Abhayanand Singh vs Rameshwar Singh Bahadur

Fazl Ali, J.—This is an application by defendant 2 in a mortgage suit which is pending in the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Darbhanga.

The facts of the case may be briefly stated as follows:

On 28th April 1916 the plaintiff opposite party brought a mortgage suit against the petitioner and certain other persons in the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Darbhanga on the basis of a mortgage bond said to have been executed by Kumar Kalikanand Singh and Kumar Kamalanand Singh on 7th May 1900 in favour of the plaintiff. On 17th December 1918 a compromise petition was filed by the parties and a compromise decree was accordingly passed in terms of the compromise petition. On 15th December 1921 the petitioner along with the other defendants except Kalikanand brought a suit in the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Bhagalpur for setting aside the compromise decree which had been passed by the Subordinate Judge of Darbhanga.

On 30th June 1923, the Subordinate Judge of Bhagalpur dismissed the suit, whereupon the petitioner as well as the other plaintiffs of the suit appealed to this Court. On 1st February 1927 a Division Bench of this Court consisting of Das and Adami, JJ., decreed the appeal and held that though the compromise was binding on the defendants other than Ganganand (defendant 5) yet as the mortgage was indivisible and the interest of Ganganand could not be separated from the interest of the other members of the family, the entire consent decree had to be set aside. The suit was accordingly restored and the Subordinate Judge was directed to proceed with it in accordance with law and there was also a direction given that there must be no further delay in trying the suit.

On 16th February 1927 the plaintiff applied to the Subordinate Judge that the alleged compromise of 17th December 1918 be recorded and a decree be passed in terms thereof against defendants 1, 2, 3, 4 and 6 and the suit might proceed against defendant 5. On 7th May 1927 the Subordinate Judge passed an order on the petition to the effect that the question of recording the alleged compromise would be gone into at the time of the hearing of the suit. The plaintiff thereupon moved this Court against the order of the learned Subordinate Judge declining to deal at that stage with the application of 16th February 1927. The matter came up before Das, J., and myself and on 4th February 1929 the Subordinate Judge was directed to deal with the application forthwith and to pass some order on that application. The Subordinate Judge accordingly reconsidered the matter and on 19th March 1929 he recorded the compromise but at the same time provided that:

the question of passing a decree on the basis of the compromise as against the defendants other than defendant 5 would be considered along with the case against defendant 5.

It appears from the order of the Subordinate Judge that on this occasion the plaintiff pressed only for a compromise being recorded and as to a decree being passed in the terms of the compromise, his prayer was that the decree should not be passed against the defendants before the trial of the suit had been finished as against defendant 5.

Defendant 2, however, not only opposed this prayer of the plaintiff on this occasion but also filed an application on 11th April 1929 before the learned Subordinate Judge of Darbhanga contending that the plaintiff having elected to get the compromise recorded and the Court having recorded the compromise under Order 23, Rule 3, Civil P.C, a consent decree must be passed at once in terms of the alleged compromise. The learned Subordinate Judge, however, rejected the application with the following observations:

In the present case which is based on a mortgage bond alleged to have been executed by the managers of a joint Mitakshara family, one of them being the father of the present defendant 2, the claim of the plaintiff has yet to be investigated as against defendant 5 who is no party to the compromise. As the mortgage is indivisible and as the question of the liability of defendant 5 has not been decided yet, the Court cannot pass a decree in accordance with the terms of the compromise as laid down in 0rder 23, Rule 3, Civil P.C.

The petitioner than moved this Court and obtained a rule calling upon the opposite party to show cause why the order of the Subordinate Judge refusing to pass a decree should not be set aside and a consent decree passed in terms of the compromise. The petitioner also filed an application on 26th April 1929 asking this Court to pass certain orders with regard to the evidence of one Mr. Wheatherall who is one of the witnesses in the case and this application and the Civil Revision No. 179 of 1929 were set down for hearing at the request of both the parties, the plaintiff having accepted notice of both the applications.

The main point which is urged in Civil Revision No. 179 is that the learned Subordinate Judge having recorded the compromise acted illegally and with material irregularity in not following the mandatory provisions of Order 23, Rule 3 and in not passing a compromise decree at once. Now, there is no doubt that the rule is mandatory and the Court having recorded the compromise it is obligatory upon it to pass a decree in accordance with the compromise.

