

(2010) 11 MAD CK 0101

In the Madras High Court

Case No : C.M.A. (MD) No. 1000 of 2009

The Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.

APPELLANT

Vs

Subbiah, Pandiammal and Muniraja

RESPONDENT

Date of Decision : 18-11-2010

Acts Referred:

Citation : (2010) 11 MAD CK 0101

Hon'ble Judges : P.P.S. Janarthana Raja, J

Bench : Single Bench

Advocate : K. Bhaskaran, for the Appellant; G.R. Swaminathan, for R1 and R2, for the Respondent

Final Decision : Dismissed

Judgement

P.P.S. Janarthana Raja, J.—The appeal is preferred by the Insurance Company against the award made in MCOP No. 212 of 2006 dated

19.01.2009 on the file of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal-cum-Sub Court, Srivilliputhur.

2. Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:

The deceased-Thangeswaran met with motor traffic accident that took place on 09.05.2006 at about 2.45 p.m. The deceased was walking on the

side of the road from North to South direction near Lakshmiyapuram. At that time, a Mahindra Jeep belonging to the third Respondent and insured

with the Appellant-Insurance Company, came in a rash and negligent manner and hit the deceased. Due to the said impact, he sustained injuries and

died on the spot. The claimants are the parents of the deceased. They claimed a compensation of Rs.2,00,000/- before the Tribunal. The Appellant-

Insurance Company who resisted the claim. On pleadings, the Tribunal framed the

following issues:

1. Who is responsible for the accident?
2. Whether the claimants are entitled to compensation? If so from whom and to what extent?

After considering the oral and documentary evidence, the Tribunal held that the accident had occurred due to the rash and negligent driving of the

driver of the Mahindra Jeep and awarded a sum of Rs. 2,40,000/- with interest at 7.5% p.a. from the date of petition. The details of the

compensation are as under:-

Rupees

Loss of income 2,25,000/-

Loss of love and

affection 10,000/-

Funeral expenses 5,000/-

Total... 2,40,000/-

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Aggrieved by that award, the Appellant / Insurance Company has filed the present appeal.

3. Learned Counsel for the Appellant/Insurance Company questioned only the quantum of compensation awarded by the Tribunal and submitted

that the compensation awarded by the Tribunal is excessive, exorbitant and without any basis and justification. Hence the order passed by the

Tribunal is not in accordance with law and the same should be set aside.

4. Learned Counsel appearing for the first and second Respondents / claimants has submitted that the Tribunal had considered all the materials and

evidence available on record and awarded the compensation which is just, fair and reasonable. Hence the order of the Tribunal is in accordance with

law and the same has to be confirmed.

5. Heard the learned Counsel on either side and perused the materials available on record. On the side of the claimants, P.W.1 and P.W.2 were

examined and documents Exs.P1 to P4 were marked. On the side of the Insurance Company, no witness was examined and no document was

marked. P.W.1 is the father of the deceased. P.W.2 is one Murugan. Ex.P1 is the certified copy of First Information Report. Ex.P2 is the certified

copy of Motor Vehicle Inspection Report. Ex.P3 is certified copy of Post Mortem Report. Ex.P4 is the certified copy of judgment in C.C. No. 26

of 2006 passed by the Judicial Magistrate Court No. 1, Srivilliputhur. After considering the above oral and documentary evidence, the Tribunal has

given a categorical finding that the accident had occurred due to the rash and negligent driving of the driver of the Mahindra Jeep. It is a question of

fact and also it is based on valid materials and evidence. Hence the same is confirmed.

6. The deceased was 8 years old at the time of accident. He was studying in II Standard. The father of the deceased was examined as P.W.1. In

the evidence of P.W.1, it is stated that the deceased was good at studies and also he was very active and used to help his father in all works. The

Tribunal fixed the notional income of Rs. 15,000/-, adopted the multiplier of 15 and determined the loss of income at Rs. 2,25,000/-. Further the

Tribunal has awarded a sum of Rs. 10,000/- towards loss of love and affection to the parents of the deceased and Rs. 5,000/- towards funeral

expenses.

7. In the case of R.K. Malik and Another Vs. Kiran Pal and Others, , the Supreme Court has considered the aspect how the compensation should

be awarded to the death of a child in the accident, and held in Paragraphs-15, 18, 25, 26, 27, 28 and 32 as under:

15. The real problem that arises in the cases of death of children is that they are not earning at the time of the accident. In most of the cases they

were still studying and not working. However, under no stretch of imagination it can be said that the parents, who are Appellants herein, have not

suffered any pecuniary loss. In fact, loss of dependency by its very nature is awarded for prospective or future loss. In this context, Lord Atkinson

aptly observed in Taff Vale Rly. Co. v. Jenkins, (1911-13) All England Reporter 160 as follows:

In case of the death of an infant, there may have been no actual pecuniary benefit derived by its parents during the child's lifetime. But this will not

necessarily bar the parents' claim and prospective loss will found a valid claim provided that the parents establish that they had a reasonable

expectation of pecuniary benefit if the child had lived.

