Abdul Rasheed and Others vs Abdul Lateef and Others

P.S. Narayana, J.—This Civil Revision Petition is filed by the unsuccessful tenant in R.A.No.296/97 on the file of Chief Judge, City Small Causes Court at Hyderabad, reversing the order made in R.C.No.256/95 on the file of II Additional Rent Controller, Hyderabad.

The facts in nutshell are that the respondent is the owner and the landlord of petition schedule premises and the Revision Petitioner is the tenant. The rent is Rs.550/- per month exclusive of electricity charges and the tenancy is oral and the respondent-landlord requires the premises for his second son for running job-work center in typewriting and they are not in possession of any other mulgi and by way of an amendment the requirement of the 3rd and the 4th sons also was pleaded by the respondent-landlord. The Revision Petitioner-tenant admitted the tenancy, but denied the tenancy being oral and had stated that he is not aware whether the respondent-landlord is the exclusive owner of the schedule premises. The Revision Petitioner further had stated in his counter that originally the father of the respondent let-out the schedule premises to him in 1951 and he has been in possession of the premises as tenant and the rental receipts issued also go to show that Muralidhar, Yadaiah, Mahesh, Madhavaiah and the respondent are the signatories. The Revision Petitioner also had specifically denied about the bonafide personal requirement of the premises by the respondent. In the light of the respective pleadings, the Rent Controller had framed the following points:

Whether a co-sharer can maintain the eviction petition on the ground of bonafide requirement of the premises.

Whether the petitioner bona fide requires the schedule premises for his sons to run typewriting institute-cum-job work center in the schedule premises.

To what relief ?

3.The respondent-landlord had examined himself as PW-1 and also examined his second son as PW-2 and third son as PW-3 and had marked Exs.P-1 to Petitioner-9. The Revision Petitioner had examined himself as RW-1 and his son as RW-2 and Exs.R-1 to Respondent-23 were marked. The learned Rent Controller placing reliance on DAMODARAM CHETTI Vs. VUNGARALA RUKMANIAMMA 1, S.SARVAIAH Vs. PRABHAVATHI 2, VASANT RAO ANKILKAR Vs. NALINI BAI JOSHI 3 had arrived at a conclusion that the respondent on his own claiming to be the exclusive owner, cannot maintain the eviction petition. The learned Rent Controller while answering Point No.2 also had arrived at the conclusion that the personal requirement pleaded by the respondent is not bonafide. Aggrieved by the same, the landlord filed R.A.No.296/97 on the file of Chief Judge, City Small Causes Court at Hyderabad and the learned Judge had framed only one point for consideration :

"Whether the requirement of the petitioner of the demised premises is bonafide ?".

The learned appellate authority in paragraphs 8 to 13 after a detailed discussion of the evidence available on record placing reliance on SARLA AHUJA Vs. UNITED INDIA INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED 4, came to the conclusion that the requirement of the landlord is bonafide and accordingly allowed the appeal and aggrieved by the same, the tenant filed the present Revision.

Smt.Jayasree Sarathy, the learned counsel while making her submissions on behalf of the Revision Petitioner-tenant had submitted that the premises itself is a very small premises i.e., 10'' x 10'' sq.ft and since a specific stand was taken that he respondent is not the exclusive owner of the petition schedule premises and inasmuch as he had not established that he is the exclusive owner, the learned Rent Controller had recorded a specific finding in this regard and this aspect of the matter was left untouched by the appellate authority. The learned counsel had strenuously contended that framing of points for consideration by the appellate authority even in a rent control proceeding is mandatory and in the absence of framing such points or non-framing of important points, which had been answered by the Court of first instance, will definitely vitiate the Judgment and the impugned order is liable to be set aside on this ground alone. The learned counsel also submitted that it is no doubt true that there is no specific denial of landlord and tenant relationship, but the stand taken by the Revision Petitioner is clear that he was inducted into possession by the father of the respondent and at any rate the respondent is not the exclusive owner of the petition schedule premises. In the light of this stand, the appellate authority ought to have framed a point on this aspect also and should have answered on the aspect of maintainability of the eviction petition and for reasons best known, the appellate authority had not adverted to this aspect of the matter at all. The learned counsel also had contended that Ex.P-4 notice was issued by the respondent, but even without waiting for the reply by the Revision Petitioner, he had rushed to the Court on the ground of personal requirement. The learned counsel also had further contended that in view of Order 41 Rule 31 C.P.C. the appellate authority should have considered the first point decided by the Rent Controller and total omission of consideration of Point No.1 by the appellate authority is bad in law.

