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Judgment
Jaswant Singh, J.
(1) The petitioner was employed as a Store Keeper by the Kashmir Peoples Cooperative Society Ltd. a Society registered under the Jammu and
Kashmir Cooperative Societies Act, I960, herein after referred to as ""The Act"". By order No. 754 dated August 5, 1971, passed by the
Administrator (Manager) of the Society the petitioner was discharged from service for fraudulent sale of a truck load of Ammonium Sulphate and
issue of a fictitious challan to cover up the transaction. Aggrieved by this order the petitioner filed before this court on October 30, 1971, a writ
petition, being writ petition No. 120 of 1971, under Section 103 read with Section 126 of the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir, challenging the
said order on the ground that it had been passed in contravention of the bye laws framed by the Society governing the conditions of his service as
also in violation of Section 126 of the Constitution and the rules of natural justice.
(2) The petition came up for hearing before Mufti BahaudDin Farooqi J. On a preliminary objection being taken by the respondent to the effect
that as the aforesaid Society neither fell within the definition of ""State"" as given in Article 12 of the Constitution of India nor was it a statutory body
nor could it issue any direction the disobedience of which could be punishable as criminal offence, no writ could be issued against it, the learned
Judge, framed the following two questions J
(1) Whether a Cooperative Society registered under the Cooperative Societies Act, is amenable to the jurisdiction of this court under Article 226
of the Constitution of India.
(2) In case, the first question is replied in affirmative, whether a writ can be issued for violation of byelaws of the Society governing the conditions
of service of its employees.
and requested the Hon'ble Chief Justice to constitute a Special Bench for determination thereof. This is how the matter is before us.
(3) For a proper determination of the first question, it is necessary to refer to a few provisions of the Constitution Section 103 of the Constitution
of Jammu and Kashmir runs thus :
'The High Court shall have power to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases any government within the State, directions,
orders, or writs, in the nature of Habeas Corpus, mandamus, prohibitions, quo warranto and certiorari, or any of them, for any purpose other than
these mentioned in clause (2A) of Article 32 of the Constitution of India.
(4) The word ''State"" has been defined in Section 11 of the Constitution as including the Government and the Legislature of the State and all local
or other authorities within the territory of the State or under the control of the Government of the State.
(5) Article 226 of the Constitution of India which corresponds to Section 103 of the State Constitution and has been made applicable to our State
vide C. O. No. 89 dated August 24, 1971, runs thus :
226 (1) Notwithstanding anything in Article 32, every High Court shall have power, throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises,
jurisdiction to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases any Government, within those territories directions, orders, or writs,
including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, or any of them, for the enforcement of any of
the rights conferred by Part III and for any other purpose (lA) The power conferred by clause (1) to issue directions, orders or writs to any
Government, authority or person may also he exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which the cause
of action wholly or in part, arises for the exercise of such power, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of
such person is not within those territories.
(2) The power conferred on a High Court by clause (I) or clause (lA) shall not be in derogation of the power conferred on the Supreme Court by
clause (2) of Article 32"".
(6) The expression ""The State"" has been defined in Article 12 of the Constitution of India as including the Government and Parliament of India and
the Government and the Legislature of each of the States and all local or other authorities within the territory of India or under the control of the
Government of India.
(7) Although the phraseology of Section 103 of the State Constitution and the corresponding Article 226 of the Constitution of India, appears to
be wide, there has been a lot of divergence of judicial opinion regarding the scope and ambit of
(8) In re Gaeda Nagabhushana Reddi and another, AIR 1951 Madras, 249, it was pointed out that a writ is available only against inferior courts,
tribunals and bodies entrusted by law with powers to affect the rights of parties and not to private organizations, however, widespread and
powerful they might be.
(9) In Carlsbad Mineral Water Mfg. Co. Ltd V. H M Jagtiani. AIR 1952 Calcutta, 315, and Firm AL. AR. Arunachalam Chattiar and ors, vs.
Kaleeswarar Mills Ltd. Coimbatore and ors, AIR 1957 Madras, 309, it was held that in spite of the apparently very wide language of Article 226
of the Constitution, it must be remembered that the High Court can issue writs only to such persons or authorities to whom according to well
established principles writs could issue.
