A. Aishath Najiya vs Messrs. Lalchand Kewalram and Others

K.M. Natarajan, J.—On a reference made by the learned Chief Justice, the matter came up before this Full Bench to resolve the apparent conflict between the judgments of the Division Benches of this Court in V. Danmull Sowcar Vs. Syed Ali Mohamed, and Jayaram v. Ramalingam 1973 T.L.N.J. 393. The question that requires an answer by us in this Reference is whether the landlord is entitled to maintain an application for eviction under S.10(3)(a)(iii) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, (hereinafter referred to as the Act) on the ground of requirement of the premises for accommodating the partnership business where one of the members of the family is a partner. C.R.P. 2791 of 1983 arises out of a petition in H.R.C.O.P. 352 of 1981, wherein it is stated that the non-residential premises bearing new door No. 10, Rattan Bazaar, Road, and new door No. 10, Ashtabujam lane, described as items 1 and 2 in the schedule, were let out to the first respondent. The petitioner is carrying on business in partnership under the name and style of Mahnoor at No. 208, Purasawalkam High Road which is a rented building. Since the petitioner is not occupying any building of his own for the purpose of business which he is carrying on in partnership he has filed the petition for eviction on the ground that the said building is required for accomodating the partnership business. The question arose in that case is whether the petitioner who is not doing exclusive business but is only one of the partners in the partnership can ask for possession for accomodating the partnership business in the petition mentioned premises. The facts which are necessary for framing a similar question involved in C.R.P. 4276 of 1984 are that the petitioners-landlord filed the petition for eviction on the ground that he required the premises bearing door new No. 1, Rama Pillai Street, Periamet, on the ground that he and five others are carrying on business in hides and skins in partnership under the name and style of Messers Sadiq and Co, at New door No. 12, Kumarappa Chetty Street, Periamet, which is a rented premises, that the petitioner''s other partners do not own any other building of their own and that the petitioner bona fide requires the premises for the purpose of carrying on business in partnership. There also a similar question arose as in C.R.P. 2791 of 1983. Before ever adverting to the decisions on this point quoted by the learned counsel appearing on both sides it is worthwhile to extract the provisions of the Act S.10(3)(a) (iii) reads as follows--

A landlord may, subject to the provisions of Cl.(d) apply to the Controller for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building--

(i)....

(ii)

(iii) in case it is any other non-residential building, if the landlord or any member of his family is not occupying for purpose of business which he or any member of his family is carrying on a nonresidential building, in the city, town or village concerned which is his own.

In the said section, the words ''any member of his family'' are substituted in the place of his son by virtue of S. 10 of Act 23 of 1973.

The earliest decision of the Division Bench of this court on this point is one reported in V. Danmull Sowcar Vs. Syed Ali Mohamed, The question referred to the Division Bench in the above quoted case was whether one of the partners of a firm who is the owner of a non-residential premises could apply for eviction of the tenant occupying the same on the ground that he required it for carrying on his partnership business, under S.10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act 18 of 1960, The Division Bench after considering the various earlier decisions of this Court and other High Courts and the All India English Reports, held--

Under S. 10 (3) (a) (iii) of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act (Act 18 of 1960), the application is maintainable and that it is not necessary that the building should be required for the applicant''s exclusive business, Persons who have entered into partnership with one another are called individually partners and collectively a firm and the name under which the business is carried on is called the firm name. It is settled law that a firm is not a separate legal entity and the firm name is a compendious way in which the business of the partners is carried on. Bach partner carried on business for himself as principal and also as agent for the other partners. Mutual agency is an essential condition of partnership. It must, therefore, be held that the landlord himself is carrying on the business. The applicant in the instant case requires possession of the premises for a business in which he is a partner. The section does not require that the claim for eviction by a landlord should be for his exclusive business.

The words the landlord will cover not only a single or sole landlord, but also one of the joint landlords and where the property is owned by the partners constituting a firm and one of them requires the building for his own occupation, it will squarely fall within the ambit of S.10 (3) (a) (i) of the Act.

