

(2018) 03 MP CK 0109
In the Madhya Pradesh High Court
Case No : MCRC NO.11127 OF 2018

Sonu Shukla & Anr.

APPELLANT

Vs

State Of Madhya Pradesh & Anr

RESPONDENT

Date of Decision : 21-03-2018

Acts Referred:

Constitution of India — Article 226
Code Of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — Section 482
Indian Penal Code, 1860 — Section 34, 120B, 294, 323, 467, 506
Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 — Section 3(1)®, 3(1)(s), 3(2)(va)

Citation : (2018) 03 MP CK 0109

Hon'ble Judges : G.S. AHLUWALIA, J

Bench : Single Bench

Advocate : Rajesh Kumar Shukla, R.V.S. Ghuraiya

Final Decision : Dismissed

Judgement

This application under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. has been filed for quashing the charge sheet and the order dated 20.2.2018 by which the Special Judge

(Atrocities) Morena has taken cognizance against the applicants for offence punishable under Sections 294, 323, 506, 34 of IPC and under Sections

3(1) (r), 3(1)(s) and 3(2)(va) of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act in Special Case No.22/2018.

The necessary facts for the disposal of the present application in short are that respondent No.2 had lodged the report against the applicants at Police

Station Ambah, District Morena alleging that on 17.4.2017 at about 10:30 in the night, when he was doing the work at Chirpura Road by JCB

Machine, at that time the applicants came there and instructed him to stop the work. When the complainant informed them that he should talk to one

Neetu Tomar who is the Vice President of Municipal Council, then both of them started abusing him and beaten him by means of kicks and fists, as a

result of which he has sustained injuries on various parts of his body. The police after registering the FIR, recorded the statements of the witnesses,

collected the caste certificate of the complainant and after completing the investigation, filed the charge sheet for offence under Sections 294, 323,

506, 34 of IPC and under Sections 3(1) (r), 3(1)(s) and 3(2)(va) of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act.

It is submitted by the counsel for the applicants that in the FIR, there is no allegation that the applicants in any manner had humiliated or insulted the

complainant by calling him by his caste name. The case diary statement of the complainant was recorded and in that statement he has not disclosed

the actual words uttered by the applicants but has merely stated that he was abused by his caste name. The police had also recorded the statement of

one Neetu @ Rajendra Singh who has stated that the applicants had humiliated the complainant by calling him by his caste name. It is submitted that

at this stage, as the complainant has not stated that he was ever humiliated by the applicants by calling by his caste name, therefore, no offence under

Sections 3(1) (r), 3(1)(s) and 3(2)(va) of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act would be made out. It is further

submitted that the case diary statement of independent witness Neetu @ Rajendra Singh cannot be believed in the light of the case diary statement of

the complainant.

Per contra, it is submitted by the counsel for the respondent/State that at this stage, the meticulous appreciation of evidence is not permissible. The

charge sheet can be quashed only when it does not disclose the commission of offence. Whether the statement of Neetu @ Rajendra Singh is reliable

or not cannot be a subject matter of proceeding under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. A charge sheet can be quashed only when this Court comes to a

conclusion that even accepting the entire allegations as gospel truth, the same does not disclose the commission of offence. In the present case, the

complainant has specifically stated that he was humiliated and insulted by calling him by his caste name whereas Neetu @ Rajendra Singh has

specifically narrated the actual words uttered by the applicants thereby humiliating and insulting the complainant by calling him by his caste name.

Heard the learned counsel for the parties.

Before considering the submissions made by the counsel for the parties, it would be necessary to consider the scope of powers under Section 482 of

Cr.P.C.

The Supreme Court in the case of Padal Venkata Rama Reddy Vs. Koveuri Satyanarayana Reddy reported in (2011) 12 SCC 437 has held as under:

“8. Section 482 of the Code deals with inherent power of the High Court. It is under Chapter 37 of the Code titled “Miscellaneous” which

reads as under:

“482. Saving of inherent powers of High Court.—“Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to

make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any court or

otherwise to secure the ends of justice.” This section* was added by the Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act of 1923 as the High Courts

were unable to render complete justice even if in a given case the illegality was palpable and apparent. This section envisages three circumstances in

which the inherent jurisdiction may be exercised, namely:

1. to give effect to any order under CrPC,
2. to prevent abuse of the process of any court,
3. to secure the ends of justice.

