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Judgment
V. Ramasubramanian, J.—The petitioners in these writ petitions, challenge the provisional orders of attachment passed by the Director of
Enforcement, which later got confirmed by the Adjudicating Authority, under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002. I have heard Mr. N.
Manokaran, Learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner in the first two writ petitions, Mr. J. Ferozkhan, Learned Counsel appearing for the
petitioner in the third and fourth writ petitions and Mr. M. Dhandapani, Learned Counsel appearing for the Directorate of Enforcement.
The petitioners in the first two writ petitions are the wife and daughter of one Md. Ismail Khan Ghori, against whom a complaint in Crime No.
35 of 2010 was registered for alleged offences u/s 420 read with Section 511 IPC and Sections 4 and 5 of Prize Chits and Money Circulation
Scheme (Banning) Act, 1978. The said Md. Ismail Khan Ghori and his two sons and another person, were partners of a Company by name M/s.
Green Life. It is alleged in the criminal complaint that the said Company collected huge amounts from thousands of customers in Trichy,
Coimbatore, Tirunelveli etc., and cheated them. The partners were all arrested and detained in custody.
Thereafter, the Deputy Director of Enforcement, who is the second respondent in the first two writ petitions, passed a Provisional Attachment
Order bearing No. 4 of 2010 u/s 5(1) of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, directing the attachment of certain immovable
properties, allegedly purchased out of the proceeds of crime. Though this order dated 23.6.2010 passed by the second respondent could be in
force for a period of 150 days, the Director is obliged u/s 5 (5) of the Act to file an application for confirmation before the Adjudicating Authority
within 30 days of the order of attachment.
Therefore, the Deputy Director filed appropriate applications in O.C. Nos. 56, 57 and 58 of 2010 before the Adjudicating Authority, praying
for confirming the order of provisional attachment u/s 8(3) of the Act. On the said application, the Adjudicating Authority issued a notice to the
petitioners. But it appears that a counsel, who undertook to appear for the petitioners in the first two writ petitions took adjournments thrice and
failed to appear before the Adjudicating Authority thereafter. Therefore, the Adjudicating Authority proceeded to hear the matter on merits and it
passed an order dated 12.11.2010, directing the confirmation of the Provisional Attachment Orders and further directing the second respondent to
forthwith take possession of the properties attached. Accordingly, the Deputy Director also took actual physical possession of the properties.
Therefore, the petitioners who are the wife and daughter of the prime accused, have come up with the above writ petitions, challenging the
Provisional Attachment Order dated 23.6.2010 and the order of the Adjudicating Authority dated 12.11.2010.
The petitioner in the third and fourth writ petitions viz., W.P. Nos. 13421 and 22062 of 2011, is the mother of one S. Anbu, who was
implicated along with one Mr. Amarchand Kothari and a few others in a criminal complaint in Crime No. 4 of 2008 for offences under Sections
420, 467, 468, 471 and 406 IPC. On the basis of the said complaint, enquiries were initiated by the Directorate of Enforcement under the
Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002.
On the basis of the documents available in Crime No. 4 of 2008, the Enforcement Directorate registered an Enforcement Case Information
Report No. 01 of 2009 dated 4.6.2009. Thereafter, a property standing in the name of the petitioner (mother of the accused by name S. Anbu)
was provisionally attached by the Deputy Director in terms of Section 5(1) of Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, by order No. 02 of
2011 dated 28.3.2011. Challenging the provisional attachment, the petitioner filed W.P. No. 13421 of 2011. Notice was ordered in the said writ
petition on 10-6-2011 and it was later admitted on 16-8-2011.
But in the meantime, a complaint u/s 5(5) of the Act was filed by the Deputy Director before the Adjudicating Authority. The Adjudicating
Authority passed an order dated 10.8.2011, confirming the provisional order of attachment and directing the Deputy Director to take possession
forthwith. Challenging the order of the Adjudicating Authority dated 10-8-2011, the petitioner in the third writ petition has come up with the fourth
writ petition W.P. No. 22062 of 2011. As a matter of fact, the order of provisional attachment dated 28.3.2011 actually got merged with the
order of the Adjudicating Authority and hence nothing survives W.P. No. 13421 of 2011.
Be that as it may, the main grounds on which the petitioners in all these writ petitions assail the impugned orders, are:-
(i) that the order of the Director u/s 5(1) and the order of the Adjudicating Authority u/s 8(3) were passed in violation of the principles of natural
justice and without providing adequate opportunity of being heard; and
(ii) that without deciding the question of independent ownership of the properties, the respondents have attached the properties owned by the
family members of the accused.
GROUND No. 1 in the first 2 writ petitions:
It is the case of the petitioners in the first two writ petitions viz., W.P. Nos. 1912 and 2870 of 2011 that no notice was ever served on them,
before an order of attachment was issued u/s 5(1) of the Act. But the said contention is to be rejected, for the simple reason that what is
contemplated u/s 5(1) is only a provisional order of attachment, to be passed subject to several pre-conditions. The Director must have reason to
believe -- (i) that any person is in possession of any proceeds of crime (ii) that such person has committed a scheduled offence and (iii) that the
proceeds of crime are likely to be concealed, transferred or dealt with, in such a manner as to result in the frustration of any proceedings for
confiscation u/s 8. He must also be satisfied, before passing the order of attachment, that a report has been forwarded to the Magistrate u/s 173 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure, in relation to the scheduled offence. Section 5(4) protects persons who are in enjoyment of such property, from
being deprived of such enjoyment. Therefore, the question of giving an opportunity of hearing at the stage of provisional order of attachment u/s
5(1) does not arise.
The petitioners in the first two writ petitions raise an additional ground to the effect that even the Adjudicating Authority did not give adequate
opportunity of hearing before passing the order dated 12.11.2010 in O.C. No. 58 of 2010. But a perusal of the order dated 12.11.2010 in O.C.
No. 58 of 2010 shows that two Advocates by name M/s. Sivabala Murugan and Aris Mohammed appeared for the hearing on 12.10.2010 at
Delhi and sought an adjournment. Therefore, the case was adjourned to 19.10.2010. Even on 19.10.2010, the said counsel appeared and sought
one more adjournment. The Adjudicating Authority finally granted an adjournment for a second time on condition that the counsel should file (i)
vakalatnama (ii) reply and (iii) submissions, on or before 25.10.2010. Despite such a conditional adjournment, the counsel for the petitioners did
not appear on 25.10.2010. Therefore, the Adjudicating Authority proceeded to pass an ex parte order, confirming the provisional order of
attachment. Hence, a person who entered appearance through counsel and sought time at least on two occasions and failed to appear on the third
occasion, cannot plead that no opportunity of hearing was given.