In Sri. Raja Lakshmi Dyeing Works and Others Vs. Rangaswamy Chettiar, where one of us, namely, Nainar Sundaram J. had occasions to consider similar question and the previous decisions. That was a case where the landlords filed petition for eviction of the tenant under S.10(3)(a)(iii) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act 18 of 1960 on the ground that their husbands, were carrying on a partnership business and for such business of their husbands the suit premises was required. The Rent Controller allowed the petition for eviction. On appeal by the tenant, the said order was reversed and when the matter came up for Revision before this Court it was held.--

By reading S.10 (3) (a) (iii) of the Act it is not possible to spell out any limitation as to the extent of the interest in the business carried on by the landlord or by their husbands. The business could be carried on either as a proprietary concern or in partnership with others. Such a construction alone will be a reasonable one and will serve the object of the provision. The requirement for the business carried on by the landlords in partnership with other can be equated to the requirement of the landlord himself. The requirement need not necessarily be that of the landlord alone and it can even be that of a member of his family whose interests the landlord is bound to serve.

Ultimately relying on the decision reported in V. Danmull Sowcar Vs. Syed Ali Mohamed, , and distinguishing the decision in Jayaram v. Ramalinga 1973 T.N.L.J. 393, this court allowed the Revision and consequently restored the order of eviction passed by the Rent Controller.

In Gopalakrishna Chettair Vs. W.K.A. Yakub Hussain, Hussain, relying on the abeve two decisions V. Danmull Sowcar Vs. Syed Ali Mohamed, and Jayaraman v. Ramalinga 1973 T.N.L.J. 393, Ramanujam, J, in a case where the landlord who was carrying on a separate business in partnership with others in a property belonging to joint family of which he was one of the coparceners applied for eviction in respect of building belonging to him for purposes of locating the partnership business under S. 10(3)(a)(iii) held--

As the property belonging to joint family Could not be taken as a landlord''s own property, he could not be said to be carrying on business in building of his own, he was entitled to seek eviction on ground that he required the premises in question for purpose of carrying on his business. The fact that he had been carrying on business in premises belonging to joint family did not disentitle him from getting his own building for purpose of business which he was carrying on.

In Kulsumbai Mulla Jeewajee v. Madras Marine (P) Ltd 1984-1-M.L.J. 399, M. Fakkir Mohammed, J. relying on the decision Danmull v. Syed Ali, held-

Eventhough the landlady is a partner in the firm, it cannot be said that she is not carrying on a business. If a question will arise, whether a person is businessman or not and that if that person is a partner in a partnership business, it will certainly be held that the said person is a businessman. There will be other nomenclature for such a person, who is a partner in a business firm. On such a view, it has to be found that the requirement of the premises for his partnership business under S. 10(3) (a) (iii) shall be deemed to be a requirement of the landlady.

Our attention was drawn to the latest decision of the Supreme Court reported in Krishnan Nair and Others Vs. Ghouse Basha, wherein their Lordships had occasion to consider the very same question under S. 10(a)(iii) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. That was a case where the landlord filed the petition for eviction on the ground that the premises is required to accommodate the partnership firm in which his sons and some strangers are partners. Originally the father and the two sons used to carry on a leather business from long time, Later, the two sons of the landlord went into the partnership with others and they held half share. It was found in evidence that the sons used to take active part even before the partnership started in the leather business carried on by their father and thereafter the partnership firm with the other partners carried on the business. The only question which was urged before their Lordships of the Supreme Court was that the application for eviction under S.10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act was liable to be dismissed solely on the ground that the landlord has chosen to file this application to accommodate a partnership firm in which his sons and some other strangers are partners and that it is not in conformity with the provisions of S.10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court have observed--

Partnership, as is well settled, has a compendious way of describing those who constitute the firm under S.4 for the Partnership Act. Now, if that is the position, in our opinion, if a person carries on a business along with other partners and it was the other partner who actually carried on the business the position perhaps would have been entirely different. If the same were only sleeping partners that would have been different. On the contrary, here having regard to the past conduct of the sons and having regard to the shares this was their only application where sons were carrying on the business along with other partner. If that is the position in our opinion under S.10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act as the sons and members of the family carrying on the business in terms of the section will be entitled to the benefit of eviction.

