Abdul Ravoof Sahib vs M. Kannappan and Another

Ramamurti, J.—This revision petition filed by the landlord arises out of proceedings filed by a tenant for restoration of possession u/s 4(5) of

the Madras Cultivating Tenants'' Protection Act, Madras Act XXIV of 1955 (referred to as the Act). The tenant''s case was that his father, as well

as himself, have been cultivating the lands on lease under the landlords, one of whom is the Petitioner in this civil revision petition, paying a rent of

Rs. 350 per year, that the rent was latterly being collected by one Abdul Latheef Sahib, the brother-in-law of the landlords and that the tenant was

dispossessed forcibly from the lands on 22nd March 1963 by one Chinnaraju Gounder along with his partymen, and that the latter harvested the

standing crops in the field and also set fire to a portion of the sugarcane crops. The application for restoration was filed on 3rd April 1963. But

even before this application was filed the landlords appear to have leased the properties in favour of Chinnaraju Gounder and Rama Gounder on

16th March 1963 under a registered lease deed exhibit B-1, dated 16th March 1963.

The landlords resisted the application for restoration of possession on the ground that the Petitioner before the Revenue Divisional Officer, the

first Respondent herein, was never their cultivating tenant, that he was never in possession of the lands, which they themselves were cultivating for

the past six or seven years and that they had leased the properties to Chinnaraju Gounder and Rama Gounder. They also denied that Abdul

Latheef Sahib was an agent working under them.

On a consideration of the oral and the documentary evidence, consisting of receipts and money order receipts, the evidence of the karnam and

other residents of the village, the Revenue Divisional Officer came to the conclusion that the first Respondent herein (the Petitioner before him) was

a cultivating tenant under the landlords for several years, and that Abdul Latheef Sahib, the brother-in-law of the landlords was also acting as their

agent collecting rents from the tenant. The attempt of the landlords either to deny the payments made by the tenant or to connect it as rent towards

some other lands failed as totally false. One of the landlords has preferred the above civil revision petition.

I have no hesitation in accepting the conclusions and findings of the Revenue Divisional Officer. The findings are supported by ample oral and

documentary evidence and the record shows that the landlords and their partymen have assumed a high handed attitude in trying to take forcible

possession of the lands. They have taken the law into their own hands ignoring altogether the rights of the Respondent as a cultivating tenant when

he has been paying the agreed rent regularly without any default.

Mr. K.S. Naidu, learned Counsel for the Petitioner, contended that even on these findings of the Revenue Divisional Officer the petition for

restoration should have been dismissed when once it was found that the lessors have parted with possession under the lease deed, exhibit B-l, and

the lessees thereunder have not been made parties to the proceedings for restoration. I am unable to agree with this contention.

Section 4 gives the right and provides the machinery for a tenant to secure possession of his holding from which he has been wrongfully

dispossessed. Sections 4(1), (2), (3) and (4) deal with a situation where the dispossession j has taken place prior to the commencement of the Act

before 1st December 1953. Section 4(4) provides that a reasonable opportunity shall be given to the landlord and the cultivating tenant, if any, in

possession of the land, to make their representations in regard to the application for restoration of possession filed by the erstwhile tenant. But this

necessity for giving notice to the cultivating tenant who has been inducted into the land by the landlord subsequent to the dispossession of a prior

tenant would not apply where the dispossession had taken place after the commencement of the Act. Section 4(5) provides that the provisions of

Section 4(4) shall, so far as may be, apply to an application for restoration of possession, where the dispossession had occurred after the

commencement of the Act. I am not inclined to accept the argument of learned Counsel for the Petitioner that the entire machinery of Section 4(4)

would apply to an application u/s 4(5). A careful perusal of the several sub-clauses in Section 4 shows that the Legislature has made a clear

distinction between a wrongful dispossession prior to the commencement of the Act and one subsequent thereto. In the former case there is

obvious need for making specific provision for giving opportunity to the subsequent lessee to make his representations as the Act retrospectively

applies to dispossession prior to the Act, and there may be cases of the landlord having leased the property before the prior tenant applies for

restoration. In other words, the rights of subsequent lessees should not be jeopardised without they being given an opportunity to make their

representations, as at the time of the leases in their favour there was no restriction on the right of the landlord, and it is only by the retrospective

operation of this particular provision of Section 4 that makes their title defeasible. It will, therefore, be seen that considerations which apply to

Section 4(1) read with Section 4(4) would not apply to a dispossession after the commencement of the Act governed by Section 4(5).