(10) In Smt Ujjam Bai v State of Uttar Pradesh and another, AIR 1962 Supreme Court, 1621, Ayyangar J observed :
''Again Article 12 winds up the list of authorities falling within the definition by referring to ""other authorities"" within the territory of India which
cannot obviously be read as ejusdem generis with either the Government and the Legislatures or local authorities. The words are of wide amplitude
and capable of comprehending every authority created under a statute and functioning within the territory of India. There is no characterisation of
the nature of the ""authority"" in this residuary clause and consequently it must include every type of authority set up under a statute for the purpose
of administering laws enacted by the Parliament or by the State including those vested with the duty to make decisions in order to implement those
laws''.
(11) In Lekh Raj v. Deputy Custodian, Bom. AIR 1966 Supreme Court, 334, it was held that mandamus lay only against a public officer in
respect of statutory duty.
(12) In Rajasthan State Electricity Board, Jaipur V. Mohan Lal and others, AIR 1967 Supreme Court, 1857, it was held that Electricity Board
was an authority within the meaning of Article 12 and that fundamental conception of authority"" is that there is in it a power to constitute, control,
and compel its obedience either by enforcing the same or by punishing disobedience, Their Lordships further held that the Electricity Board had
such power while administering the law framed by the Parliament and, therefore, it fell within the meaning of Article 12.
(13) It will be advantageous at this stage to refer to what was said in Rajasthan State Electricity Board, Jaipur v. Mohan Lal and ors (Supra) by
Bhargava J speaking for himself, K. Subha Rao CJ, J. M. Shelat, and G K. Mitter JJ :
These decisions (Smt. Ujjam Bai v State of Uttar Pradesh, 1963SCR778=(AIR 1962 SC 1621, K. S. Ramamurthy Rediar v. The Chief
Commissioner, Pondichery, 19641 SCR 656=SC 1464) of the court support cur view that the expression ""other authorities"" in Art. 12 will include
all constitutional or statutory authorities on whom powers are conferred by law. It is not at all material that some of the powers conferred may be
for the purpose of carrying on commercial activities. Under the Constitution the State is itself envisaged as having the right to carry on trade or
business as mentioned in Art. 19 (1) (g). In Part IV the State has been given the same meaning as in Art 12 and one of the Directive Principles laid
down in Art. 46 is that the State shall promote with special care the educational and economic interests of the weaker sections of the people. The
State, as defined in Art. 12 is thus comprehended to include bodies created for the purpose of promoting the educational and economic interests of
the people. The state, as constituted by our constitution, is further specifically empowered under Article 298 to carry on any trade or business. The
circumstance that the Board under the Electric Supply Act is required to carry on some activities of the nature of trade or commerce does not,
therefore, give any indication that the Board must be excluded from the scope of the word ""State"" as used in Art. 12. On the other hand, there are
provisions in the Electricity Supply Act, which clearly show that the powers conferred on the Board include power to give directions, the
disobedience of which is punishable as a criminal offence. In these circumstances we do not consider it all necessary to examine the cases cited by
Mr. Desai to urge before us that the Board cannot be held to be an agent or instrument of the Government. The Board was clearly an authority to
which the provisions of Part III of the Constitution were applicable.
(14) It will also be useful to refer to the following observations made in the above noted case by Shah J :
The Board is an authority invested by a statute with certain sovereign power of the State. It has the power of promoting coordinate, development,
generation, supply and distribution of electricity and for that purpose to make, alter, amend, and carry out schemes under Chapter V of the
Electricity Supply Act, 1948, to engage in certain incidental undertakings.
The Board is also invested by statutes with extensive powers of control over electricity undertakings. The power to make rules and regulations and
to administer the Act is in substance the sovereign power of the State delegated to the Board. The Board is thus an ""other authority"" within the
meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution.
(15) Every constitutional or statutory authority on whom powers are conferred by law is, however, not 'other authority* within the meaning of
Article 12. The expression ""authority"" in its etymological sense means a body invested with power to command or give an ultimate decision or
enforce obedience, or having a legal right to command and be obeyed.
