who was the Landowner, did not raise any objection or grievance regarding the implementation of the defective consolidation scheme until his demise, i.e. until 2005, as informed by the learned Sr. Advocate. While dealing with the said controversy, it would be appropriate to refer to Section 32 of the Act, which empowers the Settlement Commissioner to vary the scheme on the ground of error, irregularity or

informality other than the errors referred to in Section 31A of the Act. Section 32 reads thus:-

“32. Power to vary scheme on the ground of error, irregularity, or informality.

— (1) If, after a scheme has come into force, it appears to the Settlement Commissioner that the scheme is defective on account of an error (other than that referred to in section 31A), irregularity or informality, the Settlement Commissioner shall publish a draft of such variation in the prescribed manner. The draft variation shall state every amendment proposed to be made in the scheme.

(2) Within one month of the date of publication of the draft variation, any person affected thereby may communicate in writing any objection to such variation to the Settlement Commissioner.

(3) After receiving the objections under sub-section (2), the Settlement Commissioner may, after making such enquiry as he may think fit, make the variation with or without modification or may not make any variation.

(3A) If the scheme is varied under sub-section (3), a notification stating that the scheme has been varied shall be published in the Official Gazette, and the scheme so varied shall be published in the prescribed manner in the village or villages concerned.

(4) From the date of the notification [stating that the scheme has been varied], the variation shall take effect as if it were incorporated in the scheme.”

21. Section 32 empowers the Settlement Commissioner to vary the scheme on account of an error other than referred under Section 31A, irregularity or informality after following the procedure prescribed. Though there is no time limit prescribed under Section 32(1) for the Settlement Commissioner to vary the scheme which has come into force, obviously, even in the absence of any period prescribed under Section 32, or if it does not specify any period of limitation, within which an objection can be raised to the consolidation scheme, ordinarily, the said power can only be exercised within a reasonable period in any case. What would be the reasonable period for the exercise of power under Section 32(1) by the Settlement Commissioner may depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. Notably, where no period of limitation is stipulated, this court has repeatedly ruled that, ordinarily, the exercise of such power is construed to be three years. Thus, in my view, after three years of finalisation of the scheme under Section 22, it may not be justified to apply for rectification of the land area under the consolidation scheme. In the facts and circumstances of the present case, the exercise of power by the respondent authorities to vary/rectify the scheme which came into force in 1974 by initiating proceedings in 2012 cannot be said to be within a reasonable time.

22. Evidently, neither Section 31A nor Section 32 of the Act prescribes a time limit for the Settlement Commissioner to vary the scheme. Nonetheless, it does

not imply that the Settlement Commissioner has any authority to correct or vary the scheme at any point in time.

23. It is construed that even in the absence of a statutory presumption of time, the power can only be exercised within a reasonable period. In the very nature of things, the reasonableness of the period for exercise of such power would hinge upon the attendant facts and circumstances of the case. However, where no period of limitation is stipulated, ordinarily the reasonable time to exercise the power is considered to be of three years.

24. This Court, in Suresh Bapu Sankanna (supra), while dealing with the issue regarding limitation, after relying on the law laid down in 'Gulabrao Kakade's' (Supra) case in paragraph no.12 has categorically observed that "any application seeking modification of finalised consolidation scheme under Section 32 of the said Act, has to be made within three years of finalisation of the scheme. This position of law has been followed consistently by this Court".

25. In Santoshkumar Shivgonda Patil & Ors. Vs. Balasaheb Tukaram Shevale & Ors., reported in 2009 (9) SCC 352, the Apex Court categorically laid down the law that "where the legislature does not provide for any length of time within which the power of revision is to be exercised by the authority, suo moto or otherwise, it is plain that exercise of such power within reasonable time is inherent therein. Ordinarily, the reasonable period within which the power of revision may be exercised would be three years."

26. Similarly, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in North Eastern Chemicals Industries (P) Ltd. And Ors. Vs. Ashok Paper Mill (Assam) Ltd. And Ors., reported in AIR 2024 SC 436 held that "in the absence of any particular period of time being prescribed to file an appeal, the same would be governed by the principle of 'reasonable time', for which, by virtue of its very nature, no straitjacket formula can be laid down and it is to be determined as per the facts and circumstances of each case."

27. Perused the judgment in Tulsiram Shivram Dhondkar (supra) and also gone through paragraph nos. 30, 31, 36, 37, 40 and 41, as pointed out by learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner, wherein the facts are different from the case at hand. In Tulsiram's case, the consolidation scheme was not finalised/confirmed by following the due process of law. Therefore, this Court has observed that the power under Section 32 of the Act to vary the scheme could be exercised as the scheme was not confirmed, and thus, the limitation does not commence.

28. In the said case in para 10, the Court framed the moot question that arose for determination as "whether the Writ Petition can be entertained where the alternate remedy of revision is available".

29. While replying to the said question in para 13, the Court held that

"the restriction in exercise of writ jurisdiction on the face of availability of the alternate remedy of revision is a self-imposed restraint, hence the Court can

entertain the Writ jurisdiction and proceed to entertain the Writ Petition.”

30. In para 14, the Court has candidly observed that “it is well settled that the scheme enforced under the Act cannot be varied after a long period, i.e. ordinarily beyond three years of the scheme coming into force under Section 22 of the Act.” However, in order to ascertain the date from which the period of limitation would commence to challenge the scheme, the Court has examined the consolidation scheme that came into force under Section 22 of the Act and dealt with it.