Learned Counsel for the Petitioner next urged that independently of Section 4(4) of the Act, the proceedings of the Revenue Divisional Officer

should be set aside as futile and without jurisdiction,, inasmuch as the property in question has passed into the hands of the subsequent lessees, and

there was no meaning nor purpose in passing an order for restoration as against the landlord. He urged that the persons who are really interested in

resisting an order for restoration of possession are the subsequent lessees, and they should have been impleaded as parties to the proceedings and

given an opportunity for resisting the application for restoration. I am unable to agree with this contention as it proceeds upon a misconception of

the nature of the derivative rights which have been created by the landlord in favour of the subsequent lessees. Both under the general law and

under the Rent Control Act it has been held that a decree or order for eviction obtained against the lessee could be straightaway enforced and

executed as against the sub-lessees, even though the latter were not made parties to the proceedings for eviction. In this connection reference may

be made to Order XXI, Rule 35, Code of Civil Procedure, which provides that where a decree has been passed in favour of a person for delivery

of immovable property, possession thereof may be delivered to that party or to any person appointed to receive delivery on his behalf and if

necessary by removing any person bound by the decree who refuses to vacate that property. The principle underlying this provision has been

applied to proceedings under the Rent Control Act.

In Yusuf v. Jyotishchandra Banerji (1931) ILR 59 Cal. 739, a Bench of the Calcutta High Court held that a sub-tenant of a lessee is not a

necessary party to a suit for ejectment brought by the superior landlord and that such a decree for ejectment on forfeiture or on determination of

the lease could be executed against the subtenants in actual possession of the premises as persons bound by the decree within the meaning of

Order XXI, Rule 35, Code of Civil Procedure. It was observed that it would be highly unreasonable to force a landlord to implead in the suit for

ejectment of the under-lessees or even persons under under-lessees who may be in actual possession and that if all those persons should be

impleaded in the suit the nature of the suit itself may change from a simple suit for ejectment into a complicated one on title. Suhrawardy J., put the

matter thus at page 741:

So far as the landlord is concerned, the possession is with his lessee. The possession of the lessee may be by his occupying the premises himself or

by his allowing other persons to occupy the premises on his behalf, either as sub-lessees or licensees or as servants. It would be most oppressive

to insist upon the landlord to make all such persons parties to a suit. For instance, in the case of a house in Calcutta, which is popularly called

''mansion'' or court there may be some 150 subtenants in occupation of different portions of it. The owner, if the view urged by the Petitioner is

accepted, will have to make all these persons parties in a suit for ejectment against the lessee. Take another common instance of a market or

bazaar held under lease. If the owner seeks possession of it by ejecting the lessee, it will be absurd to hold that he must make every squatter or

stall-holder party to the suit.

The principles-of this decision was applied and followed in a later Bench decision of the same Court in Sailendra Nath Bhattachrjee Vs. Bijan

Lal Chakravarty and Others, . In that case the Plaintiff filed a suit for declaration that a decree for possession obtained by the first Defendant in the

action against one Sarat Chandra Khan Bhaduri is not binding on the Plaintiff who claimed to be the sub-lessees of the latter. The question as to

when a person can be said to be a privy to an action in ejectment came up for consideration. It was held that nobody can represent an interest

which is already parted with, and that consequently a transferee prior to the institution of the suit cannot be privy to or bound by a judgment

obtained against the transferor and that the position may be different in the case of subordinate holders, i.e., persons whose right in possession is in

its very nature defeasible. It was held that if the interests of the subordinate holder is of such character that it is entirely dependent on that of the

superior holder and would automatically come to an end as soon as the superior interest is extinguished, the subordinate holder should be held a

privy to the judgment obtained against the superior holder even though he was not a party to the action. B.K. Mukherjea J., observed as follows at

page 292:

If the interest of the lessee, therefore, is determined in such a way that the interest of the sub-lessee is extinguished along with it, a lawful judgment

against the lessee which gives effect to the determination of the lessee''s rights must of necessity extinguish the subordinate rights of the under-

tenant. In such cases, it is immaterial whether the interest of the under-tenant began before or after the suit. In our opinion, therefore, a sub-lessee

would be bound by a decree for possession obtained by the lessor against the lessee if the eviction is based upon a ground which determines the

under-lease also, unless he succeeds in showing that the judgment was vitiated by fraud or that the lessee collusively suffered the decree to be

passed against him. If, however, the decree for possession proceeds on a ground which does not by itself annul the sub-lease, the decree would

not be binding on the sub-lessee nor could the sub-lessee be evicted in execution of the decree if he had acquired a statutory right or protection,

e.g., under the Bengal Tenancy Act which he could assert against the lessor. Within these limits, we think a sub-lessee could be held to be bound

by a decree obtained against his lessor and when he is so bound he can undoubtedly be ousted in execution of the decree obtained against his

lessor under Order XXI, Rule 35, Code of Civil Procedure, though he was not made a party to the suit itself.