In that case, their Lordships relied on the earlier decision reported in D.N. Sanghavi and Sons Vs. Ambalal Tribhuwan Das, where the meaning of the expression ''his business'' under S.12 (1)(f) of the Madhya Pradesh Accomodation Control Act 1961 came up for consideration. The said section is in pari materia S. 10(3) (a) (iii) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. In the said decision D.N. Sanghavi and Sons Vs. Ambalal Tribhuwan Das, it was held--

The meaning of the expression ''his business'' in S.12(1)(f) of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act 1961 is to be determined by examining the object of the Act and the setting of the phrase ''his business''

In Krishnan Nair and Others Vs. Ghouse Basha, their Lordships have observed--

Our attention Cwas drawn to a decision of this Court in D.N. Sanghavi and Sons Vs. Ambalal Tribhuwan Das, where the meaning of the expression ''his business'' under S.12(1)(f) of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act 1961 came up for consideration. The said section was in pari materia with the present section. Therefore this court held that the meaning of the expression'' his business'' under S.12(1)(f) of the said Act is to be determined by the examination of the object of the Act and setting of the phrase ''his business''. There Dwidedi, J., speaking for the court found that before the partnership, it was stated that the father was to run the shop. Father died during the pendency of the suit and neither of these two passages nor anywhere else in the facts during the pendency and stated that on the terms of the partnership business they were entitled to manage the partnership business or even that would also occupy the suit accommodation along with his other partners on obtaining possession from the appellant was not stated that the other partners have agreed to shift the business. The Court observed that if the deed of partnership had excluded the son expressly or impliedly from the management of the firm of business and had made him a sleeping partner it could not be held that the accommodation was needed directly and substantially for his occupation by way of his business. The firm is carrying on the business in the premises in respect of which the eviction was asked for the said firm.

Applying the ratio in the case before their Lordships it was held that there is no evidence that the sons were sleeping partners; on the contrary there is evidence that they were in the leather business and had carried on the business previously before shifting to the premises in question. If that is the position, it cannot be accepted that they were sleeping partners. On the contrary, having regard to the number, they were active partners in the business and as such, the sons needed the accommodation with others would be for the sons business under S.10(3)(a) (iii) of the Tamil Nadu Act. In that case, their Lordships also considered the subsequent derision in Shantilal Thakordas and Others Vs. Chimanlal Maganlal Telwala, and held--

The Supreme Court felt that they should not express any opinion in that regard, but doubt was expressed as to whether the requirement of the premises by the landlord for the occupation of the partnership firm in which he was a partner would tantamount to the occupation by landlord. Further, in that case the attention of the Supreme Court was not drawn to the earlier decision in D.N. Sanghavi and Sons Vs. Ambalal Tribhuwan Das,

In view of this latest decision of the Supreme Court referred to above, we have no difficulty in answering this reference. However, it is our duty to consider the contra decision referred to earlier in Jayaraman v. Ramalinga 1973 T.L.N.J. 393. I hat was a case, where the landlord was carrying on a separate and independent business of his own in the premises belonging to a Hindu joint family of which he was a coparcener. When he applied for eviction in respect of the building belonging to him for the purpose of locating his business, it was resisted by the tenant on the ground that the landlord had been already in possession of a building of his own for his business. Admittedly, the landlord had a share in the joint family property in which he was carrying on the business. The Division Bench rejected the contention of the tenant holding that if the property occupied for the business as a business of the landlord is a Hindu joint family property and not exclusively owned by the petitioner-landlord, it can be taken that the landlord was not occupying a building of his own and therefore he would be entitled to apply for eviction under S.10(3)(a)(iii) for the two conditions set out therein, namely, (i) that the landlord is carrying on a business of his own, and (ii) that he is not occupying a nonresidential building of his own are satisfied. In that case, it has also been pointed out that if the landlord is carrying on a different business in another building, which is not his own, there is nothing in S.10(3)(a)(iii) to debar him to have recourse to the provision in that section in respect of that business, even though he might be carrying on another business in a building of his own. It is to be pointed out that the learned Judges of the Bench were not expressing any definite opinion on the question whether the landlord could ask for possession of a non-residential building for purpose of a business in which either he or any member of his family was only a partner and the decision of the Bench was rendered on the peculiar facts of the case concerned.