9. In R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab AIR 1960 SC 866 this Court laid down the following principles:

(i) Where institution/continuance of criminal proceedings against an accused may amount to the abuse of the process of the court or that the quashing

of the impugned proceedings would secure the ends of justice;

(ii) where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance of the said proceeding e.g. want of sanction;

(iii) where the allegations in the first information report or the complaint taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not constitute the

offence alleged; and

(iv) where the allegations constitute an offence alleged but there is either no legal evidence adduced or evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to

prove the charge.

10. In *State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy* (1977) 2 SCC 699 this Court has held as under: (SCC p. 703, para 7) “In the exercise of this

wholesome power, the High Court is entitled to quash a proceeding if it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue would be an

abuse of the process of the Court or that the ends of justice require that the proceeding ought to be quashed. The saving of the High Court’s

inherent powers, both in civil and criminal matters, is designed to achieve a salutary public purpose which is that a court proceeding ought not to be

permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment or persecution. In a criminal case, the veiled object behind a lame prosecution, the very nature

of the material on which the structure of the prosecution rests and the like would justify the High Court in quashing the proceeding in the interest of

justice. The ends of justice are higher than the ends of mere law though justice has got to be administered according to laws made by the legislature.

The compelling necessity for making these observations is that without a proper realisation of the object and purpose of the provision which seeks to

save the inherent powers of the High Court to do justice between the State and its subjects, it would be impossible to appreciate the width and

contours of that salient jurisdiction.”

11. Though the High Court has inherent power and its scope is very wide, it is a rule of practice that it will only be exercised in exceptional cases.

Section 482 is a sort of reminder to the High Courts that they are not merely courts of law, but also courts of justice and possess inherent powers to

remove injustice. The inherent power of the High Court is an inalienable attribute of the position it holds with respect to the courts subordinate to it.

These powers are partly administrative and partly judicial. They are necessarily judicial when they are exercisable with respect to a judicial order and

for securing the ends of justice. The jurisdiction under Section 482 is discretionary, therefore the High Court may refuse to exercise the discretion if a

party has not approached it with clean hands.

12. In a proceeding under Section 482, the High Court will not enter into any finding of facts, particularly, when the matter has been concluded by

concurrent finding of facts of the two courts below. Inherent powers under Section 482 include powers to quash FIR, investigation or any criminal

proceedings pending before the High Court or any court subordinate to it and are

of wide magnitude and ramification. Such powers can be exercised to secure ends of justice, prevent abuse of the process of any court and to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code, depending upon the facts of a given case. The Court can always take note of any miscarriage of justice and prevent the same by exercising its powers under Section 482 of the Code. These powers are neither limited nor curtailed by any other provisions of the Code. However, such inherent powers are to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution.

13. It is well settled that the inherent powers under Section 482 can be exercised only when no other remedy is available to the litigant and not in a situation where a specific remedy is provided by the statute. It cannot be used if it is inconsistent with specific provisions provided under the Code

(vide *Kavita v. State* 2000 Cri LJ 315 and *B.S. Joshi v. State of Haryana* (2003) 4 SCC 675). If an effective alternative remedy is available, the High

Court will not exercise its powers under this section, specially when the applicant may not have availed of that remedy.

14. The inherent power is to be exercised *ex debito justitiae*, to do real and substantial justice, for administration of which alone courts exist. Wherever any attempt is made to abuse that authority so as to produce injustice, the Court has power to prevent the abuse. It is, however, not necessary that at

this stage there should be a meticulous analysis of the case before the trial to find out whether the case ends in conviction or acquittal. (Vide

Dhanalakshmi v. R. Prasanna Kumar 1990 Supp SCC 686; *Ganesh Narayan Hegde v. S. Bangarappa* (1995) 4 SCC 41 and *Zandu Pharmaceutical*

Works Ltd. v. Mohd. Sharaful Haque (2005) 1 SCC 122.)

15. It is neither feasible nor practicable to lay down exhaustively as to on what ground the jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code

should be exercised. But some attempts have been made in that behalf in some of the decisions of this Court vide *State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal*

1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, *Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary* (1992) 4 SCC 305, *Rupan Deol Bajaj v. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill* (1995) 6 SCC 194 and *Indian*

Oil Corpn. v. NEPC India Ltd. (2006) 6 SCC 736.

18. In *State of Orissa v. Saroj Kumar Sahoo* (2005) 13 SCC 540 it has been held that probabilities of the prosecution version cannot be analysed at

this stage. Likewise, the allegations of mala fides of the informant are of

secondary importance. The relevant passage reads thus: (SCC p. 550, para 11) It would not be proper for the High Court to analyse the case of the complainant in the light of all probabilities in order to determine whether a conviction would be sustainable and on such premises arrive at a conclusion that the proceedings are to be quashed. It would be erroneous to assess the material before it and conclude that the complaint cannot be proceeded with.