From this it will be seen that the crucial test to determine is whether the person in possession who has not been impleaded as a party in the

proceedings for eviction has a superior right to remain in possession over-riding the right of the Plaintiff in the action. The principle of this decision

clearly applies to the instant case. When the landlord subsequently leased the property the right to the possession of the landlord, was liable to be

annulled by a successful order for restoration to possession that may be obtained by the prior lessee. In effect the order for restoration of

possession is based upon a ground which by itself could annul the right to possession of the landlord and, therefore, of the subsequent lessee

claiming under him.

In Parthasarathy and Another Vs. Krishnamoorthy and Another, , the principle of the decision in Yusuf v. Jyotishchandra Banerji ILR (1931)

Cal. 739 was applied in respect of an order for eviction obtained under the Madras Rent Control Act of 1946. Subba Rao J., held that if a

landlord obtained a right to evict his tenant the sub-tenant could not claim higher rights than the tenant and the fact that the subtenant was not made

a party to the proceedings before the Rent Controller would not make any difference as the sub-tenant was bound by the order which, was passed

against the tenant.

The same view was taken in another Bench decision of the Madras High Court in Devaraja Bhatt Vs. V.S. Raja and Others, , by Govinda

Menon and Krishnaswami Nayudu JJ. It was observed that the rights of the sub-tenant cannot be asserted against the landlord after an order for

eviction has been obtained against the tenant, and that so far as the landlord was concerned, the subtenant does not exist at all and any

proceedings by which a decree has been obtained against the tenant would be binding upon the sub-tenant also.

This decision was followed by Rajamannar C.J., and Venkatarama Aiyar J., in Express Estates Ltd. v. Modem Furnishing House ILR (1953)

Mad. 195, where in execution of a decree for possession obtained against the tenant a sub-tenant obstructed on the ground that the decree for

possession would not affect his interests as he was not made a party in the eviction proceedings. This objection was over-ruled.

In Jagadguru Gurushiddaswami Vs. Dakshina Maharashtra Digambar Jain Sabha, the Supreme Court has approved the view taken by the

Calcutta High Court in the two decisions of the Court referred to earlier. It was held by the Supreme Court that a sub-lessee would be bound by a

decree for possession obtained by the lessor against the lessee, no matter whether the sub-lease was created before or after the suit, for eviction,

provided the eviction was based on a ground which determined the sub-lease. The limits of the doctrine as to when a person can be said to be a

privy to a judgment were also indicated in this decision.

I may also refer to the decision in Geen v. Herring (1905) 1 K.B. 152. In that case the Plaintiff has made all the sub-tenants parties to the

action in ejectment and while disallowing costs incurred for service of writs upon the sub-tenants, Stirling L.J., took the view that it was not

necessary to make the sub-tenants parties to the action. He stated the reason thus at page 158:

The question therefore is whether the costs of serving till the weekly tenants with writs or notices in these actions were unnecessarily incurred, and

therefore ought to be disallowed.... It was urged that the form in which these actions were brought was a common form. Doubtless it is a common

practice in actions for the recovery of land to sue the tenants in actual occupation of the property, and not their landlord; but in every case I think

regard must be had to the circumstances. It was not disputed, and I think rightly so, by the counsel for the Plaintiff that the action for recovery of

these houses would have been well brought against Herring lone, without joining his weekly tenants.

In Minet v. Johnson (1890) 63 L.T. 507 the same view was taken that it was not necessary to join the under-tenants actually in possession as

parties to the proceedings for eviction.