The question, however, is as to whether there is anything in the rule to show that it is obligatory upon the Court to pass a decree simultaneously with the recording of the compromise and that the passing of the decree can in in no circumstances be postponed after the compromise has been recorded. The view of law put forward on behalf of the petitioner is that the Court has to pass a decree as soon as the compromise is recorded and this view is sought to be supported by certain observations made in the case of Sabitri Thakurain v. Mrs. Savi AIR 1929 Pat. 381, and in the case of Charu Chandra Mitra v. Shamlhu Nath Pandey [1918] 3 Pat. L.J. 255. The petitioner also relies on the following observations made by a Division Bench of this Court consisting of Jwala Prasad and Wort, JJ., while issuing the rule in the present case:

The Subordinate Judge seams to have contravened the provisions of the said B. 3, for after recording the compromise the passing of a decree in terms therewith is obligatory and it cannot at all be postponed. Hence the application of defendant 2 in so far as the prayer to pass a decree in terms of the compromise is concerned should be heard.

It is, however, contended by the learned Counsel for the opposite party that the above observations were made� by the learned Judges without hearing: the opposite party and they cannot have the force of a decision. It is also pointed out that the question as to whether the passing of the decree can or cannot be postponed at all after the recording of the compromise did not directly arise in any of the two cases cited by the learned Counsel for the petitioner. In the case of Sreemati Sabitri Thakurain AIR 1929 Pat. 318, the Court had recorded the compromise as well as passed a decree in terms of the compromise. One of the parties to the compromise thereupon appealed against the order of the Court recording, a compromise on the ground that that order was appealable under Order 43, Rule 1,, It was, however, suggested by the'' Stamp Reporter that the appeal was incompetent as the decree having bean already drawn up an appeal lay from the decree and not from the order which was superseded by the decree. The only question therefore which was to be decided in that case was as to whether the appeal by Sreemati Sabitri Thakurain was competent in those-circumstances or not and while discussing that question Jwala Prasad. J., observed incidentally that

Rule 3, Order 23 makes it imperative upon a Court to forthwith pass a decree when it orders that, the agreement, compromise or satisfaction shall be recorded.

Again in the case of Charu Chandra Mittra v. Shambhu Nath Pandey [1918] 3 Pat. L.J. 255, the Subordinate Judge had recorded a compromise and passed a decree in the terms of the compromise. A question, however, was raised that some of the terms of the compromise in the decree" were outside the scope of the suit and-Atkinson, J., made the following observations in that connexion:

The learned Judge''s duty with regard to the question of compromise and his obligation" relative thereto are provided for by what is now Order 23, Rule 3, Civil P.C .... If the compromise deals with matters directly within the scope of the suit then his duty is clear ; ha must accept the compromise and record it and having so accepted and recorded he must prepare and draw up a decree in accordance-with it, EO that the same may be executed in the ordinary course of procedure. If the compromise contains matters outside the scope of the suit, what then is the obligation cast upon the learned Subordinate Judicial Officer? It appears to us that, such an officer must make an order recording the entire compromise and when he has done this he mast draw up a decree giving the parties the right to execute the decree is respect of the matters which properly fall within the scope of the action leaving "it to the parties to enforce by Whatever means they likes that portion of the compromise which refers to the matters outside the scope of the suit.

Now, as I have already stated, the decree in the case referred to was passed as soon as the compromise was recorded and all that Atkinson, J., pointed out in the passage quoted above was in what terms the decree was to be drawn up when the compromise dealt with certain matters outside the scope of the suit. The question as to whether a Court has or has not the discretion in certain cases to postpone the passing of the decree neither arose nor was decided in that case.

