A. Neelakanta Iyer vs State of Travancore-Cochin and others

Vithayathil, J.—This is a petition under Art. 226, Constitution of India, for the issue of a writ of mandamus or other appropriate writ or direction. The petitioner himself argued the petition before me. The first respondent to the petition is the Travancore-Cochin State. The second respondent is the Vadakkunathan Devaswom, represented by the Secretary Cochin Devaswom Board. The third respondent represents Mampilli Illom, Trichur. The petitioner was a clerk in the Cochin Devaswom Department which was being managed by the Government. He took on lease a house site, 241/8 cents in extent, belonging to the Vadakkunathan Devaswom within the Trichur Municipality. The lease was of the year 1114. According to the petitioner, the plot was covered with jungle growth when he took it on lease and he cleared the Jungle growth and levelled up the property at considerable cost. He also put up a substantial building in the property and was living in it with his family. The cost of improvements is stated to be about Rs. 5000/-. On the complaint of the third respondent Mana, the Devaswom took steps for evicting the petitioner about three years after the date of the lease deed.

On 16-2-1117 the petitioner received a notice for quitting the property receiving Rs. 1584-7-0. He protested and prayed that he might be paid reasonable compensation for the improvements effected by him in case he was to surrender the property. The prayer was not granted. But before he could be evicted from the property Proclamation VI of 1117 was promulgated by His Highness the Maharaja giving fixity of tenure to verum-pattomdars. Notwithstanding this Proclamation pressure was exerted on the petitioner to surrender the property. His insistence on getting adequate compensation for his improvement was characterised as disobedience to Government orders and he was penalized by being degraded in service and transferred to another department. Government also ordered that the plot be compulsorily acquired under the Cochin Land Acquisition Act. It is alleged that this act of the Government amounted to an invasion of the fundamental right of the petitioner to enjoy his property. A sum of Rs 2352-1-1 was ordered to be paid to the petitioner as compensation.

On the application of the petitioner the matter was referred to the Trichur District Court under the Land Acquisition Act. A commission was issued from that court for valuing the improvements, and the commissioner estimated the value at Rs. 3900/- although, according to the petitioner, the lease-hold right was worth at the time more than Rs. 12000/-. On account of the coercive and drastic steps taken against the petitioner by the Government he was forced to put in a petition in the District Court withdrawing his objection to the award of compensation stating that he had petitioned the Government for redressing his grievances. The house and the site were handed over by the Government to the third respondent-mana. The Petitioner continued to make representations to the Government and subsequently to the Cochin Devaswom Board regarding his grievances. Government restored to the petitioner the increments in pay which had been withheld but no relief was granted in respect of the compensation for value of improvements. The last order of the Devaswom Board refusing to grant the petitioner any relief in this respect (sic) and received by him on 2-3-1953.

The orders of the Government relating to the acquisition of the property are said to be invalid and ''ultra vires'' for the following reasons; (1) The lease in favour of the petitioner was arbitrarily and illegally cancelled by the Government; (2) Government''s action was the result of influence exercised by the third respondent-mana on the Maharaja''s Palace; (3) The statutory rights of the petitioner to have fixity of tenure and to receiver full value of improvements were violated by Government; (4) The rights of the petitioner under Arts. 14, 15(1), 19(1)(f) and 31(1) and (2) of the Constitution have been infringed, and (5) though the declared purpose of the acquisition was "Devaswom purposes" it was only a cloak to deprive the petitioner of his property and to pass it on to the third respondent-mana. For these reasons, the petitioner prays that his status quo ante in respect of the house site and the improvements be restored by the issue of a writ of mandamus or appropriate writ or direction. The petitioner has also filed an affidavit in support of the allegations contained in the petition.

The second respondent, Devaswom Board, has filed a counter-affidavit. It is stated in the counter-affidavit that the lease in favour of the petitioner was of a temporary character and that the petitioner was bound to surrender the property on demand by the Devaswom without claiming any value of improvements. The allegation in the petition that the property was covered with jungle growth is also denied. The cost of the building constructed by the petitioner was only about Rs. 1500/- The plot in question formed part of the purayidom in the possession of the third respondent-mana from time immemorial. The mana was in possession of the property by virtue of the hereditary office occupied by a member of the mana as the High priest of vadakkunathan temple. On the complaint of the mana, Government held proper enquiry into the matter and cancelled the lease in favour of the petitioner. Although the petitioner was not entitled to any compensation for improvements he was allowed Rs. 1607-6-6 as compensation, the amount having been fixed by the Chief Engineer. The petitioner delayed surrender of the property by putting forth claims for more amount as compensation.

