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K.A. Puj, J.—The applicant has taken out this judges summons seeking clarification/modification in the order dated March 18, 2008, read with order dated November 21, 2008, passed in Official Liquidator Report No. 37 of 2008 and Company Application No. 443 of 2008. The applicant has also prayed for the declaration that the applicant is not liable to pay the outstanding electricity dues of the company in liquidation, for the pre-liquidation period in respect of composite lot, which included land bearing Plot No. 2348 of Survey/Block No. 219/paiki-3 admeasuring 28,328 sq. meters situated at Champaner Road, Moje Chandrapiir, Taluka Halol and land bearing Plot No. 2348 bearing Survey/Block Nos. 110/1/1118 and 110/1119 admeasuring about 32136.90 sq. meters, situated at Champaner Road, Moje Khinjarva, Taluka Savali, District Vadodara admeasuring in aggregate 60,464.90 sq. meters apropos to the order dated March 18, 2008, made by this Court in O.L.R. No. 37 of 2008 read with order dated November 21, 2008, passed by this Court in Company Application No. 443 of 2008. The applicant has further prayed for a direction to the Respondents to take all necessary steps to provide fresh electricity connection in respect of the land in question without insisting to pay the outstanding electricity dues of the pre-liquidation period of the company in liquidation. The applicant has further prayed for direction to the Respondents to provide temporary electricity connection at the site of M/s. Jalan Forgings Ltd. (in liquidation), at the land described hereinabove, without insisting to pay the outstanding electricity dues of the pre-liquidation period of the company in liquidation.
An affidavit in support of judges summons is filed by one Mr. Suresh Agarwal, director and authorised officer of the applicant. An affidavit in reply is filed on behalf of Respondents Nos. 2 and 3 by the executive engineer, Madhya Gujarat Vij Co. Ltd. Affidavit in rejoinder is filed on behalf of the applicant. Affidavit in surrejoinder is filed on behalf of Respondents Nos. 2 and 3 by the executive engineer of Madhya Gujarat Vij Co. Ltd.
Heard Mr. N.K. Pahwa, the learned advocate appearing for the applicant, Mr. J.S. Yadav, the learned advocate appearing for the official liquidator and Mr. M.D. Pandya, learned senior counsel appearing with Ms. Maya Desai for Respondents Nos. 2 and 3.
It is the case of the applicant that M/s. Jalan Forgings Ltd., came to be wound up by this Court vide its order dated December 1, 2005, passed in Company Petition No. 325 of 1999. This Court has confirmed the terms and conditions of sale of the assets of the company in liquidation and directed the official liquidator to invite bids for sale of the properties of the company in liquidation. Pursuant to the said order, the official liquidator published public advertisements in the local dailies and offers received by the official liquidator were placed before the sale committee for consideration. After the sale committee considered the offers, the official liquidator filed his Report No. 37 of 2008 before the court for confirmation of sale. This Court directed the official liquidator to intimate all the bidders for inter se bidding before this Court and after inter se bidding took place before this Court, the offer of M/s. Ajar Enterprises came to be accepted at Rs. 4.25 crores in respect of the composite lot, which included the land in question. By order dated March 18, 2008, passed by this Court in O.L.R. No. 37 of 2008, this Court has confirmed the sale on the terms and conditions approved by this Court in favour of M/s. Ajar Enterprises. As per the terms and conditions of the order confirming the sale in favour of M/s. Ajar Enterprises P. Ltd., the said party was permitted to appoint one nominee and accordingly the said party has appointed the present applicant as its nominee. The applicant has paid the full consideration pursuant to the order dated March 18, 2008. After making entire purchase consideration the applicant has approached this Court by filing Company Application No. 443 of 2008 seeking directions to the official liquidator to procure all the documents relating to the title of the property from all the secured creditors and also had prayed for execution of sale deed in favour of the applicant. This Court vide its order dated November 21, 2008, directed the official liquidator to make sale deed in favour of the applicant and also directed the official liquidator to hand over all the original documents to the applicant in respect of the property in question.
Pursuant to the said order dated November 21, 2008, two separate sale deeds came to be executed in favour of the applicant on April 16, 2009. Since the applicant was desirous to start up its unit, the applicant on May 7, 2009, made an application to the Respondent electricity company for getting new electricity connection of 4,000 KVA by providing a new HT connection. The applicant also paid requisite fees for registration of the application to the Respondent electricity company. In response to its application, the applicant received a communication from the Respondent electricity company on May 11, 2009, wherein the applicant was directed to pay the dues of the company in liquidation for the pre-liquidation period though the same is contrary to Clause 15 of the terms and conditions of sale. Respondent No. 3 informed the applicant on May 22, 2009, that there are arrears of Rs. 3,61,88,241.27 (principal amount) in the name of the previous consumer in the land bearing Survey No. 2348 and it was made explicit that only after payment of the said arrears, the application of the applicant for electricity connection would be processed. Immediately upon receipt of the said communication, the applicant informed the Respondent-company that the applicant being the auction purchaser is not liable to pay the dues of the electricity company, which is also evident from the sale deed executed by the official liquidator. The claim of the electricity company is entirely for the pre-liquidation period and therefore, the stand of the Respondent electricity company is not correct as per the say of the applicant. The applicant has also lodged a complaint with the Consumer Grievances Redressal Forum, which came to be disposed of by the Forum without appreciating the relevant provisions of the Companies Act, 1956 and the terms and conditions governing the sale in respect of the property in question. The applicant has thereafter taken out the present judges summons seeking the above declaration as well as direction to the Respondent authorities.
