Achhra Singh vs Om Parkash Garg

This is landlord''s petition whose ejectment application has been dismissed by both the authorities below.

The landlord Achhra Singh sought the ejectment of his tenant Om Parkash Garg from the house in dispute which consists of three rooms on the ground floor and two Chobaras on the first floor. The premises were rented at the monthly rent of Rs.33/- besides the tenant was also to pay the house tax and property tax. The building is situated in Sirhindi Gate, Patiala. The ejectment was sought on the ground that the landlord required the promises for the residence of his son Harcharan Singh who is married and has also got children, as provided in Section 13(2)(3) (iv) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act. It was pleaded that at present the landlord along with his family was living in House No.4258/1 which was insufficient to meet their requirements. His family consists of his wife, one married son Harcharan Singh, and two married daughter. Harcharan Singh''s family consists of his wife, three children, two of them are school going. However, it has been further stated that a fourth child was born during the pendency of these proceedings. The ejectment application was filed on 15-6-1981.It was averred that his son Harcharan Singh is a sectional Officer in Punjab P.W. D. B & R but is under suspension since 16-1-1979. His wife and children are living with the landlord in house No.4258/1. Even if Harcharan Singh is reinstated., his family plans to stay at Patiala for education of the children. The application was resisted on behalf of the tenant on the ground that the two daughters of Achhra Singh are married and that Harcharan Singh being posted out of Patiala is living at the station of his posting. It was denied that Harcharan Singh and his family are living at Patiala. It was also asserted that Harcharan Singh is independent form his father, being in service, and he does not depend upon the landlord. Moreover, he was married much earlier in the year 1969 whereas the ejectment application was filed in the year 1981. Plea was also taken that the landlord earlier also moved an application for his eviction on the ground of personal requirement and that of his married son but he failed up to the High Court. Thus the present application was barred on the principal of res judicata. According to the tenant he is being harassed since 1962 by moving various applications, one after the other, on different grounds. The, learned Rent Controller found that the landlord has failed to prove the ground of ejectment pleaded by him that he required the premises for the occupation of his married son Harcharan Singh. According to the learned Rent controller, accommodation in House No. 4258/1 is sufficient for the families of the landlord and that of his son Harcharan Singh. Consequently, his ejectment application was dismissed. In appeal, the learned appellate authority affirmed the findings of the Rent Controller and maintained the order dismissing the ejectment application. dissatisfied with the same, landlord has filed this petition in this court.

Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the whole approach of the authorities below is wrong, illegal and misconceived. It is nowhere the requirement of law that his married son should have taken place recently in order to claim ejectment on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the authority relied upon by the appellate authority i. e. (1984)1 Ren CJ 438 (Punj & Har), Kasturi Lal sharma V Kartar Singh is clearly distinguishable and has absolutely no applicability to the facts of the present case. Any observations made therein to this effect are obiter dicta. Moreover, argued the learned counsel, in the earlier proceedings where eviction was sought on the ground of personal requirements of the landlord, an application was filed in the High court in C. R. No. 337 of 1979 decided on 23-2-1981 copy Ex. AW/A that the landlord be allowed to make necessary amendments and to plead that he also required the premises for the occupation of his married son This plea or the landlord was not accepted at that time and the revision petition was dismissed. However, it was made clear therein that any observations made therein will not be deemed to limit the right of the petitioner to file a fresh ejectment application on a new cause of action, if available, to him under law. Thus argued the learned counsel, earlier no finding was given as regards the requirement of the married son, and therefore, findings of the authorities below in this behalf, are wrong, illegal and based on surmises and conjectures.

On the other hand, learned counsel for the tenant submitted that on the appreciation of the evidence it has been concurrently found that the requirement for the married son of the landlord was not bona fide and therefore, it did not call for interference in revisional jurisdiction. Moreover, argued that learned counsel, meanwhile father of Achhra Singh and his mother have died and therefore, accommodation in the present house where the landlord is living is sufficient to meet the requirements of his married son Harcharan Singh as well.

I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and I have also gone through the relevant record.