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18. Therefore keeping in view of Second Schedule of the Act, this Court do not see any reason to differ with the view taken by the Tribunal as well

as the High Court in so far as award of pecuniary compensation to the dependents/claimants is concerned. We must point out here that the learned

Counsel for the Appellants had argued that the notional sum of Rs. 15,000/- should be enhanced and increased as the legislature has not amended the

Second Schedule and the same continues to be in existence since it was enacted on 14.11.1994. We are not examining and going into this aspect as

the accident had taken place in the present case nearly three years after the enactment of the Second Schedule. The time difference between the

date of the enactment and the date of accident is not substantial.

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25. That being the position, the crucial problem arises with regard to the quantification of such compensation. The injury inflicted by deprivation of

the life of a child is extremely difficult to quantify. In view of the uncertainties and contingencies of human life, what would be an appropriate figure, an

adequate solatium is difficult to specify. The Courts have therefore used the expression "standard compensation" and "conventional amount/sum" to

get over the difficulty that arises in quantifying a figure as the same ensures consistency and uniformity in awarding compensations.

26. While quantifying and arriving at a figure for "loss of expectation of life", the Court have to keep in mind that this figure is not to be calculated for

the prospective loss or further pecuniary benefits that has been awarded under another head i.e. pecuniary loss. The compensation payable under

this head is for loss of life and not loss of future pecuniary prospects. Under this head, compensation, is paid for termination of life, which results in

constant pain and suffering. This pain and suffering does not depend upon the financial position of the victim or the claimant but rather on the

capacity and the ability of the deceased to provide happiness to the claimant. This compensation is paid for loss of prospective happiness which the

claimant/victim would have enjoyed had the child not been died at the tender age.

27. In the case of Lata Wadhwa (supra), wherein several persons including

children lost their lives in a fire accident, the Court awarded substantial amount as compensation. No doubt, the Court noticed that the children who lost their lives were studying in an expensive school, had bright prospects and belonged to upper middle class, yet it cannot be said that higher compensation awarded was for deprivation of life and the pain and suffering undergone on loss of life due to financial status. The term "conventional compensation" used in the said case has been used for non-pecuniary compensation payable on account of pain and suffering as a result of death. The Court in the said case referred to Rs. 50,000/- as conventional figure. The reason was loss of expectancy of life and pain and suffering on that account which was common and uniform to all regardless of the status. Unless there is a specific case departing from the conventional formula, non-pecuniary compensation should not be fixed on basis of economic wealth and background.

28. In *Lata Wadhawa* case (supra), where the accident took place on 03.03.1989, the multiplier method was referred to and adopted with

approval. In cases of children between 5 to 10 years of age, compensation of Rs. 1.50 lakhs was awarded towards pecuniary compensation and in

addition a sum of Rs. 50,000/- was awarded towards "conventional compensation". In the case of children between 10 to 18 years compensation of

Rs. 4.10 lakhs was awarded including "conventional loss of prospective happiness which the claimant/victim would have enjoyed had the child not

been died at the tender age. compensation". While doing so the Supreme Court held that contribution of each child towards family should be taken

as Rs. 24,000/- per annum instead of Rs. 12,000/- per annum as recommended by Justice Y. V. Chandrachud Committee. This was in view of the

fact that the company in question had an un-written rule that every employee can get one of his children employed in the said company.

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32. In view of discussion made hereinbefore, it is quite clear the claim with regard to future prospect should have been addressed by the Courts

below. While considering such claims, child's performance in school, the reputation of the school etc. might be taken into consideration. In

the present case, records show that the children were good in studies and

studying in a reasonably good school. Naturally, their future prospect would be presumed to be good and bright. Since they were children, there is no yardstick to measure the loss of future prospects of these children.

But as already noted, they were performing well in studies, natural consequence supposed to be a bright future. In the case of *Lata Wadhwa (supra)*

and *M. S. Grewal (supra)*, the Supreme Court recognised such future prospect as basis and factor to be considered. Therefore, denying

compensation towards future prospects seems to be unjustified. Keeping this in background, facts and circumstances of the present case, and

following the decision in *Lata Wadhwa (supra)* and *M. S. Grewal (supra)*, we deem it appropriate to grant compensation of Rs. 75,000/- (which is

roughly half of the amount given on account of pecuniary damages) as compensation for the future prospects of the children, to be paid to each

claimant within one month of the date of this decision. We would like to clarify that this amount i.e. Rs. 75,000/- is over and above what has

been awarded by the High Court.

The Tribunal has correctly applied the principles enunciated in the above judgment of the Supreme Court and correctly awarded a sum of Rs.

2,25,000/- towards loss of income, by adopting the notional income and also the multiplier as per the Schedule. The Tribunal has also correctly

awarded a sum of Rs. 10,000/- towards loss of love and affection and Rs. 5,000/- towards funeral expenses. I do not find any error or illegality in the

order of the Tribunal warranting interference. The order passed by the Tribunal is based on valid materials and evidence. It is a question of fact and

it is not a perverse order. Therefore, the award passed by the Tribunal is in accordance with law and hence, the same is confirmed.

8. It is stated that the Appellant-Insurance Company has deposited 50% of the award amount with accrued interest by order of this Court

dated 28.10.2009. Under the circumstances, the Appellant-Insurance Company is directed to deposit the balance amount of compensation with

interest at 7.5% p.a. from the date of petition, within a period of six weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. On such deposit, the

claimants are permitted to withdraw the same on making proper application.

9. In the result, the Civil Miscellaneous Appeal is dismissed. Consequently, M.P. (MD) No. 2 of 2009 is closed. No costs.