(16) In determining what the expression ''other authority'' in Article 12 connote?, regard must be had not only to the sweep of fundamental rights
over the power of the authority, but also to the restrictions which may be imposed upon the exercise of certain fundamental rights (e. g these
declared by Article 19) by the authority. Fundamental rights within their allotted fields transcend the Legislative and executive power of the
sovereign authority. But some of the important rights are liable to be circumscribed by the imposition of reasonable restrictions by the State. The
true content of the expression ""other authority"" in Article 12 must be determined in the rights. In considering whether a statutory or constitutional
body is an authority within the meaning of Article 12 it would be necessary to bear in mind not only whether against the authority, fundamental
rights in terms absolute are intended to be enforced, but also whether it was intended by the Constitution makers that the authority was invested
with sovereign powers to impose restrictions on very important and basic fundamental freedoms.
(17) Those authorities which are invested with sovereign power i. e. powers to make rules or regulations and to administer or enforce them to the
detriment of citizens and others, fall within the definition of State in Art. 12 and constitutional or statutory bodies which do not share that sovereign
power of the State, are not, State, within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution.''
(18) Applying the test laid down by the Supreme Court in Rajasthan State Electricity Board, Jaipur V. Mohan Lai and ors. (supra) the Bombay
High Court in Parmodrai Shamaldas Bhavsar v. Life Insurance Corporation of India, AIR 1969 Bombay, 337, held :
The expression ""other authorities"" in Art 12 will include all constitutional or statutory authorities on whom powers are conferred bylaw. It is not at
all material that some of the powers conferred may be for the purpose of carrying on commercial activities. It must include every type of authority
set up under a statute for the purpose of administering laws enacted by the Parliament or by the State including those vested with the duty to make
decisions in order to implement those laws.
(19) The Bench of the Bombay High Court further observed 5
The Life Insurance Corporation of India is a statutory corporate body created under the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. On a perusal of
the provisions of the Act, it is clear that its activity is only business activity and it possesses no power which in any manner can be exercised to
affect activities of other citizens. It is not concerned with implementing any law which affects in any manner any member of the public. The
prohibition for any private agency to do the same business is not by reason of any order that is made by the Life Insurance Corporation but by
reason of the statute itself. It is purely autonomous business body as any other private company except that the initial capital of five crores of
rupees is supplied by the Central Government. It employs servants as any private business does and enforces discipline amongst its servants as that
house Hence the Life Insurance Corporation of India does not fall within the expression ""other authorities"" in Art 12 and is not a State within the
meaning of Art 12 of the Constitution.
(20) Following the principles laid down in Rajasthan State Electricity Board, Jaipur, v. Mohan Lai and others (supra) a Full Bench of this court in
Shri Aftab Ram and others v. The State of Jammu and Kashmir and ors, 1972 J&K Law Reporter, 25, refused to issue writ against the Jammu
and Kashmir Industries (P) Ltd. Srinagar, or its Managing Director or any other officer of the company holding :
Whether or not a writ lies against a corporation or a Government Undertaking even if the Government owns the Undertaking or Corporation
completely.
In order to categorise any person or (authority within Article 12 of the Constitution the authority must be a statutory authority, must be set up under
a statute with powers which include power ions, the disobedience of which is punishable as a criminal offence. If these two ingredients are wanting
an authority cannot be construed as an ''authority'' for the purpose of Article 12.
No writ can issue against Corporations, Bodies or Associations, Individuals or Limited companies and Companies which are not created under
some statute and are not invested with powers to issue directions the violation of which would amount to a criminal offence or unless they partake
something of the sovereign powers of the State.
(21) Then came another landmark decision in Praga Tool Corporation v. C. B. Imanual, AIR 1969 Supreme Court, 1306, where it was held that
in case of a Company which is a nonstatutory body and one incorporated under the Companies Act, there was neither a statutory nor a public duty
imposed on it by a statute in respect of which enforcement could be sought by means of a mandamus, nor was there in its workmen any
corresponding legal right for enforcement of any such statutory or public duty and that no writ petition for a mandamus or an order in the nature of
a mandamus could lie against a company,
(22) In R. V. Disputed Committee of Dental Technicians 19531 AE LR Lord Goddard CJ described thus the class of bodies to which the
prerogative writs issue :
The bodies to which in modern times the remedies of these prerogative writs have been applied are all statutory bodies on whom the parliament
has conferred statutory powers and duties the exercise of which may lead to the detriment of subjects.
In Executive Committee of U. P. State Warehousing Corporation Lucknow v. Chandra Kiran Tyagi, AIR 1970 Supreme Court, 1244, it was held
that the High Court has jurisdiction to declare the decision of a statutory body given in violation of a mandatory statutory obligation relating to
dismissal of a servant as ultra viresand void.