Thus, on a careful analysis of the ratio laid down in the above quoted decisions and in view of the latest decision of the Supreme Court reported in Krishna Nair v. Ghouse Basha AIR 1987 S.C. 199, we hold that the petition for eviction can be filed under S.10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act to accommodate a partnership firm in which the members of the landlord''s family are partners along with the strangers, But, however, in view of the observations of the Supreme Court in the above quoted case, we wish to make it clear that the members of the landlord''s family in the partnership firm must be directly and substantially involved in the partnership business considering the extent of their interest in the business, i.e., the shares they have in the partnership business and or the part they play, i.e., the shares they have in the partnership business and or this part they play, i.e., as active partners but not sleeping partners. Any observation found in Jayaram v. Ramalinga 1973 T.L.N.J. 393, running contra to what we have expressed above stands overruled and we uphold the decision in V. Danmull Sowcar Vs. Syed Ali Mohamed, subject to the above qualification that the members of the landlord''s family in the partnership firm should not be sleeping partners. The Reference is ordered accordingly. The Revisions will have to go back before the single learned Judge who has to deal with the same on merits.

This petition coming on for further hearing the Court, Mohan, C.J. delivered the following Judgment :--(16th June, 1989)

The landlady is the revision petitioner. H.R.C. No 352 of 1982 was filed by her stating that the first respondent is a tenant under her in respect of the petition mentioned property. The said property is non-residential in character. It has been let out for a rent of Rs. 950 per month. Respondents 2 and 3 are sub-tenants under the first respondent. The petitioner is carrying on business in partnership under the name and style of Mahoor, The business consists of retail sales of textile and it is carried on at door No. 268, Purasawalkam High Road, Madras 7. The said building is a rented building. The petitioner is not occupying a non-residential building of her own for the purpose of business which she is carrying on in partnership. The petitioner very much requires the building under the occupation of the first respondent for running the partnership business. The claim of the petitioner is bona fide. Hence the application for eviction.

The first respondent in the counter contended that the petitioner is the owner of the property at door No. 10 Rattan Bazaar, Madras, and No. 10 Asthabujam lane, Madras-3. These two properties do not form one unit. One single petition for eviction of the respondents in respect of the properties is not therefore maintainable. The first respondent became a tenant in the year 1961 under the erstwhile owner. The lease was for a period of twenty years from 16-12-1960. The petitioner is only a recent purchaser. The petitioner is carrying on business at No. 268 Purasawalkam High Road. She is not under the threat of eviction because the property belongs only to her brother. The claim of the petitioner is not bona fide. As a matter of fact, because there was a demand for higher rent of Rs. 6000 and that was denied, the present eviction petition has been resorted to. The petitioner''s father and another person met the respondent and demanded Rs. 4000 at least and even that was not agreed to. One Sulaiman Sait wanted to bring about an amicable settlement. But no finality was reached. Thus, the petition is liable to be dismissed on the ground of lack of bona fides.

The second respondent in the counter urged that the requirement of the petition mentioned premises is not bona fide. The petition premises is unsuitable for textile business. The third respondent in the counter urged that the petition had been filed with the oblique motive of getting enhanced rent and therefore the petition is liable to be dismissed.

The Rent Controller who tried the petition was of the view that because of the failure on the part of the tenant to give enhanced rent, the present petition for eviction has been preferred. Further, the present business of the landlady is flourishing very well, even though in a rented premises and therefore it is not likely that she will shift her retail business to a place where wholesale business in textiles is carried on. Then, he was of the view that there was no bona fides in the claim of the petitioner. He, therefore, dif missed the application. Against the said dismissal, R.C.A. 1169 of 1982 was filed. In that M.P. 1600 of 1982 was also filed for additional evidence stating that the Rent Controller had held that the consent of the other partner had not been obtained and the partnership business cannot be shifted to the petition premises without the consent of the other partner. Such a plea was not taken in the counter. The partnership deed in Clause 5 clearly provides for shifting. Further the consent which is required to be given is given through the affidavit. The reception of this petition was opposed. The appellate court dismissed the petition. It concluded that there appeared to be no necessity for the petitioner to shift the principal place of business from Purasawalkam High Road to Rattan Bazaar. Relying on the decision reported in M.M. Quasim Vs. Manohar Lal Sharma and others, the Appellate Court held that the petitioner has not given any reason for shifting her premises from Purasawalkam High Road to Rattan Bazaar and she has not even chosen to let in evidence in support of her case and therefore, the claim of the petitioner cannot be said to be bona fide. Accordingly, he confirmed the dismissal of the eviction petition. Against these concurrent orders, the present civil revision petition has been filed.