Thus it is quite clear, and in fact it has been conceded by Mr. Pugh who appeared for the petitioner, that the observations made in the two cases cited on behalf of the petitioner as well as those made in the present case when the rule was issued on the opposite party are strictly speaking mere obiter and have not the force of a decision. At the same time there is no doubt that they are entitled to great respect and that makes it all the more necessary for us to eximine the question raised in this case with great care and circumspection. In fact, speaking for myself, I was so impressed by the weight of those observations and the authority of the learned Judges from whom they came, that I was at first inclined to take the view which we are urged to take in this case by the learned Counsel for the petitioner. But the peculiar circumstances of the present case have forced upon us considerations which in my view cannot be lightly brushed aside and which incline us to think that we should not too readily read into the rule words which do not occur there and adopt a construction which will not meet all the possible contingencies. Lest I should be misunderstood I wish to make it absolutely clear that I do not propose to adopt a particular construction merely on the ground of expediency, as I fully realize that the law has to be strictly construed, independently of the consequences that might follow; but at the same time I feel that the construction placed upon the section must be one which, should be as near to the intention of the framers of the Code as possible and it may be presumed that their intention could not have been to make a provision which should meet only certain contingencies and not others.

Now, the situation which has arisen in this case is really a peculiar one. The plaintiff who was at first anxious for a decree against defendants 1 to 4 and 6 now wants that no decree should be passed against them until the liability of Ganganand is determined, while the petitioner who is one of the several defendants in the case and. who began by opposing the passing of the decree is now pressing for a decres being passed at once against himself. The Subordinate Judge also does not apparently find himself in a very happy position. Having been directed to pass some order on the plaintiff''s application under Order 23, Rule 3, he felt bound to record the compromise, as in his view it had been proved to his satisfaction that the suit had been compromised between the plaintiff and defendants 1 to 4 and 6.

At the same time he found that there-was some difficulty in passing a decree'' against some of the defendants only when one of the defendants was still litigating. That the difficulty experienced by the Subordinate Judge is a real one is suggested by the order that was passed in this case by a Division Bench of this Court on 1st February 1927 when the suit was ordered to be restored. It was then decided that the compromise was binding upon all the defendants in eluding the petitioner but not upon defendant 5; yet the Court did not uphold the decree against the defendants other than defendant 5, but set aside the entire decree. The learned Subordinate Judge in considering the application of the opposite party for recording the compromise under Order 23, Rule 3, was fully alive to this part of the order and in fact he quotes the following passage from the judgment of Das, J., in dealing with the matter:

It is obvious that the entire consent decree must go as Ganganand has no interest in it capable of being separated from the interest of the other members of the family.

The learned Subordinate Judge also adopts the very argument which was the basis of the order of this Court when he says:

The mortgage being indivisible and as the question of the liability of defendant 5 has not been decided yet, the Court cannot pass a decree in accordance with the terms of the compromise as laid down in Order 23, Rule 3, Civil P.C.

Thus prima facie the view taken by the Subordinate Judge is supported to a considerable extent by the view taken by this Court in February 1927. The difficulty with which the Subordinate Judge found himself confronted will be further appreciated if we refer to the compromise petition of 17th December 1918. It will be remembered that the compromise purports to have been entered into not only by defendants 1 to 4 and 6 but also on behalf of defendant 5 and the terms of the petition are that not only defendants 1 to 4 and 6 will be bound by the mortgage decree but the decree will equally bind defendant 5 as well as his undivided share in the joint property. Now if a decree is to be passed under Order 23, Rule 3 it must be passed strictly in accordance with the terms of the compromise petition of 17th December 1918. This obviously cannot be done while defendant 5 is still litigating and his liability remains undetermined. It was this difficulty which the Subordinate Judge had to face in the present case and to me it appears that the order which he has passed when reasonably considered amounts to his saying this only, that he cannot pass a decree at this stage, because it is not possible to do so; but that he will pass a decree as soon as he finds that such a decree can be passed. In other words the Subordinate Judge has not declined to pass the decree which he is required to pass under Order 23, Rule 3, but has merely postponed the passing of the decree. If this is the position, thon the order passed by him is not without jurisdiction, unless we hold that it was incumbent upon him to pass some kind of a decree as soon as the compromise was recorded and that he is not competent in any case to postpone the passing of the decree. To take this view, however, will in my opinion, be taking too rigid a view of the section and unduly limiting the powers of the Court. I say so with great respect to the contrary view which has been suggested in some of the observations made in the cases cited by the learned Counsel for the petitioner and one of the reasons for my not assenting to that view is that I do not find any such word as "forthwith" or "at once" or any other expression in the latter part of Order 23, Rule 3 to indicate that the passing of the decree must immediately follow the recording of the compromise and that the two acts must necessarily, be more or less simultaneous. At any rate there is nothing in Order 23, Rule 3, which should be deemed to limit or otherwise affect the inherent power possessed by every Court to postpone its proceedings in the ends of justice and for reasonable cause. I may also say here that my learned brother who has considerable experience of original trials and the procedure followed in the Subordinate Courts informs me that it is by no means uncommon in practice to postpone the passing of a decree till some time after the compromise has been recorded and he has actually pointed out to the learned Counsel for the petitioner in the course of his argument in this Court a few concrete instances in which it might be necessary as well as desirable to do so.