Mr. N.K. Pahwa, the learned advocate appearing for the applicant submitted that the applicant is not required to make payment of the statutory dues of the predecessor of the company in liquidation. The claim of the Respondent-company is in respect of pre-liquidation period and therefore as per the Clause 15 of the terms and conditions of sale, the applicant is not liable to make such payments. Even the sale deed in terms stipulated that payment of dues for pre-liquidation period shall be settled as per the provisions of the Companies Act, 1956. It is further submitted that the insistence of the Respondent electricity company to pay dues of the pre-liquidation period by the applicant is without any authority of law. Mr. N.K. Pahwa further submitted, without prejudice to the above contention, that even otherwise considering the overriding provisions of Sections 529 and 529A read with Section 530 of the Companies Act, 1956, the dues of the electricity company are required to be settled by the official liquidator in order of priority as provided for in the above referred provisions. The Respondent electricity company is required to raise its claim before the official liquidator and settle its dues in accordance with the provisions contained in the Companies Act. He has therefore submitted that the stand of the Respondent electricity company is erroneous and contrary to law. Mr. Pahwa has further submitted that the only object of filing the present company application before this Court is to clarify that Clause 15 also includes electricity dues and the applicant being the auction purchaser and covered by Clause 15 of the terms and conditions is not liable to pay the outstanding electricity dues for the pre-liquidation period. He has therefore submitted that this Court should suitably clarify/modify the order dated March 18, 2008, in O.L.R. No. 37 of 2008 read with the order dated November 21, 2008, passed in Company Application No. 443 of 2008, whereby the sale was confirmed in favour of the auction purchaser, including the right of appointment of nominee and the title was transferred in favour of the applicant on the terms, including the term/clause No. 15 of the terms and conditions of sale.
Mr. Pahwa further submitted that in a similar matter filed by one auction purchaser being Company Applications Nos. 11 of 2008 and 12 of 2008, this Court by final order dated March 3, 2008, has directed Uttar Gujarat Vij Co. Ltd., to provide new electricity connection and power supply to the auction purchaser without payment of the dues for the pre-liquidation period. He has further submitted that the said order was challenged by the Uttar Gujarat Vij Co. Ltd., before the Division Bench of this Court by filing O.J. Appeal No. 160 of 2008 with Civil Application No. 324 of 2008 for stay. The Division Bench by its order dated February 12, 2009, has refused to grant interim stay against the said order.
In support of his submission that the applicant is not liable to pay the dues of the previous owner, as per the terms of the sale as well as the order of this Court, Mr. Pahwa relied on the following decisions and/or judgments:
(I). In (Gujarat Industrial Development Corporation v. Official Liquidator (Company Application No. 33 of 2009, decided on August 3, 2009) [2010] 157 Comp Cas 233 ), this Court held that so far as any other liability of the lessee towards local taxes outstanding of the notified area, it can be termed as individual liability of such company in liquidation who is the occupier of the property and such can be equated with the other taxes of the local authorities. As per the decision of the apex court in the case of AI Champdany Industries Limited Vs. The Official Liquidator and Another, , the amount outstanding towards such taxes would fall in the category of debt u/s 530 and such taxes would not be recoverable as obligations to be discharged by the company in liquidation as lessee with GIDC. The said principle was reiterated by the court in the case of Narmada Coaters P. Ltd v. Official Liquidator of Gujarat Rodrel Engineering Products (Company Application No. 201 of 2009) decided on August 13, 2009.
(II). In AI Champdany Industries Limited Vs. The Official Liquidator and Another, , the apex court held that the demand for arrears of property tax from the purchaser is not justified. Seller is bound to pay all public charges up to the date of sale. Unless there is a contract to the contrary, the rights and obligations of the parties to a sale would be as per the provisions contained in the contract. The court further held that the common law principle which was existing on the date of coming into force of the Constitution of India must yield to a statutory provision.
(III). In The State of Gujarat Vs. O.L. of Kengold (India) Ltd. (In Liqn.) and Another, , while deciding the application for review and/or recall of the orders passed by the court, it is observed that the auction purchasers are not liable to discharge any of the liabilities pertaining to the pre-liquidation period of the company in liquidation and all attachments which are made on the assets of the company in liquidation are required to be removed and the auction purchasers are entitled to get absolute, clear and marketable title, free from all encumbrances of the pre-liquidation period of the company in liquidation.
(IV). In Torrent Power AEC Ltd. Vs. Shreeji (Rakhial) Commercial Co-Oprative Housing Soc. Ltd., , the Division Bench of this Court held that a consumer is one who receives, or is supplied electric power and premises are of consumer. Supply of electric power can be disconnected where any person neglects to pay any charge for electricity in respect of supply which was made to said person. Premises cannot be a consumer. The court further held that the Appellant electricity company''s contention that it required to supply power to premises and not to person and hence, if premises are transferred, then transferee is liable to clear the dues of the transferor is without any force and substance.
(V). In Ananta Mills Ltd. (in liquidation) v. City Deputy Collector, Ahmedabad [1972] 42 Comp Cas 476, this Court held that in order to give full effect to the principle underlying the winding up provisions of the Companies Act, the only approach to the problem would be that an attachment simpliciter of the properties of a company, which was subsequently ordered to be wound up without any further action being taken, would be of no consequence or effect against the official liquidator and the property could be disposed of by the official liquidator, fully ignoring the attachment.
(VI). In Regional Director, E.S.I. Corporation v. Official Liquidator of Prasad Mills Ltd. [2006] 131 Comp Cas 652 : [2006] 3 Comp. LJ 379, the Division Bench of this Court held that the Companies Act is a complete code in itself. It provides that in what manner the company petition is to be entertained; how a company is to be taken up for winding up, in what manner an official liquidator is to be appointed, how the official liquidator shall enter upon the properties belonging to the company and after the property comes under the hands of the official liquidator, in what manner it shall be distributed. The court further held that Sections 529A and 530 of the Companies Act, 1956, provides for a clear scheme in relation to distribution of the properties belonging to the company. The first priority is to distribute the assets of the company in favour of the claimants u/s 529A of the Companies Act, 1956 and thereafter the question of Government dues or the taxes or the property attached to them shall arise.
(VII). In Rajratna Naranbhai Mills Co. Ltd. v. New Quality Bobbin Works [1973] 43 Comp Cas 131, this Court held that when the High Court is conducting winding up proceedings of a company ordered to be wound up, its jurisdiction is not confined to its ordinary jurisdiction but a special jurisdiction is confined upon it by Section 446(2). If there is a suit or a proceeding by the company or against the company pending in any court, the same can be withdrawn and disposed of by the High Court. It may be that such a suit or proceeding would not ordinarily lie in the High Court. But the High Court acquires jurisdiction because the company is being wound up and because special jurisdiction in respect of the companies which are ordered to be wound up is conferred by Sub-section (2) of Section 446. It is a statutory duty cast upon the liquidator that a winding up order being made, he must collect all the assets, properties, effects and choses-in-action of the company. Section 456(2) again enacts a deeming fiction by which all those properties collected by the liquidator shall be deemed to be in custody of the court. If the liquidator fails to collect the assets of the company, he would be charged for negligence in performance of duty. Therefore, while performing the duty, if he comes across any sale of property of the company which would be void under any of the provisions of the Companies Act or any other law for the time being in force and which would not be binding on him a liquidator of the company, it would be equally his duty to take action to collect those assets. If this is the duty cast on the liquidator, simultaneously power was conferred upon him u/s 457(1) to institute or defend any legal proceeding. If he has power to institute or defend legal proceedings and if in performance of his duty, he comes across a transaction which is void against him, the transaction becoming void because of the winding up proceedings, it would be a question of fact arising in the course of winding up of the company and this Court will have jurisdiction to decide that question. This appears to be the scope and ambit of jurisdiction conferred upon the High Court u/s 446(2) of the Act.
