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Judgment
K. Chandru, J.—Heard both sides and perused the records.
Excepting for W.P. Nos. 3273 & 3274 of 2004, 856 of 2006 and 6532 of 2007, in all the other writ petitions, the petitioners have challenged the constitutional validity of Section 3E, 3G, 3H and 3J of the National High Ways Act 1956. (for short ''the N.H. Act'')
In W.P. No. 6532 of 2007, the petitioners have challenged the validity of Section 7(2) and 12 of the Tamil Nadu Act, 31/78 (Tamil Nadu Acquisition of Land for Harijan Welfare Scheme Act, 1978) providing for payment of solatium and interest as illegal, unconstitutional, discriminatory and violative of Articles 14 and 19 of the constitution and for a consequential direction to the State of Tamil Nadu to provide solatium at the rate of 30% additional amount of compensation at 12% and interest for one year @ 9% from the date of Section 4(1) notification and thereafter, 15% till the date of payment as available under the Land Acquisition Act (Central Act 1 of 1894).
In W.P. Nos. 3273 of 2004 and 3653 of 2005, 856 of 2006, the challenge is to the notification issued u/s 3A as well as the declaration under 3D of the National High Ways Act 1956 insofar as it relates to the petitioners land.
Section 3A of the National High Ways Act 1956, provides power to the Central Government to acquire any land required for building, maintenance, management or a operation of a National High Way for public purpose. Section 3A(3) Provides for an competent authority to cause the substance of the notification to be published in two local news papers of which one should be in the vernacular language. Section 3C provides for hearing of objections from the person interested in land, Section 3D provides for declaration of acquisition by a notification in the Official Gazette and also provides for limitation by which the said declaration can be made. Section 3G provides for determination of amount payable as compensation. Section 3H provides deposit and payment of compensation. Section 3J declares that the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act (Act 1 of 1894) shall not apply to an acquisition made under the N.H. Act.
The major attack is to Section 3J which excludes the applicability of Central Act 1 of 1984 to any acquisition under the N.H. Act. Therefore, the petitioners on the basis of a comparative analysis of the Act with that of the Central Act 1 of 1984 wanted to argue that the provisions of the N.H. Act is unconstitutional.
The object for which the National High Ways Act 1956 which was appended to the Bill when introduced in the Parliament reads as follows:
Certain highways passing through various States were being maintained by the respective States within which the particular highway was situated. Some of the States were maintaining the portions of the highways which criss-crossed within their respective jurisdictions in a proper manner but some of the States, due to one reason or the other, were found deficient in their maintenance, with the result that highways were not being maintained to the desired level. With the increase of movement of traffic on account of industrial advancement and increased tourist traffic it was found necessary that important highways of the country be developed and maintained by the Central Government.
The argument advanced by the counsel is that the National High Ways Act 1956 is unconstitutional based upon the comparative provisions found in Central Act 1 of 1984. Such an argument is impermissible. In The State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. G.C. Mandawar, , a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court held that Article 14 does not authorise the striking down of the law of one State on the ground that in contrast with the law of another State on the same subject, its provisions are discriminatory, nor does it contemplate the law of the Centre or of a State dealing with similar subjects being held to be unconstitutional by a process of comparative study of the provisions of the two. The sources of authority for the two being different, Article 14 can have no application.
In Sant Lal Bharti Vs. State of Punjab, , the Supreme Court reiterated the same view.
In State of Tamil Nadu and Others Vs. Ananthi Ammal and Others, the Supreme Court while dealing with a similar subject, in para: 7, observed as follows:
When a statute is impugned under Article 14 what the Court has to decide is whether the statue is so arbitrary or unreasonable that it must be struck down. At best, a statute upon a similar subject which derives its authority from another source can be referred to, if its provisions have been held to be reasonable or have stood the test of time, only for the purpose of indicating what may be said to be reasonable in the context.
A Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court while dealing with the constitutionality of Section 25N of the Industrial Disputes of Act, 1947, vide its decision in Workmen of Meenakshi Mills Ltd. and Others Vs. Meenakshi Mills Ltd. and Another, laid down guide lines for dealing with vires of statute quoted the dictum of Patanjali Sastri. C.J. in State of Madras Vs. V.G. Row, and recorded the same as the classic exposition of law on the subject. The said passage is found in page 358 of the report in V.G. Row''s case (cited supra) and it may be usefully extracted below:
It is important in this context to bear in mind that the test of reasonableness, wherever prescribed, should be applied to each individual statute impugned, and no abstract standard, or general pattern, of reasonableness can be laid down as applicable to all cases. The nature of the right alleged to have been infringed, the underlying purpose of the restrictions imposed, the extent and urgency of the evil sought to be remedied thereby, the disproportion of the imposition, the prevailing conditions at the time, should all enter into the judicial verdict. In evaluating such elusive factors and forming their own conception of what is reasonable, in all the circumstances of a given case, it is inevitable that the social philosophy and the scale of values of the judges participating in the decision should play an important part, and the limit to their interference with legislative judgment in such cases can only be dictated by their sense of responsibility and self-restraint and the sobering reflection that the Constitution is meant not only for people of their way of thinking but for all and that the majority of the elected representatives of the people have, in authorising the imposition of the restrictions, considered them to be reasonable.
Therefore, in the light of the above guiding principles, the argument based upon a comparative analysis of two enactments and hence the National High Ways Act 1956 is being unconstitutional cannot be countenanced by this Court. Accordingly, those writ petitions challenging the validity of Sections 3A, 3C, 3D, 3G, 3H and 3J of the N.H. Act must fail.
