A P SINGH vs Paramjit Kaur

-THIS judgment will dispose of First Appeal No. 851 of 2006, A. P. Singh v. Paramjit Kaur and First Appeal No. 164 of 2007, Paramjit Kaur Narula v. A. P. Singh. Both these appeals are directed against the same judgment dated 15. 5. 2006 passed by the District Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum, Ropar (in short ''district Forum'' ). The parties are the same in both the appeals. For the sake of convenience, the facts are taken from First Appeal No. 851 of 2006. The parties would also be referred as per their status in the said appeal.

PARAMJIT Kaur Narula (in short ''complainant''), after migration from Assam, was in search of a house in Mohali. She contacted A. P. Singh, Proprietor of M/s. A. P. Traders (in short ''appellant'') who was a builder of repute. The appellant agreed to build a house for the complainant over two plots measuring 110 sq. yds. and 68 sq. yards situated at Swaraj Nagar, Kharar as both these plots were adjoining each other. The proposed house consisted of one Drawing Room, two Bed Rooms, one Kitchen and one Toilet and a car porch complete with amenities over the plot measuring 110 sq. yds. and one Bed Room with attached toilet and one small store on the plot of 68 sq. yds. The value of the entire house payable by the complainant to the appellant was fixed at Rs. 6,50,000. The parties entered into an agreement on 16. 12. 2003 and the complainant made the payment of Rs. 90,000 as advance money vide two separate cheques of Rs. 48,000 and Rs. 40,000. Rs. 2,000 were paid in cash. The last date for full and final payment was fixed as 31. 3. 2004. The possession of the house was also to be delivered by the appellant to the complainant on that date and the sale deed was also to be executed on the same day. However, the stipulated date expired without any result. The appellant again received a sum of Rs. 1 lac through cheque for which the appellant executed an affidavit on 7. 6. 2004 in which it was agreed that the possession of the house will be delivered by the appellant to the complainant on 27. 7. 2004 and the Sale Deed will also be executed on the same date. Then appellant failed to deliver the possession of the house as it was not built. Therefore, another agreement was executed between the parties on 29. 7. 2004 in which it was mentioned by which time the appellant had received a sum of Rs. 2,80,000 and the date of execution of the Sale Deed was fixed as 29. 9. 2004 and the remaining amount was payable by the complainant to the appellant on that date. The expenses of the registered Sale Deed were to be borne by the complainant. The complainant was also authorised to get the Sale Deed executed in her name or in the name of any other person. She was also entitled to get the double amount from the appellant, if he failed to execute the Sale Deed but if the complainant backed out, then the amount of Rs. 2,80,000 was to stand forfeited. The appellant was to get a house on rent for the complainant till he delivered the possession of a built house. The appellant also executed separate receipt for Rs. 2,80,000 in favour of the complainant.

The appellant again failed to complete the house or to deliver its possession to the complainant. Accordingly, the date was extended to 15. 3. 2005. On that date again the date was extended upto 9. 5. 2005. On 9. 5. 2005, the complainant reached the office of Tehsildar but the appellant failed to turn up.

IT was also pleaded that the appellant had arranged a house for the complainant in Friends Colony as per the terms of the agreement dated 29. 7. 2004. The complainant resided in the said house from March 2004 to August 2004. There was no electricity in the said house and it lacked amenities, then the complainant shifted in House No. 224, Dashmesh Nagar on monthly rent of Rs. 2,500 but the appellant paid rent only for three months and that too at the rate of Rs. 2,200 p. m. Hence the complainant filed a complaint for receiving double of the amount of Rs. 2,80,000 ; rent paid by her to the landlord; compensation for the loss of one year studies of her son; and the amount of compensation for harassment, mental agony etc. The appellant filed the written statement and contested the case. It was admitted by him that the appellant is a builder of repute and the complainant wanted to purchase a house; that an agreement was arrived at between the parties on 16. 12. 2003. The construction was to be raised by the appellant on both the plots and the complainant was to make the payment of Rs. 6,50,000 in all. The appellant had received a sum of Rs. 90,000 from the complainant as earnest money and the last date for making the remaining payment was 31. 3. 2004 on which date the appellant was to hand over the possession of the house and to execute the Sale Deed. The nature of construction was also admitted.