19. In *Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia v. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre* (1988) 1SCC 692 this Court held as under: (SCC p.695, para 7)

7. The legal position is well settled that when a prosecution at the initial stage is asked to be quashed, the test to be applied by the court is as to

whether the uncontroverted allegations as made prima facie establish the offence. It is also for the court to take into consideration any special features

which appear in a particular case to consider whether it is expedient and in the interest of justice to permit a prosecution to continue. This is so on the

basis that the court cannot be utilised for any oblique purpose and where in the opinion of the court chances of an ultimate conviction is bleak and,

therefore, no useful purpose is likely to be served by allowing a criminal prosecution to continue, the court may while taking into consideration the

special facts of a case also quash the proceeding even though it may be at a preliminary stage.

20. This Court, while reconsidering the judgment in *Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia* (1988) 1 SCC 692, has consistently observed that where matters are

also of civil nature i.e. matrimonial, family disputes, etc., the Court may consider special facts, special features and quash the criminal

proceedings to encourage genuine settlement of disputes between the parties.

21. The said judgment in *Madhavrao* case (1988) 1 SCC 692 was reconsidered and explained by this Court in *State of Bihar v. P.P. Sharma* 1992

Supp (1) SCC 222 which reads as under: (SCC p. 271, para 70) 70. *Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia v. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre* (1988) 1

SCC 692 also does not help the respondents. In that case the allegations constituted civil wrong as the trustees created tenancy of trust property to

favour the third party. A private complaint was laid for the offence under Section 467 read with Section 34 and Section 120-B IPC which the High

Court refused to quash under Section 482. This Court allowed the appeal and

quashed the proceedings on the ground that even on its own contentions in the complaint, it would be a case of breach of trust or a civil wrong but no ingredients of criminal offence were made out. On those facts and also due to the relation of the settler, the mother, the appellant and his wife, as the son and daughter-in-law, this Court interfered and allowed the appeal.â? Therefore, the ratio therein is of no assistance to the facts in this case. It cannot be considered that this Court laid down as a proposition of law that in every case the court would examine at the preliminary stage whether there would be ultimate chances of conviction on the basis of allegation and exercise of the power under Section 482 or Article 226 to quash the proceedings or the charge-sheet.â??

22. Thus, the judgment in *Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia* (1988) 1 SCC 692 does not lay down a law of universal application. Even as per the law laid down therein, the Court cannot examine the facts/evidence, etc. in every case to find out as to whether there is sufficient material on the basis of which the case would end in conviction. The ratio of *Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia* (1988) 1 SCC 692 is applicable in cases where the Court finds that the dispute involved therein is predominantly civil in nature and that the parties should be given a chance to reach a compromise e.g. matrimonial, property and family disputes, etc. etc. The superior courts have been given inherent powers to prevent the abuse of the process of court; where the Court finds that the ends of justice may be met by quashing the proceedings, it may quash the proceedings, as the end of achieving justice is higher than the end of merely following the law. It is not necessary for the Court to hold a full-fledged inquiry or to appreciate the evidence, collected by the investigating agency to find out whether the case would end in conviction or acquittalâ??.

The Supreme Court in the case of *State of Orissa v. Ujjal Kumar Burdhan* reported in (2012) 4 SCC 547 has held as under :

â??8. It is true that the inherent powers vested in the High Court under Section 482 of the Code are very wide. Nevertheless, inherent powers do not confer arbitrary jurisdiction on the High Court to act according to whims or caprice. This extraordinary power has to be exercised sparingly with circumspection and as far as possible, for extraordinary cases, where allegations in the complaint or the first information report, taken on its face value

and accepted in their entirety do not constitute the offence alleged. It needs little emphasis that unless a case of gross abuse of power is made out

against those in charge of investigation, the High Court should be loath to interfere at the early/premature stage of investigation.

9. In *State of W.B. v. Swapan Kumar Guha*, emphasising that the Court will not normally interfere with an investigation and will permit the inquiry into

the alleged offence, to be completed, this Court highlighted the necessity of a proper investigation observing thus: (SCC pp. 597-98, paras 65-66)

“65. An investigation is carried on for the purpose of gathering necessary materials for establishing and proving an offence which is disclosed.