Subsequently, after the promulgation of Proclamation VI of 1117, Government took steps to acquire the property for Devaswom purposes. The purpose was to allow the High priest of the Vadakkunathan temple to enjoy the property as it used to be enjoyed by his mana from time immemorial. Compensation was paid to the petitioner in conformity with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act and the property was taken possession of by Government in 1118. Petitioner''s claim for enhanced compensation was referred to the District Court of Trichur in L.A. Case No. 38 of 1118. But, the claim was not subsequently pressed by him. It is true that the petitioner was degraded in service and transferred to another department. But this was not done by way of penalty for refusing to surrender the property but on account of certain irregularities noticed in his official duties. The Land Acquisition proceedings were taken ''bona fide'' and in accordance with the provisions of law. The other allegations in the petition were also denied.

Before considering the points raised in the petition it is necessary to observe that the acts complained of in the petition took place long before the Indian Constitution came into force. It is well settled that the Articles of the Constitution have no retrospective effect unless otherwise expressly provided for in the Constitution itself (vide - Keshavan Madhava Menon Vs. The State of Bombay, ; - ''Rajaram v. The State'', AIR 1951 Nag 443 (FB) (B) and - Haran Chandra Dutt and Another Vs. The State of West Bengal and Others, . The question whether the petitioner is entitled to have a writ issued in the manner prayed for in the petition will, therefore, have to be considered apart from the provisions of the Constitution. It has been held by a Full Bench of this Court in - ''Muthuswamy Iyer v. Sirkar'', 1949 Trav-C LR 270 (D) that as a Court of Record this Court has got the power to issue prerogative writs in appropriate cases. The question therefore for consideration is whether the petitioner has made out a case justifying the issue of a prerogative writ in this case.

The case of the petitioner is that the order of the Government cancelling the lease in his favour and demanding surrender of the property was illegal and ''ultra vires''. In the light of the events that took place subsequent to this order, it is not necessary to consider the legality of the action of the Government in this respect. As a result of the Proclamation, VI of 1117, the petitioner got fixity of tenure and he was not evicted from the property as per the order of Government. The property was actually acquired by Government under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. In the circumstances it is not necessary to go into the question whether the action of the Government in ordering surrender of the property by the petitioner was illegal or ''ultra vires''. It may also be observed that the property being within the Municipality of Trichur is exempted from the operation of the Cochin Verumpattomdars Act, VIII of 1118, which was enacted subsequently. After the passing of that Act there could be no fixity of tenure in respect of the leasehold over this property.

The further question for consideration is whether the acquisition of the property by Government under the provisions of the Cochin Land Acquisition Act was illegal. The petitioner''s case is that the property was not acquired for a public purpose. The acquisition was stated to be for ''Devaswom purposes'' and the counter-affidavit of the second respondent shows what exactly was the purpose for which the property was acquired. As stated already, the Nambudiri of the 3rd respondent-mana is the high priest of Vadakkumnathan temple. He is to live a life of celibacy and is not even permitted to go out of the Sankedam. Ho is known as the ''Purappada Santhi''. The property acquired formed part of the purayidom which was being occupied by the ''purappada santhi'' from time immemorial. For the proper conduct of services in the Devaswom temple it was thought necessary to secure for the high priest of the temple undisturbed possession of the property which he used to enjoy from time immemorial. It was, therefore, a purpose in which the Devaswom was interested and in this sense, was a public purpose. It is, however, not necessary to go further into this question in view of the provisions of the Cochin Land Acquisition Act II of 1070, under which the acquisition was made. Section 5(3) of the Act provides that the declaration by the Government under S. 5(1) of the Act that a land is needed for a public purpose shall be conclusive evidence that the land is needed for that purpose. In view of the fact that the acquisition took place before the Indian Constitution came into force this Court cannot go into the question of the legality of the provision contained in S. 5(3) of the Act.

The further complaint of the petitioner is that he was not given adequate compensation for the property acquired by the State. This objection of his was referred to the District Court, and subsequently he withdrew the same. His case is that he was forced to withdraw the objection on account of the fear that drastic steps might be taken against him by the Government. Whatever the reason may be, so long as he withdrew the objection, the District Court had only to disallow the claim for enhanced compensation, and there is nothing for this Court to interfere in the matter. It has also to be noted that the order of the District Court was passed on 21-8-1119, about ten years ago, and this petition was filed only on 4-2-1954.

In the circumstances, I find no merit in this petition, and it has only to be dismissed. The petition is accordingly dismissed. There will, however, be no order as to costs.