Ajay Kumar vs Secretary Secondary Education Board, U.P.

Pradeep Kumar Singh Baghel, J.—The grievance of the petitioner is that he had appeared in the High School Examination-2010 conducted by the Board of High School and Intermediate Education, Uttar Pradesh (for short, the "Board") as a regular student. His result was declared in June, 2010. According to the petitioner, in all his school records including School Leaving Certificate of Class-V, School Leaving Certificate of Class-VIII and in the Transfer Certificate of Intermediate, his date of birth has been shown as 16.1.1994, however, in the mark-sheet of High School his date of birth is shown as 11.1.1996. On 11.10.2012, the petitioner has moved an application through the Principal of the concerned college for correction of his date of birth as 16.1.1994. However, the Board has not taken any step to correct his date of birth.

On 3.1.2014, learned standing counsel was directed to seek instruction in the matter.

On the instruction, learned standing counsel submits that under Regulation-7 of Chapter-III (Part II-B) of the Regulations framed under the Intermediate Education Act, two years'' period is provided for moving such an application.

In the present case, the petitioner has moved the application only three moths beyond the period prescribed therefor.

It is stated that the petitioner comes from the rural background and he was not aware of the regulations, which provide the limitation of two years.

From the records it is evident that in all the previous certificates of the petitioner, his date of birth is shown as 16.1.1994. Thus, the mistake appears to be clerical one. It is not the case that the petitioner wants to get his age reduced by the correction, but his age would be enhanced. Thus, the intention of the petitioner does not appear to take undue advantage by moving such application. The application is evidently bona fide.

A Division Bench of this Court had the occasion to deal with the similar facts and also the Regulation 7 in Special Appeal No. 1202 of 2010, Babu Ram v. State of U.P. and another, decided on 3rd August, 2010. The Court has found that Regulation 7 refers to correction in the certificate of passing and if there is any mistake in the record maintained by the Board. Regulation-7 would not be applicable. For the sake of convenience, the relevant part of the judgment of the Division Bench is quoted below:

Regulation 7 of Chapter III of the Regulations, which is relevant for the purpose, reads as under:

In the petition filed by the appellant, that plea was also taken before the learned Single Judge. However, the learned Judge held that as the application was filed beyond the time and was not maintainable, and that the appellant herein may file a civil suit for declaration of his date of birth.

In the instant case, we find that Regulation 7, referred to above, refers to correction in the certificate of passing. There is no mistake in the certificate of passing. The mistake is in the records maintained by the Board. Therefore, the said Regulation would not be applicable so far as the case of the appellant is concerned. Once the respondents themselves had issued the certificate showing the date of birth of the appellant as 1st September, 1949, the respondent No. 2 was bound to correct the clerical mistake in the record of the Board.

Keeping in the mind the aforesaid law it is evident in the present case that the petitioner''s date of birth has been correctly mentioned in the School Leaving Certificate of Class-V, School Leaving Certificate of Class-VIII as well as in the Transfer Certificate of Intermediate, however, in the record of the Board an incorrect date as 11.1.1996 has been recorded. Thus, the provisions of Regulation-7 is not attracted in the facts of the present case.

Moreover, merely on account of delay of three months the petitioner''s case could not have been rejected on the ground of limitation prescribed under Regulation-7. The Supreme Court in the case of B.T. Purushothama Rai Vs. K.G. Uthaya and Others, , has held that on the ground of limitation the right of bona fide persons cannot be destroyed. Relevant portion of the judgment, being paragraph-17, is quoted hereunder:

On the question of limitation and delay this Court in N. Balakrishnan Vs. M. Krishnamurthy, , held that the purpose of the Limitation Act was not to destroy the rights. It is founded on public policy fixing the life span for legal remedy for the general welfare. The primary function of a court is to adjudicate between the parties and to advance substantial justice. The object of providing legal remedy is to repair the damage caused as a result of legal injury. If the explanation given does not smack of mala fides or is not shown to have been put forth as a part of a dilatory strategy, the court must show utmost consideration to the suitor.

After careful consideration of the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the parties and the law laid down by this Court and the Supreme Court in the judgments, referred above, I am of the view that the end of justice would be sub-served in case a direction is issued upon the Board to correct the date of birth of the petitioner as 16.1.1994 in his mark-sheet and certificate of High School, expeditiously preferably within a period of two months from the date of communication of this order.

Accordingly, the writ petition is disposed of.

No order as to costs.