In the order passed by the Adjudicating Authority which is impugned in the first two writ petitions, the Adjudicating Authority has recorded
that notice was served on the petitioners by substituted service. The manner in which and the reason due to which substituted service was effected
upon the petitioners in the first two writ petitions, is detailed in paragraph 5.2 of the counter affidavit filed by the second respondent. It is stated
therein that the Adjudicating Authority issued a show cause notice dated 21.7.2010 to the petitioners. The notice directed them to appear for the
enquiry on 6.9.2010. The notice was served in person on the petitioner in the first writ petition, on 3.8.2010 and her acknowledgement obtained.
Later the hearing was re-fixed to 20.9.2010 and the same was intimated by another notice dated 20.8.2010. While the first hearing was fixed at
Delhi on 6.9.2010, the postponed hearing on 20.9.2010 was fixed at Chennai. But the said notice could not be served on the petitioners and they
returned unserved. Hence the said notice was served by way of affixture. Despite completion of service by affixture, the Adjudicating Authority
adjourned the hearing to 12-10-2010. On 12-10-2010, 2 Learned Counsel appeared for the petitioner and took adjournment to 19-10-2010.
Again on 19-10-2010 they sought time and it was granted. But on the next date of hearing they did not appear and hence the Authority proceeded
ex-parte. In such circumstances, I cannot accept the contention that there was no proper service of notice in the proceedings u/s 8 before the
Adjudicating Authority in respect of the first two cases.
As a matter of fact, even the provisional order of attachment is claimed by the Deputy Director to have been sent by registered post
acknowledgement due and the same was returned undelivered in so far as the petitioner in the first writ petition is concerned. Therefore, the copy
of the provisional order of attachment also had only to be affixed. However, the accused, who was in Central Prison, was duly served with the
provisional order of attachment. Therefore, the contention that there was no adequate opportunity of being heard, cannot be raised by the
petitioners in the first two writ petitions.
Mr. N. Manokaran, Learned Counsel for the petitioner relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Uma Nath Pandey vs. State of UP.
{2009 (2) CTC 663}, in support of his contention that principles of natural justice are rules guaranteeing minimum protection of the rights of the
individuals against the arbitrary procedure that may be adopted by a judicial, quasi-judicial and Administrative Authority and that therefore, they
are deeply rooted in tradition and conscience and hence, cannot be compromised. Though the said contention, as a principle of law, is
unquestionable, it has no application to the case on hand, as the petitioners allowed the opportunities given to them to drift away.
The Learned Counsel also relied upon a decision of this Court in L. Dakshinamoorthy, Advocate, 61, Kalianman Koil street, Komarapalayam
638 183 Vs. Bar Council of Tamil Nadu and others, , to drive home the point that the expression ""reason to believe"" appearing in Section 5(1) has
to be assigned its proper place. Neither the said decision is of any avail to the petitioners nor can I have reason to hold that the Deputy Director
did not have any reason to believe. Today, the Deputy Director''s order has merged with the order of the Adjudicating Authority who has gone
through all the records.
The first two writ petitioners also raise one more ground viz., that by virtue of the first proviso u/s 5(1) of the Act, a provisional order of
attachment can be made only if a report had been forwarded to a Magistrate u/s 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. But the provisional order
of attachment dated 23.6.2010 merely relies upon the first information report registered by the City Crime Branch and the statements of several
persons. There is no indication in the provisional order of attachment that a final report had already been filed. Even in the complaint filed by the
Director before the Adjudicating Authority for confirmation of the provisional order of attachment, there is no indication of any final report having
been filed u/s 173 Cr.P.C. Therefore, it is contended that the order u/s 5(1) itself was vitiated.
In answer to the said contention, the respondents rely upon a decision of a learned Judge of this Court in W.P. Nos. 24444 and 24445 of
2010 dated 18.11.2010 {R. Devadoss vs. Deputy Director}. It was held in the said decision that the requirement of a report u/s 173 Cr.P.C.,
relates to the final attachment and not to the provisional attachment.
But I do not think that the answer lies there. A perusal of Section 5(1) shows that the substantive part of Section 5(1) imposes three
requirements viz., that the Director should have reason to believe (i) that any person is in possession of any proceeds of crime (ii) that such person
is charged of having committed a scheduled offence and (iii) that such proceeds of crime are likely to be dealt with in a manner resulting in the
frustration of confiscation proceedings.
Prior to 1.6.2009, Section 5(1) had only one proviso. That proviso made it mandatory that a report u/s 173 Cr.P.C., ought to have been
forwarded to a Magistrate, if the offence falls within Paragraph 1 of Part A and Part B of the schedule. Alternatively, a police report or a complaint
should have been filed u/s 36 of the NDPS Act, before a Special Court, if the offence relates to Paragraph 2 of Part A of the schedule.
By Prevention of Money Laundering (Amendment) Act, 2009, the proviso u/s 5(1) was substituted by two provisos. This amendment came
into effect from 1.6.2009. Both the provisos read as follows:-""Provided that no such order of attachment shall be made unless, in relation to the
scheduled offence, a report has been forwarded to a Magistrate u/s 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), or a complaint has
been filed by a person, authorised to investigate the offence mentioned in the Schedule, before a Magistrate or Court for taking cognizance of the
scheduled offence, as the case may be:
Provided further that, notwithstanding anything contained in clause (b), any property of any person may be attached under this Section if the
Director or any other Officer not below the rank of Deputy Director authorised by him for the purposes of this Section has reason to believe (the
reasons for such belief to be recorded in writing), on the basis of material in his possession, that if such property involved in money-laundering is
not attached immediately under this Chapter, the non-attachment of the property is likely to frustrate any proceeding under this Act.
While the first proviso deals with an order of attachment in respect of a property which is in possession of a person charged of having
committed a scheduled offence, the second proviso relates to the property of any other person who may not even be charged of committing a
scheduled offence. The second proviso contains a non abstante clause in relation to Clause (b) of Section 5(1). In other words, the first proviso
centers around a person charged with a scheduled offence. The second proviso centers around the property of any other person, not necessarily
charged of committing a scheduled offence. Therefore, it will be illogical to think that the Director should await a final report u/s 173 Cr.P.C., even
for attaching the property of any other person (other than the one accused) for invoking the second proviso. It is possible for the Director to wait
till a final report is filed u/s 173 Cr.P.C., if the property to be attached is in possession of any person charged of having committed a scheduled
offence as per Clauses (a) and (b) of Section 5. But it is not possible to wait for such a report (there will be no such report for those not charged
of committing offences) in respect of properties in possession and enjoyment of persons not charged with the scheduled offences, who would
come within the scope of the second proviso to Section 5(1). In the cases on hand, the properties standing in the name of the petitioners are sought
to be attached in terms of the second proviso u/s 5(1). Therefore, the restriction applicable to the first proviso, cannot be relied upon.