(VIII). In Commissioner of Customs and Central Excise v. Official Liquidator [2007] 139 Comp Cas 591 (Mad), it is held that after a winding up order was passed and after appointment of the official liquidator, the entire affairs of the company would come to the hands of the official liquidator controlled by the company Court. The Companies (Court) Rules, 1959, gives wide powers to the company court to pass any order in furtherance of justice taking into consideration the charge created over the properties.
(IX). In Textile Labour Association Vs. O.L. of Vijaya Mills Ltd., , it is held that the company court has ample power u/s 446(2) of the Companies Act, 1956, to entertain and dispose of any suit or application by or against the company. Accordingly, the court has held that Respondent No. 3 was never and is not the tenant of the mills company in liquidation. His possession was that of an encroacher and he was illegally and unauthorisedly occupying the disputed premises. The court, therefore, directed the official liquidator to take away the possession from Respondent No. 3 immediately and he was further directed to inform the Ahmedabad Electricity Company to disconnect the electricity supply forthwith.
(X). In Official Liquidator, Himalaya Tools (India) P. Ltd. v. Gujarat State Finance Corporation [1991] 2 GLH 208, it is held that once winding up order is passed, the undertaking and the assets of the company passed under the control of the liquidator whose statutory duty is to release them and to pay out of sale proceeds to his creditors. No new rights can thereafter be created and no incomplete rights can be completed.
This application was strongly opposed by the electricity company. Mr. M.D. Pandya, learned senior counsel appearing for the electricity company has raised certain preliminary objections against the maintainability of this application. He has submitted that the applicant in substance seeks for adjudication of the claim raised by the applicant that it being a purchaser of the properties of the company in liquidation, is not under obligation to clear pre-liquidation dues of the company in liquidation in the shape of electricity dues of the company as claimed by the Respondent-company and as a condition precedent for being entitled to be considered for getting new power connection from the Respondent-company at the premises that were formerly properties of the company in liquidation. He has further submitted that the civil dispute has arisen, after the completed sale and after the applicant has become full and absolute owner of the properties upon a completed sale thereof by the official liquidator, between the applicant and the Respondent-company and this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain and adjudicate the said dispute. He has further submitted that unless a particular matter is specified in the Companies Act or the Rules framed thereunder as one to be dealt with by the company court, it cannot exercise jurisdiction merely because it pertains to a claim by the Respondent against the purchaser of properties and formerly belonging to the company in liquidation sold to the applicant by the official liquidator. Mr. Pandya further submitted that the Companies Act specifies certain questions or disputes to be resolved by the Central Government, certain matters by the Company Law Board and certain matters to be dealt with by the company court and in respect of all other questions of civil disputes, the jurisdiction will be of the ordinary civil court or of the court exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under the constitutional provisions. Only such matters as are specified in the Act or in the Rules to be dealt with by the court could the company court deal with. With respect to all other questions/disputes, the jurisdiction of ordinary civil court is neither expressly nor impliedly barred. He has, therefore, submitted that the natural corollary is that, unless a particular matter is specified in the Act to be dealt with by the company court, it cannot exercise jurisdiction merely because in some distant way the company comes into picture.
Mr. Pandya further submitted that Section 2(11) of the Companies Act, 1956, defines "court" to mean the court having jurisdiction under the Act with respect to the matters relating to that company as provided in Section 10, meaning thereby the appropriate court as between the High Court and the District Court when notified with reference to that matter. Those matters that are required to be dealt with under the Companies Act are specifically mentioned in certain sections such as Sections 17, 79, 101, 391(2) and 398, etc., some of which have now been assigned to the Company Law Board. If the case does not fall under any of those sections listed in Rule 11 of the Companies (Court) Rules, 1959, then they are not cases which are specifically excluded from the civil court. It is only when there is a special mode prescribed under the Companies Act could ordinary jurisdiction of the civil court be ousted. As long as the jurisdiction of the civil court is preserved, the question of bypassing the general remedy cannot arise. The company court functions only under the statutorily conferred jurisdiction. There is no specific provision in the Companies Act, 1956, or the Companies (Court) Rules, 1959, enabling the company court to entertain the proceedings of the type with which the court is presently concerned seeking declaration and other reliefs as are sought and seeking adjudication of the dispute as involved in the matter. He has, therefore, submitted that the present proceedings are void as not being amenable to the jurisdiction of this Court. The preliminary objections as regards jurisdiction of this Court is amply supported by judicial pronouncement of the High Courts and the apex court. By merely looking at the manner and words in which relief is claimed and by merely using the words in the interest of justice this Court cannot overlook the real substance of the dispute of which adjudication is sought by the present proceedings and this Court thereby could not be expected to exercise jurisdiction otherwise not vested in it.
Mr. Pandya further submitted that the Respondent electricity company is not making a claim under the provisions of the Companies Act nor it is making any claim on the strength of anything contained in the order of this Court dated March 16, 2008, read with order dated November 21, 2008, passed in O.L.R. No. 37 of 2008 and Company Application No. 443 of 2008. He has further submitted that the Respondent is not making claim as a creditor under the provisions of the Companies Act and is not making any claim on the basis of any priority in the matter of payment of sums demanded from the applicant under the provisions of the Companies Act so as to require any clarification/modification or declaration as sought for. He has further submitted that it is not disputed that when the occasion arises of official liquidator discharging the liabilities of the company to its creditors the Respondent could not claim any priority other than that as envisaged by the provisions of the Companies Act. Nor is the Respondent making any claim on the basis of any recital in the sale deed. There is no misgiving or misunderstanding so far as the contents of the orders or recitals of the deeds. The demand by the Respondent is not under but outside the purview of the provisions of the Companies Act and would not be governed by the provisions of the Companies Act and would not attract the provisions of Sections 529, 529A read with 530 of the Companies Act. The claim by the Respondent is not under the Companies Act but is a claim outside the purview of the said Act and is a claim for a sum made by the Respondent supplier of electric power against an intending consumer as a condition of such consumer being entitled to be considered for grant of new power connection as per the statutory condition governing supply of power by the Respondent, the validity whereof is upheld by the Division Bench of this Court and legal authority to demand which sum is even without the existence of any statutory provisions upheld by the apex court. Mr. Pandya has, therefore, submitted that this Court could not as a company court grant any declaration as prayed for in respect of a claim not made or arising under the Companies Act and which claim is held to be legal. Mr. Pandya has, therefore, submitted that the present proceedings instituted before this Court should not be entertained and deserve to be summarily rejected.