It may be that the landlord earlier filed the ejectment application but it could not be disputed that none of the ejectment applications was filed on the ground that he required the premises for the occupation of his married son, which is an independent ground under the Act, as provided under Sec.13(3) (2)(iv). As a matter of fact during the pendency of the Civil Revision in this Court referred to above, an application was filed on behalf of the suspension of his son Harcharan Singh, he may be allowed to amend his ejectment application and take this plea, but the same was not allowed and rather the question was left open to make a fresh application on that ground, if available. Thus, it is quite evident that this matter as to whether the landlord bona fide required the premises for his son Harcharan Singh or not, was never adjudicated upon. This fresh cause of faction has arisen to the landlord because in the year1979 his son Harcharan Singh was suspended from service. Because of that suspension he along with his family consisting of his wife and three children at that time (now four) has shifted to his father''s house at Patiala. Earlier the whole family was living at the place of his posting. In these circumstances, what was to be decided was as to whether the present accommodation in occupation of Harcharan Singh, the married son of the landlord, for whose occupation the premises in dispute are required to be vacated, was sufficient or not? The appellate authority was obsessed with certain observations in Kasturi Lal sharma''s case (1984 Ren CJ 438) (Punj & Har)(supra)wherein, it was observed:--

"The provision contained in this clause cannot be interpreted so as to entitle the landlord to claim ejectment of the tenant for the residence of his married son who is not dependant upon him and is residing separately upon him and is residing separately for a number of years."

After going through the said judgment it appears that the said observations are obiter dicta because in that case ejectment was sought on the ground of personal requirements of the landlord himself and not for the occupation of his married son.Moreover, in that case it was further found that the married son had his own house of equivalent area in the same vicinity. After making these observations the learned Judge further observed that:--

"The plea of the need of the married son and his family was, therefore, neither set up nor substantiated from the facts proved on the record."

In these circumstances, it could not be successfully argued on behalf on the tenant that since Harcharan Singh was not dependant earlier in the year 1969 and therefore, on these grounds the landlord could not seek the ejectment of his tenant under the said clause. from the language of the section, no such interpretation is warranted. It will have to be seen in each case as to when the need arose for the landlord to seek ejectment of his tenant on the ground that he required the premises for his married son. That being so, it becomes immaterial whether his son is dependent on him or not or when the marriage took place. Section 13 itself requires that when the ejectment is sough on that ground then he must prove that his married son is not occupying in the urban area concerned another building for his residence. As regards the facts of the present case the house now being occupied by the landlord was not sufficient for the accommodation of the landlord along with the family of his married son Harcharan Singh which consisted of his wife and four children. The children are of growing age. When Harcharan Singh appeared as AW 10 on 6-1-1983 he stated that his eldest son is Ravinder Singh aged 12 years, younger to him, is his daughter Ritu aged 8 years, next to the forth is daughter who has not yet been named was born about 5 months ago. His son Ravinder is studying in 5th Class whereas his daughter Ritu in Ist Class in Shivalik Public School. Richa was also admitted about 2 months ago in a school near their house. He has also given the accommodation in the house occupied by them which consists of three rooms, two chubaras and three small kothris which was insufficient for their accommodation and for the accommodation of their cattle. On the part of the tenant, what has been pleaded was that the application was not bona fide becuase earlier also his ejectment was being sought on different grounds. Even if it be so, the question is whether the ground on which the ejectment is being sought now was ever taken earlier and whether this ground has become available to him only in the year1979, when his married son Harcharan Singh was suspended form service. On the facts and circumstances of the case I am of the view that the bona fide requirements of the landlord for his married son is amply proved on the record and the approach of the authorities below in this behalf is wholly wrong, illegal and misconceived.

The authority referred to above relied upon by the appellate authority is clearly distinguishable. In these circumstances, the petition succeeds, the impugned orders are set aside and the eviction order is passed against the tenant.

However, the tenant is allowed three months'' time to vacate the premises provided all the arrears of rent, if and advance rent for 3 months is deposited with the Rent undertaking in writing that on the expiry of the said period, vacant possession will be handed over to the landlord.

Petition allowed.