GROUND NO. 2 in first 2 writ petitions:
The second ground of attack by the petitioner in the first two writ petitions is that without even deciding the question of independent ownership
of the petitioners to the property in question, the respondents have attached them. But this contention should go in view of the second proviso to
Section 5(1). If the petitioners in the first two writ petitions have acquired the properties in question from out of lawful means by themselves, they
should have participated in the adjudication proceedings before the Adjudicating Authority and adduced evidence. Having failed to do so, the
petitioners cannot now ask this Court to examine their title to the properties. Hence the second contention is also to be rejected.
GROUND NO. 1 IN THE THIRD AND FOURTH WRIT PETITIONS:
Even the petitioner in the third and fourth writ petitions claim lack of adequate opportunity of being heard and violation of the principles of
natural justice in the proceedings before the Adjudicating Authority. But the order of the Adjudicating Authority dated 10.8.2011, passed in O.C.
No. 98 of 2011 would show that the adjudication proceedings were taken up for the first time before the Adjudicating Authority on 17.6.2011. It
appears that one Mr. Firoz Khan, who is also the counsel for the petitioner in the third and fourth writ petitions, sent a letter to the Adjudicating
Authority on 11.6.2011, seeking an adjournment, on the ground that the writ petition filed against the provisional order of attachment was pending
in the Court. The request was turned down by the Authority by order dated 17.6.2011. However, the case was adjourned to 23.6.2011. On the
said date, the writ petitioner and his counsel did not appear. Therefore, the Adjudicating Authority proceeded to pass orders.
Thus it is seen that the petitioner in the third and fourth writ petitions had notice of the date of hearing. They sought adjournment by post.
Therefore they must have verified as to whether an adjournment was granted or not. Having failed to find out as to what transpired on 17.6.2011,
the petitioner cannot claim that there was no adequate opportunity of hearing. There is no necessity for an Authority like the Adjudicating Authority
to send notices for every date of hearing, unless the hearing had been postponed sine die without indicating a future date. Therefore, the primary
contention raised by the petitioner in the third and fourth writ petitions goes.
GROUND NO. 2 in the 3rd and 4th writ petitions:
The petitioner in the third and fourth writ petitions next contend that she is not accused in the criminal case and that therefore, her property
cannot be attached. Unfortunately, the petitioner in the third and fourth writ petitions relies upon the proviso to Section 5(1) as it existed before the
amendment made on 1.6.2009. In ground No. (b) in the third writ petition and in ground No. (j) in the fourth writ petition, the petitioner therein
relies upon the proviso to Section 5(1), as it existed prior to 1.6.2009. After 1.6.2009, the second proviso has been inserted, enabling the Director
even to attach any property of any person other than the one charged with an offence. Hence, the second contention of the petitioner in the third
and fourth writ petitions also fail.
COMMON GROUND IN ALL 4 WRIT PETITIONS:
Apart from the above grounds, the petitioners also complain that their dispossession from the properties in pursuance of the impugned orders
of the Adjudicating Authority is wholly illegal and unjustified. This grievance, in my opinion requires a deeper consideration, since the orders of
attachment, under this Act, precede conviction. In other words, the respondents claim that the Act gives power to them to dispossess a person
from a property, even before conviction by the competent court. What is more crucial is that even persons who are not charged of any scheduled
offence could also be deprived of possession of properties, if such properties, in the opinion of the Director represent the proceeds of crime.
Therefore, it may be essential to take note of the Scheme of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002.
The Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, hereinafter called the ''Act'', was enacted in pursuance of the Political Declaration adopted
by the Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly held in June 1998, calling upon the member States to adopt National Money
Laundering Legislation and Program, primarily with a view to meet out the serious threat posed by money laundering to the Financial Systems of
countries and to their integrity and sovereignty. If we have a look at the statement of objects and reasons and also trace the historical basis for the
Political Declaration and Global Program of Action adopted by the General Assembly, it could be seen that the concern of the Global Community
which led to the above resolutions, was about the illicit traffic in Narcotic drugs and the huge amount of money generated from the same. The
original object of the Declaration of the General Assembly and the 2002 Act, was not to deal with normal crimes such as robbery, dacoity, fraud
etc. But in course of time, the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 also appears to have fallen into the same kind of disuse/misuse as other
enactments of similar nature, by first targeting local criminals than their international counter parts.
The Constitutional validity of the Act came to be challenged in a batch of writ petitions before a Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High
Court in B. Rama Raju vs. Union of India {2011 (3) ALT 443}. One of the main planks of challenge therein, was to the power vested with the
Director of Enforcement u/s 8(4) of the Act, to take possession of a property attached, if such property was purchased from out of the proceeds
of crime. Therefore, one of the issues taken up for consideration by the Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court, as could be seen from
para-10 (D) of the judgment is as follows:-
(D) Whether Section 8 (4) is invalid for enjoining deprivation of possession of immovable property even before conclusion of guilt/conviction in the
prosecution for an offence of money-laundering?
The discussion with regard to the said question could be found from paragraphs 100 to 103 of the decision of the Division Bench of the
Andhra Pradesh High Court. In a nutshell, the contention that the power conferred by Section 8(4) was arbitrary as it precedes the conviction by
the Special Court for the offence of money laundering was rejected by the Andhra Pradesh High Court. To come to the said conclusion, the
Andhra Pradesh High Court gave the following reasons in paragraphs 101 to 103:-
(i) that the preservation of the right to the enjoyment of immovable property upto the stage of confirmation of attachment and the mandate for
dispossession after confirmation of attachment, are intended by the legislative scheme to balance the governmental interest on the one hand and the
rights of persons in possession of the property on the other hand; and
(ii) that the apparent purpose for dispossession u/s 8(4) is to prevent wastage or spoilage of property and the dissipation of its value, till the stage
of confiscation.
On the above reasoning, the Andhra Pradesh High Court upheld in para 128 (iii) of its decision, the validity of Section 8(4), which enjoins
deprivation of possession of immovable property, pursuant to an order confirming the provisional attachment, even before the conviction of the
accused for an offence of money laundering.
