

(2025) 06 DEL CK 0640
In the Delhi High Court
Case No : Bail Application NO. 1713 Of 2025

Suraj Kanojia

APPELLANT

Vs

State Govt Of Nct Of Delhi

RESPONDENT

Date of Decision : 25-06-2025

Acts Referred:

Constitution of India, 1950 — Article 21
Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 — Section 180, 187(3), 190, 193, 193(3),
210, 232, 483, 528, 529
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — Section 167, 167(2), 173, 173(2), 439, 482, 483
Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 — Section 3(5), 109(1), 326(g), 324(6), 331(6)
Arms Act, 1959 — Section 25, 27, 39, 54, 59

Citation : (2025) 06 DEL CK 0640

Hon'ble Judges : Tejas Karia, J

Bench : Single Bench

Advocate : Mohit Mathur, Harsh Gautam, Keshav Pratap Singh, Yudhvir Singh Chauhan

Final Decision : Dismissed

Judgement

Tejas Karia, J

INTRODUCTION:

1. The present application has been filed by the Petitioner/Applicant under Section 483 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 ('BNSS') [earlier Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 ('CrPC')] read with Sections 187(3)/528/529 of the BNSS [earlier Sections 167(2)/482/483 of the CrPC] seeking Regular Bail in the FIR No. 512/2024 registered at Police Station – Sangam Vihar, New Delhi ('FIR') under Sections 109(1)/331(6)/326(g)/3(5)/324(6) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 ('BNS') and Sections 25/27 of the Arms Act, 1959.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND:

2. It is alleged by the Complainant in the instant FIR that on 25.10.2024 around midnight, someone hit the gate of his house with force. When he saw outside the window, he noticed that it was the Applicant along with three other co-accused persons, who were throwing stones at the main gate of his house while also hurling abuses.

3. It is alleged that the Applicant also had a firearm in his hand and fired a bullet at the gate of the house. Thereafter, the main door of the house opened and the Applicant turned the said firearm towards the Complainant and fired a bullet. It is further alleged that the Applicant and the other co-accused persons also damaged household articles of the Complainant.

4. Subsequently, enquiry was conducted by the Investigation Officer ('IO') and after completion of spot inspection, a seizure memo was prepared which listed seizure of a few empty cartridges and one live cartridge at the site of the incident. The said incident was also recorded in the PWD's government installed CCTV cameras, which was shown to the Complainant, who identified the Applicant and other co-accused involved in the commission of the aforesaid acts.

5. Thereafter, search for the accused persons was conducted and three co-accused persons were arrested. However, search conducted for the Applicant yielded no results. The chargesheet dated 02.01.2025 was filed by Investigating Agency, which specifically recorded that despite extensive efforts to locate the Applicant, he could not be found as he was absconding and evading arrest.

6. Ultimately, the Applicant was arrested on 12.01.2025 in a different case in FIR No. 09/2025 under Sections 25/54/59 of the Arms Act registered at Police Station – Crime Branch. A production warrant for the Applicant was moved before the Court concerned and after obtaining permission on 15.01.2025, he was interrogated and subsequently, arrested. A Supplementary Chargesheet dated 14.02.2025 was filed against the Applicant under Sections 109(1)/331(6)/326(g)/3(5)/324(6) of the BNS and Sections 25/27 of the Arms Act, 1959.

7. A bail application was moved by the Applicant before the learned Additional Sessions Judge-06 ('ASJ'), Saket Courts, New Delhi, however the same was dismissed vide Order dated 24.03.2025. Thereafter, an application was moved by the Applicant before the learned ASJ under Section 187(3) of the BNSS seeking default bail, and the same was also dismissed vide Order dated 21.04.2025. Hence, the present application before this Court.

SUBMISSIONS BY THE APPLICANT:

8. Mr. Mohit Mathur, learned Senior Counsel for the Applicant submitted that Section 193 of the BNSS does not contemplate a piecemeal investigation and filing of an incomplete chargesheet before the Court. It is further submitted that till the investigation is completed, any report sent by the IO shall not be a Police Report within the meaning of Section 193(3) of BNSS.