My attention was drawn to a judgment of Srinivasan J., in Venkatarama Iyer v. Asan Md. Rowther (1961) 2 M.L.J. 227 in which a landlord

sought eviction impleading the lessee and the sub-lessee. The Revenue Divisional Officer dismissed the petition as against the sub-lessee on the

ground that no relief could, be granted against him in that proceeding, and that the remedy of the landlord would be to file a separate suit. As

against the tenant the petition was dismissed on the ground that in view of the sub-lease he ceased to be a cultivating tenant as he was not in actual

cultivation. On revision by the landlord, Srinivasan J., held that the order negativing any relief as against the sub-lessee was correct, but that the

landlord would be entitled to obtain an order for eviction as against the main lessee, even though, he had sub-leased, in the view that, when, at the

commencement of the lease, he took possession of the property, he did so as a cultivating tenant. The fact that he passed on that possession to the

sub-lessee would not make him any the less a cultivating tenant vis-a-vis his land-lord. As regards the sub-lessee the learned Judge disposed of the

matter very briefly as follows at page 278:

In so far as the order of the Assistant Collector in relation to the sub-lessees, is concerned that is perfectly correct. No relief as against thorn is

available to the landlord under the above mentioned Act.

The attention of the learned Judge does not appear to have been drawn to the decisions of these and other High Courts and of the Supreme

Court referred to earlier. The same view has been reiterated in a recent judgment in Rup Chand Gupta Vs. Raghuvanshi Private Limited and

Another, to which I shall presently refer. It has to be noticed that the question as to how far the landlord can execute an order for eviction obtained

against the tenant as against the sub-lessee did not come up for consideration before Srinivasan J.

Learned Counsel, Sri Naidu, also relied upon a decision of Anantanarayanan J. in Vellachamy Ambalam Vs. Paramasamy Ambalam, as

supporting his contention that in an application for restoration of possession the subsequent tenants who had been inducted into possession by the

landlord should also be made parties. The attention of the learned Judge was not drawn to the decisions referred to earlier in this judgment; further,

the position has to be examined in the light of the law declared by the Supreme Court in Rup Chand Gupta Vs. Raghuvanshi Private Limited and

Another, . The learned Judge was inclined to take the view that an order made in proceedings wherein the party entitled to be heard was not even

served with process is null and void and that restoration of possession obtained by the tenant cannot be enforced against the subsequent tenant

who was actually in possession at the time of the commencement of the proceedings. It must be noticed that that was a case in which the

controversy directly arose between the tenant and the sub-tenant in a civil suit as well as in a, proceeding before the Revenue Court. From a

perusal of the judgment it appears that the learned Judge was inclined to take the view that even in a case where after the commencement of the

Act the landlord wrongfully dispossessed a tenant and inducts some other tenant into the land thereafter in a proceeding for restoration of

possession by a prior tenant, the subsequent tenant should also be made a party thereto. The learned Judge was of the view that Section 4(5)

attracts the operation of Section 4(4). With great respect this view, fails to take note of the clear distinction between Section 4(4) and Section 4(5)

and that the provisions of Section 4(4) are rendered applicable only so far as may be and not absolutely. Here too, the attention of the learned

Judge does not appear to have been drawn to the several decisions referred to earlier touching the array of parties in a suit for possession by a

landlord against a lessee. The decision in Craig v. Kanssen (1943) 1 K.B. 256 that an order made in proceedings in the absence of a party who is

necessary, would be null and void postulates a situation in which the party has got an undoubted right to be heard. The mere fact that a person, is

in possession of the property and the order for eviction, if enforced, or executed, would affect his rights is not a ground by itself to hold that he

should be made a party without reference to the character of his right under the general law. If the right of the person who is in possession is a

derivative right essentially defeasible and solely depending upon the right of some other person from whom he obtained possession and if the

ground of eviction is sufficient to annul the right of that person, it cannot be said that every person in possession, regardless of all circumstances,

should be made parties to the proceeding. The crucial question, in all cases is to find out when a person be said to be a privy to a judgment. In this

connection I may refer to the statement of the law in Hill and Readman''s Law of Landlord and Tenant, thirteenth edition, at page 602.

The proper persons to be made Defendants are usually the persons in actual possession. But this is not a fixed rule, and regard should be had

to all the circumstances. Thus if a sub-tenant is in possession, the lessor may sue either the lessee or the sub-lessee or both. Mortgagees by sub-

demise need not be joined as Defendants. Any person not named as a Defendant may by leave appear and defend if he shows that he is in

possession of the land by himself or his tenant.

In Annual Practice, 1962, dealing with the array of parties in an action to recover land the law is summed up in these terms at page 320:

Defendants : Prima facie the proper persons to be made Defendants to an action to recover land are the persons in actual possession ; and an

action to recover possession on forfeiture by reason of assignment may be brought against the assignee in possession, the issue of the writ

operating as an election to determine the lease Commissioners of Works v. Hull (1922) 1 K.B. 205 Frequently these persons are the only persons

interesed who are known to the Plaintiff, who may not even know who is the immediate landlord of the occuppying tenant....