Then again the view that I take is supported to some extent by the distinction drawn in the CPC between an order and a decree and by the fact of an appeal being provided under Order 43, Rule 1 from an order recording an agreement, compromise or satisfaction. I say so because if it was the intention of the legislature that a decree in the terms of the compromise should be passed simultaneously with the order directing a compromise to be recorded, then there was apparently no necessity for making a distinct provision that the order will be appealable; because to quote the language of a decision to which I shall presently refer

the order or for the matter of that all previous proceedings get merged in the decree which is the final declaration of the Courts mind and decision and loses a separate existence of its own.

Again if the order directing a compromise to be recorded was to be passed in all eases at the same time as the decree, it is difficult to understand why it is provided that an appeal lies from the order but not from a consent decree. I may here refer to the case of Bengal Coal Company, Ltd. Vs. Apcar Collieries, Ltd., and Others, which was decided by a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in 1934 and from which I have quoted the above passage. In that case an appeal was filed only against the order regarding the compromise although there was also a decree passed in pursuance of the order and it was held that the appeal was incompetent in that the decree having been passed before the appeal was filed an appeal did not lie from the order which was superseded by the decree. The reasoning underlying this decision was (1) that the order directing the compromise to be recorded would merge in the decree as soon as the decree is passed and (2) that if the order passed under Order 23, Rule 3, is set aside in appeal the decree not appealed against may remain which would be an anomaly. This decision was cited before Jwala Prasad and Wort, JJ. in the case of Sabitri Thakurain v. Mrs. Savi AIR 1929 Pat. 318 but their Lordships declined to follow it in that particular case and held that the right of appeal conferred under Order 43, Rule 1, Clause (m)., Civil P.C., against the order directing the compromise to be recorded under Order 23, Rule 3 of the Code, is not lost by reason of the preparation and the passing of the decree in accordance with the said order.

The fact, however, remains that the reasoning adopted in the Calcutta case does raise certain important considerations which cannot be entirely overlooked in construing Order 23, Rule 3. Let us by way of illustration take a case in which a Court passes an order, directing a compromise to be recorded and the party against whom the order is made applies to the Court and asks the Court to postpone the ''passing of the decree until he has appealed under Order 43, Rule 1, Clause (m) against the order. The question is whether the Court would in such a case be absolutely incompetent to allow the prayer and it must proceed at once to pass a decree. In my opinion if the view of the Calcutta High Court is correct that the order will merge into the decree and the party will be deprived of his right of appeal under Order 43, Rule 1, as soon as the decree is passed it will work a great hardship upon the party if the Court refuses to postpone the passing of the decree. Even assuming, however that the right of appeal conferred upon the party by Order 43, Rule 1 will not case even after the-passing of the decree, there will still, be the possibility of a very anomalous situation being created in case the order appealed against is set aside and the consent decree which is not appealable remains intact.

Thus having anxiously considered the, matter the view that I take is that; there is nothing in Order 23, Rule 3, to prevent the Court from postponing the passing of the decree in a proper case so long; as the Court is conscious of the fact that unless the order is set aside in appeal it is obligatory upon it to pass a decree and that sooner or later a decree will have to be passed. No doubt in a large number of cases when a case has been compromised it will not be at all necessary to postpone the passing of the decree and that may be the reason why the view that the Court is to pass a decree as soon as the compromise is recorded appears to commend itself at first sight but it does not necessarily follow that the rule is without exceptions and the exceptions are not covered by the terms of Order 23, Rule 3 or that the Court has no discretion to postpone the passing of the decree in a proper case where the circumstances of the case justify such postponement.