Mr. Pandya, in support of his submission that the company court does not have jurisdiction in all matters pertaining to the company incorporated under the provisions of the Companies Act, relied on the following decisions of various High Courts as well as the apex court:
(1). In R. Prakasam v. Sree Narayana Dharma Paripalana Yogam [1980] 50 Comp Cas 611 (Ker), it is held that (headnote):
"Whether for vindicating corporate rights or personal, whether representative or individual, the ''action'' cannot be confused with initiation of proceedings before the company court in all matters. Except in cases where the Companies Act, 1956, confers jurisdiction on the company court or some other authority like the Central Government or the Company Law Board, either expressly or by implication, all other disputes pertaining to a company are to be resolved through the forum of civil courts when the disputes are capable of being resolved by them."
The court further held that (headnote of 50 Comp Cas):
"The definition of ''court'' in Clause (11) of Section 2 and Section 10 of the Companies Act, 1956, dealing with ''jurisdiction of courts'' read together only enable the shareholders to decide as to which court they should approach for remedy in respect of a particular matter. It is difficult to construe the definition clause as one conferring jurisdiction exclusive or otherwise and even Section 10 refers only to ''the court having jurisdiction under this Act'' where such jurisdiction is conferred by the Act under particular sections like Sections 107, 155, 163(2), 237, 397, 425, etc. The conferment of jurisdiction on ''the court'' is not u/s 10 but by the other provisions of the Act. The court further held that:
Section 10 of the Act does not purport to invest the company court with jurisdiction over every matter arising under the Act. In view of the elaborate provisions contained in the 1956 Act in regard to management and conduct of a company''s affairs, including even important internal matters of administration, the scope for interference by the civil court may have become more limited, but the power has not at all been taken away. Where a wrong is done to an individual member he could insist by recourse to a civil suit on ''the strict observance of the legal rules, statutory provisions and provisions in the memorandum and articles which cannot be waived by a bare majority of shareholders''."
(2). The same principle is reiterated by the Delhi High Court in the case of Maharaja Exports v. Apparels Exports Promotion Council [1986] 60 Comp Cas 353. While dealing with the suit filed by the Plaintiff, a shareholder in a company, who had filed a suit against the company for a declaration that the notice issued by the company regarding the holding of an annual general meeting was illegal and had, besides other reliefs, sought a declaration that the 27 members of the existing executive committee (i.e., the board of directors) were not entitled to hold their respective offices and further that 18 members who had retired by rotation were not entitled to continue in office, the court held that (headnote):
"... the civil court had jurisdiction to entertain that suit."
(3). The Andhra Pradesh High Court has also reiterated the same principle in the case of Avanthi Explosives P. Ltd. v. Principal Subordinate Judge, Tirupathi [1987] 62 Comp Cas 301, and held that (headnote):
"... the director of a company could maintain a suit before the civil court challenging the validity of resolutions passed by its board of directors to the effect that he had been disqualified from being a director as he had not disclosed his interest as required by Sections 293 and 299 of the Companies Act, 1956, as a partner in a firm from which the company had taken a sub-lease of premises."
(4). In Thiruvaluvar Velanmai Kazhagam (P) Ltd., , it is held that (headnote):
"The exclusion of the jurisdiction of the civil court is not to be readily inferred. Such exclusion must be either explicitly expressed or clearly implied. A provision of law ousting the jurisdiction of a civil court must be strictly construed and the onus lies on the party seeking to oust the jurisdiction to establish his right to do so."
The court further held that (headnote of 64 Comp Cas):
"In respect of all matters dealt with under the Companies Act, 1956, the court having jurisdiction is the court as defined u/s 10 of the said Act. But in respect of matters not dealt with by the Companies Act or for which the Companies Act does not provide remedies, the ordinary civil court alone will have jurisdiction. In other words, the civil court will have no jurisdiction only in respect of matters falling exclusively within the jurisdiction of the court having jurisdiction under the Companies Act."
The court further held that (headnote of 64 Comp Cas):
"A suit filed by a company against its former managing director for rendition of accounts cannot be considered to be a matter within the Companies Act and hence the ordinary civil court will have jurisdiction in the matter."
(5). In R.R. Rajendra Menon (No. 2) Vs. Cochin Stock Exchange Ltd. and Another, , it is held that (headnote):
"Unless a particular matter is specified in the Companies Act as one to be dealt with by the company court, it cannot exercise jurisdiction merely because it is also a matter which relates to a company. There is no provision in the Companies Act, expressly or impliedly specifying that an application to compel a company to comply with the requirements of Section 257 of the Companies Act would lie before the company court."
The court therefore held that (headnote of 69 Comp Cas):
"... the single judge was right in dismissing as not maintainable the petition filed by the Appellant seeking a direction to the Respondent company, to circulate before the meeting of the Respondent-company, his letter showing an intention to propose himself as a candidate for the ensuing election to the council of management of the company."
(6). In M.G. Doshit Vs. Reliance Petrochemicals Ltd., , it is held that (headnote):
"Section 10 of the Companies Act, 1956, which provides that the location of the registered office of the company would determine the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court cannot be construed to mean that the High Court has jurisdiction with respect to all matters relating to that company.
The High Court is a special court or a company court with special company jurisdiction and that jurisdiction has to be found from specific provisions of the Act. The High Court does not have any general plenary or residuary jurisdiction to deal with all matters and all questions arising under the Companies Act.
No special remedy is provided under the Companies Act, 1956, for breach of the provisions of Section 166 of the Act, which prescribes the time and place for holding annual general meetings of companies. Therefore the common law remedy within the jurisdiction of the civil court would remain. Therefore, the High Court, in the absence of a specific provision, has no jurisdiction to pass orders in respect of alleged breach of Section 166(2) of the Companies Act."
