A. Alangaram vs A. Ganesan

Abdul Hadi, J.—The tenant under the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, (hereinafter referred to as ''the Act''), who has

failed in both the courts below, is the petitioner in this civil revision petition against the concurrent eviction order passed u/s 14(1)(b) of the Act.

The main argument of the learned Counsel for the petitioner is that there is neither plea, nor proof regarding the dilapidated condition of the

petition-building, which, according to the learned Counsel, is absolutely required to be pleaded and proved pursuant to the recent decision of the

Supreme Court reported in P. Orr and Sons (P.) Limited v. Associated Publishers (Madras) Limited, (1990)2 L.W. 547. On the other hand, the

learned Counsel for the respondent-landlord, in this regard, contends that the pleading should not be construed strictly and that at any rate even

assuming that the abovesaid plea is not in the petition it was in contemplation between the parties and therefore, the evidence in that regard could

be looked into and that the courts below have come to the right conclusion on the evidence recorded. He also cited several decisions, which

according to him, would support his abovesaid submission.

In the light of the abovesaid rival submissions it is necessary to set out the material portions of the plea as found in the R.C.O.P.

The respondent is the tenant of the building NMC No. 12/49 from the last 15 (fifteen) years.... The building is a non-residential building and the

respondent is doing business therein The petitioner is doing business in timber adjacent to the schedule building. For the convenience of the

petitioner''s business, the petitioner is in need of an office room. The petitioner, therefore, intends to pull down the entire existing structure including

the petition Schedule building and reconstruct a pucca building.

[Italics supplied]

But, as per Section 14(1)(b) of the Act, eviction could be ordered only if ""the building is bona fide required by the landlord for the immediate

purpose of demolishing it and such demolition is to be made for the purpose of erecting a new building on the site of the building sought to be

demolished"".

[emphasis supplied]

While interpreting the abovesaid Section 14(1)(b), the Supreme Court in the above referred to P. Orr and Sons (P.) Limited v. Associated

Publishers (Madras) Limited (1990) 2 L.W. 547, has held as follows:

We accordingly hold that Section 14(1)(b) is satisfied only if the building is bona fide required by the landlord forthe ""immediate"",ie., direct, sole

and timely purpose of demolishing it with a view to erecting a new building on the site of the existing building....

but the essential and overriding consideration which, in the general interests of the public and for the protection of the tenants from unreasonable

eviction, the legislature has in mind is the condition of the building that demands timely demolition by reason of the extent of damage to its structure

making it uneconomical or unsafe to undertake repairs. While the condition of the building by itself may not necessarily establish the bona fide

requirement under Clause (b), that condition is not only one of the various circumstances which may be taken into account by the Controller, but it

is the essential condition in the absence of which it would not be possible for the landlord to prove that he has a bona fide requirement which is

timely, directly and solely for the purpose of demolition of the building. The Act does not accept the requirement by the landlord as a bona fide

requirement within the meaning of the provision unless the condition of the building, in the context of the relevant circumstances, requires

demolition.

[Italics supplied]

In the above background, it is clear that in the present case, the necessary averments which should be there u/s 14(1)(b) of the Act have not

been made at all in the present R.C.O.P. On the other hand it is only averred that the landlord is doing business in the adjacent building and the

petition building is required since the landlord is in need of an office room and that, therefore, the landlord 1 intends to pull down the entire existing

structure including the petition schedule building''. So, not only could it be stated that what is required u/s 14(1)(b) has not been pleaded but it

could also be stated that the only reason pleaded in the petition is something extraneous to what is required u/s 14(1)(b) of the Act.

Further, when some imperfect language is used in the pleadings then it could be said that the language should be liberally construed. But, that is

not the case here at all. There is a total absence of requisite plea, as stated above. Hence, the decisions in S.B. Noronah Vs. Prem Kumari

Khanna, and Ruth Margaret Gonsalves v. KT.M. Presses by its Proprietor, Kumar, 100 L.W. 258, cited by the learned Counsel for the

respondent in this regard have absolutely no application to the present case.

No doubt, the learned Counsel for the respondents points out that admittedly the petition-building is a tiled building. But, even the said averment

is not there in the abovesaid petition or the schedule therein. Further, the mere fact that the petition-building is a tiled building, would not by itself

satisfy the abovesaid requirement u/s 14(1)(b) as enunciated by the Supreme Court in the decision referred to above.

The learned Counsel for the respondent also contends that the courts below have held that the petition-building is aged 50 years. But, even here

I must state that there is no such plea in the petition. Further, merely because the age of the building is 50 years, it cannot be automatically

concluded that the requirement u/s 14(1)(b) of the Act is satisfied. The learned Counsel for the petitioner drew my attention to Rule 11 of the Tamil

Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Rules, 1974, which requires that in any application under the Act, inter alia the date on which the

construction of the building was completed must be stated. According to him, if this is stated, it would have given the age of the building, but it was

also not stated in the R.C.O.P.

It is a settled principle of law that no amount of evidence can be looked into on a plea which was never put forward. No doubt, even if strictly

speaking the relevant plea is not there in the petition, if atleast the said plea was in contemplation of the parties when they go to trial, the court

could take into account the evidence recorded in that regard. (Vide : Nagubai Ammal and Others Vs. B. Shama Rao and Others, . But, in the

present case, even when P.W.I, the only witness on the side of the landlord, was examined he did not whisper at all anything about the actual

condition of the petition-building or the damaged or dilapidated nature thereof. That shows that the abovesaid aspect was not in the contemplation

of the parties also even when they went to the trial. So, strictly speaking, there is no necessity for me to consider the entire evidence recorded in

the present case, regarding the abovesaid aspect.

Anyway since the learned Counsel for the respondent made some attempt to point out something in this regard from the evidence recorded. I

shall consider it also. He points out that Ex. A-3 petition notice mentions that the petition building is ""old"", and to that Ex. A-3 notice, there was no

reply by the tenant, nor there is any explanation why no reply was given. But, the mere fact that the building was old, is not enough, as already

pointed out by me earlier, to satisfy the requirements u/s 14(1)(b) of the Act. In the present case, not only the landlord has not examined any

independent witness, but he has not also sought for appointment of a Commissioner to inspect the petition-building to assess the dilapidated or

damaged condition of the building, so that the court could come to a conclusion that the building is bonafide required for the immediate purpose of

demolition.

Apart from Ex. A-3 which only speaks of the building being old, there is absolutely no documentary or oral evidence regarding the abovesaid

aspect, which is required to be proved u/s 14(1)(b) of the Act. The decision in Shyamlal Agarwal Vs. Ratanlal Malviya (dead) by Lrs., , cited by

the learned Counsel for the respondent has no application to the present case as it dealt with the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, in

which the corresponding relevant provision was different. The Supreme Court also observed there in the context of the relevant provision under the

abovesaid enactment as follows:

There is no statutory requirement that while considering the bonafide need of the landlord for reconstruction of the accommodation the building

must necessarily be in a dilapidated condition requiring repair or demolition. Unlike other Rent Control Laws the Madhya Pradesh

Accommodation Act does not expressly provide for any such condition.

Therefore, it is clear that the courts below have clearly erred in arriving at the decision they have reached, without properly noting the

exposition of law in this regard by the Supreme Court in the above referred to P.Orr. and Sons (P.) Limited v. Mis Associated Publishers

(Madras) Limited (1990) 2 L.W. 547. Accordingly, the civil revision petition is allowed, the orders passed by both the authorities below are'' set

aside and the R.C.O.P. is dismissed. However, in the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.