31. This Court in *Tulsiram Shivram Dhondkar’s* case (Supra), on which the learned Advocate for the Petitioner is relying, in para 14, clearly opined that “the scheme enforced under the Act cannot be varied after a long period, i.e. ordinarily beyond three years of the scheme coming into force under Section 22 of the Act.” In the case at hand, the Petitioner doesn’t dispute that the scheme came into force in 1974. His grievance is only that the defects occurred in the division of lands and in the preparation of the consolidation scheme, thereby causing inconvenience to him in the cultivation of his lands. Therefore, he requested that the said mistakes/errors be rectified. While implementing the scheme, some defects occurred; consequently, he made a representation to have them corrected. That being so, the observation made in *Tulshiram’s* case is hardly of any assistance to the Petitioner in support of his case, as he does not dispute the implementation of the scheme.

32. Moreover, in the case at hand, admittedly, for a period of thirty-five years, the original owner, during his lifetime until 2005 and after his demise, the petitioner has not taken steps to rectify the mistake that occurred while implementing the consolidation scheme. As a consequence, the petitioner failed to demonstrate that he had filed the application/representation within a reasonable period of limitation from the implementation of the Scheme. Hence, I answer Point No. (I) in the negative.

33. Apart from this during the argument, learned counsel for Respondent Nos. 5 and 6 has drawn my attention to the statement made by the owner of the land before the Settlement Officer (Exh. D Pg.44 & 45) and submitted that in the said statement, father of the petitioner - Narsingh Pachpute and other land owners, after consultation with each other, had given their consent for carrying out the divisions and consolidation of the lands as per their qualities and thereby given consent to implementation of the consolidation scheme. They also agreed not to make any grievance regarding the possession of the lands received under the consolidation scheme. Thus, it appears that the petitioner's father consented to the implementation of the consolidation scheme. It is to be noted that during his lifetime until 2005, the father of the petitioner had not raised any objection/grievance about the said settlement or implementation of the scheme, nor had he denied his signature on the possession receipt of the land, nor raised any grievance regarding the possession receipt of the land. Therefore, it would not be appropriate for the petitioner to raise the said objection/grievance after his

demise.

34. Learned counsel also submitted that the father of the petitioner was not aware of the scheme, and behind his back, his thumb impression was obtained. However, on perusal of Form 5 (Pg. 48), it reveals that the father of the petitioner made a signature on the said form and gave an acknowledgement about the receipt of possession of the land. During his lifetime, the original landowner, Narsingh Pachpute, neither denied his signature on form No. 5 nor disputed the said document; therefore, an adverse inference can be drawn that the said document was executed by Narsingh Pachpute, in the absence of any material to show that it was forged. Therefore, I also do not find substance in the contention of the petitioner in that regard.

35. During the argument, Mr. Hon, learned senior counsel, drew my attention to the communication dated 16th December, 2013, which was addressed to the District Superintendent of Land Records by the Deputy

Superintendent of Land Records, wherein he admitted that the map was not prepared as per the statement recorded by the Settlement Officer. Therefore, he submitted to the District Superintendent of Land Records for rectification of the error that occurred while implementing the consolidation in respect of Gut No. 1206. Hence, he submitted that the said communication itself indicates that, during the implementation of the scheme, an error occurred and that the petitioner is therefore entitled to rectify the mistake.

36. However, as stated above, the petitioner failed to apply within a reasonable period of limitation. The original owner, i.e. father of the petitioner, did not raise any objection during his lifetime regarding the implementation of the scheme, nor did he make any grievance that he had not signed the possession receipt of the land or that the authorities had incorrectly divided and consolidated the lands in question. On the contrary, in his statement, he candidly admitted that he consented to the implementation of the consolidation scheme and acknowledged the receipt of possession of the land. Therefore, I do not find any merit in his contention in that regard.

37. Besides, it is imperative to note that the Consolidation Scheme was fully implemented prior to 1975. In this backdrop, the exercise of the power to embark upon an enquiry to vary the scheme after a lapse of 38 years from the settlement of the scheme, inevitably entails the consequence of unsettling the settled claims.

38. Having gone through the judgments cited by learned Senior Counsel/counsel for the parties, it seems that the facts and grounds raised in *Tulsiram Shivram Dhondkar* (supra) are distinct from the case at hand, and therefore, the observations in the said judgment are of hardly any assistance to the Petitioner. On the contrary, dictum laid down in *Manikrao Potanna Pati* (supra), *Rangnath Nivrutti Dhavalshank* (supra), *Gulabrao Bhaurao Kakade* (supra), *Suresh Babu Sankanna* (supra) and *M/s Aluwid Architectural Pvt. Ltd* (supra) are clearly

applicable to the facts of the case at hand.

39. Perused the impugned order. The learned State Minister, after considering the rival contentions, in the concluding paragraph nos. 1, 2 and 3, has categorically held that the petitioner failed to apply within a reasonable period of limitation. Also, the petitioner's grievance that the authorities have cheated his father by preparing a forged possession receipt does not fall within his purview/ambit; therefore, it was held that it is not within his jurisdiction to determine the same. Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed.

40. Learned senior counsel failed to point out any illegality or perversity in the impugned order to interfere in the writ jurisdiction. On the contrary, the order passed by the learned Minister appears to be just, legal, and proper, and no interference is required in it.

41. Consequently, the writ petition, being bereft of merits, stands dismissed. Rule is discharged. No order as to costs.