(23) In Vidya Ram V. S J. N. College, AIR 1972 SC 1450, it was observed :
In order that the third exception to the general rule that no writ will lie to quash an order determining the contract of service albeit illegally as stated
in AIR 1964 SC 188U might apply, it is necessary that the order must be the order of a Statutory body in breach of a mandatory obligation
imposed by a statute.
(24) The position that emerges from a review of the above noted decisions is that in order that a writ can issue to an authority it must be
ascertained whether the authority is a statutory one i e. created by a statute.
(25) Let us now proceed to find out whether a Cooperative Society is a statutory body. There is no provision in the Act to show that a
Cooperative Society is a creature of the Act. Section 4 of the Act enables a Cooperative Society which has as its objects the promotion of the
economic interests of its members in accordance with Cooperative Principles, or which is established with the object of facilitating the operation of
such a society to be registered if it conforms to the requirements of Section 6 of the Act. Section 9 of the Act renders a Cooperative Society after
registration a body corporate.
(26) In Ram Nath Sharma v. Madhya Bharat, AIR 1959 M. P. 218, it was held:
There are on the other hand, a number of Banks or banking or commercial corporations not created by statute, but incorporated or registered
under it, and such rules and regulations as might be made under it......if they (the controlling authorities) abuse their powers or violate any provision
of the law the aggrieved corporation can seek a remedy by way of a writ, but the employee or a third party contracting with the corporation cannot
seek the remedy of a writ against it, because the offending corporation is not State as defined in Art 12 of the Constitution and exercises no public
functions.
(27) Agreeing with the observations in Ram Nath sharma vs. Madhya Bharat (Supra) S Velu Pillai J. held in Arumugham v. Kadalundy
Cooperative Urban Bank and another, AIR 1961 Kerala, 123 that a body which is a creature of the statute, such as the university under the
Kerala University Act, is different from a body which is registered in pursuance of a statute or is recognised by it and that a cooperative Bank is
not a statutory body but is only a banking corporation registered under the Act and an employee like the petitioner whose relations with such
corporation are governed by the contract of employment cannot seek remedy under Article 226. His remedy consists in invoking the ordinary civil
jurisdiction to enforce his rights under the contract.
(28) In Re V S Hariharan AIR 1960 Andhra Pradesh, 518, it was held that the fact that the Government of India subscribed 80% of the share
capital of the public Ltd. Company registered under Companies Act, that 10% of its Directors were nominated by the Government of India and
that large subsides and advances were given by the Union Government from out of the Shipping Development Fund and, therefore, the
Government of India had an administrative control and authority over the company would not make any difference to the jural character of the
company which was still a Limited liability company and could in no sense be called a public or statutory authority.
(29) In Moti Lal Dhar v. The Managing Director J&K Minerals, 1967 Kashmir Law Journal 434, it was held that the respondent company which
was a limited company was not amenable to the writ jurisdiction of the court.
(30) In AIR 1^69 Calcutta, 525, it was held that Council of Scientific and Industrial Research, a Society registered under the Societies
Registration Act, is not amenable to writ jurisdiction.
(31) Again in 1971 All L J. 840 (841) it was held that writ cannot be issued to private bodies or organisations like cooperative societies.
(32) In the Industrial Finance Corporation of India, New Delhi, v Delhi Administration and ors. 1973 (2) S. L. R. 462, a Full Bench of the Delhi
High Court held that the mere fact that body is constituted by a Statute cannot be regarded as ""Authority"" and hence ""State'' within meaning of
Article 12 The body would, however, be regarded as Authority, hence State if it is an agent of Government or has been set up for administering
law enacted by Legislature. The tests laid down in this decision are also not satisfied in the present case.
(33) There can, therefore, be no manner of doubt, that a Cooperative Society, though it possesses a corporate character, cannot be regarded as a
statutory authority.
