Ajay vs State of Maharashtra and Others

A.S. Chandurkar, J.—Rule. Heard finally with consent of the learned Counsel for the parties.

The petitioner herein is aggrieved by the order dated 20-5-2014 by which the name of of respondent No. 4 was entered as group leader of Bahujan Samaj Party in respect of Councilors of Amaravati Municipal Corporation.

In the general elections for electing Councilors that were held in February, 2012, the petitioner as well as respondent No. 4, both belonging to Bahujan Samaj Party came to be duly elected. Subsequently, the petitioner was nominated as group leader of said party on 20-2-2012. Necessary entries in the register were duly taken by respondent No. 2. The petitioner, therefore, functioned as group leader of the political party. There were about six Councilors of said political party. It appears that on account of some political disputes, the Vice President of the party issued a communication to respondent No. 2 on 25-5-2012 stating that the respondent No. 4 was being appointed as leader of the political party. There was certain correspondence between both the sides. According to the said political party, the petitioner had been suspended from primary membership of said party. The respondent No. 4 had approached this Court in Writ Petition No. 910/2014 praying that the respondent No. 2 be directed to accept her as leader of the Municipal party. While disposing of said writ petition, the present respondent No. 4 was permitted to move appropriate application before the respondent No. 2 for being registered as group leader of the Municipal party.

The respondent No. 4, accordingly, on 21-4-2014 moved an application to enter her name as group leader of the Municipal party. The petitioner filed a caveat before respondent No. 2 for being heard in said matter. By the order dated 20-5-2014, respondent No. 2 on the basis of material available before him recognized the respondent No. 4 as leader of the political party and directed necessary entries to be taken in the concerned registers. The petitioner was informed that request for hearing made by him was not being considered. The petitioner thereafter moved an application for recalling the earlier communication dated 20-5-2014, but no cognizance of said application was taken by respondent No. 2. Hence, being aggrieved, the petitioner has challenged the order dated 20-5-2014 recognizing respondent No. 4 as leader of the party.

Shri R.A. Haq, the learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that as the petitioner had been initially recognized as the group leader of the political party, if his name was to be excluded as such, then an opportunity of hearing was required to be granted before making any change in the name of group leader of the political party. He submitted that though a caveat was filed in the said proceedings, no opportunity of hearing was granted to the petitioner and an order prejudicing his legal rights had been passed. He submitted that the impugned order resulted in civil consequences and by failing to hear the petitioner said order stood vitiated. The learned Counsel placed reliance upon the decisions of the Supreme Court in A.K. Kraipak and Others Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, , Manohar Anchule Vs. State of Maharashtra and Another, , and Bharat Sewak Samaj Vs. LT. Governor and Others, . He then submitted that respondent No. 2 while considering a similar controversy in respect of another Aghadi had heard all the concerned parties and had thereafter arrived at a particular conclusion. To demonstrate said aspect, he relied upon judgment of the Division Bench in Writ Petition No. 2772/2014 decided on 22-8-2014 and the subsequent judgment of the Supreme Court dated 20-2-2015 affirming said view. He, therefore, submitted that the respondent No. 2 had acted in a biased manner and this also vitiated the impugned order.

On the other hand, Shri P.A. Kadu, the learned Counsel for respondent No. 4 submitted that there was no right vested in the petitioner to seek an audience before respondent No. 2. He submitted that respondent No. 2 had not been conferred any adjudicatory powers and the provisions of the Maharashtra Local Authority Members Disqualification Rules, 1987 (for short, the Rules of 1987) did not contemplate grant of opportunity of hearing. He relied upon decision of the Supreme Court in Dr Umrao Singh Choudhary Vs. State of M.P. and Another, in that regard. He further submitted that the petitioner had been expelled from the political party and said fact had been brought to the notice of respondent No. 2. The act of expulsion had been challenged by the petitioner by filing Writ Petition No. 2698/2014, but the same came to be withdrawn on 22-7-2014. He also submitted that out of six Councillors of the party, four Councillors were present before respondent No. 2 which even otherwise supported the case of respondent No. 4. The learned Counsel also placed reliance on the order passed by the Division Bench in Writ Petition No. 4664/2008 (Mahadeo Bhaiyalal Bundele Vs. State of Maharashtra) decided on 1-12-2008. He, therefore, sought dismissal of the writ petition. The learned Asstt. Government Pleader appears for respondent Nos. 1 and 2 and Shri S. Shingane, the learned Counsel for respondent No. 3 submitted to the orders of the Court.

I have considered aforesaid submissions and I have gone through the material on record. It is not in dispute that initially the petitioner had been appointed as group leader of the political party and his name had been entered as such. Subsequently, there appear to have been some developments in the political party whereby it was stated that the petitioner had been suspended for a period of one year from the political party. This fact is contested by the petitioner on the ground that alleged action of suspending him from the political party is unauthorized. It is also evident that the Divisional Commissioner had referred aforesaid dispute regarding leader of the political party to the State Government and it is stated that the matter was pending with the State Government. This dispute between the parties appears to have led one group of Councilors to nominate respondent No. 4 as leader of the political party in the Municipal Corporation. Apprehending such steps, the petitioner had sought to be heard in the proceedings before respondent No. 2 by filing a caveat.