(7). In Prakash Roadlines Ltd. v. Vijaya Kumar Narang [1995] 83 Comp Cas 569 (Karn), it is held that (headnote):
"Under the company law, there is a distinction between individual membership rights and rights available to qualified minorities. The qualified minority rights are generally enforceable by recourse to civil suits except in cases where specific provision is found in the Companies Act for its enforcement elsewhere....
There is no particular provision in the Act which specifically provides for the enforcement of the right under Sections 257 and 284 by invoking the jurisdiction of a special court or Tribunal. Sections 397 and 398 are effective to grant relief to individual members under all circumstances. Therefore, a suit filed by a shareholder against refusal by the company to accept the notice given by the shareholder under Sections 284 and 257 to move certain resolutions for removal of directors and proposing the names of persons as directors in their place at the annual general meeting of the company, would be maintainable."
(8). In Poonamchand Kothari v. Rajasthan Tube Manufacturing Co. Ltd. [1996] 87 Comp Cas 842 (Raj), while dismissing the petition, filed u/s 10 of the Companies Act, 1956, the court held that (head-note):
"... the power u/s 10 could be exercised by the court only in respect of the matters for which the jurisdiction was conferred by other provisions of the Act or the rules made thereunder. The High Court when acting as a company court had special jurisdiction conferred by the provisions of the Companies Act or Rules made thereunder and the power could not be exercised as a general power or as plenary or residuary jurisdiction. If there was any dispute between the subscriber and the company, it could be tried in a civil court. Even if any provision had been contravened by the company, power had been given for prosecution of the company, but that had to be exercised by the court having jurisdiction and not by the High Court. Since the court had no jurisdiction, no direction could also be issued to the Registrar to file a complaint against the company."
(9). In Tej Prakash S. Dangi and Others Vs. Coromandal Pharmaceuticals Ltd. and Another, , it is held that (headnote):
"There is no specific provision in the Companies Act, 1956, enabling the company court to entertain a petition seeking a declaration that a notice in the newspapers of forfeiture of shares in a public company is void and that certain persons continue to be the holders of those shares. If the forfeiture is claimed to be invalid due to any legal infirmity, no specific power is provided therefor in the articles. The only section which may be referred to is Section 155 of the Companies Act which empowers the court to rectify the register of members if the name of any person is, without sufficient cause, omitted from the register of members of the company. This section, however, was omitted by the Companies (Amendment) Act, 1988, with effect from May 31, 1991, because this power was assigned to the Company Law Board u/s 111(4). Again, by a recent amendment brought about by the Depositories Ordinance, 1996, Section 111 has been confined to a private company and a new Section 111A has been incorporated which empowers the Company Law Board to direct any company to rectify the register or the records if the transfer of shares is in contravention of the provisions of the Securities and Exchange Board of India Act, 1992, or Regulations made thereunder or the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985. Therefore, a petition seeking a declaration that a forfeiture of shares is void is not amenable to the jurisdiction of either the company court or the Company Law Board u/s 111 or Section 111A of the Companies Act."
(10). In K. Radhakrishnan v. Thirumani Asphalts and Felts P. Ltd. [1998] 91 Comp Cas 31 (Mad), it is held that (headnote):
"The enactment of a special statute like the Companies Act does not have the effect of barring the jurisdiction of the civil court unless the statute expressly prohibits the jurisdiction of the civil court in relation to all matters arising under the statute or the scheme of the statute is such that such prohibition is necessarily to be implied. There is no provision in the Act expressly barring the jurisdiction of the civil court with respect to all matters arising under the Act. The bar of jurisdiction is implied and is in respect of some matters only. Neither Section 2(11) nor Section 10 of the Companies Act creates jurisdiction with respect to all matters arising under the Act concerning a company whose registered office is located within the jurisdiction of the company court. The jurisdiction of the court is to be ascertained from the other substantive provisions of the Act. The exclusive jurisdiction of the company court is therefore limited to matters which are required by the other provisions of the Act to be dealt with by the court.
Section 283 of the Companies Act sets out the circumstances on the occurrence of which the office of a director shall become vacant. The section does not contemplate any application being made to the company court either to declare that the office has been vacated or to declare that the office has not been vacated. The company court cannot, therefore, entertain a petition to declare that the Petitioner continues to be a director and that he has not vacated the office."
(11). In Inter Sales Vs. Reliance Industries Ltd., , while allowing the appeal filed against dismissal of the suit by the civil court on the ground that it did not have jurisdiction, the court held that (headnote):
"... ''the court'' as defined in Section 2(11) read with Section 10 of the Companies Act did not have the jurisdiction to decide the subject-matter of the suit from which the appeal had arisen and as such the jurisdiction of the civil court vested u/s 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, was not ousted by the Companies Act."
The court further held that (headnote):
"To fall within the jurisdiction of ''the court'' as defined in Section 2(11) read with Section 10 of the Companies Act, 1956, the matter should be such as is provided by the Act to be adjudicated by ''the court''. In respect of matters regarding which the Act does not provide for adjudication by court, the adjudicating authority cannot mean ''the court'' as defined by Section 2(11). It is only where the Act provides for adjudication by ''the court'', that ''the court'' would mean the court as defined in Section 2(11). The definition clause cannot be given the interpretation that whenever there is a dispute relating to a company, it is the company court as defined in Section 2(11) that will have the jurisdiction."
(12). In Dwarka Prasad Agarwal v. Ramesh Chandra Agarwala [2003] 117 Comp Cas 206, the apex court held that (headnote):
"By Sections 9 and 10 of the Companies Act, 1956, the jurisdiction of the civil court has not been ousted. Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, confers jurisdiction upon the civil courts to determine all disputes of civil nature unless it is barred under a statute either expressly or by necessary implication. Bar of jurisdiction of a civil court is not to be readily inferred. A provision seeking to bar the jurisdiction of the civil court requires strict interpretation. The court, it is well-settled, would normally lean in favour of the construction, which would uphold retention of jurisdiction of the civil court. The burden of proof in this behalf shall be on the party who asserts that the civil court''s jurisdiction is ousted. Even otherwise, the civil court''s jurisdiction is not completely ousted under the Companies Act, 1956."