9. It is submitted that a cognizance taken by the learned Trial Court on an incomplete chargesheet without the sanction order under Section 39 of the Arms Act, 1959 and the order directing committal of the proceedings to the learned ASJ are bad in law due to which the right of the present Applicant to be released on default bail got scuttled.

10. It is submitted by the learned senior counsel for the Applicant that the learned JMFC, South, Saket Court, Delhi had no territorial jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offence on an incomplete chargesheet filed by the investigating agency as the investigation was not complete and custody of the accused was not permissible beyond the statutory period of ninety (9) days from the date of his arrest. Accordingly, the Applicant had right to be released on bail.

11. It is further submitted that the learned ASJ erred in not appreciating that an incomplete chargesheet cannot be treated as a police report as contemplated under Section 190 of BNSS. The learned ASJ failed to appreciate the fact that the true test regarding a complete chargesheet is that the report filed by the police official must be such that the learned Magistrate could straightaway proceed to take cognizance under Section 210 of BNSS and then commit to the learned Sessions Court under Section 232 of BNSS. However, in the present case, the learned JMFC had no territorial jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offence on the basis of an incomplete chargesheet in the absence of a sanction order under Section 39 of the Arms Act, 1959.

12. The learned senior counsel for the Applicant submitted that it is a settled law that a piecemeal investigation and filing of incomplete chargesheet before the Court is not stipulated under Section 173 of CrPC [Section 193 of BNSS]. It is only filing of a final report after the completion of the entire investigation of the case in respect of all offences, especially when there are several offences involved in a case, is required under the said provision.

13. It was further submitted that an investigating agency cannot circumvent Section 187(3) of BNSS [Section 167(2) of CrPC] by filing an incomplete chargesheet. The learned Senior Counsel for the Applicant relied on the judgments of the Supreme Court in *Satender Kumar Antil v. CBI*, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 825 and *M Ravindran v. The Intelligence Officer*, (2021) 2 SCC 485 to submit that the object behind Section 187(3) of the BNSS is to ensure an expeditious investigation and a fair trial, and the same cannot be defeated by filing an incomplete chargesheet.

14. The learned senior counsel for the Applicant submitted that the chargesheet cannot be filed within the meaning of Section 193(3) of BNSS [Section 173(2) of CrPC] until the investigation is completed. Any report sent before the investigation is completed shall not be a police report within the meaning of Section 193(3) of BNSS [Section 173(2) of CrPC].

15. It was submitted that the chargesheet in the present case was filed without sanction under Section 39 of the Arms Act, 1959 which is mandatory to

prosecute under Sections 25/27 of the Arms Act, 1959. It is submitted that in the present case, the prosecution has filed an incomplete chargesheet within the prescribed period in order to defeat the right of the Applicant to default/statutory bail under Section 187(3) of the BNSS and that cognizance of an offence cannot be taken on the basis of an incomplete chargesheet.

16. The learned Senior Counsel for the Applicant has relied upon the decision of Supreme Court in *M. Ravindran v. The Intelligence Officer*, (2021) 2 SCC 485, which examined the practice of filing preliminary chargesheet and observed that Article 21 of the Constitution of India, 1950 provides that no person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except in accordance with the procedure established by law. As held in *Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India*, (1978) 1 SCC 248, such procedure cannot be arbitrary, unfair or unreasonable. It was held that the safeguard of default bail contained in proviso to Section 167(2) of CrPC [Section 187(3) of BNSS] is intrinsically linked to Article 21 of the Constitution of India, 1950 and is nothing but the legislative exposition of the constitutional safeguard that no person shall be detained except in accordance with rule of law.

17. It was submitted that the Applicant has deep roots in society and has never been found guilty of violating the law. It was also submitted that the Applicant satisfies the triple test for the grant of bail, as set out in various judgments of the Supreme Court.

18. Therefore, in view of the foregoing submissions, it was prayed that the present application be allowed and the Applicant be enlarged on Bail in the instant case.

SUBMISSIONS BY THE RESPONDENT:

19. Per contra, Mr. Yudhvir Singh Chauhan, learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the State ('APP') for the State vehemently opposed the present application and submitted that the Applicant is charged with heinous offences including, inter alia, attempt to cause death and use of illegal firearms. Hence, no leniency should be accorded to the Applicant at this stage.