Mr. N.C. Ragavachari, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner, would urge that the lower appellate Court has misread Cl. 5 of the partnership deed because that clearly enables the petitioner to shift the premises. Though this point about the lack of consent from the other partner was not specifically raised in the counter, such a consent came to be given by means of additional affidavit and therefore properly speaking, it ought to have been taken note of, more so, for the specific purpose, an M.P. was taken. No doubt, the Appellate Court had not gone into the question whether the landlady demanded higher rent or not. But in fact, the evidence is very clear that the tenant never met the landlady and it is so admitted. Therefore, it is incorrect to say that there was a demand for higher rent. Even otherwise, according to him, having regard to the ruling of this Court in Gopalakrishna Chettair Vs. W.K.A. Yakub Hussain, such a demand does not establish lack of bona fides.

The learned counsel would submit that both the Rent Controller and the appellate authority have gone on advising the landlady as to how she must conduct her business and in what premises. According to the learned counsel, the requirements of law are fully complied with. Therefore, merely on the imaginary ground of lack of bona fide, the Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority cannot say that the application is bereft of bona fides. The facts in this case are very clear that the Revision petitioner is carrying on business in a rented premises. It is not necessary that she must be under the threat of eviction from the rented premises. Again it is not necessary for her to establish that the present building is not suitable for her necessitating her to shift to her own building. The law is that where the petitioner is not in occupation of a building of her own, she could seek eviction of the tenant. If the decision of the Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority are to be accepted, then it would mean that the landlady would have to depend upon the convenience of the tenant and she cannot demand eviction for her own occupation. From this point of view, he submits that the authorities below have not properly appreciated the true scope of the law. The Revision petitioner is not asking for re-appraisal of the evidence on the question of bona fides. In such a case alone, she is barred under S.25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act.

Mr. S. Raghavan, learned counsel for the respondents in opposition to this would urge that there were talks for enhancement of rent is very clear and because of the failure on the part of the tenants to pay enhanced rent, the landlady resorted to the petition for eviction and this shows lack of bona fides. The decision in Gopalakrishna Chettair Vs. W.K.A. Yakub Hussain, cannot come to the rescue of the revision petitioner lie further submitted that the consent of the other partner for shifting the business had not been obtained at all. Today, the landlady is carrying on retail textiles business at a place where there are only seven such shops. Her volume of business is increasing. No prudent person would shift her business where the competition is severe and the business is done mostly in wholesale. This is undoubtedly a point to decide whether the application is actuated by bona fides or not. It was this aspect of the matter which was borne in mind by the Courts below. As on today, the law as laid down in M.M. Quasim Vs. Manohar Lal Sharma and others, is that right of re-entry of the landlord is not unfettered. Lastly, it is urged that where on a proper appreciation of the evidence with regard to the bona fides findings of fact have been arrived at by the courts below, this court exercising Revisional power under S.25 of the Act may not interfere, since that is a dictum laid down by the Supreme Court in Sri. Raja Lakshmi Dyeing Works and Others Vs. Rangaswamy Chettiar,

