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Judgment
P. Bhavadasan, J.—The accused was prosecuted for the offence punishable u/s 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. He was found guilty and was, therefore, convicted and sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for two months and also to pay an amount of Rs. 21,500/- as compensation to the complainant with a default clause of simple imprisonment for a further period of two months. In appeal, the appellate court confirmed the conviction, but modified the sentence as simple imprisonment till the rising of the court and to pay Rs. 21,500/- as compensation to the complainant in default of payment of which he has to undergo simple imprisonment for two months.
According to the complainant, the accused owed Rs. 21,500/- to him and in order to discharge the said liability, Ext.P1 cheque was issued to the complainant, which, on presentation, was returned with the endorsement funds insufficient. Statutory notice issued to the accused invoked no response. The amount remained unpaid and therefore, a complaint was filed.
Cognizance of the offence was taken by the trial court and summons was issued to the accused. On appearance of the accused, the particulars of the offence were read out to him, to which, he pleaded not guilty. Evidence consists of the testimony of PW1 and documents marked as Exts.P1 to P6 from the side of the complainant. After close of the complainant''s evidence, the accused was questioned under 313 Cr.P.C. He denied all the incriminating circumstances brought out in evidence against him and maintained that he is innocent. The accused examined DW1 in support of his defence.
The trial court on an appreciation of the evidence, came to the conclusion that the evidence adduced by the accused is not sufficient to establish the defence set up by him. Accordingly, the conviction and sentence as already mentioned followed. In appeal, though the conviction was confirmed, the sentence was modified.
The learned counsel for the revision petitioner pointed out that Ext.D1 is a receipt which is admitted by the complainant and if that be so, proceedings u/s 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, cannot lie. The complainant has given evidence as PW1. In her chief examination, she has deposed that the accused received Rs. 25,000/- from her promising to arrange visa for her for going abroad. As the accused could not arrange the visa as agreed, the complainant demanded back the money paid by her. Thereupon, the accused gave her a cheque for Rs. 21,500/- which, on presentation, bounced with the endorsement funds not sufficient.
The accused denied of having received any money from the complainant and claimed that he had no transaction with the complainant. He produced Ext.D1 receipt issued by him in favor of one M.A. Kalam and it is stated therein that she had received a cheque as security for the payment of the amount due to her from the accused. But no evidence was adduced by the accused to show that the cheque was issued by him on behalf of a third person.
The issuance of the cheque is admitted. There is no suggestion to the complainant that the particulars in the cheque were filled up by her. Further, both the courts below have taken note of Ext.D1 and have held that it is sufficient to show that there were transactions between the complainant and the accused. It is an admitted fact that the accused had received a statutory notice from the complainant. If he had a case that he had not issued any cheque to the complainant, he would have utilised the first opportunity to respond to the notice. His silence shows his culpability. It was the above facts and circumstances that had persuaded the courts below to come to the conclusion that the offence has been made out against the accused. The findings are based on appreciation of evidence. There is nothing to show that the findings are either perverse nor unwarranted by the evidence on record, warranting interference under the revisional jurisdiction. The revision petition is only to be dismissed.
Faced with the above situation, the learned counsel for the revision petitioner submitted that he may be granted some time to pay the compensation amount to ward off the default clause as imposed by the lower appellate court.
Considering the facts and circumstances of the case and also the willingness expressed by the revision petitioner to pay the compensation amount, he is granted two months'' time from today to pay the compensation amount as ordered by the appellate court, failing which the default clause imposed by the appellate court will take effect.