The court, considering the facts of the case further held that (head-note):
"... the civil court was concerned with the rival claims of the parties as to whether one party had illegally been dispossessed by the other or not. The dispute between the parties was eminently a civil dispute and not a dispute under the provisions of the Companies Act. Such a suit, apart from the general law, would also be maintainable in terms of Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963."
(13). In Vijay Kumar Gupta v. Ram Naresh Singh [2004] 122 Comp Cas 771 (Pat), it is held that (headnote):
"The jurisdiction of the civil court is a very expansive one as is evident from Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and its exclusion is not to be readily inferred. Unless its jurisdiction is barred by the statute either expressly or by implication it has jurisdiction to entertain a suit concerning a dispute of a civil nature. If a statute creates a special right or liability and a forum for determination of the same and provides that all questions concerning such right or liability are to be determined by the said Tribunal or forum and bars the jurisdiction of the civil court, then such rights and liabilities are to be determined by the Tribunal or forum created by the statute and not by the civil court."
In the case before the Patna High Court (headnote):
"... the Respondents in a suit complained that the decision of appointment of additional directors as well as employees of the company in question was illegal and a nullity as not taken by the decision of the board of directors, and also prayed for certain other reliefs. The Petitioner''s application challenging the maintainability of the suit was dismissed by the civil court. On a revision application."
The court while dismissing the application, held that (headnote):
"... neither by express provision nor by necessary implication had the suit been barred nor was there any provision for adequate or efficacious remedy provided under the Companies Act with regard to the dispute raised in the plaint."
The court therefore held that (headnote):
"The suit was maintainable."
(14). In Smt. Premvati and Others Vs. Smt. Bhagwati Devi and Others, , it is held that (headnote):
"Except in cases where the Companies Act, 1956, confers jurisdiction on the company court or some other authority like the Central Government or the Company Law Board, either expressly or by implication all other disputes pertaining to a company are to be resolved through the forum of the civil courts.
A dispute as regards the right of inheritance between parties is a civil dispute and cannot be said to be a dispute as regards oppression of minority shareholders by the majority shareholders and/or mismanagement."
(15). In B.K. Syed Zakir v. Bangalore Electricity Supply Co. Ltd., AIR 2005 Kar. 289, it is held that (page 291):
"... a duty is cast upon the court to protect the public property and see that such claims which would be against the interest of public are not encouraged. There is a statutory provision empowering the Board to claim the said amount. The court has to give effect to the said right of the Board and not to find fault with that claim."
(16). In Seena B. Kumar Vs. Asst. Executive Engineer, Electrical Major Section, Mavelikkara and Others, , while incorporating Regulation 15(c) of the Conditions of Supply of Electrical Energy Regulations, the court held that (page 344):
"... where the occupant desires reconnection he has to remit the entire arrears of current charges and the dues in respect of the connection already given to the premises. After payment of the entire amount the Board can give reconnection to a new consumer. It is also open to the Board to recover the amount through revenue recovery proceedings from the previous consumers, but on recovery of the said amount it should be refunded to the new consumer. Such a provision cannot be said to be a illegal provision."
Mr. Pandya further submitted that the applicant has wilfully and deliberately suppressed material fact from this Court and thereby misdirected the court. The applicant has not disclosed the fact that prior to moving this Court by presenting the present proceedings the applicant-company had approached the Consumer Grievances Redressal Forum with its complaint against non-release of the new HT connection of 4,000 KVA due to non-clearance of pending arrears of the previous consumer, i.e., the company in liquidation. The matter was adjudicated by the forum and in the light of the judicial pronouncement of the apex court in the matter of Paschimanchal Vidyut Vitran Nigam Ltd. and Others Vs. DVS Steels and Alloys Pvt. Ltd. and Others, , the forum held that non-release of new HT connection to the complainant by MGVCL, pending the payment of past arrears of the previous owner by the new purchaser to the MGVCL is not untenable and refused issuing direction to MGVCL to consider granting the new HT connection to the complainant, pending payment of past arrears due from previous owner. He has further submitted that if the applicant had felt aggrieved by non-issuance of the direction by the forum as prayed for, by non-redressal of its complaint by the forum it has been statutorily provided with a remedy which is to approach the Ombudsman. The applicant has chosen to bypass the said remedy and without disclosure of the said proceedings and order passed therein, has chosen to file the present proceedings which is not permissible in law. If the said remedy is not availed of the adjudication by the forum, he has submitted that the same attained finality and could not be ignored by filing the present proceedings.
Mr. Pandya has further submitted that the decision on which the applicant has placed reliance is not applicable in this wise that while deciding the said matter, this Court has not considered the impact of statutory condition No. 2(j) of the conditions of supply governing the parties to any contract relating to supply of power nor the judgment upholding validity thereof nor the judgment of the apex court referred to by the Respondent. All these questions arise before this Court for the first time and hence the proceedings referred to in paragraph 15 could in no way come in the way of this Court deciding the issues raised by the Respondent.
Mr. Pandya further submitted that in the light of the observations made by the apex court in Isha Marble''s case in exercise of its powers to frame conditions of supply a condition of supply had come to be introduced by the board being condition No. 2(j) which reads as under:
"Re-connections or new connection of any premises where there are arrears of the board pending from the consumers/occupiers shall not be entertained. New successors/occupier has to clear these dues of the previous consumer before the application of successor/occupier is processed for supply of electricity. If the Board at a later date gets the full or part of these dues from the previous consumer, then amount shall be refunded to the successor/occupier after adjusting the costs including legal expenses to recover such arrears and the refund shall bear no interest."
Mr. Pandya has further submitted that the validity of this condition 2(j) has been upheld by the Division Bench of this Court by its judgment dated July 18, 2005, rendered in L.P.A. No. 691 of 2003. He has further submitted that similar denial to supply power without the outstanding dues from the previous consumer are cleared, has been upheld by the High Court of Kerala in the case of K.J. Dennis v. Official Liquidator [2002] 108 Comp Cas 353 and K.G. Purushothaman Vs. Kerala State Electricity Board and Another, . The demand made by the Respondent is thus justified in law and the applicant, who is governed by the above condition of supply, is therefore not entitled to the reliefs sought for.
Mr. Pandya further submitted that the apex court in its judgment in the 17 matter of Paschimanchal Vidyut Vitran Nigam Ltd. and Others Vs. DVS Steels and Alloys Pvt. Ltd. and Others, , has held that:
"Distributor of supply of electricity can stipulate as one of the conditions of supply that the arrears due in regard to the supply of electricity to the premises when it was in occupation of the previous owner/occupant should be cleared before electric supply is restored to the premises or a fresh connection is provided to the premises. If there be any statutory rules in this behalf insistence upon fulfilment of the said requirements could be insisted."
