Abhishek Kumar vs State Of H.P. And Others

Rakesh Kainthla, J

The petitioner has filed the present petition for quashing of FIR No. 0056 of 2025, dated 10.04.2025, registered for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 121(1), 132, 190, 191(2), 324(4), and 333 of Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023 and Section 3 of Prevention of Damage to Public Property (PDP) Act, 1984 at Police Station Dehra, District Kangra, H.P. and also consequential proceedings arising out of the FIR.

It has been asserted that, as per the prosecution, the informant, Head Constable Surender Singh, was posted as Investigating Officer in Police Post Dadasiba. He was present in the Police Post on 09.04.2025 along with his staff. Constable Yusuf Deen was sitting outside the Police Post. The petitioner Abhishek Kumar, his brother, Parikshit, Om Dutt, Lucky, Kalu and two other people came to the Police Station and told Constable Yusuf Deen that they had to make a complaint about a threat extended to Lucky by liquor contractors from Punjab. Ankush alias Hondo, Aashu and Anku also reached the spot, in two different vehicles with 10-12 people. Ankush alias Hondo enquired as to who was saying that he would sell illicit liquor. Petitioner Abhisek Kumar started video recording the incident. Ankush and other people asked the petitioner why he was video recording the incident. The petitioner replied that he was a journalist and was preparing a video of the incident. Both parties started quarrelling with each other outside the Police Post. The informant was carrying out the investigation, and he was obstructed in the discharge of his duties. He came out of the Police Post and requested the people not to quarrel with each other. However, both parties continued to abuse each other. Ashu and Kalu caught each other by the throat and started beating each other. The informant and other police officials tried to rescue Ashu, Kalu and other persons. The petitioner entered the police Post while video recording the incident. Ashu, Kalu and other people also tried to enter the Police Post. Constable Yusuf Deen tried to prevent them from entering the Police Post. However, he was pushed, and the door of the Police Post was damaged. The articles lying inside the Police Post were picked up by the persons and thrown at each other. The laptop, keyboard and mouse were damaged in the incident. The informant asked the people to go outside the Police Post, but they refused. They pushed the informant, and he sustained injuries. All the persons except the petitioner left the Police Post, and the petitioner continued to video record the incident. The people who had gone outside the Police Post tried to re-enter the post. The matter was reported to the police, and the police investigated the FIR.

Being aggrieved by the registration of the FIR, the petitioner has filed the present petition asserting that he has been a journalist since 2022. He was present at Dadasiba to cover news events. He went to the Police Post after hearing the noise and started covering the incident happening outside the Police Post Dadasiba. The petitioner had not caused any interruption to the police in the discharge of their official duties. He had also not caused any damage to the public property. The petitioner was prevented from video recording the incident, and he had made a complaint to the Superintendent of Police, Dehra, District Kangra, H.P., regarding the incident. The allegations of the FIR, even if accepted to be correct, do not constitute the commission of any cognizable offence; therefore, it was prayed that the FIR and the proceedings arising out of the FIR be quashed against the petitioner.

The petition is opposed by filing a status report reproducing the contents of the FIR. It was asserted that the petitioner was asked to produce the documents regarding his status as a journalist, but he did not produce any documents and went outside the Police Post. The petitioner's brothers were asked to call the petitioner, but his phone was found to be busy. Om Dutt revealed subsequently that the petitioner had circulated a live video in which he was threatening to commit suicide. The petitioner was found on the riverbank of the Beas River, and he had consumed some poison. He was admitted to the hospital, and his samples were preserved. The accused had damaged the door of the Police Post, which was worth ₹19,186/-. Many cases were registered against the petitioner. The CCTV footage of the incident was seized. As per the report of RFSL, Dharamshala, Phenol was detected in the petitioner's samples. The petitioner has wrongly asserted in his petition that he was present at the place of the incident as a journalist. He was involved in the commission of the offence with the other co-accused. Hence, the status report.

I have heard Mr Ram Lal Thakur, Ld. counsel for the petitioner and Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General, for the respondent/State.

Mr Ram Lal Thakur, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the petitioner is innocent and he was falsely implicated. The allegations in the FIR, even if accepted to be correct, do not constitute the commission of any cognizable offence. The petitioner is a journalist, and he was video recording the incident. He had not caused any obstruction to any police official. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the FIR registered against the petitioner, and the proceedings arising out of the said FIR be quashed.

Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General for the respondent/State, submitted that the petitioner was involved in the commission of the crime with the other co-accused. The petitioner and the co-accused had damaged the door of the Police Post Dadasiba and obstructed the informant in the discharge of his official duties. The police have completed the investigation and filed the charge sheet before the Court. This Court should not exercise the inherent jurisdiction vested with it and should leave the matter to the learned Trial Court, which is seized of the matter. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed.

