Abdul Salam vs Central Administrative Tribunal, Chandigarh Bench and Others

A.K. Sikri, C.J.—The case of the petitioner herein for promotion to the post of Principal (Diploma Wing), Chandigarh College of Engineering and Technology, Sector 26, Chandigarh was considered along with the other candidate by the Departmental Promotion Committee. It is not in dispute that benchmark for promotion to the said post is ''Very Good'' rating in ACRs for the last five preceding years. The petitioner and even the other candidate who was considered did not acquire this bench-mark and, therefore, the Departmental Promotion Committee found them unfit for promotion. Insofar as the petitioner is concerned, his ACRs for the last five years were ''Good'' only. The petitioner challenged the non-promotion by filing Original Application u/s 19 of the Administrative Tribunal Act before the Central Administrative Tribunal, Chandigarh Bench. This Original Application has been dismissed vide orders dated 2.9.2010 and questioning the validity of that order, present writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is filed in this Court. The Tribunal gave the following reasoning in support of its conclusion that the petitioner did not have any case on merits:-- 4. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the ACRs/DPC proceedings produced by the respondents along with other relevant record.

It is admitted case of the parties that the bench-mark for the post of Principal (Diploma Wing) CCET, Sector 26, Chandigarh was ''Very Good''. The selection committee has followed due procedure and considered the relevant record of the applicant from 1995-96 to 1999-2000, though according to them the down graded and un-communicated ACR has not been taken into consideration by them. Even so, from perusal of service record of the applicant, we find that he has failed to achieve the prescribed bench-mark of ''Very Good'' and there is nothing wrong in the assessment made by the DPC.

It is well settled law that a Court/Tribunal should not ordinarily interfere with the findings of the DPC/Selection Committee, unless, of course, if the same are not violative of the statutory provisions of the Recruitment Rules or are actuated by mala fides. In the case of Smt. Nutan Arvind Vs. Union of India and another, , it has been held by the Hon''ble Supreme Court that "when a high level Committee had considered the respective merit of the candidate, assessed the grading and considered their cases for promotion, this Court cannot sit over the assessment made by the DPC as an appellate authority."

In Union Public Service Commission Vs. Hiranyalal Dev and Others, the Apex Court held that "How to categorize in the light of the relevant records and what norms to apply in making the assessments are exclusively the function of the Selection Committee. The jurisdiction to make selection is vested in the Selection Committee."

In the case of Dalpat Abasaheb Solunke and Others Vs. Dr. B.S. Mahajan and Others, , the Hon''ble Supreme Court has held that it is needless to emphasize that "it is not the function of the Court to hear appeals over the decisions of the Selection Committees and to scrutinize relative merits of the candidates. Whether a candidate is fit for a particular post or not has to be decided by the duly constituted Selection Committee which has the expertise on the subject."

In the recent judgment in Appeal (Civil) No. 689/2007 (arising out of SL (C) No. 2610 of 2001) in the matter of Union of India (UOI) and Another Vs. S.K. Goel and Others, , the Hon''ble Supreme Court has held that "the DPC enjoys full discretion to devise its methods and procedure for objective assessment of suitability and merit of the candidates being considered by it. Hence, the interference by the Hon''ble Court is not called for." It has been further held by the Hon''ble Supreme Court that it is now more or less well settled that evaluation made by an Expert Committee should not be easily interfered with by the Courts which do not have the necessary expertise to undertake the exercise that is necessary for such purpose.

In the present case, we find no procedural infirmity and the applicant has also not alleged mala fide against any member of the Selection Committee. Therefore, no interference by this Court is called for with the findings arrived at by the DPC. Hence, the OA has no merit and is dismissed as such. No costs.

Submission of learned counsel for the petitioner is that the ACRs for the years in question were never communicated to the petitioner and, therefore, the same could not be taken into consideration. He further submitted that even if the remarks were ''Good'', since they were below bench-mark, it became imperative on the part of the respondents to communicate these ACRs, as held in the case of U.P. Jal Nigam and others Vs. Prabhat Chandra Jain and others, as well as in Dev Dutt Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, . On the facts of this case, it may not even be necessary to go into this submission. Reason for that is that right from 1993-94, the petitioner earned only ''Good'' remarks. The remarks ''Good'' in the ACRs of the petitioner from 1.4.1994 to 31.3.2002 are as under:--

Five years'' record, which was relevant and was considered by the Departmental Promotion Committee, pertained to the years 1997-98 to 2001-2002. Even if we go back and consider the record from 1994, still the petitioner earned only ''Good'' ACRs. As already pointed out above, the bench-mark for promotion to the post of Principal, as prescribed by instructions, is ''Very Good'' in all five years. The effect of non-communication of the ACRs, even if the contention of the petitioner is accepted, could be to ignore these ACRs and consider the ACRs for previous years. However, that would not help the petitioner, as he did not earn ''Very Good'' remarks in all these years even for one year. It would be impossible for him to make out a case for five ''Very Good'' reports. In a case like this, it is not necessary to exercise our extra-ordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. We, thus, do not find any merit in the petition which is accordingly dismissed.