IT was also admitted that the payments were received by the appellant as pleaded by the complainant and the affidavit to that effect was sworn in by the appellant on 7. 6. 2004. However, the plots were situated in an unauthorised Colony. Since criminal action was being contemplated against the sellers and purchasers by the Competent Authority, therefore, the complainant had got apprehension of her involvement in some criminal case and she had asked the appellant to stop the construction and to extend the period of completion of agreement. All the extensions in the date of agreement were made with the express consent of the complainant as the complainant did not have the requisite balance amount of sale consideration. The terms and conditions were incorporated in the agreement dated 29. 7. 2004. Further extensions for the implementation of the agreement were also admitted. It was further pleaded that the appellant had reached the office of Sub-Registrar, Kharar on 9. 5. 2005 but the complainant had failed to appear on that date with the balance amount of sale consideration. The construction of house is complete. The appellant is ready to execute the sale deed. The complainant had resided in the house for 8-9 months which was hired for her by the appellant. It was denied if the said house was without electricity or if it lacked other amenities. The complainant is not entitled to the double of the advance money or to the rent amount or to the amount spent on the treatment of her husband or damages on account of loss of one year by the son of complainant or damages on account of mental agony etc. Hence, dismissal of complaint was prayed. The learned District Forum considered the matter and accepted the complaint partly and directed the appellant to make the payment of Rs. 5,60,000 to the complainant (double of the amount of earnest money of Rs. 2,80,000 ) plus Rs. 30,900 as the balance amount of rent plus Rs. 40,000 as compensation to the complainant, within a period of one month vide impugned order dated 15. 5. 2006.

AGGRIEVED against this order, the present appeal (First Appeal No. 851 of 2006) was filed by the appellant.

THE complainant also filed appeal (First Appeal No. 164 of 2007) seeking enhancement in the amount of compensation awarded by the learned District Forum vide impugned order dated 15. 5. 2006. The first submission of the learned Counsel for the appellant was that there was an agreement between the parties even as per the version of the complainant. Therefore, the complainant was neither a consumer nor the District Forum had the jurisdiction to decide the issue. The only remedy available to the complainant was to file a civil suit for specific performance. Hence, it was prayed that the parties be relegated to the Civil Court. In support of his submission, reliance was placed on the judgments of the Hon''ble National Commission reported as Executive Engineer, Gosikhurd Dam Division v. Shri Hariganga Cement Ltd. , I (1996) CPJ 299 (NC)=1996 (1) CON. LT 559 and Griffon Masih v. G. S. Oberoi and Others, 2005 (1) CPC 340; Pondicherry State Consumer Commission reported as S. Ravindran v. A. S. Kumaravelu, 2005 (2) CPC 155; Calcutta State Consumer Commission reported as Coal Executive Welfare and Housing Org. v. Bibek Kanta Chakraborty, 2002 (2) CON. LT 521; Tamilnadu State Consumer Commission reported as Mrs. Bindu Rajakrishnan v. Mrs. Kanchana, II (2001) CPJ 479=2001 (2) CPC 678; and Uttaranchal State Consumer Commission reported as Rajeev Kumar Shah v. Prabhagiya Van Adhikari and Ors. , III (2005) CPJ 93=2005 (2) CON. LT 489.

On the other hand, the submission of the learned Counsel for the complainant was that the appellant had agreed to render service to the complainant on payment which he had failed to render as per the agreement, and therefore, there was deficiency in service. Since it was a consumer dispute, therefore, the matter can be decided by the District Forum under the provisions of Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (in short the ''act'') and the parties cannot be relegated to the Civil Court. Hence it was prayed that the appeal of the appellant deserves to be dismissed while the appeal filed by the complainant deserves to be allowed and the amount of compensation needs to be enhanced. Reliance was placed on the judgment of Hon''ble Supreme Court reported as Lucknow Development Authority v. M. K. Gupta, III (1993) CPJ 7 (SC)=air 1994 SC 787.