The apex court has further held that:
"If the rules are silent, it can stipulate such terms and conditions as it deems fit and proper to regulate its transactions and dealings and that there was nothing unreasonable in imposing such condition."
In support of the submission that notification issued u/s 49 introducing condition 2(j) despite repealed of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948, by the Electricity Act, 2003, still continues to operate. Mr. Pandya relies on the following decisions:
(a). In State of Punjab v. Mohar Singh Pratap Singh reported in AIR 1955 SC 84, it is held that whenever there is a repeal of an enactment, the consequences laid down in Section 6 of the General Clauses Act will follow unless, as the section itself says, a different intention appears. In the case of a simple repeal there is scarcely any room for expression of a contrary opinion. But when the repeal is followed by fresh legislation on the same subject the court would undoubtedly have to look to the provisions of the new Act, but only for the purpose of determining whether they indicate a different intention. The line of enquiry would be, not whether the new Act expressly keeps alive old rights and liabilities, but whether it manifests an intention to destroy them. The court cannot therefore subscribe to the broad proposition that Section 6 of the General Clauses Act is ruled out when there is repeal of an enactment followed by a fresh legislation. Section 6 would be applicable in such cases also unless the new legislation manifests an intention incompatible with or contrary to the provisions of the section. Such incompatibility would have to be ascertained from a consideration of all the relevant provisions of the new law and the mere absence of a saving clause is by itself not material. The provisions of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act will apply to a case of repeal even if there is simultaneous enactment unless a contrary intention can be gathered from the new enactment. Of course, the consequences laid down in Section 6 of the Act will apply only when a statute or Regulation having the force of a statute is actually repealed. It has no application when a statute, which is of a temporary nature automatically expires by efflux of time.
(b). In The Chief Inspector of Mines and Another Vs. Lala Karam Chand Thapar etc., , it is held that though u/s 31(4) of the Mines Act, 1923, the Regulations became part of the Act, they are not repealed along with the Act by Section 88 of the Mines Act, 1952. The Rules and Regulations do not lose their character as rules and Regulations, even though they are to be of the same effect as if contained in the Act. They continue to be the rules subordinate to the Act, and though for certain purpose, including the purpose of construction, they are to be treated as if contained in the Act, their true nature as subordinate rule is not lost. Therefore, with regard to the effect of a repeal of the Act, they continue to be subject to the operation of Section 24 of the General Clauses Act.
(c). In The Brihan Maharashtra Sugar Syndicate Ltd. Vs. Janardan Ramchandra Kulkarni and Others, , it is held that Section 658 of the Companies Act, 1956, might have been enacted ex abundanti cautela, but, by virtue of it, Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, remains applicable with respect to the effect of the repeal of the Indian Companies Act of 1913. The latter section preserves the rights and liabilities created by Section 153C of the Act of 1913 and a continuance of the proceeding in respect thereof would be competent in spite of the repeal of the Act of 1913, inasmuch as a contrary intention is not indicated in the later Act. It is further held that there is nothing in Section 647 of the Act of 1956 which can be understood as indicating an intention that Section 6 of the General Clauses Act is not to apply. On the other hand, the provisions of Section 153C of the Act of 1913 have been substantially re-enacted by the Act of 1956 and this would indicate an intention not to destroy the rights created by Section 153C. The court further held that Section 24 of the General Clauses Act, does not cancel the notification empowering the District Judge to exercise jurisdiction under the Act of 1913. Since u/s 6 of the General Clauses Act the proceeding in respect of the application u/s 153C of the Act of 1913 is continued after the repeal of that Act, it follows that the District Judge continues to have jurisdiction to entertain it. If it were not so, then Section 6 would become infructuous.
(d). In Jayantilal Amrathlal Vs. The Union of India (UOI), , it is held that in order to see whether the rights and liabilities under the repealed law have been put an end to by the new enactment, the proper approach is not to enquire if the new enactment has by its new provisions kept alive the rights and liabilities under the repealed law but whether it has taken away those rights and liabilities. The absence of a saving clause in a new enactment preserving the rights and liabilities under the repealed law is neither material nor decisive of the question.
(e). In Jayantilal Amrathlal Vs. The Union of India (UOI), , it is further held that a saving provision in a repealing statute is not exhaustive of the rights and obligations so saved or the rights that survive the repeal. Whatever rights are expressly saved by the "savings" provision stand saved. But, that does not mean that the rights which are not saved by the "savings" provision are extinguished or stand ipso facto terminated by the mere fact that a new statute repealing the old statute is enacted. Rights which have accrued are saved unless they are taken away expressly. This is the principle behind Section 6(c) of the General Clauses Act, 1897.
(f). In State Vs. N.B. Hankins, , the court was called upon to decide the question as to whether the notification issued by the Chief Commissioner of Delhi under the Act of 1918 continues to be in force under the Act of 1952. While giving an answer to this question the court referred to Section 24 of the General Clauses Act, which says that: "where any Central Act... is, after the commencement of this Act, repealed and re-enacted with or without modification, then, unless it is otherwise expressly provided, an ... notification ... issued under the repealed Act ... shall, so far as it is not inconsistent with the provisions re-enacted, continue in force, and be deemed to have been issued under the provisions so re-enacted, unless and until it is superseded by any notification issued under the provisions so re-enacted".
(g). In Deep Chand Vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh and Others, , the court while assuming that Parliament in the present case by enacting the Amending Act repugnant to the State law with respect to the same subject-matter, i.e., nationalisation of road transport, impliedly repealed the State law, Section 6 of the General Clauses Act saves the scheme framed under the U.P. Act; a scheme framed is a thing done under the repealed Act within Section 6 of the General Clauses Act.
(h). In Shri Ram Prasad (Deceased) by his Legal Representative Vs. The State of Punjab, , it is held that the expression "things done" occurring in Article 357(2), in our opinion, must receive in liberal and extensive construction. As already indicated, all the clauses of the Regulation Order must be read together as an integrated whole and we have to find, on a construction of all the clauses, whether they were intended to continue beyond the period of one year in which Clause 4(1)(iii) occurs, it is not unreasonable to construe the power to make rules vested in the board under that clause as things done within the meaning of Article 357(2). There can be no doubt about the intention to preserve and continue the rules even after the period of one year after the cessation of the emergency so that there may not be any hiatus in the administration of the affairs of the bank.