When an offence is disclosed, a proper investigation in the interests of justice becomes necessary to collect materials for establishing the offence, and

for bringing the offender to book. In the absence of a proper investigation in a case where an offence is disclosed, the offender may succeed in

escaping from the consequences and the offender may go unpunished to the detriment of the cause of justice and the society at large. Justice requires

that a person who commits an offence has to be brought to book and must be punished for the same. If the court interferes with the proper

investigation in a case where an offence has been disclosed, the offence will go unpunished to the serious detriment of the welfare of the society and

the cause of the justice suffers. It is on the basis of this principle that the court normally does not interfere with the investigation of a case where an

offence has been disclosed.”

66. Whether an offence has been disclosed or not must necessarily depend on the facts and circumstances of each particular case. “If on a

consideration of the relevant materials, the court is satisfied that an offence is disclosed, the court will normally not interfere with the investigation into

the offence and will generally allow the investigation into the offence to be completed for collecting materials for proving the offence.”

(emphasis supplied)

10. On a similar issue under consideration, in *Jeffrey J. Diermeier v. State of W.B.*⁴, while explaining the scope and ambit of the inherent powers of

the High Court under Section 482 of the Code, one of us (D.K. Jain, J.) speaking for the Bench, has observed as follows: (SCC p. 251, para 20)

“20. The section itself envisages three circumstances under which the

inherent jurisdiction may be exercised, namely, (i) to give effect to an order under the Code; (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of court; and (iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice. Nevertheless, it is neither possible nor desirable to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of inherent jurisdiction of the court. Undoubtedly, the power possessed by the High Court under the said provision is very wide but it is not unlimited. It has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and cautiously, *ex debito justitiae* to do real and substantial justice for which alone the court exists. It needs little emphasis that the inherent jurisdiction does not confer an arbitrary power on the High Court to act according to whim or caprice. The power exists to prevent abuse of authority and not to produce injustice.â??

The Supreme Court in the case of *Vinod Raghuvanshi Vs. Ajay Arora*, reported in (2013) 10 SCC 581 has held as under :

â??30. It is a settled legal proposition that while considering the case for quashing of the criminal proceedings the court should not â??kill a stillborn childâ?, and appropriate prosecution should not be stifled unless there are compelling circumstances to do so. An investigation should not be shut out at the threshold if the allegations have some substance. When a prosecution at the initial stage is to be quashed, the test to be applied by the court is whether the uncontroverted allegations as made, *prima facie* establish the offence. At this stage neither can the court embark upon an inquiry, whether the allegations in the complaint are likely to be established by evidence nor should the court judge the probability, reliability or genuineness of the allegations made therein.â??

The Supreme Court in the case of *Smt. Nagawwa vs. Veeranna Shivalingappa Konjalgi & Ors.* reported in AIR 1976 SC 1947 has held as under:-

â??6. â?|..... The High Court appears to have gone into the whole history of the case, examined the merits of the evidence, the contradictions and what it called the improbabilities and after a detailed discussion not only of the materials produced before the Magistrate but also of the documents which had been filed by the defence and which should not have been looked into at the stage when the matter was pending under Section 202, has held that the order of the Magistrate was illegal and was fit to be quashed.....

7. For these reasons, therefore, we are satisfied that the order of the High Court suffers from a serious legal infirmity and the High Court has

exceeded its jurisdiction in interfering in revision by quashing the order of the Magistrate. We, therefore, allow the appeal, set aside the order of the

High Court dated December 16, 1975 and restore the order of the Magistrate issuing process against respondents No.1 and 2.â??

Thus, it is clear that when the entire allegations are accepted on their face value, and if they do not disclose the commission of offence, only then this

Court in exercise of powers under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. can quash the proceedings. It is well established principle of law that the legitimate

prosecution should not be stifled in the mid way. If the facts and circumstances of the case, are considered in the light of the above-mentioned

judgments, then it is clear that there is an evidence on record to the effect that the applicants had humiliated and insulted the complainant by calling

him by his caste name and had also committed an offence under Sections 3(1) (r), 3(1)(s) and 3(2)(va) of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes

(Prevention of Atrocities) Act. The allegations of abusing, assault and threat are also corroborated by the documentary as well as ocular evidence.

Therefore, this Court is of the considered opinion that the charge sheet filed against the applicants for offence under Sections 294, 323, 506, 34 of IPC

and under Sections 3(1) (r), 3(1)(s) and 3(2)(va) of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act cannot be quashed at this

stage. Accordingly this application fails and is hereby dismissed.