Sri Bakshi, the learned counsel representing the respondent-landlord had contended that a Rent Control proceeding is only a summary proceeding and in the light of the clear language of Section 20 of A.P.Buildings (Lease, Rent & Eviction) Control Act, for short hereinafter called the "Act", it cannot be said that the non-compliance of Order 41 Rule 31 C.P.C. i.e., framing of Points for consideration, will be fatal. The learned counsel also submitted that a co-owner can definitely maintain an eviction petition. Apart from it, there is no specific denial of the jural relationship of landlord and tenant in the counter and a mere vague denial is of no consequence. The learned counsel had placed reliance on SMT.KANTA GOEL Vs. B.P. PATHAK 5, K.LAKSHMANRAO Vs. GULAM HABEEB KHAN 6 and JAGDISH Pd. Vs. STATE OF U.P. 7. The learned counsel also submitted that in the decision referred (6) supra, the decision referred (1) supra also was referred to. Apart from it when there is no objection by the other co-owners, a co-owner can definitely maintain the eviction petition and this position is clear in view of the ratio laid down in the decision (5) supra. The learned counsel also had submitted that in view of subsequent events the personal requirement of the landlord is really bonafide. The learned counsel also had drawn my attention to the definition of "landlord" under the Act.

Heard both the counsel. It is no doubt true that the appellate authority had not specifically dealt with the first point framed by the Rent Controller relating to the maintainability of the eviction petition by a co-owner. At this juncture itself it may be stated that the denial, even in the counter, is a vague denial. No clear and specific stand had been taken by the Revision Petitioner-tenant. However, it had been pleaded that the landlord is not the exclusive owner. A person who receives rent also falls within the definition of "landlord" u/s 2(vi) of the Act. In the light of the fact that there is no specific denial relating to the jural relationship, the appellate authority had proceeded to decide the matter on the ground that there is no dispute relating to the relationship of "landlord" and "tenant". This aspect of the matter was stressed by the learned counsel representing the petitioner. For this purpose only, strong reliance was placed on Order 41 Rule 31 C.P.C. to framing of points for consideration by the appellate authority. It is needless to say that a rent control proceeding is a summary proceeding and Section 20 of the Act deals with appeal. Sub-sections (1) to (3), the Explanation and Sub-section (4) of Section 20 of the Act clearly specify the procedure to be followed by the appellate authority. It is no doubt true that certain provisions of the CPC which may not be in conflict with the provisions of the Act or the Rules framed thereunder are made applicable to the rent control proceedings. Now, the question is whether it is mandatory on the part of the appellate authority to frame the points for consideration and whether the non-framing of the points for consideration vitiates the Judgment of the appellate authority. As already observed by me, the rent control proceeding is a summary proceeding. Section 20 of the Act deals with Appeal containing sub-sections (1) to (3), an Explanation and also sub-section (4).Section 20(3) of the Act reads:

"The appellate authority shall send for the records of the case from the Controller and after giving the parties an opportunity of being heard and, if necessary, after making such further inquiry as he thinks fit either personally or through the Controller, shall decide the appeal".

In view of this provision, what is contemplated is after giving the parties an opportunity of being heard and if necessary after making such further enquiry. In the light of this provision, if the appellate authority decides the matter after considering the material available on record, it cannot be said that the failure to frame the points for consideration will vitiate such Judgment of the appellate authority. If the appellate authority choses to follow such principle of framing points for consideration, it will be well within its authority, but at the same time it cannot be said to be mandatory, as far as the appellate authority under the Act dealing with appeals, is concerned. It is pertinent to note that the appellate authority is a persona-designata under the Act. Now coming to the facts on hand, it is no doubt true that as already stated the first point framed by the learned Rent Controller had been left untouched by the appellate authority. Evidently , the appellate authority felt that the point framed by him alone falls for consideration and had discussed the oral and documentary evidence in detail at paragraphs 8 to 13 of the Judgment and had arrived at a conclusion that the personal requirement of the landlord is bonafide. It is no doubt true that in the decision referred (2) supra, it is held that the eviction petition by a co-sharer, without impleading the other co-sharers is not maintainable. But however in the decision (6) referred supra, it was held that the eviction petition by one co-sharer of a premises is maintainable even though the other co-owners do not join him. However, in view of the decision of the apex Court in the decision (5) referred supra, I am not inclined to deal with this aspect further inasmuch as the apex Court held that when a landlord who had let-out his premises to a tenant dies and his heirs succeed to his estate, one co-heir who receives the rent on behalf of the estate is landlord for the purpose of the Act. No doubt that was a case decided under the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, but the principle underlying the said decision is applicable even to the facts of the present case. Apart from this aspect, the evidence of PWs.1 to 3, PWs.2 and 3 being the sons of PW-1, is very clear on the aspect of bonafide personal requirement and the oral evidence had been clearly discussed by the appellate authority and had reversed the decision of the Rent Controller holding that the landlord is entitled for the relief of eviction. Hence, in the light of the foregoing discussion, I am of the considered opinion that the appellate authority, though had not specifically answered Point No.1, discussed by the Rent Controller, that by itself may not vitiate the order of the appellate authority in view of the detailed discussion relating to the appreciation of facts and in the light of the ratio laid down by the apex Court in this regard. Hence, I am of the opinion that the order of the appellate authority does not suffer from any legal infirmity and hence while exercising revisional jurisdiction u/s 22 of the Act, such order of the appellate authority does not warrant any interference.

In the result, the Civil Revision Petition is devoid of merits and accordingly the same is dismissed. Taking into consideration the fact that the Revision Petitioner-tenant has been occupying the premises from a long time and has been doing business, six months time is given for vacating the premises on payment of usual rent. No costs.