20. It was submitted that the Complainant in his statement under Section 180 of the BNSS, specifically named the Applicant as the person who fired gunshots towards him with the intention to kill. It was also submitted that the crime scene evidence, including the recovered cartridges and damage to property, corroborate the Complainant's statement.

21. The learned APP submitted that given the armed nature of the assault, the Applicant is likely to threaten or influence the prosecution witness. It was further submitted that there is also a strong likelihood that the Applicant may abscond if he is enlarged on bail. As the Applicant is named in other criminal proceedings, there is also a strong likelihood that he may commit similar offences if he is released on bail.

22. It was submitted that the chargesheet against the Applicant was filed within

the prescribed period of ninety days under Section 187(3) of the BNSS and mere pendency of a procedural formality of sanction under Section 39 of the Arms Act, 1959 does not entitle the accused to default bail under Section 187(3) of the BNSS as it is available only when the chargesheet is not filed within the stipulated time.

23. It was submitted by the learned APP that the law is settled that cognizance is taken of the offence and not merely of an individual accused. The sanction under Arms Act, 1959 does not affect the cognizance of the offence under BNSS, which is independent and cognizable.

24. The learned APP has also relied upon the case of M. Ravindran (*supra*) to submit that the default bail is available only when no chargesheet is filed within the stipulated time and not when an incomplete chargesheet is filed and cognizance is taken.

25. The learned APP has also relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Rakesh Kumar Paul v. State of Assam, (2017) 15 SCC 67, which held that the right to default bail arises only when the prosecution fails to file a chargesheet within ninety days and no cognizance is taken.

26. The learned APP has also relied upon the decision in Hitendra Vishnu Thakur v. State of Maharashtra, (1994) 4 SCC 602 in which the Supreme Court has held that a sanction under a special law does not vitiate proceedings under general criminal law, unless specifically made mandatory for cognizance.

27. In view of the foregoing submissions, it was prayed that the present application be dismissed.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS:

28. Heard the learned Counsel for the parties and perused the record.

29. Section 187(3) of the BNSS reads as under:

“(3) The Magistrate may authorise the detention of the accused person, beyond the period of fifteen days, if he is satisfied that adequate grounds exist for doing so, but no Magistrate shall authorise the detention of the accused person in custody under this sub-section for a total period exceeding—

(i) ninety days, where the investigation relates to an offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term of ten years or more;

(ii) sixty days, where the investigation relates to any other offence, and, on the expiry of the said period of ninety days, or sixty days, as the case may be, the accused person shall be released on bail if he is prepared to and does furnish bail, and every person released on bail under this sub-section shall be deemed to be so released under the provisions of Chapter XXXV for the purposes of that Chapter.”

30. In various judgments of the Supreme Court, it has clearly been held that

Section 187(3) of the BNSS [earlier Section 167(2) of the CrPC] seeks to protect the fundamental right to life and personal liberty of the accused under Article 21 of the Constitution of India.

31. In the case of Sanjay Kumar Pundeer v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2023 SCC OnLine Del 5696, this Court held as under:

“10. The fundamental right to personal life and liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution of India and its co-relation with 167(2) of the CrPC has been, over the years, clearly established by way of judicial precedents of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India as well as various High Courts. The right of an accused to default bail under Section 167(2) of the CrPC would arise in a case where the chargesheet is not filed within the stipulated period. The other circumstance giving rise to the right to default bail would be in case where the prosecution files a preliminary or incomplete chargesheet, within the period prescribed for offences mentioned therein and in that process, defeating the right of the accused to statutory bail.”

32. From the above judgment, it is clear that if an incomplete chargesheet is filed by the prosecution, it gives rise to the right of default bail even if the same is filed within the prescribed period. However, in the present case, the Supplementary Chargesheet was filed against the Applicant within the stipulated period under Section 187(3) of the BNSS. Despite that, it is the Applicant's case that the said chargesheet was incomplete as it was filed by the investigating agency without the mandatory sanction under Section 39 of the Arms Act, 1959 for prosecution under Sections 25/29 of the Arms Act, 1959. Hence, the Applicant has contended that he is entitled to default bail under Section 187(3) of the BNSS.

33. Hence, the central issue before this Court for determination is whether a chargesheet filed by the investigating agency without the sanction under Section 39 of the Arms Act, 1959, renders it incomplete.