It is, however, contended on behalf of the petitioner that assuming that the Subordinate Judge does not find it possible to pass a decree in terms of the-compromise at this stage there is no-guarantee that he will ever be able to pass a decree in those terms and Mr. Lachmi Kanta Jha therefore wants an answer to the query as to what will happen if the Subordinate Judge ultimately finds himself unable to pass a decree in the terms of the compromise. Now I do not pretented to be able to foresee how the presend litigation will ultimately end but I think the question is somewhat premature'' at this stage and all that can be said is that should the Subordinate Judge at any future data refuse to pass a decree in terms of the compromise, either on the ground that he is unable to pass a decree in those terms or on some other ground, it will be open to the party that might feel itself aggrieved by the order to attack the order on the ground that it is not in compliance with the provisions of Order 23, Rule 3. I may also refer here to another argument advanced by Mr. Pugh. The argument in substance was that the order of the Subordinate Judge directing the compromise to be recorded at this stage was a bad order and that if the Subordinate Judge really found it impossible to pass a decree in terms of the compromise at this stage, the learned Subordinate Judge should have refrained from recording a compromise also at the present stage. Now as the question, as to whether the Subordinate Judge was or was not justified in recording a compromise at this stage, has neither been directly raised nor fully argued before us; I do not wish to express any opinion upon that question.

It is, however, apparent that if the view of Mr. Pugh is correct and the order of the Subordinate Judge directing a compromise to be recorded at this stage is really an improper one, it was open to the petitioner to have appealed against that order under Order 43, Rule 1, Clause (m) and get it set aside. It is, however, said distinctly on behalf of the petitioner that he has no desire to take that course. Thus assuming that the Subordinate Judge has taken a wrong course in recording the compromise at this stage, that will be no justification for compelling him to follow up one wrong course by another and to pass a decree when, as he says, it is not possible for him to pass it at this stage. I may mention here that it is frankly stated by Mr. Lachmi Kanta Jha that he does not want to disclose the reason why the petitioner wants the Subordinate Judge to pass a consent decree straightaway. Now, there is no doubt that it is the right of every litigant not to disclose to his opponent why a certain move has been made by him and why he wants a particular course to be adopted; but as we are dealing with the present application in our revisional jurisdiction we have to proceed upon certain well-recognized principles. One of these principles is that we shall not exercise our discretionary powers at the instance of a party who has another remedy open to him by way of an appeal or otherwise. Another principle is that we shall exercise our powers only when there are genuine wrongs to be redressed and the relief sought is one the refusal of which will entail real injury or prejudice to the party invoking the relief.

If, however, it appears to us that the party is merely manoeuvring for a position or trying to secure a mere tactical advantage over the adversary and there is no substantial wrong to be redressed, I for one would be reluctant to intervene at the instance of such party u/s 115, Civil P.C. Now in this particular case, as I have already stated in an earlier part of the judgment and as Jwala Prasad and Wort, JJ., also pointed out when admitting this application, the attitude of both the parties has been far from consistent. The plaintiff asked for the recording of the compromise as well as for a decree on 16th February 1927, but having obtained an order for recording the compromise he now says that the matter should stand there and no decree should be passed at this stage in terms of the compromise. The petitioner on the other hand began with opposing the petition of the plaintiff that a compromise should be recorded and a consent decree be passed, and, now that the compromise has been recorded, he says that a decree should also be passed against him. It is also to be noted that defendants 1, 3, 4 and 6 are still neutral in the matter and have not joined the petition. Now the attitude of the plaintiff though it merits no sympathy from us may be explained in view of the difficulties pointed out by the Subordinate Judge to the passing of the decrees piecemeal.

The petitioner''s attitude, however, does not appear to me to be quite intelligible, because if he is really opposed to the compromise being recorded, as at one time he was, he can appeal against the order now that the compromise has been recorded and he can have the whole order set, aside, if he succeeds in showing that the compromise has been improperly recorded. Then again having once opposed the recording of the compromise and the passing of the decree I do not see why he should now turn round and insist upon a decree being passed unless if is for some tactical reasons which have not been disclosed before us and which he does not want to disclose.

Having regard therefore to the circumstances of Mio case I am not disposed to interfere with the order passed by the Subordinate Judge against which this application is directed. The application therefore fails and is dismissed, but there will be no order as to costs in view of the inconsistent attitude adopted by the plaintiff.

