A. Sabhapathy Pillai and others vs The Special Tahsildar for Land Acquisition and another

T.C. Raghavan, J.—Three objections have to be considered in these appeals. The first is that Sabhapathi Pillai, one of the appellants in one of these appeals, is, not entitled to file the appeal as he was not a party to the land acquisition reference before the lower court; the second objection is that the appellants should file six different appeals against the six references; and the third objection is that the court fee paid in the appeals is not correct. An anicut and a canal system belonged to a joint Hindu family consisting of four brothers, of which Venkitachalam Pillai was the eldest. The anicut and the canal system were acquired in six different stages--six different portions of the system were acquired on six different dates. Venkitachalam Pillai, the eldest brother obtained six references in these acquisitions to the Subordinate Judge. But, at the time of hearing, the Subordinate Judge consolidated all the references into one and fixed a value of Rs. 52,009.40 p. for the entire system. Against two awards by the Collector two of the other brothers also obtained references to the Subordinate Judge. However, since all the six references were consolidated, the Subordinate Judge did not pass any order on these references separately. The Subordinate Judge though he fixed Rs. 52,009.40 p. as the value of the entire anicut and canal system awarded only a fourth of the amount to Venkitachalam Pillai saying that it was only, he that obtained the references to the Subordinate Judge. Against this decision, one appeal has been filed by the three brothers impleading Venkitachalam Pillai as a respondent. The other two appeals have been filed by the two brothers who obtained reference against two awards on which the Subordinate Judge did not pass separate orders. Thus the three appeals. In these appeals the court fee paid by the appellants is under Schedule II, Article 3 (iii) (A) (i) (a) of the Kerala Court Fees Act as if the appeals are against orders not provided for by section 31 of the Act. The objection against court fee is that the appellants should pay ad valorem court fee u/s 51.

On the first question, there cannot be any doubt that Sabhapathi Pillai can also file an appeal, because he is one who is affected or bound by the award passed by the Subordinate Judge. We do not think that any authority is required for this; but, if any authority is necessary, there is the Division Bench ruling of this Court in Executive Officer, Sri Padmanabhaswamy Temple Vs. Raghavan Pillai and Another, , wherein it is laid down that a person, who was not a party to a suit but is bound by the decree or whose interests are prejudicially affected by it, may file an appeal with the leave of the appellate court, though he cannot file an appeal as of right. The maximum that can be demanded is that Sabhapathi Pillai should file an application for leave, which he has done in this case. Therefore, there is no merit in the first objection.

In the second objection also we find little substance, because the Subordinate Judge consolidated all the references and passed only one award. Therefore, only one appeal can be filed against the award. It is evident that six appeals cannot be filed, because there are no six separate awards against which appeals could be filed. If compensations are not awarded separately for the separate portions of the irrigation system, how can separate appeal be filed? The appellants are well advised in filing only one appeal as that alone is possible.

The third objection relates to court fee. The counsel of the appellants has drawn our attention to two or three decisions. The first is Kochummon Easo v. State of Kerala (I.L.R. 1964 1 Ker. 380) by Mathew J., where the learned Judge has held that, when an appeal is filed against an order passed by a Subordinate Judge in a land acquisition reference that the owner of the land was not entitled to claim compensation as he failed to make a claim before the land acquisition officer, court fee need not be paid u/s 5 of the Travancore-Cochin Court Fees Act--similar to section 31 of the Kerala Court Fees Act. Another decision brought to our notice in Hakim Martin De Silva Vs. Martin De Silva II and Others, , where a Division Bench of the Rajasthan High Court has held that, when the dispute related to the shares of the parties in the property acquired, what the appellant wanted was merely a declaration that he alone was the owner of the property; in such a case, the Rajasthan High Court has held, ad valorem court fee need not be paid. In this decision the Rajasthan High Court has referred to the decision of the Privy Council T.B. Raz Chandra Rao v. A.N.S. Samchandra Rao ( AIR 1922 P.C 80). The judicial Committee said that, when once the award as to the amount had become final, all questions as to fixing of compensation were then at an end; and that the award as constituted by the statute was nothing but an award which stated the area of the land, the compensation to be allowed and the apportionment among the persons interested in the land, of whose claims the Collector had information. If there was a dispute between the interested people as to the extent of their interest, the Privy Council said, such dispute formed no part of the award. Yet another decision brought to our notice is the decision of the Supreme Court in State of U.P. v. Ram Kishen Burman (1969 2 S.C.W.R. 625), where the Supreme Court has pointed out the difference is meaning between the expressions "decree for money or other property" and "decree for declaration of title to money or other property". The Supreme Court has pointed out that one is a decree for recovery or realisation of the money or the property while the other is a declaration of title to the money or the property.

In the light, of these decisions, Mr. K.N. Karunakaran, on behalf of the appellants, argues that what is sought in these appeals is only a declaration that Venkitachalam Pillai obtained the references, not in his individual capacity, but as the kartha of the joint family or that it was the joint family that was "interested in, or was the owner, of the irrigation system acquired by the Government; and that the entire compensation amount should go to the joint family and not to any one of the brothers individually. The prayers in the memorandum of appeals also support this contention. The Subordinate Judge actually found that "The total compensation on that basis will be Rs. 52,009.40p." But towards the end of the judgment he said, that, since Venkitachalam Pillai alone obtained the references, what should be awarded was only his share of the compensation. In these circumstances, we feel that the award was complete when the Subordinate Judge fixed the value at Rs. 52,009.40p; and that the further question he decided was only whether the references were on behalf of the joint family or in Venkitachalam Pillai''s individual capacity. And the Subordinate Judge thought that Venkitachalam Pillai applied for references only in his individual capacity. That was really a question whether the family was entitled to the amount or whether the brothers individually were entitled to the amount; and that, as pointed out by the Privy Council, was not part of the award. In this view, the court fee paid in the main appeal is correct. The counsel of the appellants has submitted that the other two appeals have been filed only out of abundant caution and strictly those appeals may not be necessary. Whatever that be, the question involved in those appeals in one of apportionment of the total amount among the six acquisitions; and in that view, the court fee paid in those appeals is also correct.