Therefore, it is contended by Mr. M. Dhandapani, Learned Counsel for the Enforcement Directorate that the power conferred by Section
8(4), to dispossess a person in possession of the proceeds of crime or the property acquired from out of the proceeds of crime, even before the
conviction of the accused, is perfectly valid and justified. As a matter of fact, the direction issued by the Adjudicating Authority in the writ petitions
on hand, mandating the Director of Enforcement to take possession of the properties of the writ petitioners, is on the basis of the language
employed in Section 8 and the reasoning given by the Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court for upholding the validity of Section 8(4),.
But there is some difficulty in accepting the reasoning given by the Andhra Pradesh High Court, on this issue and the manner in which Section
8(4), has been understood. It must be noted that the Act not only enables the Director or Deputy Director of Enforcement to proceed against the
properties of a person charged of having committed a scheduled offence, but also to proceed against ""any person"" in possession of any proceeds
of crime. In other words, the power to attach a property provisionally u/s 5(1), the power to have such attachment confirmed u/s 8(3), and the
power to dispossess u/s 8(4),, can be used not necessarily against the person accused of committing an offence, but also against any person in
possession of the property purchased out of the proceeds of crime. It is possible that such persons happen to be the family members of the
accused, including small children and the elderly. It is also possible that the property may be in possession of tenants, who have statutory
protection in terms of other enactments.
While the 2002 Act may have an overriding effect by virtue of Section 71, upon other enactments in so far as the rights of persons charged
under the Act are concerned, I doubt if it could have overriding effect upon the enactments which confer certain rights upon persons entirely
unconnected with the crime. Similarly, the rights of children and women, who form part of the household of even those charged under the Act, may
have protection in terms of the Constitutional provisions and international conventions relating to women and children. The validity of Section 8(4),
has not been tested by the Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court, on the touchstone of (i) the Constitutional guarantees available to
children and women residing in the property and (ii) the statutory protection available to tenants in terms of other enactments.
With great respect to the Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court, the Court has not tested the validity of Section 8(4), of the Act
even on the touchstone of the rights as well as plight of the victims of the offences. Section 5(1) enables the Director to order provisional
attachment of any property which, he has reason to believe, represent the proceeds of crime, provided the person in possession is charged of
having committed scheduled offence. By virtue of the second proviso to Section 5(1), the property which represent the proceeds of crime can be
attached even if it be in possession of any other person, provided the property is considered to have been involved in money laundering. Therefore,
either of the two conditions are to be satisfied u/s 5(1). The first condition is that the person charged of having committed a scheduled offence is in
possession of any proceeds of crime. The alternative condition is that the property is involved in money laundering though the person in possession
is not charged under the Act.
Section 3 defines money laundering to mean the indulgence or involvement in any process or activity connected with the proceeds of crime,
provided the person so indulging or involving projects it as untainted property. Therefore, it is clear that the stress is on two things viz., (i) proceeds
of crime and (ii) scheduled offence.
The expression ""proceeds of crime"" is defined in Section 2(1)(u) to mean any property derived or obtained by any person as a result of
criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence. The expression ""scheduled offence"" is defined in Section 2(1)(y) to mean (i) either the offences
specified in Part A of the schedule to the Act or (ii) the offences specified in Part B of the schedule, if the total value involved in such offences is
Rs. 30 lakhs and more or (iii) the offences specified in Part C of the schedule.
A careful look at Parts A, B and C of the schedule, would highlight the lacuna in the Act.
The schedule to the Act contains 3 Parts viz., Part A, Part B and Part C. Part A contains 4 paragraphs, Part B contains 25 paragraphs and
Part C merely relates to offences of cross border implications that may be covered by Parts A and B.
Part A of the Schedule to the Act, covers offences under various enactments. They can be presented in a tabular column as follows:-
Part B of the Schedule to the Act enlists under 25 paragraphs, various offences under various Acts. They can be presented in a tabular column
as follows:-
Under Paragraph 1 of Part A of the schedule, only a few Sections of Indian Penal Code viz., Sections 121, 121 -A, 489-A and 489-B alone
are included.
In so far as Part B is concerned, certain offences under the Indian Penal Code come under Paragraph-1. It is interesting to note that prior to
1.6.2009, Paragraph 1 of Part B of the schedule included within itself, the offences under Sections 302, 304, 307, 308, 327, 329, 364A, 384 to
389, 392 to 402, 467, 489-A, 489-B, 412, 413, 414, 417, 418, 419, 420, 421, 422, 423, 424, 467, 471, 472, 473, 475, 476, 481, 482, 483,
484, 485, 486, 487 and 488 of the Indian Penal Code. But with effect from 1.6.2009, the old paragraph 1 of Part B of the schedule to the Act,
was substituted by a new Paragraph I by the Prevention of Money Laundering (Amendment) Act, 2009. Now Paragraph-1 of Part B lists out only
the offences under Sections 120-B, 255, 257, 258, 259, 260, 302, 304, 307, 308, 327, 329, 364-A, 384 to 389, 392 to 402 and 411 IPC.
Interestingly, a look at Paragraph 1 of Part B of the schedule (as it stands after 1-6-2009) shows that the offence of kidnapping for ransom,
punishable u/s 364-A, the offences related to extortion punishable under Sections 384 to 389 and offences relating to robbery and dacoity
punishable u/s 392 to 402 have also been made scheduled offences, if the value of the property involved is more than Rs. 30 lakhs. Therefore, the
properties which represent the proceeds of these crimes can also be attached u/s 5 of the Act and an adjudication can take place in terms of
Section 8. Once the order of attachment is made absolute after adjudication and the accused is convicted of the offences, the property gets
confiscated in terms of Section 8(6). Once the property is confiscated u/s 8(6), it vests absolutely in the Central Government free of all
encumbrances u/s 9. Therefore, persons who are victims of crimes such as dacoity, robbery, kidnapping for ransom etc., are also liable to lose
their property to the Central Government.