34. In this regard, this Court in Nitin Nagpal v. State, 2006 SCC OnLine Del 704 has held as under:

“9. Mr. Pawan Sharma next submitted that the statement of the injured had not been recorded inasmuch as the doctor had opined that the said injured was not fit to make any statement. In these circumstances, therefore, the non-filing of the statement of the injured could not be regarded as an incomplete challan been filed and/or the investigation not having been completed. He also submitted that the factum that the Sanction under Section 39 of the Arms Act had not been obtained did not mean that an incomplete challan had been filed. According to him, the investigation had been completed and the question of sanction did not come in the way of the filing of the police report/challan which had been done within 90 days. Insofar as these submissions with regard to the statement of the injured not being recorded as he was medically unfit and the non-filing of the sanction under the Arms Act, 1959, I am in agreement with the learned

counsel for the State and no further discussion is necessary. The statement would not be taken as it was not possible. The non-obtaining of sanction under the Arms Act, 1959 may have a legal effect qua the prosecution but would not entail that the challan was incomplete or that investigation was not over. However, the aspects of the case with regard to the CFSL Report and the question of cognizance not having been taken till 18.10.2005 requires further discussion.”

35. In the case of Suresh Kumar Bhikamchand Jain v. State of Maharashtra, (2013) 3 SCC 77, the Supreme Court held that the grant of sanction is not contemplated under Section 167 of the CrPC. The relevant extract of the said judgment is reproduced as under:

“17. In our view, grant of sanction is nowhere contemplated under Section 167 CrPC. What the said section contemplates is the completion of investigation in respect of different types of cases within a stipulated period and the right of an accused to be released on bail on the failure of the investigating authorities to do so. The scheme of the provisions relating to remand of an accused, first during the stage of investigation and, thereafter, after cognizance is taken, indicates that the legislature intended investigation of certain crimes to be completed within 60 days and offences punishable with death, imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term of not less than 10 years, within 90 days. In the event, the investigation is not completed by the investigating authorities, the accused acquires an indefeasible right to be granted bail, if he offers to furnish bail. Accordingly, if on either the 61st day or the 91st day, an accused makes an application for being released on bail in default of charge-sheet having been filed, the court has no option but to release the accused on bail. The said provision has been considered and interpreted in various cases, such as the ones referred to hereinbefore. Both the decisions in Natabar Parida case [(1975) 2 SCC 220 : 1975 SCC (Cri) 484] and in Sanjay Dutt case [(1994) 5 SCC 410 : 1994 SCC (Cri) 1433] were instances where the charge-sheet was not filed within the period stipulated in Section 167(2) CrPC and an application having been made for grant of bail prior to the filing of the charge-sheet, this Court held that the accused enjoyed an indefeasible right to grant of bail, if such an application was made before the filing of the charge-sheet, but once the charge-sheet was filed, such right came to an end and the accused would be entitled to pray for regular bail on merits.”

36. Further, the Supreme Court in the case of Judgebir Singh v. NIA, (2023) 17 SCC 48 referred to the judgment in Suresh Kumar (supra) and held that a chargesheet filed without sanction cannot be treated as an incomplete chargesheet and does not entitle an accused to a default bail as contemplated under Section 167(2) of the CrPC [now Section 187(3) of the BNSS]. The relevant extract of the judgment is reproduced below:

“45. We find no merit in the principal argument canvassed on behalf of the appellants that a charge-sheet filed without sanction is an incomplete charge-

