Adhimoola Gounder, Adhilatchumi, Ranganathan, Adhimoolam P., Saroja, Janarthanam and Kamaraj vs Batcha Reddiar

A. Ramamurthi, J.—The second defendant in the suit is the appellant.

The case in brief is as follows:-

a) The plaintiff filed a suit for recovery of a sum of Rs.15,000/- towards principal and interest. The defendants borrowed Rs.15,000/- on

22.12.1977 from the plaintiff, agreed to pay the said amount with interest at 12 per cent per annum. Thereafter, no payment was made and notice

was sent to the second defendant and in spite of this, no amount was paid. The suit is not barred by limitation as saved under the French Law.

b) The defendants resisted the suit stating that they never borrowed the suit amount of Rs.15,000/- from the plaintiff and they never executed the

suit document. They took land of the plaintiff for cultivation as tenants and at that time, the signatures were obtained by the plaintiff in more than

one document. In that process, he must have fabricated the suit pro-note. The lands were also subsequently acquired by the Government. Besides

the suit is also barred by limitation since it was instituted after ten years.

c) The trial Court framed four issues and on behalf of the plaintiff, he was examined as P.W.1 and Exs.A-1 to A-4 were marked. On the side of

the defendants, D.Ws.1 and 2 were examined and Ex.B.1 was marked. The trial Court dismissed the suit and aggrieved against this, the plaintiff

preferred A.S.No.21 of 1989 on the file of I Additional District Judge, Pondicherry and the learned Judge, after hearing the parties, allowed the

appeal and set aside the judgment and decree of the trial Court and decreed the suit. Aggrieved against this, the second defendant has come

forward with the present second appeal.

At the time of admission of the second appeal, the appellants have raised the following substantial questions of law:-

i) Whether the suit filed on 28.7.87 based on a promissory note dated 22.12.77 is not barred by limitation?

ii) In the light of the facts and circumstances of the case, whether Article 2262 of French Code Civil could be said to be applicable to the present

case?

iii) Whether the suit promissory note is not equivalent under the French Law to a ""Billet d''Ordre"" and if so, whether the application of Article 2262

of the French Code Civil is valid and proper?

Heard the learned counsel for the parties.

The plaintiff filed a suit for recovery of a sum of Rs.15,000/- and the defendants executed Ex.A.1 pro-note dated 22.12.77. Ex.A.2 is the office

copy of the notice and Ex.A.3 is the reply. The main defence taken by the defendants is that the suit document was not executed and they never

borrowed Rs.15,000/-. They also raised a plea that even assuming that the suit document was executed in the year 1977, the suit was filed in the

year 1987, that is, after a period of ten years and as such, it is barred by limitation.

The trial Court dismissed the suit whereas the lower appellate Court reversed the said finding and decreed the suit. The learned counsel for the

appellants mainly contended that the lower appellate Court erred in finding that the suit is not barred by limitation. The lower appellate Court erred

in finding that Article 2262 of French Code Civil alone would apply and it provides a period of 30 years for filing the suit. The period of limitation

is only three years and therefore, it is barred by time. Article 2262 of the French Code Civil would be not applicable and that the promissory note

would be a document equivalent under the French Law to Billet d''Ordre.

The learned counsel for the appellants raised a plea that the execution of the document Ex.A.1 was denied, but no finding has been given by the

trial Court as well as the appellate Court. It is necessary to state that this ground has not been taken as one of the grounds in the appeal now filed

presently. The learned counsel for the appellants mainly contended that the suit has not been filed within a period of three years and admittedly,

filed after ten years and under the New Limitation Act, the suit is clearly barred by limitation. The learned counsel also stated that Article 2262 has

no application after the passing of Indian Limitation Act, 1963, which provides the period of limitation as three years.

Reliance is placed upon the judgment in Syndicate Bank Vs. Mr. Prabha D. Naik and Another etc., , wherein it is stated that the Limitation Act,

1963 is the one general law of limitation for whole of India, except State of Jammu and Kashmir and is applicable to Union Territory of Goa,

Daman and Diu, in case of a right arising under Indian Law. The provision regarding extinction of remedy under Portuguese Civil Code is deemed

to be repealed by implication. Admittedly, the Limitation Act is a statute enacting the provisions in general terms applicable to the entire country

excepting the exception as mentioned in the statute itself. It is a later statute of the year 1963 only that Portuguese Civil Code assuming had its

application in the State of Goa, Daman and Diu and an earlier statute thus stands altered, as the latter is expressed in affirmative language, more so

by reason of specific application of the Negotiable Instruments Act and Indian Contract Act and it thus cannot but be said to be repealing by

implication.

