
(1991) 10 SC CK 0042

In the Supreme Court Of India

Case No : Civil Appeal No. 1677 of 1984

Sanganer Dal and Flour Mill

APPELLANT

Vs

F.C.I. and others

RESPONDENT

Date of Decision : 22-10-1991

Acts Referred:

Arbitration Act, 1940 — Section 20

Constitution of India, 1950 — Article 136

Partnership Act, 1932 — Section 18, 19(1), 19(2), 22

Citation : AIR 1992 SC 481 : (1992) 1 BC 187 : (1991) 5 JT 355 : (1992) 1 OLR 1 : (1991) 2 SCALE 983 : (1992) 1 SCC 145 : (1991) 1 SCR 542 Supp : (1992) 1 UJ 471

Hon'ble Judges : Yogeshwar Dayal, J;K. Ramaswamy, J

Bench : Division Bench

Advocate : S. K. Jain, Pratibha Jain and Sudhanshu Atreya, for the Appellant; C.K. Sucharita, Y. Prabhakara Rao (N.P.) and Ganpathi Iyer Gopalkrishnan, for the Respondent

Final Decision : dismissed

Judgement

1. This appeal by special leave under Article 136 of the Constitution is against the order of the High Court of Rajasthan dated July 7, 1983. The appellant a partnership firm consists of nine partners of which Satya Narain is one of the partners. On July 25, 1973 Satya Narain submitted a tender to the respondents offering to supply 1000 quintals of Gram Dal at the rate of Rs. 185/- per bag. This was accepted by the respondents by letter dated August 28, 1973 followed by confirmation letter by the firm on August 31, 1973. It is the case of the respondents that the appellant committed breach of the contract and as a result, the respondents filed an application u/s 20 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 (for short as the 'Act') before the District Court for making reference for arbitration in terms of the contract. The Addl. District Judge after considering the evidence and the objections allowed the application and referred the dispute for arbitration. Against that order, the appeal was filed and the High Court confirmed the order

of the Addl. District Judge.

2. The contention raised by Sri Sushil Kumar Jain, learned Counsel for the appellant is that by operation of Section 19(2)(a) of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932 (for short as the 'Partnership Act') there is no implied authority given to one of the partners to refer the dispute relating to the business of the firm for arbitration and therefore the reference made by the court, pursuant to a contract entered into by Satya Narain on behalf of the firm, is without jurisdiction. The High Court found as a fact that none of the partners have entered into the witness box to deny the validity of the contract nor raised any objection that they had not authorised Satya Narain to enter into the contract nor that they were bound by any acts done by him. It is also found that Satya Narain signed the tender and at that time no other partners raised objection regarding the signing of the tender by Satya Narain on behalf of the firm. In view of these facts it is clear that they ratified the contract. It is also further to be noted that in terms of the contract, the corporation had appropriated the security deposit made by the appellant-firm and that was not objected to at any time. This itself would fortify the conclusion that the firm had entered into a binding contract with the corporation and contract contained the arbitration clause which binds the partners. The contention raised that the contract is void and that in terms of the contract, making a reference is without jurisdiction bears no substance.

3. The High Court found that Satya Narain has implied power to conduct business on behalf of the partnership firm and the implied authority binds all the partners. Section 18 of the Partnership Act postulates that "subject to the provisions of the Act a partner is the agent of the firm for the purposes of the business of the firm". Section 19(1) adumbrates that "subject to the provisions of Section 22 the act of the partners which is done to carry on in the usual way the business of the kind carried on by the firm, binds the firm". Thus, Satya Narain has implied authority to enter into the contract with the corporation to supply the Dal of 1000 quintals at the contracted rate which is the usual course of the business of the appellant. But it is settled law that the operation of Sections 18 & 19(1) is subject to the exceptions engrafted in Sub-section (2) of Section 19. Section 19(2)(a) provides that in the absence of any usage or custom of trade to the contrary, the implied authority of a partner does not empower him to submit a dispute relating to the business of the firm to arbitration. Satya Narain has power to do business on behalf of the firm and in exercise thereof he entered into the contract with the corporation during the usual control of business to supply the Dal. Then crucial question is whether a valid contract which was not repudiated as per law, binds the other partners? Our answer is yes. It is not in dispute that the contract engrafts an arbitration clause and in terms thereof the dispute is to be referred to the arbitration. Therefore, the reference made by the Addl. District Judge u/s 20 of the Arbitration Act is perfectly within the jurisdiction and in terms of the contract. It is not the case of the partners that the firm is not carrying on the business of the supply of Dal and that Satya Narain, as found by the Trial Court, was authorised to do business on behalf of the firm.

4. Under those circumstances, the reference is clearly valid. We do not find any illegality to interfere with the order of the High Court.

5. In this view, the decisions in Gopal Das Vs. Baij Nath and Others ; Rajendra Prosad Vs. Panna Lal-Champa Lal and Another, ; AIR 1934 485 (Lahore) ; Sohanlal v. Firm Madharam Banwarilal AIR 1952 Punj 240; and Alazappa Cotton Mills v. Indo Burma Trading Corporation AIR 1976 Mad 79; cited by learned Counsel are of little assistance to the appellant. In M/s. Alazappa Cotton Mills case the original contract does not contain arbitration clause. In a separate letter with a rubber stamp (facsimile) of the firm one of the partners agreed for reference to arbitration. On those facts it was held that the reference does not bind the other partners. The appeal is accordingly dismissed. Since we do not call upon the respondents to argue, there will be no order as to costs.