In order to appreciate this controversy, it is necessary for me to deal with the law relating to the eviction of tenants from non-residential premises as laid down under S. 10 of the Rent Control Act. It is well settled today that S.10 of the Act is a Code by itself. Therefore, the right of the landlord will have to be founded only within the four corners of this section. S.10(1) of the Act says that "a tenant shall not be evicted whether in execution of a decree or otherwise except in accordance with the provisions of this section or Ss. 14 to 16". Sub-S.(2)of S.10 says that a landlord who seeks to evict his tenant shall apply to the Controller for a direction in that behalf Sub-S.(3)(a)(iii) provides that a landlord may subject to the provisions of Clause (d) apply to the Controller for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building, in case it is any other non-residential building, if the landlord or any member of his family is not occupying for purposes of a business which he or any member of his family is carrying on, a nonresidential building in the city, town or village concerned which is his own. The provisions are not necessary for our purpose. It is in this context, the question arose as to whether one partner could seek eviction on behalf of the partnership. This point was referred to a Full Bench and the Full Bench on 14th March 1989 in this Civil Revision Petition and C.R.P. 4276 of 1984, answered that such a petition could be maintained. I will now go to Cl.(e) of S.10(3). It reads as follows--

S.10(3)(a) : The Controller shall, if he is satisfied that the claim of the landlord is bona fide, make an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building on such date as may be specified by the Controller and If the Controller is not so satisfied, he shall make an order rejecting the application.

It requires to be carefully noted that what the Rent Controller is required to find out is about the claim of the landlord, whether it is bona fide or not.

In this case, the Revision petitioner claims that she is not occupying for purposes of her business a non-residential building of her own in the city. In fact it is not denied before me that she is carrying on business at premises No. 268, Purasawalkam High Road, which is a rented building. It is not further denied that the petition premises belonged to her. Therefore, the resultant position boils down to this. The petitioner is carrying on business in a rented premises. She wants to shift her business to her own premises. It is opposed by the tenant saying that her business in the rented premises which consists of retail textile business is flourishing year by year. If she were to shift her business to her own premises she will be obliged to meet severe competition and in the petition premises area, there are several persons doing business in wholesale and therefore that will not be suitable. It is this submission which met with the approval of both the Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority.

For my part, with respect, I am unable to appreciate this line of reasoning. The Court is not here to advise a businessman as to how and in what manner his business ought to be conducted. If at all, the landlord takes the risk. Therefore, to say, as the Appellate Authority has said, that the business in Purasawalkam High Road is flourishing and encouraging and as per the agreement between the parties as evidenced by Ex.P3, the principal place business shall be premises No. 268 Purasawalkam High Road, and there appears to be no necessity for the petitioner to shift the principal place of business from Purasawalkam High Road to Rattan Bazaar, seems to be unacceptable and unsustainable. It may be that her business is flourishing. But that may not be a ground for deciding the question of bona fides, because as I have pointed out earlier, her claim that she is carrying on business in a rented premises and that she requires the petition building for her own occupation alone requires to be examined. Though there are a series of decisions of this Court on his question, the Supreme Court had held that even in such cases, bona fides, is warranted. The approach to the question should be the other way as rightly pointed out by Mr. N.C Ragavachari. It is necessary on the part of the landlady to suffer the tenant for all time to come merely because her business is flourishing at Purasawalkam High Road? It may be that when she shifts the business to her own premises, the business might flourish more. The Court cannot speculate and on that ground say that the petition lacks bona fides. In so doing the Appellate Authority relied on the ruling in M.M. Quasim Vs. Manohar Lal Sharma and others, It seems that the petitioner has not given any reason for shifting the business from Purasawalkam High Road to Rattan Bazaar. For my part, I am unable to say as to what reason should be given when the landlady wants to shift her own business from a rented premises to a premises of her own.

It is true that the petitioner''s brother is the landlord. It is equally true that she is not under the threat of eviction. Law does not demand that a particular person should be under threat of eviction. In this regard it is pertinent to note the preamble of the Act. It does not altogether taboo eviction. It is only an Act relating to the regulation of the letting of residential and nonresidential buildings and the control of rents of such buildings and the prevention of unreasonable eviction of tenants therefrom in the State of Tamil Nadu. This is not a case of unreasonable eviction of a tenant.

When examined in the above background, for my part, I am unable to accept the following findings of the Appellate Authority:--

It is not even her case that the landlord of the premises where she is carrying on business requires the portion in the occupation of the respondent for his own use and occupation When there is no demand by the landlord of the premises No 268, Purasawalkam High Road, there appears to be no necessity for the petitioner to shift her principal place of business from the above premises to the petition mentioned property.