sheet which could be termed as not in consonance with sub-section (5) of Section 173CrPC. It was conceded by the learned counsel appearing for the appellants that the charge-sheet was filed well within the statutory time period i.e. 180 days, however, the court concerned could not have taken cognizance of such charge-sheet in the absence of the orders of sanction not being a part of such charge-sheet. Whether the sanction is required or not under a statute, is a question that has to be considered at the time of taking cognizance of the offence and not during inquiry or investigation. There is a marked distinction in the stage of investigation and prosecution. The prosecution starts when the cognizance of offence is taken. It is also to be kept in mind that cognizance is taken of the offence and not of the offender. It cannot be said that obtaining sanction from the competent authorities or the authorities concerned is part of investigation. Sanction is required only to enable the court to take cognizance of the offence. The court may take cognizance of the offence after the sanction order was produced before the court, but the moment, the final report is filed along with the documents that may be relied on by the prosecution, then the investigation will be deemed to have been completed. Taking cognizance is entirely different from completing the investigation. To complete the investigation and file a final report is a duty of the investigating agency, but taking cognizance of the offence is the power of the court. The court in a given case, may not take cognizance of the offence for a particular period of time even after filing of the final report. In such circumstance, the accused concerned cannot claim their indefeasible right under Section 167(2)CrPC for being released on default bail. What is contemplated under Section 167(2)CrPC is that the Magistrate or Designated Court (as the case may be) has no powers to order detention of the accused beyond the period of 180 days or 90 days or 60 days as the case may be. If the investigation is concluded within the prescribed period, no right accrues to the accused concerned to be released on bail under the proviso to Section 167(2)CrPC.

46. Once a final report has been filed with all the documents on which the prosecution proposes to rely, the investigation shall be deemed to have been completed. After completing investigation and submitting a final report to the court, the investigating officer can send a copy of the final report along with the evidence collected and other materials to the sanctioning authority to enable the sanctioning authority to apply his mind to accord sanction. According sanction is the duty of the sanctioning authority who is not connected with the investigation at all. In case the sanctioning authority takes some time to accord sanction, that does not vitiate the final report filed by the investigating agency before the court. Section 173CrPC does not speak about the sanction order at all. Section 167CrPC also speaks only about investigation and not about cognizance by the Magistrate. Therefore, once a final report has been filed, that is the proof of completion of investigation and if final report is filed within the period of 180 days or 90 days or 60 days from the initial date of remand of accused concerned, he cannot claim that a right has accrued to him to be released on bail for want of filing of

sanction order.

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51. The charge-sheet is nothing but a final report of police officer under Section 173(2)CrPC. Section 173(2)CrPC provides that on completion of the investigation, the police officer investigating into a cognizable offence shall submit a report. The report must be in the form prescribed by the State Government, stating therein

- (a) the names of the parties;
- (b) the nature of the information;
- (c) the names of the persons who appear to be acquainted with the circumstances of the case
- (d) whether any offence appears to have been committed and, if so, by whom;
- (e) whether the accused has been arrested;
- (f) whether he had been released on his bond and, if so, whether with or without sureties; and
- (g) whether he has been forwarded in custody under Section 170.

52. As observed by this Court in *Satya Narain Musadi v. State of Bihar* [*Satya Narain Musadi v. State of Bihar*, (1980) 3 SCC 152 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 660] , SCC at p. 157 that the statutory requirement of the report under Section 173(2)CrPC would be complied with if the various details prescribed therein are included in the report. This report is an intimation to the Magistrate that upon investigation into a cognizable offence the Investigating Officer has been able to procure sufficient evidence for the court to inquire into the offence and the necessary information is being sent to the court. In fact, the report under Section 173(2)CrPC purports to be an opinion of the Investigating Officer that as far as he is concerned he has been able to procure sufficient material for the trial of the accused by the court. The report is complete if it is accompanied with all the documents and statements of witnesses as required by Section 175(5)CrPC. Nothing more need be stated in the report of the Investigating Officer. It is also not necessary that all the details of the offence must be stated. The details of the offence are required to be proved to bring home the guilt to the accused at a later stage i.e. in the course of the trial of the case by adducing acceptable evidence. (See *K. Veeraswami v. Union of India* [*K. Veeraswami v. Union of India*, (1991) 3 SCC 655 : 1991 SCC (Cri) 734] .)

53. The maximum period of 180 days which is being granted to the investigating agency to complete the investigation in the case wherein the prosecution is for the offence under UAPA is not something in the form of a package that everything has to be completed including obtaining of sanction within this period of 180 days. As observed above, the investigating agency has nothing to do with

sanction. Sanction is altogether a different process. Sanction is accorded, based on the materials collected by the investigating agency which forms the part of the final report under Section 173CrPC. The investigating agency gets full 180 days to complete the investigation. To say that obtaining of sanction and placing the same along with the charge-sheet should be done within the period of 180 days is something which is not only contrary to the provisions of law discussed above, but is inconceivable.”