(i). In Hasan Nurani Malak Vs. Assistant Charity Commissioner, Nagpur and Others, , it is held that the words "anything duly done" in Sub-clause (a) of Section 86(3) of Madhya Pradesh Public Trusts Act, 1951, are very often used by the Legislature in saving clauses such as we have in Section 86(3). Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, also provides that unless a different intention appears the repeal of an Act would not affect anything duly done or suffered thereunder. The object of such a saving clause is to save what has been previously done under the statute repealed. The result of such a saving clause is that the pre-existing law continues to govern the thing done before a particular date from which the repeal of such a pre-existing law takes effect. On a proper interpretation of the expression "things done" it is to be held that such expression is comprehensive enough to take in not only the things done but also the effect of the legal consequences flowing therefrom.
(j). In Neel alias Niranjan Majumdar Vs. The State of West Bengal, , the court held that the combined effect of Sections 6 and 24 of the General Clauses Act is that the said notification of 1923 issued u/s 15 of the Act of 1878 not only continued to operate but has to be deemed to have been enacted under the new Act.
Mr. Pandya further submitted that seeking any clarification as sought for or by seeking a declaration as sought for, the electricity company could not be called upon or be expected to be prevented from insisting upon compliance with the demand as a precondition of being entitled to power supply, which demand, it can legally make. This Court''s jurisdiction cannot be invoked for that purpose. He has, therefore, submitted that the application deserves to be dismissed.
While dealing with the preliminary objections raised by Mr. Pandya on 21 behalf of the Respondent, Mr. Phawa in rejoinder has submitted that the terms and conditions of sale are approved by this Court, based on which the sale of the properties in question was confirmed in favour of the applicant. He has further submitted that no civil dispute has arisen as alleged by the Respondent. He has further submitted that this Court is having the jurisdiction to entertain the application and to grant the relief as prayed for. This Court is a court of winding up and it ipso facto has jurisdiction to entertain the proceedings of the nature initiated by the applicant and this Court has the jurisdiction to decide the claims by or against the company in liquidation as per the provisions of Section 446(2) read along with other relevant provisions of the Act. Mr. Pahwa has further submitted that as per the scheme of the Act, once a company is ordered to be wound up and an official liquidator is appointed, all the assets of the company in liquidation vest in the custody of this Court through the official liquidator. The custody of the assets of the company in liquidation vest in the official liquidator free from all encumbrances and charges. The assets of the company in liquidation are to be disposed of by the official liquidator on the basis of the terms and conditions to be approved by this Court. Any issue arising from the interpretation of the terms and conditions as approved by this Court or arising from the confirmation of the sale can be decided only by this Court. During the pendency of the winding up proceedings, the company court is as such deemed to be a court of winding up and it is competent to decide all issues arising out of the winding up proceedings. Any person aggrieved by any action/order is entitled to maintain an application before the company court and the company court has jurisdiction to entertain and decide all such issues. The claims by or against the company are required to be decided by this Court as per the provisions of Section 446 of the Act. The official liquidator is obliged to settle the claims of the secured creditors, unsecured creditors and statutory creditors as per the provisions of Sections 529, 529A and 530 of the Act. He has, therefore, submitted that this Court has jurisdiction to decide the priorities in claims of various claimants. The stand taken by the Respondent-company is thus misconceived and contrary to the scheme of the Act.
Mr. Pahwa further submitted that the Respondent-company is indirectly seeking to enforce its claims against the applicant though the Respondent-company is obliged to lodge its claims with the official liquidator as per the scheme of the Act. He has further submitted that as per the scheme of the Act, once the assets of the company in liquidation vest in the official liquidator, all the claimants are required to lodge their claims with the official liquidator and the official liquidator is required to settle the dues pari passu and as per the priorities provided for in Sections 529, 529A and 530 of the Act. The very object of winding up is to put all the secured creditors at par and pay them pari passu. Accordingly, all the attachments, if any, of any authority or body would become ineffective. Considering this object and the scheme of the Act, the Respondent-company has no option but to lodge its claims with the official liquidator. The claim of the Respondent-company until the date of winding up are required to be settled as per the above provisions of the Act.
Mr. Pahwa further submitted that the jurisdiction of this Court is the special jurisdiction in view of the fact that the jurisdiction of this Court is under the Act which is a special law. This Court is only the competent court to decide the issues arising from the winding up proceedings. The relevant provisions of the Act also contain non obstante clause. Hence, no other court or forum is competent to decide the issues, which this Court alone can decide. He has further submitted that the condition No. 2(j) of the conditions of supply as referred to by the Respondent-company is misconceived. The said condition is not binding on the sales effected under the order of this Court. The sales effected under the order of this Court are governed only by the terms and conditions approved by this Court read with the provisions of the Act, which is a special law. He has further submitted that even otherwise condition No. 2(j) is no longer in existence. This condition therefore would have no application in the facts of the present case. He has further submitted that a judgment of the Division Bench as referred to by the Respondent-company and as rendered in L.P.A. No. 691 of 2003 would have no application to the facts of the present case. The subsequent decision of this Court after the enactment of the Electricity Act, 2003, would govern the field which in terms observed that condition No. 2(j) no longer exists. Mr. Pahwa submitted that this is without prejudice to the contention that this condition in any case would have no applicability in cases of sales effected under the supervision and orders of this Court. He has further submitted that the judgment of the apex court in the case of Paschimanchal Vidyut Vitran Nigam Ltd. and Others Vs. DVS Steels and Alloys Pvt. Ltd. and Others, , is also not applicable to the facts of the present case. The findings recorded in the said judgment by the apex court would have no application in cases of sales effected under the orders of this Court. The Respondent-company is bound by the terms and conditions approved by this Court and is also bound by the provisions of the Act, which is a special Act. Mr. Pahwa has, therefore, submitted that the reliefs prayed for in the present application deserve to be granted and the application be allowed.
Based on the above submissions and judicial precedents, Mr. Pahwa submitted that this Court is well within its jurisdiction to decide this application and grant the reliefs as prayed for.
While dealing with the applicant''s case on merits and even with regard to the preliminary objections, Mr. Pandya reiterated his submissions on the basis of the affidavit-in-surr