In other words, the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, not only seeks to punish the offenders, but also seeks to punish the victims of
such offences. Take for instance a case, where an offence of kidnapping for ransom punishable u/s 364-A takes place. If the money involved in the
crime is more than rupees 30 lakhs, it becomes a scheduled offence. Therefore, if the money is later recovered and an attachment followed by
confiscation is ordered, then the person who paid the ransom and who happens to be the victim of the crime, will have to lose his money by virtue
of Section 8(6) and Section 9. He would rather prefer to turn hostile in the criminal case by reaching an agreement with the accused so that the
attachment order gets lifted u/s 8(5) and he takes away his money. In other words, Section 8(6) and Section 9, which seeks to punish the victims
of crime along with the accused, appear to be a disincentive for the victims. The same analogy holds good even for the offences of robbery and
dacoity punishable under Sections 392 to 402, which are included in Paragraph 1 of Part B of the schedule to the Act. A person, who is robbed
or a person on whom dacoity is committed, has to lose his property to the Central Government by virtue of Section 8(6) and Section 9 of the Act,
if the stand taken by the respondents is accepted. In other words, the only choice available for the victims is to lose the property either to the
central government or to the accused.
I should make it clear at this stage that the above discussion is neither purely academic nor merely hypothetical. Today, I have passed orders in
another case arising out of similar orders of attachment. In that case, a company was accused of defrauding 3 nationalised banks. Therefore, at the
instance of the banks, criminal cases were lodged and a property purchased out of the funds provided by the Bank was sought to be attached
under the PML Act, 2002. Then the Bank woke up and came up with a writ petition W.P. No. 4696 of 2012 (--reported in this issue at 2012
Writ L.R.689) challenging the order of attachment on the ground that the property was mortgaged to them and that they have the right to proceed
against the property under the SARFAESI Act, 2002. I accepted the bank''s contention and allowed the bank to proceed with the sale since the
bank was a victim of fraud and they cannot be punished. Therefore, my discussion is not on presumptions and surmises.
But unfortunately, the validity of Sections 8(4) and 8(6) read with Section 9 and the relevant paragraphs of Part A and B of the schedule to the
Act, has not been tested by the Andhra Pradesh High Court from the point of view of their impact upon the victims of a crime. The Andhra
Pradesh High Court tested the validity of the provisions of the Act from the point of view of proceeds of crime and national interest vis-�-vis the
rights of criminals. The fact that Sections 8, and 9 place the victims of crime also alongside the accused and that these Sections victimise even the
victims has not been taken note of by the Andhra Pradesh High Court.
46.1 am conscious of the fact that the validity of Section 8(4) is not under challenge before me. But a direction issued by the Adjudicating
Authority in the impugned orders, directing the second respondent to take possession of the property, is under challenge. This direction of the
Adjudicating Authority is based upon the interpretation given to Section 8(4) by the Andhra Pradesh High Court and hence I have necessarily to
see what interpretation to Section 8(4) would subserve the ends of justice. I should do so in order to test the correctness of the direction issued by
the Adjudicating Authority in the orders impugned in these writ petitions, in terms of Section 8(4).
For finding out the kind of interpretation that should be placed upon Section 8(4), it is necessary to take a look at Sections 5 and 8 in entirety.
Therefore, they are extracted as follows:-
Attachment of property involved in money laundering.--(1) Where the Director, or any other Officer not below the rank of Deputy Director
authorised by him for the purposes of this Section, has reason to believe (the reason for such belief to be recorded in writing), on the basis of
material in his possession, that-
(a) any person is in possession of any proceeds of crime;
(b) such person has been charged of having committed a scheduled offence; and
(c) such proceeds of crime are likely to be concealed, transferred or dealt with in any manner which may result in frustrating any proceedings
relating to confiscation of such proceeds of crime under this Chapter,
he may, by order in writing, provisionally attach such property for a period not exceeding one hundred and fifty days from the date of the order, in
the manner provided in the Second Schedule to the income tax Act, 1961 (43 of 1961) and the Director or the other Officer so authorised by him,
as the case may be, shall be deemed to be an Officer under sub-rule (e) of rule 1 of that Schedule:
Provided that no such order of attachment shall be made unless, in relation to the scheduled offence, a report has been forwarded to a Magistrate
u/s 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), or a complaint has been filed by a person, authorised to investigate the offence
mentioned in the Schedule, before a Magistrate or Court for taking cognizance of the scheduled offence, as the case may be:
Provided further that, notwithstanding anything contained in clause (b), any property of any person may be attached under this Section if the
Director or any other Officer not below the rank of Deputy Director authorised by him for the purposes of this Section has reason to believe (the
reasons for such belief to be recorded in writing), on the basis of material in his possession, that if such property involved in money laundering is
not attached immediately under this Chapter, the non-attachment of the property is likely to frustrate any proceeding under this Act.
(2) The Director, or any other Officer not below the rank of Deputy Director, shall, immediately after attachment under sub-section (1), forward a
copy of the order, along with the material in his possession referred to in that sub-section, to the Adjudicating Authority, in a sealed envelope, in
the manner as may be prescribed and such Adjudicating Authority shall keep such order and material for such period as may be prescribed.
(3) Every order of attachment made under sub-section (1) shall cease to have effect after the expiry of the period specified in that sub-section or
on the date of an order made under sub-section (2) of Section 8, whichever is earlier.
(4) Nothing in this Section shall prevent the person interested in the enjoyment of the immovable property attached under sub-section (1) from
such enjoyment.
Explanation.--For the purposes of this sub-section, ""person interested"" in relation to any immovable property, includes all persons claiming or
entitled to claim any interest in the property.
(5) The Director or any other Officer who provisionally attaches any property under sub-section (I) shall, within a period of thirty days from such
attachment, file a complaint stating the facts of such attachment before the Adjudicating Authority.
Adjudication.--(1) On receipt of a complaint under sub-section (5) of section 5, or applications made under sub-section (4) of Section 17 or
under sub-section (10) of Section 18, if the Adjudicating Authority has reason to believe that any person has committed an offence u/s 3 or is in
possession of proceeds of crime, it may serve a notice of not less than thirty days on such person calling upon him to indicate the sources of his
income, earning or assets, out of which or by means of which he has acquired the property attached under sub-section (1) of Section 5, or, seized
u/s 17 or Section 18, the evidence on which he relies and other relevant information and particulars, and to show cause why all or any of such
properties should not be declared to be the properties involved in money laundering and confiscated by the Central Government.
Provided that where a notice under this sub-section specifies any property as being held by a person on behalf of any other person, a copy of such
notice shall also be served upon such other person:
Provided further that where such property is held jointly by more than one person, such notice shall be served to all persons holding such property.
(2) The Adjudicating Authority shall, after-
(a) considering the reply, if any, to the notice issued under sub-section (1);
(b) hearing the aggrieved person and the Director or any other Officer authorised by him in this behalf; and
(c) taking into account all relevant materials placed on record before him,
by an order, record a finding whether all or any of the properties referred to in the notice issued under sub-section (1) are involved in money-
laundering:
Provided that if the property is claimed by a person, other than a person to whom the notice had been issued, such person shall also be given an
opportunity of being heard to prove that the property is not involved in money laundering.