(34) I am not unaware of the two decisions in Dukhooram Gupta Hari Prasad Gupta v. Co. operative Agricultural Association Ltd. Kawardha and
ors. AIR 196l Madhya Pradesh, 289, and Madan Mohan Sen Gupta and another v. State of West Bengal and ors, AIR 1966 Calcutta, 23, where
it was held that a cooperative society registered under the Cooperative Societies Act being an authority or a body of persons having the power of
framing by laws and whose affairs and activities are entirely controlled by the Registrar of the Cooperative Societies who is a public authority, is
amenable to the writ jurisdiction. It must, however, be remembered that these decisions were rendered before the decisions of the Supreme Court
in Rajasthan State Electricity Board, Jaipur v Mohan Lal and ors. AIR 1967 SC 1257, Praga Tool Corporation v. C. B. Imanual AIR 1969 SC
1306, Executive Committee of U P State Warehousing Corporation, Lucknow v. Chandra Kiran Tyagi, AIR 1970 SC 1244, and Vidya Ram v.
S. J. N. College, AIR 1972 SC 1450 and as such their soundness is open to grave doubt.
(35) Even assuming that a Cooperative Society is amenable to the writ jurisdiction of the High Court, a writ against it will not lie unless it is
established that it has acted in violation of a mandatory obligation imposed by a statute.
(36) This takes me to the consideration of the 2nd Question namely whether a writ can be issued for violation of byelaws of the Society governing
the conditions of service of its employees.
(37) Section 124 (c) of the Act read with Rule 5 (2) (e) of the Act, no doubt, enables a Cooperative Society to make byelaws regulating the
conditions of service of its paid officers and employees, but the byelaws are merely regulations and have no statutory force. In Aiunugham v.
Kadalundy Cooperative Urban Bank and anr, AIR 1961 Kerala, 123, (Supra) it was held that byelaws framed by the respondent Cooperative
Bank cannot be regarded as having statutory force merely because the provisions of the Madras Cooperative Societies Act, (6 of 1952) enable
such byelaws to be framed, It was further held therein' that notwithstanding registration of a Bank under the Act the byelaws remain at bye laws of
the corporation and even though the bye laws may have been violated in holding the disciplinary enquiry, the petitioner cannot avail himself of the
remedy under Article 226. Expressing similar view, a Bench of the Madras High Court held in C. Lakshimiah Reddiar v. The Shri Perumbadur
Taluk Cooperative Marketing Society Ltd. AIR 1962 Madras' 169, that the regulations framed by the respondent society itself had no statutory
force. Even in Dukhooiam Gupta Hari Prasad Gupta v. Cooperative Agricultural Association Ltd. Kawardha and ors, AIR 1Q61 Madhya
Pradesh 289, (supra) the learned Judges consisting the Division Bench recognized that statutory rules and byelaws differ in important aspects and
that the rule framed under a Statute is a part of the Statute while the byelaws are not
(38) In Executive Committee of U. P. State Warehousing Corporation Lucknow v. Chandra Kiran Tyagi AIR 1970 Supreme Court 1244,
(Supra) their Lordships of the Supreme Court, while setting out the third exception to the common law rule that no declaration to enforce a
contract of personal service will be normally granted held, after an exhaustive review of the judicial decisions, that noncompliance with regulations
framed by the appellant corporation would not amount to a breach of mandatory obligation imposed by the statute. It will be advantageous in this
connection to refer to the following observations occurring in the judgment of their Lordships :
Mr. S T. Desai pointed out that by the appellant conducting an enquiry and passing an order of dismissal in violation of regulation 16 (3) it cannot
be stated that it has acted in breach of any mandatory provision of the Act resulting in the order being declared as void or ultravires. The
noncompliance with the regulations, at the most; will result in the order of dismissal being wrongful attracting the normal rule in such matters of
making the appellant liable for damages.
(39) That the byelaws governing the conditions of service of employees of a society have no statutory force will also be evident from a perusal of
the decision, of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Anand Krishna Purohit v. Board of Governors, Regional Engineering College, Kurukshetra,
and others 1972 S. L R. 597.
(40) It is, therefore, manifest that the byej laws or regulations cannot be said to have a statutory force.
(41) The following passages occurring in the judgment repotted in AIR 1970 SC 1244 are also very helpful in the determination of the second
question.