WE have perused the record. The submissions have been considered. The settled law is that the Consumer Protection Act is a social benefit oriented legislation and the Hon''ble Supreme Court in M. K. Gupta''s case (supra) was pleased to observe in paragraph 2 in the judgment as under: "but before doing so and examining the question of jurisdiction of the District Forum or State or National Commission to entertain a complaint under the Act, it appears appropriate to ascertain the purpose of the Act, the objective it seeks to achieve and the nature of social purpose it seeks to promote as it shall facilitate in comprehending the issue involved and assist in construing various provisions of the Act effectively. To begin, with the preamble of the Act, which can afford useful assistance to ascertain the legislative intention, it was enacted ''to provide for the protection of the interest of consumers''. Use of the word ''protection'' furnishes key to the minds of makers of the Act. Various definitions and provisions which elaborately attempt to achieve this objective have to be construed in this light without departing from the settled view that a preamble cannot control otherwise plain meaning of a provision. In fact the law meets long felt necessity of protecting the common man from such wrongs for which the remedy under ordinary law for various reasons has become illusory. Various legislations and regulations permitting the State to intervene and protect interest of the consumers have become a heaven for unscrupulous ones as the enforcement machinery either does not move or it moves ineffectively, inefficiently and for reasons which are not necessary to be stated. The importance of the Act lies in promoting welfare of the society by enabling the consumer to participate directly in the market economy. It attempts to remove the helplessness of a consumer which faces against powerful business, described as, ''a network of rackets'' or a society in which, ''producers have secured power'' to ''rob the rest'' and the might of public bodies which are degenerating into store house of inaction where papers do not move from one desk to another as a matter of duty and responsibility but for extraneous consideration leaving the common man helpless, bewildered and shocked. The malady is becoming so rampant, widespread and deep that the society instead of bothering, complaining and fighting for it, is accepting it as part of life. The enactment in these unbelievable yet harsh realities appears to be a silver lining, which may in course of time succeed in checking the rot. A scrutiny of various definitions such as ''consumer'', ''service'', ''trader'', ''unfair trade practice'' indicates that Legislature has attempted to widen the reach of the Act. Each of these definitions are in two parts, one, explanatory and the other expandatory. The explanatory or the main part itself uses expressions of wide amplitude indicating clearly its wide sweep then its ambit is widened to such things which otherwise would have been beyond its natural import. "

To determine the jurisdiction of Consumer Forums and Commissions under the Act, it would be beneficial to refer to some terms used in this Act. The word ''service'' has been defined in Section 2 (l) (o) of the Act as under: " (o) "service" means service of any description which is made available to potential users and includes, but not limited to the provision of facilities in connection with banking, financing, insurance, transport, processing, supply of electrical or other energy, board or lodging or both, housing construction, entertainment, amusement or the purveying of news or other information, but does not include the rendering of any service free of charge or under a contract or personal service. "

THIS definition clearly reveals that even the housing construction activities under the contact amounts to service. Only the service free of charge and the personal service under a contract have been excluded from the definition of service. This clearly means, therefore, that the agreement between the appellant and the complainant by which the appellant agreed to construct a house for the complainant and to sell the same to her for consideration amounts to service within the meaning of this section. Similarly, it would be worthwhile to refer to the definition of "deficiency" provided under Section 2 (1 ) (g) of the Act which reads as under: " (g) "deficiency" means any fault, imperfection, shortcoming or inadequacy in the quality, nature and manner of performance which is required to be maintained by or under any law for the time being in force or has been undertaken to be performed by a person in pursuance of a contract or otherwise in relation to any service. " This also specifically lays down that any fault, imperfection, shortcoming or inadequacy etc. in the performance of anything undertaken to be done by a person in pursuance of a contract amounts to deficiency in service. The appellant had agreed to construct a house of specific kind and specific quality and to make it available to the complainant but he failed to do so which clearly falls in the definition of ''service'' as defined in Section 2 (l) (g) of the Act. Moreover, merely because an agreement was entered between the parties in writing, it cannot be interpreted to mean that the doors of Consumer Forums are shut for the consumers or that the parties are to be relegated to Civil Court. In this context, reference may be made to the provisions of Section 3 of the Act. It reads as under: "3. Act not in derogation of any other law.-The provisions of this Act shall be in addition to and not in derogation of the provisions of any other law for the time being in force. "

It clearly lays down that the remedy of the Consumer Forums is available to the consumers even if some other remedy is available to them. It is in addition and not in derogation.

EVEN in the judgment of Hon''ble Supreme Court in M. K. Gupta''s case (supra), it was observed by the Hon''ble Supreme Court as under: "the provisions of the Act thus have to be construed in favour of the consumer to achieve the purpose of enactment as it is a social benefit oriented legislation. The primary duty of the Court while construing the provisions of such an Act is to adopt a constructive approach subject to that it should not do violence to the language of the provisions and is not contrary to attempted objective of the enactment. "