(3) Where the Adjudicating Authority decides under sub-section (2) that any property is involved in money laundering, he shall, by an order in
writing, confirm the attachment of the property made under sub-section (1) of Section 5 or retention of property or record seized u/s 17 or Section
18 and record a finding to that effect, such attachment or retention of the seized property or record shall-
(a) continue during the pendency of the proceedings relating to any scheduled offence before a Court; and
(b) become final after the guilt of the person is proved in the trial Court and order of such trial Court becomes final.
(4) Where the provisional order of attachment made under sub-section (1) of Section 5 has been confirmed under sub-section (3), the Director or
any other Officer authorised by him in this behalf shall forthwith take the possession of the attached property.
(5) Where on conclusion of a trial or any scheduled offence, the person concerned is acquitted, the attachment of the property or retention of the
seized property or record under sub-section (3) and net income, if any, shall cease to have effect.
(6) Where the attachment of any property or retention of the seized property or record becomes final under clause (b) of sub-section (3), the
Adjudicating Authority shall, after giving an opportunity to the person concerned, make an order confiscating such property.
Section 5(1) authorises the Director or any other Officer, not below the rank of Deputy Director, to pass an order provisionally attaching a
property for a period not exceeding 150 days. The manner in which and the conditions subject to which the order is to be passed are also
indicated in Section 5(1) itself. In so far as the manner in which a provisional attachment order is to be passed, Section 5(1) makes a reference to
the Second Schedule to the Income Tax Act, 1961. In so far as the conditions are concerned, Section 5(1) stipulates that the concerned Officer
should have reason to believe, on the basis of materials in his possession -
(i) that any person is in possession of any proceeds of crime;
(ii) that such person has been charged of having committed a scheduled offence; and
(iii) that such proceeds of crime are likely to be concealed, transferred or dealt with in any manner which may result in frustrating any proceedings
relating to confiscation of such proceeds of crime.
Therefore, primarily it is the property of ""the person charged of having committed a scheduled offence"" which represents the proceeds of the
crime, that could be attached u/s 5(1). However, the Second Proviso to Section 5(1), which contains a non abstante clause, enables the concerned
Officer to attach ""any property of any person"", if such property is believed to be involved in money laundering and the non attachment of the same
is likely to frustrate the proceedings under the Act. It is only by virtue of the Second Proviso inserted by way of amendment under Amendment Act
21 of 2009 that the Director derives his powers, even to attach the property standing in the name of any person other than those charged of having
committed a scheduled offence.
Keeping the above in mind, let me now turn on to Section 8.
The Officer who passes the order of attachment u/s 5(1), is obliged to file a complaint within 30 days u/s 5(5), before the Adjudicating
Authority. Upon receipt of the said complaint, the Adjudicating Authority is obliged to serve a notice upon the person against whom the complaint
is made, calling upon him to indicate the sources of his income, earning or assets, out of which he had acquired the property. After such person
gives a reply, the Adjudicating Authority should hear the aggrieved person as well as the Director, take into account all relevant materials and pass
an order thereafter, recording a finding whether the property in question was involved in money laundering.
While sub-section (1) of Section 8 deals with the service of notice by the Adjudicating Authority on the person against whom the complaint is
made, sub-section (2) deals with the manner in which the Authority should deal with the complaint, reply and evidence and the manner in which the
Authority shall record a finding.
Under sub-section (3) of Section 8, the Adjudicating Authority should pass an order ""confirming the provisional attachment"" if he decides
under sub-section (2) that the property is involved in money laundering. While ordering confirmation of attachment under sub-section (3), the
Adjudicating Authority shall also pass an order to the effect (i) that the attachment shall continue during the pendency of the proceedings relating to
any scheduled offence before a Court; and (ii) that the attachment shall become final after the guilt of the person is proved in the Trial Court and
the order of such Trial Court becomes final.
A careful reading of Sections 5(1), 5(2), 8(2) and 8(3) would show that an order of attachment passes through 3 different stages. They are (i)
provisional order u/s 5(1) (ii) confirmation of the provisional order u/s 8(3) and (iii) finality to the order of attachment under Clause (b) of sub-
section (3) of Section 8. In other words, a provisional order of attachment is passed by the Director u/s 5(1). This is the first stage. The Director
then files a complaint before the Adjudicating Authority, which holds an enquiry and passes an order of confirmation of attachment under sub-
section (3) of Section 8. This is the second stage. At this stage, the order of attachment does not attain finality, though it is confirmed. The order
reaches finality only after the guilt of the person is proved in the Trial Court. The order of attachment reaching finality, upon the establishment of
guilt of the accused before the Trial Court, is the third stage.
To indicate that there are 3 different stages relating to attachment, the statute uses 3 different expressions viz., (i) ""provisional"" in Section 5 (ii)
confirmation"" in Section 8(3) and (iii) ""final"" in Clause (b) u/s 8(3). Keeping in mind, the difference in these 3 expressions, let us now move on to
Section 8(4).
u/s 8(4), the Director is empowered to take possession of the attached property forthwith, if the provisional order of attachment passed u/s
5(1) is confirmed u/s 8(3). Section 8(4) uses the expression ""confirmed"". It does not use the expression ""final"" as found in Section 8(3)(b).
Therefore, it may appear at the threshold that immediately after an order of provisional attachment is confirmed u/s 8(3), the Director can take
possession, even without waiting for the order of attachment to attain finality as contemplated u/s 8(3)(b). But whether such understanding or
interpretation will be in tune with the scheme of the Act, and in tune with Constitutional guarantees, is the question that we should address ourselves
to.
Sub-section (5) of Section 8 declares that the attachment u/s 8(3) shall cease to have effect, if the person concerned is acquitted on conclusion
of a trial for any scheduled offence. But if a person is convicted and the order of attachment becomes final in terms of Section 8(3)(b), the
Adjudicating Authority may pass an order confiscating such property, u/s 8(6).
If the Legislative intent behind Section 8(4) was to take actual physical possession of the attached property, immediately after confirmation of
attachment u/s 8(3), but before the attachment attains finality u/s 8(3)(B), then as a corollary of such intent, Section 8(5) should contain a provision
for handing over possession back to the accused person, upon his acquittal. But Section 8(5) stops with a mere declaration that upon the acquittal
of a person, the attachment confirmed u/s 8(3) shall cease to have effect. Section 8(5) does not speak about returning the possession of the
property back to the accused.