Rule 3 of the Rules of 1987 relates to information to be furnished by leader of a party. Rule 4 pertains to information to be furnished by a Councillor or Member and such information in terms of Rule 5 has to be entered in the register of information. Perusal of Rules 3 and 4 of the Rules of 1987 indicate that if any change takes place in the information already furnished with respect to leader of the Municipal party, then such change has to be communicated to the Collector or Commissioner as the case may be after which the same is required to be registered in the register of information as per Rule 5. Aforesaid provisions and especially Rules 3 and 4 of the Rules of 1987 do not indicate that there is any adjudicatory power conferred on respondent No. 2 to record a finding as to whether such change as reported is legal or valid.

In Mahadeo Bundele (supra), a similar controversy was considered by the Division Bench in relation to change in the name of leader of the political party. The alleged change was challenged on the ground that without hearing the persons likely to be affected, said change had been effected. It was held by the Division Bench that recording the name of a new party leader was an administrative act and hence, it could not be said that any right in the person whose name was entered was being violated. In paragraph 4A and 5, the Division Bench observed thus:

"4A. Having regards to the Rules of 1987 and amended Rules of 2007 (as amended) we have no doubt that the action of recording the name of the party leader or the name of the new party leader is an administrative act by the Divisional Commissioner or under his orders. With the help of Mr. Madkholkar, the learned Counsel for the petitioner we have gone through the Rules as amended and we are satisfied that there is no civil rights vested with the party leader except that the Municipal Commissioner is required to consult the party leader and the opinion expressed in such consultation is not binding on the said authority. It is well settled that the extent and application of the doctrine of natural justice cannot be imprisoned within the straitjacket of a rigid formula. The application of the doctrine depends upon the nature of the jurisdiction conferred on the administrative authority. Upon the character of the rights of the persons affected, the scheme and policy of the statute and other relevant circumstances disclosed in the particular case. What particular rule of natural justice should apply to a given case must depend to a great extent on the facts and circumstances of that case the framework of the law under which the enquiry is held and the constitution of the Tribunal or the body of persons appointed for that purpose. Whenever a complaint is made before a court that some principle of natural justice had been contravened the court has to decide whether the observance of that rule was necessary for a just decision on the facts of that case. A.K. Kraipak and Others Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, .

On the obtaining facts of this case and more particularly the Scheme of Rules 1987 as amended in the year 2007 as well as the record produced before us, we have no doubt in our mind that while directing the change in the Corporation in the official record the Divisional Commissioner was not required to hear the applicant and before passing the impugned order. The election of a party leader and any dispute therein is purely a matter between the party corporators and the scheme and the rules indicates that change in the party leader can be effected at any time by the party. There is no fixed minimum tenure of any party leader and, therefore, such a change cannot be a matter of judicial review by the courts."

From the aforesaid, it is, therefore, clear that election of a party leader and any dispute therein is purely a matter between the Councillors and name of the party leader can be changed at any point of time. Moreover, there is no minimum tenure of any leader of the political party.

The matter can be viewed from another angle. There were admittedly six Councillors belonging to the Bahujan Samaj Party. On 20-5-2014, four of the said Councilors were present before respondent No. 2 and they accepted the fact that respondent No. 4 was the new leader of the Municipal party. Hence, even ignoring the dispute as regards the petitioner being suspended from the party and even assuming that he was required to be heard, it is evident that majority of the Councillors of the political party were present before respondent No. 2 and they had admitted that respondent No. 4 was the new leader. In such situation, there was hardly any option left with the respondent No. 2 than to recognize respondent No. 4 as the party leader. Hence, even if the petitioner would have been heard in the said matter, the same would have been an empty formality especially in view of the fact that respondent No. 2 was not vested with any adjudicatory powers in the matter of dispute between two groups of a political party.

As regards reliance placed by the learned Counsel for the petitioner on the decision in A.K. Kraipak (supra), said decision has also been considered by the Division Bench in Mahadeo Bundele (supra) while holding that it was for the Court to decide on facts whether observance of principles of natural justice was necessary in the facts of said case. Considering the view as taken by the Division Bench in aforesaid decision, the observations in Bharat Sewak Samaj (Supra) and Manohar Anchule (supra) cannot come to the aid of the petitioner as said decisions are rendered in different factual context. Similarly, the submission that respondent No. 2 had heard the Councilors belonging to another political group in another matter while changing the name of the group leader of the political party cannot assist the case of the petitioner in the facts of the present case when it is evident from the impugned order that majority of the Councillors of the political party had accepted respondent No. 4 as leader of the Municipal party. Hence, it cannot be said that by not hearing the petitioner the impugned order stands vitiated. It is, therefore, clear that no fault can be found with the impugned order recognizing respondent No. 4 as leader of the Municipal party.

As regards dispute in relation to the petitioner''s removal from the political party, it is not necessary to enter in the said area. Moreover, it is stated that the proceedings in that regard have been referred to the State Government and the same are pending. In view of aforesaid, the impugned order does not call for any interference whatsoever. The writ petition is, therefore, dismissed with no order as to costs. Rule stands discharged.

At this stage, the learned Counsel for the petitioner prays for continuing the order of status quo that is operating since 3-6-2014. The request is opposed by the learned Counsel for respondent No. 4. As the order of status quo is operating since 3-6-2014, the same shall remain in operation for a period of six weeks and it shall cease to operate automatically after expiry of said period.