THE following observations made by the Hon''ble Supreme Court in M. K. Gupta''s judgment (supra) also reveal that the pro-vision of this Act are applicable to such like matters: "if a builder of a house uses sub-standard material in construction of a building or makes false or misleading representation about the condition of the house then it is denial of the facility or benefit of which a consumer is entitled to claim value under the Act. When the contractor or builder undertakes to erect a house or flat then it is herent in it that he shall perform his obligations agreed to. A flat with a leaking roof, or cracking wall or sub-standard floor is denial of service. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A person who applies for allotment of a building site or for a flat constructed by the development authority or enters into an agreement with a builder or a contractor is a potential user and nature of transaction is covered in the expression ''service of any description''. It further indicates that the definition is not exhaustive. The inclusive clause succeeded in widening its scope but not exhausting the services which could be covered in earlier part. So any service except which it is free of charge or under a constraint of personal service is included in it. Since housing activity is a service it was covered in the clause as it stood before 1993. "

It was also observed by the Hon''ble Supreme in M. K. Gupta''s case (supra) as under: "the respondents were aggrieved either by delay in delivery of possession of house or use of sub-standard material etc. and therefore they claimed deficiency in service rendered by the appellants. Whether they were justified in their complaint and if such act or omission could be held to be denial of service in the Act shall be examined presently, but the jurisdiction of the Commission could not be ousted because even though it was service it related to immovable property. "

This clearly demolishes the submission raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant that the matter in issue does not fall in the purview of the District Forums.

REFERENCE may also be made to the recent judgment of the Hon''ble Supreme Court reported as Bhandari Construction Company v. Narayan Gopal Upadhye, III (2007) SLT 627=air 2007 SCW 1846. The facts of this case were almost identical to the facts of the present case as is clear from paragraph 3 (reproduced below) of the judgment: "the appellant is a construction company. The respondent sought to purchase an office room in the third floor of a building being constructed by the appellant. The parties agreed to sell and purchase. According to the company the purchase price was fixed at Rs. 7,75,000. Documentation, registration and other expenses were to be borne by the respondent. Rs. 5,00,000 was paid by cheque. The balance due, was Rs. 3,41,190. The respondent had not paid the said sum. The sale transaction was, therefore, not complete. The room was not put in the possession of the respondent. The terms of the transaction were reduced to writing by an agreement dated 27. 7. 1997. "

In the reported judgment, the District Forum had dismissed the complaint and the parties were relegated to the Civil Court (paragraph 8 of the judgment) but the State Commission had remanded back the case to the District Forum for deciding the same on merits. It was decided on merits. The matter reached the State Commission, the National Commission and ultimately in the Hon''ble Supreme Court. Hon''ble Supreme Court was pleased to uphold the finding of the District Forum by which the liberty was granted to the consumer to seek refund from the builder with interest etc. These facts clearly reveal that the contract between the consumer and the builder falls within the domain of Consumer Forums and the parties cannot be referred to Civil Court.

IN view of the law enunciated by the Hon''ble Supreme Court as discussed above, the judgments of National Commission/various Commissions relied upon by the learned Counsel for the appellant laying down law to the contrary cannot be of any assistance to the appellant. In view of the facts stated and the law discussed above, it becomes abundantly clear that the matter falls within the jurisdiction of Consumer Forums constituted under the Act and there is no need to relegate the parties to Civil Court. The perusal of the facts of this case clearly reveals that the agreement was arrived at between the parties on 16. 12. 2003 (Annexures C-3 and C-4) and the house, duly constructed on two plots measuring 110 sq. yards and 68 sq. yards, was to be handed over by the appellant to the complainant on 31. 3. 2004. The appellant had received a sum of Rs. 90,000 on 16. 12. 2003 itself and the balance payment (Rs. 6,50,000 minus Rs. 90,000 ) was to be paid on the date of registration i. e. 31. 3. 2004. The amenities which the appellant was to provide in the house were duly detailed in Annexure C-5.

THE appellant failed to honour his commitment. Rather he received another amount of Rs. 1 lac on 7. 6. 2004 and got the date extended to 10. 7. 2004 (Annexure C-6 ). Still, he failed to honour his commitment and on 29. 7. 2004 he got the date extended to 29. 9. 2004 vide a written agreement (Annexure C-7 ). In this agreement, he admitted having received a sum of Rs. 2,80,000 from the complainant.

AS it appears, it was the habit of the appellant to dishonour his own commitment and again failed to stand by the promise made by him in the agreement dated 29. 7. 2004 and to hand over the duly constructed house by 29. 9. 2004. By another writing, he got the time extended to 15. 3. 2005 vide writing dated 13. 1. 2005 (Annexure C-8 ). The appellant again failed to stand by it and on 15. 3. 2005, he got the date extended to 9. 5. 2005. These documents clearly reveal that although the appellant had agreed to hand over a duly constructed house to the complainant upto 31. 3. 2004 but he got the date extended numerous times from 31. 3. 2004 to 9. 5. 2005.