Therefore, in my considered view, there are only two alternatives to resolve this lock jam. One is to understand Section 8(4) to mean that the
expression ""confirmed"" used therein, should be understood to mean ""final"". In other words, Section 8(4) is to be understood to mean that upon the
order of attachment attaining finality u/s 8(3)(b), the Director shall take possession of the property. The second alternative is to see if the
expression ""possession"" used therein can be taken to mean ""actual physical possession"". If it is not, then even on a plain reading of Section 8(4),
without uprooting the expression ""confirmed"" appearing therein, it is possible to synchronise Section 8(4) with Section 8(5).
It is well settled that the expression ""possession"" has different connotations such as ""actual physical possession"", ""symbolic possession"",
constructive possession"" etc. In National Safe Deposit Co. vs. Stead {232 U.S. 58}, the United States Supreme Court pointed out that ""there is
no word more ambiguous in its meaning than possession"". Moore, L.J., pointed out in Martin Estates Co. Ltd vs. Watt and Hunter {(1925) NI
79} that possession as enjoyed by the owner of an immovable property may mean either the use of it by someone else who is a tenant, the rents
and profits being received by the owner or the owner himself enjoying such benefits.
Interestingly, Black''s Law Dictionary contains as many as 30 distinctive sub-definitions of the various forms and types of possession, indicating
thereby that the term may be subjected to plurality of meanings and interpretations.
Other authorities such as the Dictionary of English Law (Earl Jowitt) (1959, at page 1367) define possession as ""the visible possibility of
exercising physical control over a thing, coupled with the intention of doing so, either against all the world, or against all the world except certain
persons. There are, therefore, three requisites of possession. First there must be actual or potential physical control. Secondly, physical control is
not possession, unless accompanied by intention; hence, if a thing is put into the hand of a sleeping person, he has not possession of it. Thirdly, the
possibility and intention must be visible or evidenced by external signs, for if the thing shows no signs of being under the control of anyone, it is not
possessed;..."" (cited by Krishna Iyer, J., in Gurucharan Singh vs. Kamla Singh {1976 SCR (1) 739}. Moreover, the above reproduced definition
of the Dictionary of English Law was cited with approval in Gurucharan Singh (supra) as well as in Baleshwar Tewari (Dead) by LRs. and others
Vs. Sheo Jatan Tiwary and others, Ramesh Bejoy Sharma and Ors. vs. Pashupati Rai and Ors. { 1979 AIR 1769} and S. Govindarasu Udayar
Vs. Pattu and Others,
In Babu Singh Chauhan Vs. Smt. Rajkumari Jain and Others, , the Supreme Court held that possession by a landlord of his property may
assume various forms. A landlord may be serving outside, and yet, may retain possession over his property or a part of it either by leaving it in
charge of a servant or by putting his household effects locked up in the premises. Such an occupation would also be full and complete possession
in the eye of law.
In Sadashiv Shyama Sawant [D] through L.Rs. and Others Vs. Anita Anant Sawant, , the Supreme Court quoted paragraph 1111, at page
617 of Volume 35 from Halsbury''s Laws of England, 4th Edition, for drawing the distinction between physical and legal possession. The Court
also quoted from ""An essay on Possession in the Common Law"" by Pollock and Wright, about a right to possess and a right to have legal
possession. Thereafter, the Supreme Court went on to hold that even a landlord, by letting out a property to a tenant, does not lose possession and
that he continues to retain legal possession or constructive possession.
Therefore, the question that I should address myself is as to whether the expression ""possession"" appearing in Section 8(4) should be
construed to mean actual physical possession or not. This exercise has become necessary in view of the fact that while upholding the Constitutional
validity of the Act, the Andhra Pradesh High Court has understood the expression ""possession"" to mean actual physical possession.
But it is well settled that if certain provisions of law construed in one way would make them consistent with the Constitution and another
interpretation would render them unconstitutional, the Court would lean in favour of the former construction { Kedar Nath Singh Vs. State of
Bihar, }. The Courts have repeatedly acknowledged that while interpreting a Statute, reference has to be made to the broader Constitutional
Scheme.
The right to property, though not a fundamental right, is nevertheless a Constitutional right in terms of Article 300-A. The Supreme Court has
held the right to property as a human right also. Even if I assume for a minute, that the object of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 is
to keep the accused out of the possession and enjoyment of the proceeds of crime, the human rights of other members of his family or even
persons who are in occupation of the property under lawful agreements of tenancy, cannot be thrown to the mercy of the respondents. We must
be conscious of the fact that the right to dispossess the accused, is conferred upon the respondents by the Statute, even before his conviction.
Therefore, if the expression ""possession"" is construed to mean actual physical possession, Section 8(4) would infringe upon the human rights and
Constitutional rights not only of persons accused, but also of other persons who are in actual physical possession of the property.
As I have pointed out in the previous part of this order, the offences of kidnapping in ransom, extortion, fraud, dacoity, robbery etc., are also
made scheduled offences under the Act, if the value is more than the prescribed limit. But for the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, the
victims would approach the regular Criminal Courts with applications u/s 451 of the Criminal Procedure Code for return of property. But that
cannot be done once the provisions of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 are invoked. Since this is draconian, at least in so far as the
victims are concerned, the expression ""possession"" cannot be taken to mean ""actual physical possession"".
In H.H. Maharajadhiraja Madhav Rao Jivaji Rao Scindia Bahadur of Gwalior and Others Vs. Union of India and Another, , the Supreme
Court held that the interpretation of a Statute should, as far as possible, be agreeable to justice and reason and that in case of two or more
interpretations, one which is more reasonable and just, shall be adopted, for there is always a presumption against the law-maker intending to do
injustice. When an interpretation leads to a manifest contradiction of the apparent purpose of the enactment or to some inconvenience or absurdity,
hardship or injustice, a construction may be put upon it which modifies the meaning of the words and even the structure of the sentence. Therefore,
I am of the view that understanding the expression ""possession"" appearing in Section 8(4) of the Act, to mean constructive or symbolic possession,
would not only save the validity of Section 8(4), but also save the Constitutional and human rights guaranteed to the accused, victims and third
parties who are in possession of such properties.