There remains now the application of the petitioner dated 26th April 1929. That application has not been pressed before us probably in view of the fact that we have finally heard and are going to dispose of the Civil Revision. No. 179 of 1929, and as there is no merit in the application that application also is rejected. The Subordinate Judge will now proceed with the trial of the case and it is hoped that both the parties will cooperate with him in finishing the trial as early as possible, considering that this litigation has been going on sines 1916.

Chatterji, J.

I agree. The contention raised by the learned Counsel for the petitioner implies that we must read the word " forthwith " between the words "shall" and "pass" in Order 23, Rule 3, Civil P.C. I do not see any reason to read any word which does not exist in the rule, and if the legislature intended that the decree must at once be prepared in every instance without regard to the circumstances of each case it can very well be presumed that the word "forthwith" would have been used by it. The Lord Chancellor Lord Loreburn has stated in Vickers, Son and Maxim v. Evans [1910] 79 L.J.K.B. 594:

We are not entitled to read words into an Act of Parliament unless clear reason for it is to be found within the four corners of the Act itself.

This has been reiterated by Tindal, C.J., in Everett v. Wells [1841] 2 M. & G. 269 where it is observed that

it is our duty neither to add to nor to take from a statute unless we see good ground for thinking that the legislature intended something which it has failed precisely to express.

Therefore let us look to the Act itself in order to see whether we shall be justified in adding the word "forthwith" as contended on behalf of the petitioner.

The word "decree" has been defined in Section 2, Sub-section (2), Civil P.C., and means the formal expression of an adjudication which, so far as regards the Court expressing it, conclusively determines the rights of the parties with regard to all or any of the matters in controversy in the suit and may be either preliminary or final. But the essential thing to remember is that it is the formal expression of an adjudication which conclusively determines the rights of the parties. The parties here certainly mean the parties to the action. Therefore, there must prima facie be one complete decree which would formally express an adjudication conclusively determining the rights of the parties. Now in the present case a compromise is recorded as binding on defendants other than defendant 5. If a decree be at once prepared on the basis thereof it will express an adjudication between the plaintiff and some of the parties to the suit. Therefore, it is impossible at this stage to prepare a self-contained decree determining the rights of the parties, that is, all the parties to the litigation. In this view it cannot be said that the Act affords a reason for reading the word forthwith into the rule. Bather the indication from the Act itself points the other way.

Order 23, Rule 3, proceeds on the basis of an adjustment of a suit wholly or in part by any lawful agreement or compromise and refers to three stages: namely (1) an enquiry whether a lawful compromise has really been effected; (2) order that such compromise be recorded; and (3) the passing of a decree in accordance with the compromise so far as it relates to the suit. It is suggested that if the Court feels in any case that a decree cannot be prepared immediately then the Court should not pass an order that the compromise be recorded, but an answer to this is quite simple. Suppose in a case the parties enter into a compromise, but one of them resiles from it thus necessitating an enquiry, while the only material witness to prove the compromise is a person in deathbed. The Court cannot in a case like this postpone the enquiry and having held the enquiry cannot properly defer passing an order for any length of time.

Therefore a contingency may arise when it becomes the bounden duty of a Court to order an agreement to be recorded oven if it finds that it cannot pass a decree immediately. In the present case the original compromise was entered into not only by the petitioner but also by other members of the family including Ganganand who was defendant 5. It has been held in this Court in a suit brought to set aside the aforesaid compromise and the decree passed thereupon that the compromise decree is void as against Ganganand though the compromise is binding on ''the others. The decree that was passed by Das, J., with the concurrence of Adami, J., runs as follows:

I give Ganganand a decree declaring that the compromise decree passed by the learned Subordinate Judge in suit No. 172 of 1916 is void as against him. I must also issue a permanent injunction restraining the defendant from executing the decree against the interest of Ganganand in any of the properties. It is obvious that the entire consent decree must go as Ganganand has no interest in it capable of being separated from the interests of the other member of the family.

In the absence of Ganganand and when the litigation, so far as he is concerned, is still pending, how can the Court pass a decree on the compromise according to the terms of which the entire mortgaged property including the interest of Ganganand is to be sold? It is only at the conclusion of the trial that it will be possible for the Subordinate Judge to pass an effective decree determining the right of the parties, otherwise serious complications may arise.

Considering all the circumstances of the case I agree that it is not a fit case for invoking the revisions jurisdiction of this Court and that the application should be dismissed.