The submission of the learned Counsel for the appellant was that the date was extended for the reason that the complainant was not possessed of sufficient funds to make the payment of balance sale consideration. Another reason was that the colony where the said plots were located and the construction was being raised was an unauthorised Colony being not approved by the Competent Authority and since criminal action was being contemplated by the Competent Authority against the sellers and purchasers, therefore, the complainant was apprehensive that she might not be got involved in some criminal case and accordingly she had asked the appellant to stop the construction and to extend the period of completion of the agreement. Moreover, all these extensions throughout were made with the express consent of the complainant. Now, she is estopped by her own act and conduct to challenge the extensions.

THESE submissions have been considered. If these were the reasons for the extensions, these could have been incorporated in the documents which were executed between the parties for extension of time but the perusal of the affidavit dated 7. 6. 2004 (Ex. C-6) executed by the appellant extending the time to 10. 7. 2004 does not contain any such reason as is pleaded by the appellant and argued on his behalf.

AFTER the execution of the affidavit dated 7. 6. 2004, an agreement dated 29. 7. 2004 was entered into between the parties as the appellant had failed to give complete possession upto 10. 7. 2004 and the dates were extended to 29. 7. 2004. As per this agreement, the area measuring 178 sq. yards situated at Swaraj Nagar, Kharar was within the municipal limits of Kharar. The appellant was full owner of this plot and was in its complete possession and the property was free from all encumbrances. In paragraph 3 of this agreement, it is stated that electric wires pass over this plot and the appellant had already filed an application to the Electricity Board for the removal of these electric wires. All these writings in the agreement dated 29. 7. 2004 (Ex. C-7) clearly reveal that the appellant has concocted the false version that the plots were situated in an unauthorised Colony or if there was an apprehension of criminal proceedings or for this reason the house could not be completed. These facts stated in the agreement dated 29. 7. 2004 (Ex. C-7) go contrary to the pleadings made by the appellant before the District Forum. It is not mentioned in this agreement if the date was extended to 29. 9. 2004 because the complainant was short of funds or if the extension was made on her request. Therefore, this version of the appellant is false that the extensions were sought by the complainant as she had no funds to make the payment of balance sale consideration. Even in the agreement dated 13. 1. 2005 (Ex. C-8), no such facts are described, as have been pleaded by the appellant in his written reply. Therefore, these allegations made in the written reply are not correct and are concocted. In the agreement dated 15. 3. 2005, it is specifically mentioned that the date of registration has been extended as the house was incomplete. It is not specifically mentioned in this writing dated 15. 3. 2005 if the extension was sought by the complainant for want of funds or if completion of the building was deferred as the area was situated in unauthorised Colony or if there was apprehension of criminal liabilities. These stories have been incorporated in the written reply by the appellant to defeat the complainant and to dupe the Court.

IT is the settled law that the documents have to be read as per the language incorporated in these documents and nothing more can be read in it. In the judgment of M/s. Bhandari Construction Company''s case (supra), the Hon''ble Supreme Court was pleased to make reference to the provisions of Sections 91 and 92 of Evidence Act and was pleased to hold that when an agreement between the parties is reduced into writing, there was a bar against leading evidence contradicting its terms. Therefore, the document is to be read as per its contents and no foreign aid can be taken to read something in the written document which is not made out from its language. Therefore, when these agreements/affidavits do not contain any assertion regarding the non-availability of the funds with the complainant or that the area was situated in an unauthorised Colony and that there was apprehension of initiation of criminal proceedings which caused the delay in the construction of the house, cannot be read into these documents.

IT is, therefore, held that the pleas taken by the appellant are false and frivolous and invented by the appellant to defeat the case of the complainant. On 9. 5. 2005, the version of the complainant is that she appeared before the Sub-Registrar and remained present there throughout the day from 9. 00 a. m. to 4. 50 p. m. but the appellant did not turn up. Her affidavit, duly attested by the Executive Magistrar, Kharar in whose Court she remained present for getting the Sale Deed registered in her favour, is Ex. C-14.

