A. Narayana vs State of Madras (Now Andhra) and Others

Umamaheswaram, J.—This is an application for the issue of a suit of certiorari, to call for the records of the State of Madras in G. O. Ms. No. 2:22-1, Homo Department, dated 9th July, 1953, and to quash the order passed by the Government.

The Petitioner originally owned MDQ. 509 and has replaced it now by MDQ. 587. The. 2nd Respondent herein is the owner of MDQ. 531. Both the Petitioner and the 2nd Respondent applied for the issue of permits to run stage carriages along tire route Kurnool to Anantapur, and they were granted permits accordingly. On 30th May, 1949, the Regional Transport Officer, Cuddapah fixed the timings tentatively. He also directed that the operators viz., the 2nd Respondent and the Petitioner should run their vehicles MDQ. 531 and 509 on the route Kurnool Anantapur on a system of daily rotation. On 1st June, 1949, a notification was issued accordingly. It states that the buses should run on a system of daily rotation and that the rotation timings would be given effect from 1st June, 1949, starting with MDQ. 531. On 28th April, 1950, the Regional Transport Authority revised the timings. But he did not in any way alter the prior order fixing the system of daily rotation. On 28th May, 1932, the Regional Transport Authority went back upon his order dated 30th May, 1949. Ho passed the order in the following terms:

In this office proceedings first cited, the buses MDQ. 531 & 587 on the route Kurnool Anantapur were ordered to run in fixed timings starting at Kurnool by 6-30 A. M., and 9-00 A.M., respectively.

But it is brought to my notice that both are being run in daily rotation in the above timings.

The expression "respectively" is opposed to the terms of the order passed OJI 30th May, 1949. The operators were running the buses on a system of daily rotation according to the order passed on 30th May, 1949. I am unable to understand how the Regional Transport Authority felt any doubt as to why they were being run in daily rotation. On 19th June, 1952, he passed the following order:

The operators of buses MDQ. 587 and 531 on the route Kurnool to Anantapur are hereby informed that they should ply in fixed timings issued in this office Proceedings No. 1810-B of 1950, dated 28th April, 1950, which supersede the orders issued in this office R. No. 5683-E of 1949, dated 30th May, 1949.

No reasons are given by the Regional Transport Authority as to why he went back upon the order fixed on 30th May, 1949. Aggrieved by this order, the Petitioner herein went up on appeal to the Central Road Traffic Board. The Central Road Traffic Board held that no appeal lay. When the attention of the Regional Transport Authority, Cuddapah was drawn to G.O. Ms. No. 2921, Home, dated 15th July, 1949, he passed the following order on 23rd March, 1953:

The rotation of timings in respect of the bus MDQ. 587 of Sri. K. Babanna and the bus MDQ. 531 of the Kurnool Co-operative Motor Transport, Kurnool, running on the route Kurnool to Anantapur via Dhone and Gooty are hereby granted and MDQ. 531 shall take the first timings on 25th March, 1953 and follow the rotation thereafter with effect from 25th March, 1953.

The 2nd Respondent preferred a revision petition to the Government against the order of the Regional Transport Authority, dated 23rd, March, 1953. The Government by its order dated 9th July, 1953 set aside the order of the Regional Transport Authority dated 23rd March, 1953 and restored the order dated 28th May, 1952. The Petitioner has consequently preferred this application for the issue of a writ of certiorari.

I have carefully gone through the several orders, and I am clearly of opinion that there is an error apparent on the face of the order passed by the Government. They ignored the valid order passed by the Regional Transport Authority on 30th May, 1949, fixing the system of daily rotation. No reference whatsoever is made by the Government to this order which had become final. I do not agree with the contention addressed by Sri Gangadhara Rao on behalf of the Government or of Mr. Sankara Rao that the system of daily rotation was fixed tentatively. The order dated 30th May, 1949, is quite clear that what were fixed tentatively were only the timings. The rights inter se between the Petitioner and the 2nd Respondent were duly fixed on 30th May, 1949, by introducing the system of daily rotation. No valid reasons are stated in the Government Order as to why that system should be altered to the prejudice of the petitioner. In the order passed by the Regional Transport Authority on 28th May, 1952, and in the order passed by the Government, no reference whatsoever is made to the order passed in 1949. The order is therefore liable to be quashed.