I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.

The law relating to quashing of FIR was explained by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in B.N. John v. State of U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 7 as under: -

"7. As far as the quashing of criminal cases is concerned, it is now more or less well settled as regards the principles to be applied by the court. In this regard, one may refer to the decision of this Court in State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, wherein this Court has summarised some of the principles under which FIR/complaints/criminal cases could be quashed in the following words:

"102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.

(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.

(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code, except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.

(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.

(4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.

(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable based on which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.

(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings, and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.

(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to a private and personal grudge." (emphasis added)

Of the aforesaid criteria, clause no. (1), (4) and (6) would be of relevance to us in this case.

In clause (1), it has been mentioned that where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused, then the FIR or the complaint can be quashed.

As per clause (4), where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order dated by the Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155 (2) of the CrPC, and in such a situation, the FIR can be quashed.

Similarly, as provided under clause (6), if there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the CrPC or the concerned Act under which the criminal proceedings are instituted, such proceedings can be quashed."

This position was reiterated in Ajay Malik v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 185, wherein it was observed:

"8. It is well established that a High Court, in exercising its extraordinary powers under Section 482 of the CrPC, may issue orders to prevent the abuse of court processes or to secure the ends of justice. These inherent powers are neither controlled nor limited by any other statutory provision. However, given the broad and profound nature of this authority, the High Court must exercise it sparingly. The conditions for invoking such powers are embedded within Section 482 of the CrPC itself, allowing the High Court to act only in cases of clear abuse of process or where intervention is essential to uphold the ends of justice.

It is in this backdrop that this Court, over the course of several decades, has laid down the principles and guidelines that High Courts must follow before quashing criminal proceedings at the threshold, thereby pre-empting the Prosecution from building its case before the Trial Court. The grounds for quashing, inter alia, contemplate the following situations : (i) the criminal complaint has been filed with mala fides; (ii) the FIR represents an abuse of the legal process; (iii) no prima facie offence is made out; (iv) the dispute is civil in nature; (v.) the complaint contains vague and omnibus allegations; and (vi) the parties are willing to settle and compound the dispute amicably (State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335)

The present petition is to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court.

The allegations in the FIR show that the petitioner and his brother had visited the Police Post along with some other persons, complaining of a threat advanced to Lucky. The other persons came to the spot, and both parties started quarrelling with each other. The petitioner started video recording the incident. He entered the Police Post and continued to video record the incident. The fact that the petitioner was video recording the whole incident right from the beginning till the end clearly shows that he was not involved in beating any person or obstructing any police official in the discharge of their official duties.

The informant asserted in the FIR that he was carrying out the investigation, and the quarrel between the persons caused obstructions to him. This is not sufficient. It was laid down by the Supreme Court B.N. John (supra) that there must be an assault or criminal force meant to deter a public servant from discharging his official duties. It was observed:

"23. For a prohibited act to come within the scope of the offence under Section 353 of the IPC, such an act must qualify either as an assault or criminal force meant to deter a public servant from the discharge of his duty. Obviously, such an act cannot be a mere act of obstruction, which is an offence under Section 186 of the IPC. The offence contemplated under Section 353 of the IPC is of a more serious nature involving criminal force, or assault, which attracts more stringent punishment that may extend to two years. On the other hand, the offence of obstruction covered under Section 186 of the IPC is punishable by imprisonment, which may extend to three months at the maximum.

A close examination of Section 353 of the IPC would indicate that to invoke the aforesaid offence, there must be use of criminal force or assault on any public servant in the execution of his official duty or with the intent to prevent or deter such public servant from discharging his duty. It would be clear from a reading of the provisions of Section 186 as well as Section 353 of the IPC that Section 353 of the IPC is the aggravated form of offence where criminal force or assault is involved. Unlike in the case of Section 186 of the IPC, where voluntarily obstructing any public servant in the discharge of his official function is sufficient to invoke the said section, in the case of an offence under Section 353 of the IPC, as mentioned above, not only obstruction but actual use of criminal force or assault on the public servant is necessary.

In the present case, however, what can be seen from a perusal of the contents of the FIR is that no such allegation of assault or use of criminal force has been made. The aforesaid FIR is based on the complaint filed by the District Probation Officer, which has already been quoted above, and the same has been reproduced verbatim in the said FIR, in which only the allegation of creating disturbance has been made.