The appellant has also filed his affidavit, Annexure RW-3/a in which it is stated that he remained present in the office of Sub-Registrar on 9. 5. 2005 to execute the Sale Deed but the complainant did not turn up. However, he has not proved his affidavit duly attested by the Sub-Registrar to that effect. If the appellant had come present in the office of Sub-Registrar on 9. 5. 2005, he would have sworn his own affidavit on 9. 5. 2005 and would have got it duly attested from Sub-Registrar to show his presence. The appellant, of course, placed on file a photocopy of the affidavit dated 9. 5. 2005 to the effect that he remained present before the Sub-Registrar, Kharar to execute the Sale Deed but the complainant had not turned up. However, his affidavit is not attested by any Sub-Registrar. It is only attested by the Oath Commissioner and is signed by the Lamberdar. Neither this affidavit has been proved before the District Forum nor this affidavit can serve the purpose as it is not duly attested by the Sub-Registrar/executive Magistrate in whose Court the appellant allegedly remained present throughout the day on 9. 5. 2005.

AFTER appreciating the affidavits/documents placed on file by the parties, the inevitable conclusion is that on 9. 5. 2005, the complainant remained present in the office of Sub-Registrar to get the Sale Deed executed in her favour as per the terms of the agreement but the appellant had failed to appear before the Sub-Registrar. The appellant has concocted a false story about his presence in the office of Sub-Registrar on 9. 5. 2005. It may also be seen that as per the agreement dated 29. 7. 2004 (Ex. C-7), the appellant had agreed to arrange for a rented house to the complainant at his own expenses till the built house was made available to her. This is not even denied by the appellant. The appellant in fact had also arranged a house for the complainant in the Friends Colony but that house had no electricity or other amenities. The complainant resided in the said house along with her children from March 2004 to August 2004. For want of amenities, the complainant shifted to House No. 224, Dashmesh Nagar on the monthly rent of Rs. 2,500 but the appellant paid the rent only for three months and that too at the rate of Rs. 2,200 p. m. It has come in evidence of the complainant that the cheques issued by the appellant in lieu of rent were dishonoured. This fact was also admitted by the appellant at the time of arguments before this Commission but he submitted that thereafter he had paid the rent in cash.

THE fact remains that the appellant had arranged for a house which lacked amenities and electricity. When the complainant shifted to another house, the rent was paid only for a short period and that too at the lesser rate. As per the agreement, the appellant was bound to arrange for the house till the duly constructed house was made available by him to the complainant i. e. till the Registered Sale Deed was executed by the appellant in favour of the complainant. Therefore, he had no right to deny the payment of rent to landlord of the complainant. The conduct of the appellant also caused harassment to the complainant when he issued the cheque as payment of rent and the said cheque was dishourned. Whether the payment is made later on or not, the kind of mental torture suffered by the complainant, can never be measured. From all these circumstances, it is clear that the appellant had been committing default to fulfil the promise made by him and to honour his own commitment. Therefore, as per the terms of the agreement, the appellant was entitled to double of the amount of the earnest money of Rs. 2,80,000. The learned District Forum vide impugned order dated 15. 5. 2006 awarded a sum of Rs. 5,60,000. She has also been awarded Rs. 30,900 as the balance amount of rent and compensation to the tune of Rs. 40,000. The amounts awarded by the learned District Forum are well justified, and therefore, this order does not suffer from any illegality. Therefore, the appeal filed by the appellant (First Appeal No. 851 of 2006) is dismissed.

SO far as the appeal filed by the complainant (First Appeal No. 164 of 2007) is concerned, it was submitted by the learned Counsel for the complainant that the prices of the property have gone up, therefore, the amount of compensation be enhanced to Rs. 3 lacs instead of Rs. 40,000. It was also prayed that an amount of Rs. 25,000 as litigation expenses be also awarded.

THIS submission has been considered. The amount of Rs. 40,000 as compensation has been awarded by the learned District Forum and this Commission does not find merit in the submission of learned Counsel for the complainant to enhance this amount.

However, to ensure that the appellant makes the payment of this amount without delay, it is ordered that the appellant will pay this amount to the complainant within 45 days from today. If he fails to do so, the amount of Rs. 5,60,000 + Rs. 30,900 will carry interest @ 9% p. a. from the date of this order till the date of payment. The complainant is also awarded Rs. 10,000 as cost of litigation in all.

THE appellant has deposited an amount of Rs. 25,000 at the time of filing the appeal (First Appeal No. 851 of 2006 ). This amount be released to Paramjit Kaur, complainant by way of crossed cheque/bank Draft and the same be sent by registered post after the expiry of 45 days. The arguments in this case were heard on 19. 11. 2007. The judgment was reserved. Now, the orders be communicated to the parties. Appeal dismissed.