I am of the view that need is not dictated by necessity. That is something not contemplated by the provisions of the Act.

With regard to the principal place of business, as stated in the deed of partnership, I am somewhat surprised to see that the lower appellate Court must have taken this as inviolable. At the time when the partnership deed was drafted, no doubt premises No. 268 Purasawalkam High. Road was the principal place of business. But Cl. 5 of the partnership deed clearly mentions as follows:--

The parties hereto shall have the right to shift the principal place of business elsewhere and to open branch or branches and to close down any or all of them.

Therefore, the business could be shifted. Even otherwise, according to me, if the petitioner desires to shift her business premises, there is no bar.

The next question is whether the consent of the other partner is required. In D.N. Sanghavi and Sons Vs. Ambalal Tribhuwan Das, it is observed as follows:--

In neither of these two passages nor anywhere else in the evidence he has stated that on the terms of the partnership he is entitled to manage the partnership business or even that he would also occupy the suit accommodation along with his partners on obtaining possession from the appellants.

In this case it is admitted by Mr. Raghavan, that this was not raised in the counter. However, he would say that it is for the petitioner to prove that she had obtained consent. Therefore, where that was not so stated in the petition, the tenant was not called upon to raise this issue. I am unable to accept this because unless this was put in issue, there was no necessity on the part of the landlady to say that the consent had been obtained already and the other partner has also consented. It is precisely for this purpose M.P. 1600 of 1982 was taken out in the appellate Court. The whole question could have been set at rest by allowing the miscellaneous petition. But what has been done was that it has been dismissed on a technical ground. If that affidavit is taken into consideration, the question of lack of consent pales into insignificance.

This is not a case of landlady having several buildings and she requires the building in the respondents for her own use and occupation. In such an event alone, the ruling in M.M. Quasim Vs. Manohar Lal Sharma and others, wherein the right of re-entry of a landlord has been held to be not unfettered would apply. But the facts here are totally different. There is only one non-residential premises to which the landlady wants to shift from a rented building.

Then comes the demand for higher rent. The learned Rent Controller has dealt with this aspect and has observed as follows:--

Now we have to see whether there was any demand for higher rent by the petitioner from the first respondent. Only, the oral evidence of P.W.1, P.W.2, and R.W.1 is available to decide this point. Admittedly, the petitioner never demanded any enhanced rent from the respondent. R.W.1 himself admitted this fact in his evidence. It is pertinent to note that the petitioner is a pardanasin lady. The petitioner never collected any rent from the first respondent. The first respondent never met the petitioner. So the contention of the first respondent that the petitioner demanded enhanced rent from him would only mean that the demand of enhanced rent was made only by the petitioners'' representative and not by the petitioner personally.

This point was not dealt with specifically by the Appellate Authority. That is why the learned counsel for the respondents would say that if at all, the matter could be remanded on this score, But I am of the view that having regard to the decision in Gopalakrishna Chettair Vs. W.K.A. Yakub Hussain, the demand for higher rent at an earlier stage will not debar the landlady from claiming eviction on the ground of bona fide requirement of the premises for her own use.

Then the last question is as to scope of S.25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960, Mr. Raghavan, learned counsel for the respondents brings to my notice the decision in Sri. Raja Lakshmi Dyeing Works and Others Vs. Rangaswamy Chettiar, wherein the Supreme Court has observed as follows:--

A concurrent finding based on evidence that the landlord did not bona fide require the premises for his own use and occupation is not in our view a finding which can be touched by the High Court exercising jurisdiction under S. 25 of Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act 1960.

In this case, I make it very clear that I am not reappraising the evidence on record. I am only pointing out as to how both the Rent Controller and the Appellate-Authority in disregard of the statutory pro visions, proceeded to assess the evidence from angles which are not warranted by the statute, from perfectives which are not contemplated under the statute. In such a case, certainly the Revisional power could be exercised where the approach itself is totally wrong. Hence this decision cannot help the respondents.

In the result, the civil revision petition is allowed, the order of the Rent Controller as confirmed by the Appellate Authority is set aside and there will be an order of eviction of the respondent. There will be no order as to costs. The respondent will have time till 30th September 1989 to vacate and handover vacant possession to the landlady.