Apart from arriving at the conclusion on the basis of the Constitutional Scheme. I can also derive an additional factor of comfort from a few
other provisions of the Act, itself. For instance, Section 10 of the Act, deals with the management of properties confiscated under Chapter III of
the Act. Interestingly, Section 10(2) empowers the Administrator appointed by the Central Government, to receive the property and manage it,
only after an order of confiscation is passed u/s 8(6). In other words, the Administrator receives the property and starts managing the property
only after conviction by the Criminal Court and only after confiscation u/s 8(6). Therefore, necessarily, the property is to remain in the possession
of the Director/Central Government from the stage at which a confirmation is granted by the Adjudicating Authority u/s 8(3) till the stage at which a
confiscation is passed u/s 8(6). In the interregnum between the confirmation u/s 8(3) and confiscation u/s 8(6), there is no scope for the
management of the property by the Administrator. The question as to how the property will be managed during the said period is left open in the
Act for anybody''s guess.
Similarly, the first proviso u/s 9 postpones the vesting of a confiscated property in the Central Government, free of all encumbrances, till a
declaration is made by the Adjudicating Authority that an encumbrance on the property or leasehold interest has been created with a view to
defeat the provisions of this Chapter. Therefore, it is clear that the vesting of the property u/s 9, is not absolute even after an order of confiscation
u/s 8(6), if there is a leasehold interest created in the property. If the intention of the law-makers was to enable the Directorate to take actual
physical possession of the property even u/s 8(4), the Lessee would have already been thrown out of possession, even before confiscation u/s 8(6)
and vesting u/s 9. In such an event, there is no necessity for the Adjudicating Authority to declare a leasehold interest to be null and void in terms of
the first proviso to Section 9. Thus, the first proviso to Section 9 also gives a clue that the expression ""possession"" used in Section 8(4), cannot be
taken to mean actual physical possession.
A careful scrutiny of Sections 5 and 8 would show that the object of attachment is to ensure that the proceedings for confiscation of proceeds
of crime, are not frustrated. By retaining symbolic, legal and constructive possession of the property, the Government can always ensure that the
proceedings for confiscation are not frustrated. Once a property is attached and necessary encumbrances are entered in the records of the Sub
Registrar and once a prohibitive order is also passed, no alienation can take place. Even if any alienations take place, they would be null and void.
Therefore, merely because physical possession is retained by a person accused of the scheduled offences under the Prevention of Money
Laundering Act, 2002, it does not mean that the proceedings for confiscation may get frustrated. Section 5(4) of the Act, in fact, makes it clear
that nothing in Section 5 shall prevent the person interested in the enjoyment of the immovable property attached under sub-section (1) from such
enjoyment. It must be noted that Section 5(4) uses the expression ""enjoyment of the immovable property"". Therefore, without depriving persons
interested, from enjoying the immovable property, the respondents can always take symbolic possession u/s 8(4).
Mr. M. Dhandapani, Learned Counsel for the respondents relied upon the decision of the High Court of Karnataka in W.P. No. 29626 of
2011 dated 10.8.2011. In the said case, a challenge was made to the direction issued by the Adjudicating Authority to the Director to take
possession of the property, pending disposal of an appeal before the Appellate Tribunal. In the said case, a learned Judge of the Karnataka High
Court held that in view of the provisions contained in Section 8(4) of the Act, possession could also be taken by the Authorities. Having said that,
the learned Judge of the Karnataka High Court also pointed out that in case of residential houses where the family members of the accused reside,
the Authorities can take only constructive possession, till an appeal is disposed of. In other words, the Karnataka High Court almost come to the
same conclusion as I had done, but limited the relief only till the disposal of the statutory appeal u/s 26. Therefore, more than supporting the stand
of the respondents, the judgment of the Karnataka High Court tends to support the view I have taken above.
Therefore, it is clear that Section 8(4) cannot be understood to confer a power to take actual physical possession. But the respondents,
including the Adjudicating Authority, have understood the expression to mean actual physical possession. This is on account of the interpretation
placed by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh and hence, the petitioners are entitled to a limited relief, as otherwise, the Adjudicating Authority as
well as the Appellate Authority, are obliged to follow only the interpretations given by the Andhra Pradesh High Court with regard to actual
physical possession.
Before winding up, I must deal with one preliminary objection raised by Mr. M. Dhandapani, Learned Counsel for the respondents as to the
maintainability of the above writ petitions, in view of the availability of an alternative remedy of appeal to the Appellate Tribunal u/s 26(1) of the
Act. The Learned Counsel also relied upon a judgment of K. Chandru, J., in G. Srinivasan vs. Chairperson {W.P. No. 530 of 2011 dated
1.4.2011} in support of his contention that the petitioners ought to have gone to the Appellate Tribunal under the Act. But I have not accepted the
said preliminary objection, in view of the fact that the order of the Appellate Tribunal is ultimately subject to an appeal to this Court u/s 42 of the
Act. By the time the petitioners go before the Appellate Authority and thereafter come up before this Court u/s 42, the petitioners would have long
lost possession of their properties. In view of the interpretation given by the Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court to Section 8(4) in
their decision in B. Rama Raju vs. Union of India {2011 (3) ALT 443 (DB)}, both the Adjudicating Authority and the Appellate Tribunal cannot
decide the question relating to dispossession. Moreover, the writ petitions were already admitted. Therefore, the petitioners whose writ petitions
were already admitted, cannot be driven at the stage of final hearing to take recourse to alternative remedy of appeal under the Act. This is
especially so when on the question of entitlement of the respondents to take possession of the properties, the Appellate Tribunal could have hardly
taken any independent decision, in contrast to the view taken by the Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court.
Therefore, in fine, I hold that all the contentions of the writ petitioners are bound to fail, except the contention relating to the entitlement of the
respondents to take possession of the properties immediately after the orders of the Adjudicating Authority. While the orders of attachment passed
by the Deputy Director and the orders of confirmation passed by the Adjudicating Authority are liable to be upheld, the direction issued by the
Adjudicating Authority to the Director to take possession of the properties alone is liable to be set aside, in view of the interpretation that I have
given to the expression ""possession"" appearing in Section 8(4) of the Act. Therefore, the writ petitions are allowed to a limited extent, confirming
all other portions of the impugned orders of the Deputy Director and the Adjudicating Authority, except the portion relating to actual physical
possession. The respondents are directed to put the petitioners back into possession of the properties. However, the legal and constructive
possession of the properties shall be deemed to remain with the Deputy Director/Director and the petitioners cannot alienate, encumber or part
with possession of the properties until the conclusion of the criminal proceedings against the accused and until the conclusion of the confiscation
proceedings that may be taken up after the decision of the Criminal Courts. There will be no order as to costs. Consequently, connected
miscellaneous petitions are closed.