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A. Venkatasami Naidu vs The State of Tamil Nadu

Madras High Court · Decided on 9 November 1972 · Citation: AIR 1974 Mad 124

HON’BLE JUDGES
Gokulakrishnan, J
CASE NUMBER
Civil Rev. Petition No. 2101 of 1971

AI Structured Summary

Not yet generated for this judgment

Judgment

93 paragraphs · 2,103 words
1.

The State of Tamil Nadu, through the State representative (Land Reforms), the Authorised Officer, Land Reforms, Madurai 2 (the respondent

herein) issued a notice dated 4-4-1970 u/s 9(2)(b) of the Tamil Nadu land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling on Land) Act, 1961 (Act LVIII of 1961)

(hereinafter referred to as the Act), directing the petitioner herein to show cause why he should not hand over 4.25 standard acres from out of his

private trust lands. According to the respondent, the petitioner is having a private trust, that the private trust is entitled to hold only 30 standard

acres and that since he is owning 34.25 standard acres, he has to declare an extent of 4.25 standard acres as surplus holding. The petitioner

alleged before the respondent that the trust is exempted from the operation of the act and that he would produce necessary documents and sought

extension of time to file his objections to the notice u/s 9(2)(b). In spite of several opportunities given to the petitioner to file his objections, no

objection was filed by him before the respondent. Finally, the respondent rejected the further request for grant of extension of time by a month to

file objection, and directed the petitioner to furnish the particulars of surplus land to the extent of 4.25 standard acres within seven days from the

date of the receipt of his order dated 22-6-1970.

2.

Aggrieved by the said decision of the Authorised Officer, the petitioner preferred an appeal to the Land Tribunal (Subordinate Judge),

Ramanatapuram at Madurai. Before the Land Tribunal, the petitioner contended that u/s 73(ii)(b) of the Act, all trusts are exempted from the

operation of the Act, that no portion of the properties can be declared as surplus land, that Section 6 of the Act, which deals with basis of

calculation of the extent of land held by the founder of a trust, has no application to his case, that if Section 6 is excluded, there is no basis of

resorting to Section 5, for declaring any portion of the lands as surplus and that the respondent was wrong in proceeding on the basis that the trust

in question is a ''private'' trust. The land tribunal, after observing that the settlement deed cannot be construed as creating a ''public'' trust, and also

distinguishing the decision in the Commissioner, Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Vs. Narayana Ayyangar and Others, ,

dismissed the appeal. Aggrieved by the decision of the Tribunal, the petitioner has preferred this civil revision petition u/s 83 of the Act and Section

115, Civil Procedure Code.

3.

Thiru S. V. Jayaraman, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that any ''trust'' is exempted from the operation of the Act, as

per Section 73(ii)(b) thereof. The learned counsel also brought to my notice the provision u/s 3(49) defining ''trust'' and stated that a ''trust'' means

trust for a public purpose of a religious or charitable, or of an educational, nature. The learned counsel also stated that the trust deed clearly creates

''public'' trust and submitted that any mention in the nature of private benefit found in the deed can be ignored in view of the specific mention of the

public nature of the trust in the deed itself.

4.

Sri Kumaraguruparan, appearing on behalf of the Assistant Government Pleader, submitted that he trust in this case is a ''private'' trust and that

there is absolutely nothing in the deed denoting a ''public'' purpose. He also submitted that the trust itself was created for the benefit of the family

members and as such it will not be exempted u/s 73 of the Act.

5.

The Act, in its defining Section--Section 3(49)--contemplates only trust which is intended for public purpose of a religious or charitable, or of an

education, nature. Hence it is necessary to construe as to whether the present trust is a trust for a public purpose of a religious of charitable nature.

The question as to whether it is a ''public'' trust or a ''private'' trust is not very material for the present case since the decision has to be rendered on

the question whether the trust is for a ''public'' purpose of a religious or charitable nature''.

6.

The Tribunal has completely ignored this aspect of the case and has erred in holding that since it is not a ''public'' trust, the exemption is not

attracted.

7.

According to the trust deed dated 13-9-1956, the petitioner has clearly endowed the properties for the purpose of performance of certain

charities. The predominent intention and purpose of creating the trust is only to perform the charities which the petitioner''s ancestors were doing

prior thereto. Incidental honours which the trustee gets by reason of such performance of charities cannot be construed as the purpose for which

the trust was created. The main intention of the founder of the trust is to do certain mandagapadies to the deities and on days of these

mandagapadies to feed the bakthas who collect there. Both in the A schedule dharmam and the B schedule dharmam, mentioned in the deed of

trust, the main object is to perform necessary mandagapadies for the deities mentioned there and also to do charity with the residual funds.

8.

Thus it is clear that the main purpose of the trust is only a public purpose of a religious and charitable nature. If it is a public purpose of a

religious and charitable nature, the exemption granted u/s 73 will squarely apply.

9.