In the FIR, there is no allegation of use of criminal force or assault by the appellant so as to invoke the provision of Section 353 of the IPC. It is to be remembered that a criminal process is initiated only with the lodging of an FIR. Though FIR is not supposed to be an encyclopedia containing all the detailed facts of the incident and it is merely a document that triggers and sets into motion the criminal legal process, yet it must disclose the nature of the offence alleged to have been committed as otherwise, it would be susceptible to being quashed as held in Bhajan Lal's case (supra) (vide clause 1 of Para 102 of the decision).

This Court in CBI v. Tapan Kumar Singh, (2003) 6 SCC 175, observed as follows:

"20. It is well settled that a first information report is not an encyclopaedia, which must disclose all facts and details relating to the offence reported. An informant may lodge a report about the commission of an offence, though he may not know the name of the victim or his assailant. He may not even know how the occurrence took place. A first informant need not necessarily be an eyewitness so as to be able to disclose in great detail all aspects of the offence committed. What is of significance is that the information given must disclose the commission of a cognizable offence, and the information so lodged must provide a basis for the police officer to suspect the commission of a cognizable offence. At this stage, it is enough if the police officer, on the basis of the information given, suspects the commission of a cognizable offence, and not that he must be convinced or satisfied that a cognizable offence has been committed. If he has reasons to suspect, on the basis of information received, that a cognizable offence may have been committed, he is bound to record the information and conduct an investigation. At this stage, it is also not necessary for him to satisfy himself about the truthfulness of the information "

(emphasis added)

However, a perusal of the FIR in issue does not at all indicate the commission of any crime of use of criminal force or assault by the appellant against the public servant, except for the offence of obstruction, which is punishable under Section 186 of the IPC. As such, the ingredients of the offence under Section 353 of the IPC are clearly absent in the FIR. To that extent, we are in agreement with the appellant that since no ingredient for the offence under Section 353 of the IPC is found in the FIR, taking cognisance by the CJM of an offence that is not made out in the FIR does not appear to be correct."

In the present case, there is no evidence that any assault or criminal force was caused to the informant by the petitioner. The status report repeatedly mentions that the petitioner continued to video record the incident. Therefore, the contents of the status report do not show the commission of an offence punishable under Section 132 of the BNS.

The police have registered the FIR for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 191(2), 190, 333, 121(1) and 324(4) of BNS. Section 121(1) of BNS punishes a person who voluntarily causes hurt or grievous hurt to deter a public servant from his duty. The status report nowhere mentions that the petitioner had caused any hurt to any police official with the intent to deter him from discharging his duties. Hence, the allegation in the FIR does not satisfy the requirements of Section 121(1) of BNS.

Section 190 of BNS deals with the members of an unlawful assembly, and Section 191 (2) of BNS deals with rioting. As per the status report, the petitioner was merely video recording the incident. The status report does not show that he had caused any hurt to any person or damage to any property.

Therefore, the allegations in the status report do not satisfy the requirements of these sections.

Section 324 (4) of BNS deals with mischief. The status report does not mention that the petitioner had caused damage to any property. Therefore, the ingredients of Section 324 (4) and Section 3 of the PDPP Act are not satisfied.

Section 333 of the BNS deals with house trespass after preparing for hurt, assault or wrongful restraint. The status report specifically mentions that the petitioner had entered the Police Post to video record the incident. Therefore, there was no house trespass with the intent to cause hurt to any person.

It was submitted that the petitioner had not produced any document showing that he was a journalist. This submission will not help the State because even if the petitioner were not a journalist, video recording the incident did not constitute any offence.

Therefore, the submission that the allegations in the FIR, even if accepted to be correct, do not constitute the commission of any cognizable offence has to be accepted as correct, and the continuation of the proceedings against the petitioner cannot be permitted.

No other point was urged.

In view of the above, the present petition is allowed and F.I.R. No. 0056 dated 10.04.2025, registered for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 191(2), 190, 333, 132, 121(1) and 324 (4) of BNS, 2023 and Section 3 of PDPP Act, 1984 is ordered to be quashed qua the petitioner. Consequent upon the quashing of FIR, criminal proceedings pending/initiated against the petitioner (Abhishek Kumar) in pursuance thereof are also ordered to be quashed.

Petition stands disposed of in the above terms, so also pending applications, if any.

The observations made herein before shall remain confined to the disposal of the petition and will have no bearing whatsoever on the merits of the case.

Parties are permitted to produce a copy of this judgment, downloaded from the webpage of the High Court of Himachal Pradesh, before the authorities concerned, and the said authorities shall not insist on the production of a certified copy, but if required, may verify passing of the order from the website of the High Court.