It is, however, no longer imperative to make the persons in actual occupation Defendants, as it was formerly (O.L.P. Act, 1862 Section 168) and

regard should be had to all the circumstances. Thus, if the occupation is that of a sub-tenant, the landlord may join both the tenant and sub-tenant

or make either of them Defendant without the other, though in ordinary cases it is the proper practice to direct the writ to the person in

occupation.... Where there are a large number of sub-tenants in occupation it is sufficient to address the writ to the lessee alone, notice may be

given to the sub-tenants so as to afford them an opportunity of appearing if they so desire (see 0rder 12 rule 25;...) but this is not obligatory.

I may now refer to the recent judgment of the Supreme Court in Rup Chand Gupta Vs. Raghuvanshi Private Limited and Another, . In that

case a landlord brought a suit against his lessee for ejectment after serving a valid notice to quit but without impleading the sub-lessee as the

defendent. The lessee did not contest and in pursuance of an agreement an ex parte decree for possession was passed. The sub-lessee later on

brought a suit against the landlord and lessee for a declaration that he was not bound by the decree on the ground that he should have been made a

party to the eviction proceedings and also on the ground that the prior proceedings were vitiated by fraud and collusion between the landlord and

the tenant. In holding that the sub-lessee need not be impleaded as a party in the landlord''s suit for ejectment the law was stated in these terms at

page 1892:

Taking the last action, first, viz., Raghuvanshi''s omission to implead the Appellant, it is quite clear that the law does not require that the sub-lessee

need be made a party. It has been rightly pointed out by the High Court that in all cases where the landlord institutes a suit against the lessee for

possession of the land on the basis of a valid notice to quit served on the lossee and does not implead the sub-lessee as a party to the suit, the

object of the landlord is to eject the sub-lessee from the land in execution of the decree and such an object is quite legitimate. The decree in such a

suit would bind the sub-lessee. This may act harshly on the sub-lessee; but this is a position well understood by him when he took the sub-lease.

The law allows this and so the omission cannot be said to be an improper act.

I am clearly of the opinion that the principle of this decision would equally apply to proceedings initiated by a tenant for restoration of

possession complaining of wrongful dispossession by the landlord. The question is not whether the subsequent lessee was or was not made a party

to the proceeding but whether his right also would not come to an end along with the extinguishment of his landlord''s right to remain in possession.

The crux of the matter lies in recognising the consequences of a defeasible or derivative title coming to an end by the operation of a superior right.

Any other view would, in my opinion, completely frustrate and defeat the purpose of the special legislation the Madras Cultivating Tenants''

Protection Act. Every order passed by the Revenue Divisional Officer for possession, whether in favour of the landlord or in favour of the tenant

could be set at naught and rendered futile and useless by either the landlord or the tenant putting some other third party in possession of the

property. The subsequent lease that may be granted by the landlord may be oral; or equally the sub-lease that may be created by the tenant may

be oral. In my opinion, it will be neither possible nor practicable for the party who files a petition for eviction to find out the rights which other

people might have acquired from the opposite party. An encumbrance certificate even if obtained may not disclose the particulars. If after the order

for eviction or restoration of possession is passed there should be obstruction in enforcing that order the proceedings would be endless as at every

stage and on every occasion the rights of the successful party could be easily defeated, each time by a party afresh being put in possession on the

basis of sub-lease or subsequent lease. The following classical statement of Turner L.J., on the doctrine of lis pendens in the leading case of

Bellamy v. Sabine (1857) 1 De. G. & J. 566 584 can well be applied for finding out when a person can be said to be a privy to a judgment so as

to be held as a person bound by the decree even though, not a party to the proceeding within the meaning of Order XXI, Rule 35, Code of Civil

Procedure.

It is, as I think, a doctrine common to the Courts both of law and of Equity, and rests as I apprehend, upon this foundation--that it would

plainly be impossible that any action or suit could be brought to a successful termination, if alienation, pendente lite were permitted to prevail. The

Plaintiff would be liable in every case to be defeated by the Defendants alienating before the judgement or decree, and would be driven to

commence his proceedings do novo, subject again to be defeated by the same course of proceeding.

