

(2018) 12 CAT CK 0111

In the Central Administrative Tribunal

Case No : Review Application No. 251 Of 2018, Miscellaneous Application No. 5087 Of 2018, Original Application No. 997 Of 2016

Raj Kumari

APPELLANT

Vs

Union Of India And Anr

RESPONDENT

Date of Decision : 11-12-2018

Acts Referred:

Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 — Section 22(3)(f)
Code Of Civil Procedure, 1908 — Section 114, Order 47 Rule 1
Constitution Of India, 1950 — Article 226

Citation : (2018) 12 CAT CK 0111

Hon'ble Judges : Nita Chowdhury, Member (A)

Bench : Single Bench

Advocate : R. Satish Kumar

Final Decision : Dismissed

Judgement

1. This MA has been filed by the applicant seeking condonation of delay in filing the Review Application, vide which the applicant is seeking to review the Order passed on 26.9.2018 passed in OA 997/2016, and sought condonation of delay of 39 days in filing the Review Application. The instant MA as well as RA was filed on 4.12.2018.

2. As per the provisions of Section 22(3)(f) of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, the review has to be filed within 30 days from the date of receipt of a copy of the order sought to be reviewed. The applicant has pleaded in the instant MA that applicant came to know about the said Order in the month of October and thereafter she approached the Delhi State Legal Service Authority and the Legal Service Authority on 26.10.2018 had marked the matter to the present advocate and thereafter the applicant approached the said marked advocate after collecting the entire necessary documents in the month of November and the instant RA as well as MA have been filed on 4.12.2018. As per the applicant's own averments, when this matter was marked to certain advocate on

26.10.2018, the present MA as well as RA at least ought to have been filed before 26.11.2018. But the present RA has been filed after the said date. However, taking a lenient view, this Court allows the present MA. Accordingly, the delay in filing the Review Application is condoned.

3. This Court perused the said Order under Review as well as Review Application. The grounds taken in the present Review Application are not based on any error apparent on the face of record. In fact, the review applicant is questioning the conclusion arrived at by this Bench in the said Order. If this Court agrees to his prayer, this Court would be going into the merits of the case again and re-writing another judgment of the same case. By doing so, this Court would be acting as an appellate authority, which is not permissible in review. In the case of *Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma vs. Aribam Pishak Sharma*, [AIR 1979 SC 1047], the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as follows:-

"It is true as observed by this Court in *Shivdeo Singh v. State of Punjab*, AIR 1963 SC 1909, there is nothing in Article 226 of the Constitution to preclude a High Court from exercising the power of review which is inherent in every Court of plenary jurisdiction to prevent miscarriage of justice or to correct grave and palpable errors committed by it. But, there are definitive limits to the exercise of the power of review. The power of review may be exercised on the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence was not within the knowledge of the person seeking the review or could not be produced by him at the time when the order was made; it may be exercised where some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record is found; it may also be exercised on any analogous ground. But, it may not be exercised on the ground that the decision was erroneous on merits. That would be the province of a Court of appeal. A power of review is not to be confused with appellate power which may enable an Appellate Court to correct all matters or errors committed by the Subordinate Court."

Again in the case of *Ajit Kumar Rath vs. State of Orissa and others*, 1999 (9) SCC 596, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as follows:-

"The provisions extracted above indicate that the power of review available to the Tribunal is the same as has been given to a court under Section 114 read with Order 47 CPC. The power is not absolute and is hedged in by the restrictions indicated in Order 47. The power can be exercised on the application of a person on the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the order was made. The power can also be exercised on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record or for any other sufficient reason. A review cannot be claimed or asked for merely for a fresh hearing or arguments or correction of an erroneous view taken earlier, that is to say, the power of review can be exercised only for correction of a patent error of law or fact which stares in the face without any elaborate argument being needed for establishing it. It may be pointed out that the expression "any

other sufficient reason" used in Order 47 Rule 1 means a reason sufficiently analogous to those specified in the rule.

Any other attempt, except an attempt to correct an apparent error or an attempt not based on any ground set out in Order 47, would amount to an abuse of the liberty given to the Tribunal under the Act to review its judgment."

[Emphasis added]

In the case of Gopal Singh vs. State Cadre Forest Officers' Assn. and others, (2007 (9) SCC 369), the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as follows:-

"The learned counsel for the State also pointed out that there was no necessity whatsoever on the part of the Tribunal to review its own judgment. Even after the microscopic examination of the judgment of the Tribunal we could not find a single reason in the whole judgment as to how the review was justified and for what reasons. No apparent error on the face of the record was pointed, nor was it discussed. Thereby the Tribunal sat as an appellate authority over its own judgment. This was completely impermissible and we agree with the High Court (Justice Sinha) that the Tribunal has traveled out of its jurisdiction to write a second order in the name of reviewing its own judgment. In fact the learned counsel for the appellant did not address us on this very vital aspect."

4. Thus, on the basis of the above citations and observations made hereinabove, this Court comes to the conclusion that it was not open to the review applicant to question the merits of the decision taken by this Tribunal. In fact, he could have pointed out only some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record or for any other sufficient reason or on the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the order was made, but no such thing is pointed out in any of the grounds taken in the Review Application. As such this Review Application is devoid of merit and the same is accordingly dismissed in circulation.