From a review of the English decisions, referred to above, the position emerges as follows: The law relating to master and servant is clear. A
contract for personal service will not be enforced by an order for specific performance nor will it be open for a servant to refuse to accept 'the
repudiation of a contract of service by his master and say that the contract has never been terminated. The remedy of the employee is a claim for
damages for wrongful dismissal or for breach of contract. This is the normal rule and that was applied in Barbar's case, 19581 All ER 322 and
Francis, case, 19623 All ER 633 But when a statutory status is given to an employee and there has been a violation of the provisions of the statute
while terminating the services of such an employee, the latter will be eligible to get the relief of a declaration that the order is null and void and that
he continues to be in service, as it will not then be a mere case of a master terminating the service of a servant. This was the position in Vine's case,
19563 All ER 939.
X X X X
X X X X
(42) The jurisdiction of the courts to grant a declaration in a particular case that an order of dismissal is void and that the dismissed employee
continues, to remain in service, again came up for consideration before this court in S. R. Tewari V. District Board Agra, 19643 SCR 55= (AIR
1964 SC 1680) In that case the appellant's service as an Engineer under the District Board, Agra, was terminated by the latter, after giving salary
for three months in lieu of notice, The appellant after having unsuccessfully appealed against the order of termination to the State Government
initiated proceedings under Article 226 before the Allahabad High Court for a writ of certiorari for quashing the order of the District Board
dismissing him from service and also sought a writ in the nature of mandamus commanding the District Board and the State of Uttar Pradesh to
treat him as the lawfully appointed engineer, and not to give effect to the order terminating his service. The High Court dismissed the writ petition
holding that the employee had been properly dismissed from service. The employee came up to this court in appeal. On behalf of the District
Board, the respondent therein, it was contended that the remedy of the appellant, if any was only to institute a suit for damages for wrongful
termination of employment and that he was not entitled to pray for a declaration that the termination of employment was unlawful and a
consequential order for restoration in service. The decision in Dr. Dutt's case, 1959 SCR 1236=(AIR 1958 SC 1059) among other decisions was
relied on in support of this contention, This court negatived that contention and stated the position in law as follows:
Under the common law the court will not ordinarily force an employer to retain the services of anemployee whom he no longer wishes to employ.
But this rule is subject to certain well recognised exceptions. It is open to the courts in an appropriate case to declare that a public servant who is
dismissed from service in contravention of Article 311 continues to remain in service, even though by so doing the State is in effect forced to
continue to employ the servant whom it does not desire to employ. Similarly under the industrial law, jurisdiction of the labour and industrial
tribunals to compel the employer to employ a worker whom he does not desire to employ, is recognized. The courts are also invested with the
power to declare invalid the act of a statutory body, if by doing the act the body has acted in breach of a mandatory obligation imposed by a
statute, even, if by making the declaration the body is compelled to do something which it does not desire to do.
(43) Vine's case 19583 All ER 939, which was relied on before the court was distinguished on the ground that the purported order of dismissal
therein which was set aside was a nullity since the local Board in that case had no power to delegate its disciplinary function. Again decision in Dr
Dutt's case, 1959 SCR 12^6=(AIR 1958 SC 1050) was stated to be not a case in which the invalidity of an act done by the university on the
grounds that it infringed a statutory provision fell to be determined and the rights and obligations of the parties rested in contract and therefore the
award was declared to be one contrary to the rule contained in Section 21 (b) of the Specific Relief Act and hence void, This court wound up the
discussion in Tewari's case 19643 S. C. R. 55= AIR 1964 S C, 1680 as follows at p. 62 (of SCR)=(at p 1633 of AIR),
The jurisdiction to declare the decision of the Board as ultravires exists though it may be exercised only when the court is satisfied that departure is
called for from the rule that a contract of service will not ordinarily be specifically enforced.
(44) On facts, this court held that the order of dismissal of the appellant before them was proper and justified
(45) From the two decisions of this court referred to above, the position in law is that no declaration to enforce a contract of personal service will
be normally granted. But there are certain well recognized exceptions to this rule and they are : To grant such a declaration in appropriate cases
regarding (1) a public servant, who has been dismissed from service in contravention of Article 311 (2) Reinstatement of a dismissed worker under
Industrial Law by Labour or Industrial Law by Labour or Industrial Tribunals, (3) A statutory body when it has acted in breach of a mandatory
obligation, imposed by statute.
(46) I am, therefore, clearly of the view that a writ cannot be issued for violation of byelaws of the Society governing the conditions of service of its
employees.
(47) In the result, the questions referred to this Bench are answered as indicated above.
(48) The case will now go back to the learned Single Judge for disposal according to law.