In W.P. No. 6532 of 2007, as noted already the challenge is to the validity of Sections 7(2) and (12) of Tamil Nadu Acquisition of Land for Harijana Welfare Schemes Act, 1978 (Tamil Nadu Act 31 of 1978) providing for reduce to solatium and interest as violative of Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution. The petitioner seeks for the application of Central Act 1 of 1894 providing for higher compensation. The petitioner cannot try to compare the State Enactment with that of the Central Enactment and try to seek for an additional provision analogous to the Central Act. In fact, the very Tamil Nadu Act was held to be unconstitutional by a Division Bench of this Court by a comparative analysis of the Central Act with that of the State Act vide its judgment in W.P. No. 7997 of 1980 dated 09.09.1981. The said judgment was reversed by the Supreme Court in State of Tamil Nadu and Others Vs. Ananthi Ammal and Others, . Even the grant of solatium, the Supreme Court dealt with the issue and held the provisions of Tamil Nadu 31 of 1978 as intra vires of the constitution.
In Prakash Amichand Shah Vs. State of Gujarat and Others, , a Constitution Bench held that it could not be said as a rule that the State, which has to supply and maintain large public services at great cost, should always pay, in addition to reasonable compensation for acquired land, some amount by way of solatium; the interest of the public was equally important.
The Supreme Court in Papnasam Labour Union Vs. Madura Coats Ltd. and Another, dealt with the principles and guidelines that should be kept in mind for considering the constitutionality of a statutory provision upon a challenge on the alleged vires or unreasonableness of the restriction imposed by the said legislation. In doing so, the Supreme Court surveyed all its previous decisions and culled out those guidelines along with its sources. They are found in Para: 15 of the judgment and it may be worth quoting:
(a). The restriction sought to be imposed on the Fundamental Rights guaranteed by Article 19 of the Constitution must not be arbitrary or of an excessive nature so as to go beyond the requirement of felt need of the society and object sought to be achieved. (Chintaman Rao v. State of M.P. 1950 SCR 759).
(b). There must be a direct and proximate nexus or a reasonable connection between the restriction imposed and the object sought to be achieved. ( O.K. Ghosh and Another Vs. E.X. Joseph, )
(c). No abstract or fixed principle can be laid down which may have universal application in all cases. Such consideration on the question of quality of reasonableness, therefore, is expected to vary from case to case. (Kavalappara Kottarathil Kochuni v. State of Madras and Kerala).
(d). In interpreting constitution provisions, courts should be alive to the felt need of the society and complex issues facing the people which the Legislature intends to solve through effective legislation. ( Jyoti Pershad Vs. The Administrator for The Union Territory of Delhi, .)
(e) In appreciating such problems and felt need of the society the judicial approach must necessarily be dynamic, pragmatic and elastic. ( Jyoti Pershad Vs. The Administrator for The Union Territory of Delhi, .)
(f) It is imperative that for consideration of reasonableness of restriction imposed by a statute, the Court should examine whether the social control as envisaged in Article 19 is being effectuated by the restriction imposed on the Fundamental Rights.( State of Madras Vs. V.G. Row, ).
(g) Although Article 19 guarantees all the seven freedoms to the citizen, such guarantee does not confer any absolute or unconditional right but is subject to reasonable restriction which the Legislature may impose in public interest. It is therefore necessary to examine whether such restriction is meant to protect social welfare satisfying the need of prevailing social values. ( State of Madras Vs. V.G. Row, ).
(h) The reasonableness has got to be tested both from the procedural and substantive aspects. It should not be bound by processual perniciousness or jurisprudence of remedies. ( Fatehchand Himmatlal and Others Vs. State of Maharashtra, .
(j) Restriction imposed on the Fundamental Rights guaranteed under Article 19 of the Constitution must not be arbitrary, unbridled, uncanalised and excessive and also not unreasonably discriminatory. Ex hypothesi, therefore, a restriction to be reasonable must also be consistent with Article 14 of the Constitution.
(k) In judging the reasonableness of the restriction imposed by Clause (6) of Article 19, the Court has to bear in mind Directive Principles of State Policy. ( His Holiness Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalvaru Vs. State of Kerala, .
(l) Ordinarily, any restriction so imposed which has the effect of promoting or effectuating a directing principles can be presumed to be a reasonable restriction in public interest. ( Workmen of Meenakshi Mills Ltd. and Others Vs. Meenakshi Mills Ltd. and Another, .
It is surprising that the petitioner should chose to challenge the provisions of Tamil Nadu Act 31 of 78 relating to solatium in spite of the fact that there was already an authoritative pronouncement by the Supreme Court in Ananthiammal''s case (cited supra) relating to the very same enactment. Therefore, W.P. 6532 of 2007 must necessarily fail.
In all the other three writ petitions namely W.P. Nos. 3373 of 2004, 3623 of 2005 and 1856 of 2006 have been filed on the basis that should this Court declare Section 3A, 3C, 3D, 3H, 3G & 3J as unconstitutional then necessarily the notification under 3A and the consequential declaration u/s 3D in respect of the individual land owners must also necessarily fail. Since this Court has upheld the validity of those provisions the notification and declaration issued under these provisions are valid and does not call for any interference. No other arguments were advanced in any individual cases.
In the light of the above, all these writ petitions are dismissed. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petitions are also dismissed. No costs.