

(2013) 10 GUJ CK 0057
In the Gujarat High Court

Case No : Special Civil Application No. 15361 of 2013

Shivji Siddhnath Ram

APPELLANT

Vs

State of Gujarat and Others

RESPONDENT

Date of Decision : 25-10-2013

Acts Referred:

Citation : (2013) 10 GUJ CK 0057

Hon'ble Judges : S.G. Shah, J

Bench : Single Bench

Advocate : Matafer R. Pande, for the Petitioners No. 1, for the Appellant;
Moksha Thakkar, A.G.P. for the Respondent(s) No. 1, for the Respondent

Final Decision : Allowed

Judgement

S.G. Shah, J.—Heard learned counsel for the parties. This petition is directed against the order of detention dated 13/02/2013 passed by respondent No. 2, in exercise of powers conferred u/s 3[2] of the Gujarat Prevention of Anti Social Activities Act, 1985 [for short "the Act"] by detaining the detinue as a "dangerous person" as defined u/s 2[c] of the Act.

2. Learned advocate for the detinue submits that the order of detention impugned in this petition deserves to be quashed and set aside and the ground that the registration of solitary offence by itself cannot bring the case of the detinue within the purview of definition of "dangerous person" u/s 2[c] of the Act. Learned counsel for the detinue further submits that the illegal activity carried out as alleged, cannot have any nexus or bearing with the maintenance of the public order and at the most it can be said to be breach of law and order. Further, except statements of witnesses and registration of FIR, no other relevant or cogent material is available on record connecting the alleged anti-social activities of the detinue with breach of the public order.

3. Learned counsel for the detinue, placing reliance on the decisions reported in the cases of [i] Ranubhai Bhikhabhai Bharwad (Vekaria) Vs. State of Gujarat, [ii]

Ashokbhai Jivraj @ Jivabhai Solanki Vs. Police Commissioner, and [iii] Mustakmiya Jabbarmiya Shaikh Vs. M.M. Mehta, Commissioner of Police and Others, submitted that the case on hand is squarely covered by the ratio laid down in the aforesaid decisions. Learned counsel for the detainee further submits that it is not possible to hold in the facts of the present case that the activities of the detainee with reference to the criminal cases had affected even tempo of the society, posing a threat to the very existence of the normal and routine life of the people at large or that on the basis of the criminal cases, the detainee had put the entire social apparatus in disorder, making it difficult for whole system to exist as a system governed by the rule of law by disturbing the public order.

4. Learned AGP for the respondent ? State supported the detention order passed by the authority and submitted that the detainee is a dangerous person and sufficient material and evidence was found during the course of investigation, which was also supplied to the detainee, indicating that the detainee is in habit of indulging into activities as defined u/s 2[c] of the Act and considering the facts of the case, the detaining authority has rightly passed the order of detention and the detention order deserves to be upheld by this Court.

5. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and considering the facts and circumstances of the case, it appears that the subjective satisfaction arrived at by the detaining authority cannot be said to be legal, valid and in accordance with law inasmuch as the offences alleged in the FIR cannot has any bearing on the public order since the law of the land i.e. Indian Penal Code and other relevant penal laws are sufficient enough to take care of the situation and that the allegations as have been levelled against the detainee cannot be said to be germane for the purpose of bringing the detainee as a dangerous person within the meaning of section 2[c] of the Act and, unless and until the material is there to make out a case that the person concerned has become a threat and a menace to the society so as to disturb the whole tempo of the society and that the whole social apparatus is in peril disturbing public order at the instance of such person, it cannot be said that the detainee is a dangerous person within the meaning of Section 2[c] of the Act. Except general statement, there is no material on record which shows that the detainee is acting in such a manner which is dangerous to the public order. In view of the ratio laid down by the Hon"ble Supreme Court in the cases of [i] Ranubhai Bhikhabhai Bharwad [supra], [ii] Ashokbhai Jivraj @ Jivabhai Solanki [supra] and [iii] Mustakmiya Jabbarmiya Shaikh [supra], the Court is of the opinion that the activities of the detainee cannot be said to be dangerous to the maintenance of public order and at the most fall under the maintenance of "law and order". Further, there are serious allegations against the petitioner. On perusal of the jail record it seems that police has not taken proper care in investigating offences and petitioner was arrested only on presumption and therefore I to not see any reason to detain the petitioner by confirming the detention order. However, it is made clear that this order will not influence the trial in any manner.

6. In view of the above, I am inclined to allow this petition because simplicitor registration of FIRs by itself cannot have any nexus with the breach of maintenance of public order and the authority can take recourse under the Indian Penal Code and no other relevant or cogent material exists for invoking powers u/s 3[2] of the Act.

7. If we peruse the citations, it becomes clear that even the Hon"ble Supreme Court has considered that detention is not permitted even in the case of robbery and theft. The present is the case of section 25(1)(B)(A) of the Arms Act. Moreover, the competent authority has assigned such a reason that since they are unable to take action under sections 107 and 110 of the Criminal Procedure Code [Cr.P.C.], they are detaining the detainee. Unfortunately and surprisingly the authority has disclosed in the impugned order that they do not believe in taking action under sections 107 and 110 of the Cr.P.C. and instead of following such rule of law, they selected to pass an order of detention. Therefore, the Court has no option but to allow the petition.

8. The petitioner has argues on merits of FIR, referring certain judgments. However, discussion of such facts, prima facie at this stage, is not warranted since it may otherwise prejudice to the trial.

9. However, since all such orders are quashed on technical ground, the same shall not come in the way of the Detaining Authority to pass an appropriate order in future. In the result, the petition is allowed. The order of detention dated 13/02/2013 passed by the respondent No. 2 is quashed and set aside. The detainee is ordered to be set at liberty forthwith if not required in connection with any other case. Rule is made absolute accordingly. Direct service permitted.