The learned counsel for the respondent, however, stated that the aforesaid decision cannot be made applicable to the present case because the

local law of Pondicherry Civil Code has not been repealed and this being a special law, it will prevail. Moreover, in the decision cited above, it is

clearly stated that so far as Goa, Daman and Diu are concerned, the applicability of the local law has been repealed, but insofar as Pondicherry is

concerned, it was not repealed and hence, Article 2262 of the Pondicherry Civil Code alone is applicable.

The learned counsel for the respondent relied upon the judgment in CHOCKALINGA MUDALIAR v. MANIVANNA PILLAI (1978) 2

M.L.J. 544, wherein it is stated that the French Civil Code was a local law because it applied, and was in force, in the former French

establishments of Pondicherry and it was not in force anywhere else in India and that after the de jure merger of Pondicherry in the Indian Union on

16th August, 1962, all the laws formerly in force in that territory were continued, by force of Section 4(1) of the Pondicherry (Administration) Act,

1962 and this meant that the laws so preserved continued to remain local laws. It is further stated that the law of limitation in the French Civil Code

had thus to be regarded as a local law, because that was what its character was at the time when Parliament passed the Limitation Act, 1963.

It has been held in Justiniano Augusto De Piedade Barreto Vs. Antonio Vicente Da Fonseca and Others, , that the body of provisions in the

Portuguese Civil Code dealing with the subject of Limitation of suits etc., and in force in the Union Territory of Goa, Daman and Diu only is ""local

law"" within the meaning of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963. These provisions have to be read into the Limitation Act, 1963, as if the

Schedule to the Limitation Act is amended mutatis mutandis. No question of repugnancy arises. The provisions of the Portuguese Civil Code

relating to limitation continue to be in force in the Union Territory of Goa, Daman and Diu.

Reliance is also placed upon the judgment in Rajamannar Chettiar Vs. Velayutha Chettiar and Another, under the Rent Control Act relating to

Pondicherry.

Reliance is also placed upon the judgment in COOPOUSAMY v. ALAMELU (1988) 1 M.L.J. 422, wherein it is held that merely because

the law of Limitation is a procedural law, it cannot be deemed to have been extended, replacing local laws u/s 29(2) of Limitation Act as soon as

C.P.C. was extended with effect from 1.8.1966. The said local law, as held by the Full Bench is the ''LEX FORI'', for suits instituted even after

C.P.C., was extended. Unless the other provisions of the Limitation Act are extended, French Civil Code being the ''Local Law'' and such a law

having been applied by the Court below.

Reliance is also placed upon the judgment in Palaniraja and Others Vs. Jayalakshmi, , which was exactly under Article 2262 of the French

Code Civil.

It has also been held in a Division Bench decision of this Court in RANGASWAMY @ GOVINDARAJAN (DIED) v.

KOTHANDARAMAN 1977 2 CTC 97 relating to applicability to territory of Pondicherry by virtue of G.O.Ms.9/95 LD dated 28.2.95 and that

provisions of limitation Act is made applicable to Pondicherry with effect from 1.3.95. It is clear from this decision that Article 2262 would

continue to have application in the Union territory of Pondicherry and the extended period of limitation provided therein will be available to a

litigant. So far as the Union territory of Pondicherry is concerned, it is only thereafter the Pondicherry Limitation (Repeal of Local Laws) Act,

1995, Act 15 of 1994 was passed. The said Act provided for in Section 3, repeal of local laws in force in the Union territory of Pondicherry or

any area therein corresponding to the Limitation Act, 1963 on and from the date of coming into force of the said Act. Section 1(3) provided that

the Act shall come into force on such date as the Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, appoint. The Government of Pondicherry

issued the aforesaid G.O. appointing first day of March, 1995 as the date on which the provisions of Act 15 of 1994 shall come into force in the

whole of the Union territory of Pondicherry. In view of the above, the local law, namely, the French Civil Code in so far as it relates to the relevant

provision pertaining to the period of limitation visualised under Article 2262 of the French Civil Code, could, if at all, be said to have ceased

application only on and from 1.3.1995. I am of the view that this decision is applicable to the case on hand. Hence, there is no difficulty in coming

to the conclusion that the suit is well within time and there is no reason calling for any interference.

For the reasons stated above, the second appeal fails and is dismissed.