High CourtsSingle Bench(2017) 07 MEG CK 0015

Abdul Zinnah Mondal S/o Abu Bakkar Mondal vs Garo Hills Autonomous District Council, Tura represented by its Secretary, & Ors.

Meghalaya High Court · Decided on 10 July 2017

HON’BLE JUDGES
Ved Prakash Vaish
RESULT
Dismissed
CASE NUMBER
1 of 2017

AI Structured Summary

Not yet generated for this judgment

Judgment

69 paragraphs · 1,454 words
1.

By way of the present application the applicant/petitioner seeks review of Judgment dated 18.04.2017 passed in WP(C) No. 116 of 2016.

2.

The brief facts of the case as set out in the application are that the applicant/petitioner had filed a writ petition that he was working as Assistant

Inspector of Taxes and was re-designated as Enforcement Sub Inspector in Taxation Branch of the Garo Hills Autonomous District Council,

(GHADC). The petitioner retired on 31st December, 2011, however, retiral benefits were not paid to the petitioner soon after retirement and the

same were delayed for about four months. The petitioner moved an application on 19th April, 2012 to the respondent authorities for sanction and

disbursement of retirement benefits and the respondent authorities sanctioned an amount of Rs. 9,38,700/- (Rupees Nine lacs Thirty Eight

Thousand Seven Hundred only) on 17th October, 2012 subject to deduction of Rs. 4,89,345/- (Rupees Four Lacs Eighty Nine Thousand Three

Hundred Forty Five only). It was also alleged that despite sanctioned of the said amount, the same was not released to the petitioner for almost

four years. Hence, the petitioner filed writ petition bearing WP(C) No. 116 of 2016 and the said petition was disposed of vide Judgment dated

18th April, 2017.

3.

Learned counsel for the applicant/petitioner submits that gratuity of retiree Government servant is a valuable right and constitutes ''property''

within the purview of Article 300-A of the Constitution of India and the same cannot be curtailed by an executive order and that too without

following the due process of law. He also submits that the respondent authorities had released the amount after illegally deducting a sum of Rs.

4,89,345/- (Rupees Four Lacs Eighty Nine Thousand Three Hundred Forty Five only). He also submits that Mr. S.A. Sheikh, learned counsel

appearing on behalf of the petitioner had made submission contrary to the writ petition.

4.

Learned counsel for the applicant/petitioner further submits that the respondent authorities had wrongly deducted the amount of 4,89,345/-

(Rupees Four Lacs Eighty Nine Thousand Three Hundred Forty Five only) out of the sanctioned amount of Rs. 9,38,700/- (Rupees Nine lacs

Thirty Eight Thousand Seven Hundred only) and the impugned Judgment dated 18th April, 2017 is liable to be reviewed.

5.

On the other hand, Mr. S. Dey, learned counsel for the respondents has pointed out that the petitioner had filed writ petition seeking directions

to the respondents to release the sanctioned retirement benefits being gratuity and leave salary to the petitioner. He has also pointed out that in

Para-6 of the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents, it was specifically mentioned that the petitioner had misappropriated Rs.

4,89,345/- (Rupees Four Lacs Eighty Nine Thousand Three Hundred Forty Five only). The said amount was deducted from the retiral benefits

and the same was mentioned in the sanctioned letter dated 17th October, 2012 and the same was not disputed by the petitioner. Learned counsel

for respondents further submits that the petitioner had filed rejoinder affidavit and in reply to Para-6 of the counter affidavit the petitioner had

admitted that some amount was due to be paid to the respondent authorities by the petitioner.

6.

I have carefully considered the submissions made by learned counsel for the parties. I have also gone through the material on record.

7.

Rule (1) of Order 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure reads as under:

(1) Application for review of judgment.-(1) Any person considering himself aggrieved,-

(a) by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed, but from which no appeal has been preferred,

(b) by a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed, or

(c) by a decision on a reference from a Court of Small Causes,

and who, from the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within his

knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed or order made, or on account of some mistake

or error apparent on the face of the record, or for any other sufficient reason, desires to obtain a review of the decree passed or

order made against him, may apply for review of judgment to the Court which passed the decree or made the order.

(2) A party who is not appealing from a decree or order may apply for a review of judgment notwithstanding the pendency of an

appeal by some other party except where the ground of such appeal is common to the applicant and the appellant, or when, being

respondent, he can present to the Appellate Court the case on which he applies for the review.

Explanation-The fact that the decision on a question of law on which the judgment of the Court is based has been reversed or

modified by the subsequent decision of a superior Court in any other case, shall not be a ground for the review of such judgment.

8.

On perusal of Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it is manifestly clear that the grounds mentioned in the said provision are

specific. The Court may review its order, if any of the grounds specified in the aforementioned provision are satisfied.

9.

The Hon''ble Supreme Court considered the scope of review in case ''M/s Thungabhadra Industries Ltd. v. The Government of Andhra

Pradesh'', AIR 1964 SC 1372, it was held as under:

11.

What, however, we are now concerned with is whether the statement in the order of September 1959 that the case did not

involve any substantial question of law is an ""error apparent on the face of the record"". The fact that on the earlier occasion the court

held on an identical state of facts that substantial question of law arose would not per se be conclusive, for the earlier order itself

might be erroneous. Similarly, even if the statement was wrong, it would not follow that it was an ""error apparent on the face of the

record"", for there is a distinction which is real, though it might not always be capable of exposition, between a mere erroneous

decision and a decision which could be characterised as vitiated by ""error apparent"". A review is by no means an appeal in disguise

whereby an erroneous decision is reheard and corrected, but lies only for patent error"".

10.

The Hon''ble Supreme Court, after considering the judgment in the case of ''M/s Thungabhadra Industries Ltd.''s case (supra), in another case

''PARSION DEVI AND OTHERS v. SUMITRI DEVI AND OTHERS'', (1997) 8 SCC 715 observed as under:

9.

Under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC a judgment may be open to review inter alia if there is a mistake or an error apparent on the face of

the record. An error which is not self-evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning, can hardly be said to be an error

apparent on the face of the record justifying the court to exercise its power of review under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. In exercise of the

jurisdiction under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC it is not permissible for an erroneous decision to be ""reheard and corrected"". A review

petition, it must be remembered has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be ""an appeal in disguise"".

11.

The Hon''ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid judgments has laid down the nature, scope and ambit of the power to review. It is a settled law

that an error is to be self- evident and not such error which is required to be traced by a process of reasoning.

12.

In the present case, the application filed by the applicant/petitioner seeking review of the order dated 18th April, 2017 shows that none of the

grounds mentioned therein can be said to fall within the ambit and scope of Order 47 Rule 1 of C.P.C. The applicant has not pointed out any

error apparent on the face of the record"" which could have been reviewed.

13.

The impugned judgment dated 18th April, 2017 clearly shows that, during the course of argument, Mr. S.A. Sheikh, learned counsel appearing

on behalf of the petitioner submitted that he was not disputing deduction of Rs. 4,89,345/- (Rupees Four Lacs Eighty Nine Thousand Three

Hundred Forty Five only) and on the basis of said submission the judgment was passed by the court. It is pertinent to mention that there is no

allegation in the present application that Mr. S.A. Sheikh, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner did not make such submission.

14.

In view of the facts and circumstances of the case and the aforementioned discussion, no ground for review is made out. Accordingly, the

present application is dismissed.