37. In view of the above judgments of the Supreme Court and this Court, the filing of the chargesheet against the Applicant in the present case, without sanction under Section 39 of the Arms Act, does not render the said chargesheet incomplete under Section 193(3) of the BNSS. Consequently, the case of the Applicant that it is entitled to default bail under Section 187(3) of the BNSS, is without any merit as obtaining sanction is not contemplated under the said provision.

38. In the alternative, the Applicant has also approached this Court seeking regular bail under Section 483 of the BNSS. It is the Applicant’s case that it satisfies the triple test for the grant of bail, as has been laid down in multiple judgments of the Supreme Court.

39. The Supreme Court in the case of P. Chidambaram v. CBI, (2020) 13 SCC 337 laid down the well-settled principles to be considered for the grant of bail. The relevant extract of the said judgment is reproduced below:

“21. The jurisdiction to grant bail has to be exercised on the basis of the well-settled principles having regard to the facts and circumstances of each case. The following factors are to be taken into consideration while considering an application for bail:

- (i) the nature of accusation and the severity of the punishment in the case of conviction and the nature of the materials relied upon by the prosecution;
- (ii) reasonable apprehension of tampering with the witnesses or apprehension of threat to the complainant or the witnesses;
- (iii) reasonable possibility of securing the presence of the accused at the time of trial or the likelihood of his abscondence;
- (iv) character, behaviour and standing of the accused and the circumstances which are peculiar to the accused;
- (v) larger interest of the public or the State and similar other considerations.

[Vide Prahlad Singh Bhati v. State (NCT of Delhi) [Prahlad Singh Bhati v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2001) 4 SCC 280 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 674]”

40. This Court has considered the following factors that have a bearing on the determination of the present case:

a. The role of the Applicant in the present case is that he fired a firearm towards

the Complainant in an attempt to kill him, which is corroborated by the footage of the CCTV installed in the vicinity and the seizure of cartridges at the site of the incident. The accusations levelled against the Applicant in the present case are grave and serious in nature.

b. The incident took place on 25.10.2024 and while the other co-accused were arrested soon thereafter, the Chargesheet dated 02.01.2025 clearly mentions that the Applicant was absconding and evading arrest, and that he could not be found despite extensive efforts undertaken to locate him.

c. It is recorded in the Supplementary Chargesheet dated 14.02.2025 that the Applicant was ultimately arrested on 12.01.2025 in a different case in FIR No. 09/2025 registered at Police Station – Crime Branch, under Section 25/54/59 of the Arms Act.

d. The nature of the offence and the punishment provided thereof are serious in nature. The role of the Applicant is captured in the CCTV footage. There is a possibility that the Applicant may threaten or influence the witnesses and also influence their testimonies as they are residing in the neighbourhood of the Applicant.

e. The Applicant had allegedly fired gunshots on the main gate of the household of the Complainant as well as towards him. The Applicant appears to be the mastermind behind the incident in question. All the recovered exhibits, including the cartridges, the damaged door piece and recovered fire arm have been sent to the FSL, Rohini.

f. There are multiple eye-witnesses including the Complainant and the independent witnesses point towards active involvement of the Applicant in the commission of the offence, which shows that the Applicant was directly involved in the crime.

g. The Complainant has specifically named the Applicant in his statement under Section 180 of BNSS stating that the Applicant fired the gunshots at the residence with the intention to kill the Complainant.

h. Given the armed nature of the offence, the Applicant can be a threat to the key prosecution witnesses and also will be a flight risk or commit similar offences, as the Applicant has been previously named in other criminal proceedings.

i. There is no parity with the co-accused as the Applicant fired the gunshots, which is not comparable with the other co-accused who did not fire or enter the Complainant's premises.

j. The offences are of serious nature including unlawful assembly, grievous hurt using dangerous weapons, attempt to cause death and use of illegal firearms.

41. Considering the above factors and the grave and serious nature of the offence alleged against the Applicant in the FIR, in addition to apprehension of

absconding if released on bail, this is not a fit case to enlarge the Applicant on bail under Section 483 read with Section 187(3) and Sections 528/529 of the BNSS.

42. Accordingly, the present Application is hereby dismissed.