Commissioner, Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Vs. Narayana Ayyangar and Others, , the one cited before the tribunal

itself, and submitted that the ratio decidendi of that case will apply squarely to the case on hand. In that case, the main question was whether on the

facts found by the court of first instance and confirmed by the high Court, the ''Samaradhanai fund'' in that case was a ''religious charity'' within the

meaning of Section 6(13) of Madras Act XIX of 1951. That section defines ''religious charity'' as meaning ''a public charity associated with a

Hindu festival or observance of a religious character, whether it be connected with a math or temple or not"". The two conditions thus prescribed by

the definition were: there must be a public charity and that charity must be associated with a Hindu festival or observance of a religious character. If

these be fulfilled, a public charity will be a religious charity, even if it is not connected with a math or temple. The High Court, in that case, found

that feeding Brahmin pilgrims during the Rathothsavam festival of Sri Venkatachalapathi Swami shrine at Gunaseelam did not constitute an

association between the fund and the Rathothsavam festival. This view was not accepted by the Supreme Court. On the facts, the Supreme Court

held that on the occasion of the Rathothsavam festival pilgrims from many places attend the festival and the object of the charity is to feed Brahmins

attending the festival, that it was not disputed that setting up a fund for feeding Brahmins is a public charity, that the primary purpose of the charity

is to feed Brahmin pilgrims attending the Rathothsavam and that this public charity has therefore a real connection with the Rathothsavam which is a

Hindu festival of a religious character, and therefore a religious charity within the meaning of Section 6(13) of Madras act IX of 1951. Finally the

Supreme Court confirmed the finding of the trial Court.

10.

As far as the present case is concerned, there is a clear recital in the deed for the performance of charities and also to feed bakthas who collect

during the festivals for the deities. Even the mandagapadies are done in public place in a mantap and bhakthas are allowed to worship the deities.

The properties are definitely dedicated for the performance of the charities mentioned in the A and B schedules.

11.

For construction of a trust deed as a deed for public purpose of a religious or charitable nature, it is not necessary to take into account certain

immaterial recitals in the deed which confer benefits to the trustee or members of his family. For this position Sri S. V. Jayaraman, the learned

counsel for the petitioner, cited the decision in Nirmala Bala Ghose and Another Vs. Balai Chand Ghose and Others, , wherein the Supreme Court

has held that provision for maintenance and could not therefore be interpreted as restrictive of the estate of the deity and that the deed

consequently created an endowment for the benefit of the deity absolutely but subject to certain charges in favour of the shebaits and the

descendants of the settlor.

12.

Sri S.V. Jayaraman also cited the decision in S. Shanmugam Pillai and Others Vs. K. Shanmugam Pillai and Others, for the position as to how

a complete decision of property to religious or charitable purpose must be construed. There, the Supreme Court held:

The dedication of a property to religious or charitable purposes may be either complete or partial. If the dedication is complete a trust in favour of

a charity is created. If the dedication is partial, a trust in favour of a charity is not created but a charge in favour of a charity is attached to, and

follows, the property which retains its original private and secular character. Whether or not a dedication is complete is a question of fact to be

determined in each case on the terms of the relevant document if the dedication was made under a document. In such a case it is always a matter

of ascertaining the true intention of the parties. Such an intention must be gathered on a fair and reasonable construction of the document

considered as a whole. If the income of the property is substantially intended to be used for the purpose of a charity and only an insignificant and

minor portion of it is allowed to be used for the maintenance of the worshipper the manager, it may be possible to take the view that dedication is

complete. If, on the other hand, for the maintenance of charity a minor portion of the income is expected or required to be used and a substantial

surplus is left in the hands of the manager or worshipper for his own private purposes, it would be difficult to accept the theory of complete

dedication"".

13.

Applying this decision to the case on hand, it is clear that there is a ''complete dedication'' of the properties for a public purpose of a religious

and charitable nature.

14.

In G. Radhakrishna Chettiar and Others Vs. The Commissioner, Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments, , a Bench of this court has held,

on the facts of that case, that feeding Arya Vysya pilgrims who happen to visit religious festivals upon stated occasions and the endowment created

for that purpose, would be ''religious charity''. In Commissioner, Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Vs. Narayana Ayyangar

and Others, also, the feeding of Brahmins on Rathothsavam festival has been held to be a religious charity. Thus, even a trust created for a certain

section of people has been held to be a religious trust. As far as the present case is concerned, the purpose of the trust is for doing mandagapadies

for the deities wherein the public have access to, irrespective of caste or creed and all bakthaas who collect there have to be fed. Hence, there is

no difficulty so far as the present case is concerned, for coming to the conclusion that the trust is for a public purpose of a religious and charitable

nature. The description that it is a ''private'' trust and that the Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowment Board has no voice in the trust and like

recitals in a trust deed cannot give the character of a ''private'' or ''public'' trust to the trust created. It is the duty of the court to read the recitals in

the deed of trust and spell out the intention of the founder of the trust for the purpose for which it is created.

15.

In view of the abovesaid finding, it is needless to say that the properties mentioned in the trust deed in question are exempt from the operation

of the Act.

16.

In these circumstances, the civil revision petition is allowed with the finding that the lands involved in the trust deed in question are exempt from

the provisions of the Act. 17. It is regrettable that Assistant Government Pleader is absent when this judgment is pronounced. Hence the civil

revision petition is allowed with costs. Revision allowed.