It is contended on behalf of the Respondent that the order passed by the Regional Transport Authority in 1952 or by the Government is only an administrative order, and that this Court has no jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari under Article 226 of the Constitution. Various authorities were cited before mo for the purpose of drawing the distinction between an administrative order and a judicial or quasi judicial order. It is sufficient to refer to the Supreme Court decision in Province of Bombay Vs. Kusaldas S. Advani and Others, , on this point. The definition of a judicial order given by May, C. J., was approved by Lord Atkinson in From United Breweries Co. v. Bath Justices 1926 AC 586 at p. 602 (B). Kama, C. J., accepted that definition as the best definition of a judicial act as distinguished from an administrative act and it is as follows:

In this connection, the term ''Judicial'' does not necessarily mean acts of a judge or legal tribunal sitting for tire determination of matters of law, but for tire purpose of this question a judicial act seems to be an act done by competent authority, upon consideration of facts and circumstances, and imposing liability or affecting the rights of Ors. ". Kania, C. J., then proceeded to consider the four conditions laid down by Atkin, L. J., under which a rule for certiorari may issue. At page 707 the four conditions are laid down in the following terms:

Wherever any body of persons (1) having legal authority, (2) to determine questions affecting rights of subjects, and, (3) having the duty to act judicially, (4) act in excess of their legal authority - a writ of certiorari may issue.

Applying those tests, I have no doubt that the orders passed by the Regional Transport Authority and the Government are quasi-judicial orders. This question was considered by Subba Rao, J., (as he then was) in A. Vedachala Mudaliar Vs. The State of Madras and Another, . He discussed the several sections of the Motor Vehicles Act and held at page 415 (of Mad LJ): (at pp. 278, 279 of AIR) that the Regional Transport Authority has the legal authority to determine the questions affecting the rights of subjects. After referring to the Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court in Moti Lal and Others Vs. The Government of the State of Uttar Pradesh and Others, he took the view that the Regional Transport Authority is a quasi-judicial body. He rejected the argument addressed by the Advocate-General and Sri Bashyam Iyengar that the said authority in fixing the timings or modifying them later is only performing an administrative act. At page 416 (of Mad LJ): (at p. 279 of AIR) he observed as follows:

If fixing the time table in the first instance could be made only by adopting judicial procedure, it is unreasonable to hold that under Rule 269 the Regional Transport Authority could modify the time table in an administrative capacity, for, if that be so, the safeguards provided by the Legislature would be defeated. Mr. Bashyam made an attempt to make a distinction between the orders u/s 48(a), (b) and (e) and the orders u/s 48 (d). I cannot appreciate the distinction for those orders under whatever clause they are made are made only after the necessary judicial enquiry provided in Section 47.

I accept the entire reasoning of the learned Judge.

The learned Advocates for the Respondents sought to contend that the-decision was wrong. My attention was drawn to the several provisions of the Act. The arguments addressed by the Advocate-General and Sri Bashyam Iyengar before Subba Rao, J., (as he then was) were practically repeated before me. I am not persuaded to take a different view or refer the matter lo a Bench. 1 am inclined to hold that tire Regional Transport Authority acting under Sections 47 and 48 is acting in a judicial or quasi-judicial capacity. He can neither alter the timings nor change the system of rotation so as to prejudice the parties arbitrarily or capriciously as contended by Sri Sankara Rao.

The next contention urged on behalf of the Respondents was that the decision in A. Vedachala Mudaliar Vs. The State of Madras and Another, was reversed by a Bench of the Madras High Court in M. Kali Mudaliar Vs. A. Vedachala Mudaliar and Others, and. that the decision of Subba Rao, J., (as he then was) ought not to be followed. At page 155 (of Mad LJ); (at p. 548 of AIR) Rajamannar, C. J., delivering the judgment of the Bench leaves open the correctness of the conclusions of Subba Rao, J., (as he then was) on the question as to whether the order was an administrative or Quasi-judicial order. The observations are as follows:

In this view it does not become necessary to examine the correctness of tire learned Judge''s conclusion on tire other important question argued before him as to die nature of the order of the Regional Transport Authority in fixing or regulating the timings.

A careful reading of the Bench judgment discloses that tire Bench only took the view that the fixing of the timings was not a condition of the permit and that die appeal to the Centra Road Traffic Board was not maintainable. I do not agree with the contention that the conclusion of Subba Rao, J., (as he then was) as to the nature of the order had been reversed by the Bench. I therefore hold that there is no force in the preliminary objection- raised by the Respondents that the order is an administrative one.

Having regard to the fact that there is a clear error apparent on the face of the record, I quash the order passed by the State of Madras on 9th July, 1953. The writ petition is allowed with costs. The Advocate''s fee is fixed at Rs. 100 (Respondents 1 and 2 to pay Rs, 50 each).