The third party who may be inducted into possession may be a mere agent or a mere licensee. It would be impossible for the party aggrieved

to take note of rights of all persons that may be in apparent possession. It is very important to bear in mind that the main scheme of the enactment

is that rights of parties, the landlord and the tenant, should be worked out in summary proceeding before Revenue Divisional Officer as

expeditiously and without delay and expenses and without being tossed about from Court to Court like a regular suit in a civil proceeding. It will be

cutting at the very root of the scheme of the Act to hold that the successful party who has obtained an order under the special statute could not

obtain effective satisfaction in this proceeding itself but would be obliged to a file a separate suit in a civil Court. The position becomes obvious if

the matter is looked at from the point of view of the tenant. The acceptance of the rival view that the tenant after obtaining the order of possession

could enforce it only in a separate suit on payment of heavy Court fees would make this valuable statutory right of the tenant u/s 4 to obtain

restoration of possession wholly illusory. If in the case of decrees obtained in suits a person could be dispossessed (as a person bound by the

decree even though not a direct party to those proceedings), I do not see why the principle of Order XXI, Rule 35, CPC should not apply to

orders obtained in proceedings under the Cultivating Tenants Protection Act. Otherwise there would be no end to litigation and the whole purpose

of the Act would be simply defeated. In this case, the record shows that the subsequent lessees were fully aware of the proceedings for restoration

of possession and they were making common cause with the landlord. In fact one of the subsequent lessees was examined as a, witness on the side

of the landlord in support of his case which was found to be false. For all these reasons I am of the view that the fact that they were not impleaded

as parties to the proceedings is of no consequence.

Mr. Naidu further contended that Rule 10 framed under the Act simply provides that an. order passed by the Revenue Divisional Officer shall

be enforceable by an officer of the revenue department not lower in rank than a revenue inspector and that there is no machinery like Order XXI

Rule 35 and Order XXI, Rules 95 to 103 of the CPC and the remedy of the tenant, therefore, would only be to file a suit for possession. I do not

agree. Order XXI, Rule 35 and Order XXI Rules 95 to 103 of the CPC (though rules of procedure) embody the basic principle of finality to

litigation governing both the aspects; rights created before the proceeding and rights created during the pendency of the proceeding. The revenue

inspector, while functioning under Rule 10 acts as the delegate of the Revenue Divisional Officer, and when disputes arise in enforcing his order,

the Revenue Divisional Officer himself can and must decide the dispute in the same way as a civil Court would do, while executing a decree for

possession. The Revenue Divisional Officer will undoubtedly have power and jurisdiction to pass auxiliary orders which may be necessary to

enforce and implement his original order for eviction and make it as efficacious as necessary. The fact that there is no specific provision does not

matter. The principle of Order XXI, Rule 102, CPC and Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act would apply to obstructions caused by

persons in whose favour rights were created during the pendency of proceedings for eviction or for restoration of possession. It is needless to

observe that if a person in possession obstructs asserting a paramount right, a right superior to the opponent in the proceeding, the successful party

will have necessarily to work out his rights in a civil suit as in such, cases the Revenue Divisional Officer cannot embark upon an investigation of

competing title. But so long as the person in. possession has no such superior right, the Revenue Divisional Officer will have undoubted jurisdiction

to pass an order capable of execution against the subsequent lessee, or the sub-lessee, as the case may be.

Before parting with this case I think it necessary to observe that the government should amend the Act by providing suitable machinery for

effective enforcement of the order for eviction or order for possession, preferably on the same lines as Order XXI, Rule 35 and Order XXI, Rules

95 to 103, Code of Civil Procedure. Section 26 of the Madras Rent Control Act of 1960 contains a special provision regarding the sub-tenants,

and the array of parties, and under this provision it may be necessary to implead the sub-tenants as parties to the proceeding. It is a question to

consider whether the Legislature thereby deliberately intended to make a departure from the general law as declared in the cases referred to. Even

so, it is a matter for the government to consider whether a provision should not be made obliging the sub-tenants or persons obtaining derivative

interests to give notice to the main landlord so that lie can implead them as parties as indicated in Section 26 of the Madras House Rent Control

Act of 1960. That would avoid complications which may arise on account of the ignorance and difficulties in finding out rights of persons in

apparent; possession, of the property.

As it is represented that the subsequent lessees have raised sugarcane crops, they will be entitled to continue in possession till the harvest is

over. They shall hand over possession as soon as the harvest is over. In default the first Respondent tenant will be entitled to obtain possession.

For all these reasons the civil revision petition has to be dismissed with costs.