High CourtsSingle Bench

Ajay Singh Yadav vs State Of Madhya pradesh & Ors

Madhya Pradesh High Court · Decided on 24 April 2018 · Citation: (2018) 04 MP CK 0150

HON’BLE JUDGES
SANJAY YADAV, J
ACTS & SECTIONS REFERRED
Indian Penal Code, 1860 — Section 34, 323, 324, 504, 506B · Constitution of India — Article 142(1), 226
RESULT
Dismissed
CASE NUMBER
WP-5059 OF 2017
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Judgment

257 paragraphs · 2,258 words

la

dza",fu.kZ; dh dafMdk,"vH;FkhZ ds izdj.k dh

fLFkfr

1,"Information given to the employer

by a candidate as to conviction,

acquittal or arrest, or pendency of

a criminal case, whethter before or

after entering into service must be

true and there should be no

suppression or false mention of

required information.","vH;FkhZ }kjk

vuqizek.ku QkeZ esa

mlds fo:) iathc) vijk/k dk

ys[k fd;k gSA

2,"while passing order of termination

of services or cancellation of

candidature for giving false

information, the employer may

take notice of special

circumstances of the case, if any,

while giving such information.",

3,"The employer shall take into

consideration the Government

orders

instructions/rules,

applicable to the employee, at the

time of taking the decision .","vH;FkhZ ij iathc) vijk/k

dh /kkjk 148]149]325

Hkk-n-fo- 'kklu ds

funsZ'k dzekad

,Q&17&74@2002@lh&1

fnukad 5 twu 2003 ds

vuqlkj uSfrd v/kksiru dh

Js.kh esa gksdj xEHkhj

izd`fr dh gSA vH;FkhZ

dh nks""keqfDr Clean or

Hournable Acquittal

dh Js.kh esa ugh vkrh

gSA

,& ;wfuQkeZ

lsok@ukSdjh pkgus okys

O;fDr dh lsok,as vU;

lsok okys mEehnokj ls

fHkUu Lrj dh Js.kh esa

vkrh gS iqfyl foHkkx esa

p;fur mEehnokj dk

drZO; izns'k dh dkuwu

O;oLFkk ,oa turk dh

tku eky dh lqj{kk dk

fuoZgu djuk gksrk gSA

iqfyl dh lsok esa

,,"mPp uSfrd vkpj.k gksuk

o vijkf/kd xfrfof/k;ka u

gksuk vko';d gS

ch& 'kkldh; lsodks ds

laca/k esa 'kklu ds mRre

vkpj.k laca/kh fl)kUrksa

ds vuqlkj 'kkldh; dehZ

dks mRre Nfo okyk

gksuk pkfg, pqafd iqfyl

foHkkx ds vf/kdkfj;ksa ij

vijkf/kd izo`fRr ds

yksxksa ij vadq'k yxkus

dh ftEesnkjh gksrh gSA

vr% tufgr esa vijkf/kd

fjdkMZ ds O;fDr dks

iqfyl foHkkx esa fu;qDr

fd;k tkuk mfpr ugh gS

lh& iqfyl foHkkx esa

fu;qfDr gsrq mEehnokj

ds mRre pfj=] lR;fu""Bk

,oa bZekunkjh dh vis{kk

dh tkrh gSA ,slk

mEehnokj tks iwoZ ls

vijkf/kd xfrfof/k;ksa esa

lafyIr jgk gS] Hkfo""; esa

Hkh bl izdkj dh

xfrfof/k;ksa esa lafyIr

gksus dh laHkkouk ls

badkj ugha fd;k tk ldrkA

4,"In case there is suppression or

false information of involvement in

a criminal case where conviction

or acquittal had already been

recorded before filling of the

application/ verification form and

such fact later comes to

knowledge of employer, any of the

following recourse appropriate to

the case may be

adopted:-

(a) In case trivial in nature in which

conviction had been recorded,

such as shouting slogans at young

age or for a petty offence which if

disclosed would","vH;FkhZ }kjk vijkf/kd

tkudkjh fNikbZ ugha

xbZ gSA

,"not have rendered and incumbent

unfit for post in question, the

employer may, in its discretion.

Ignore such suppression of fact or

false information by condoning the

lapse.

(b) where convictionhas been

recorded in case which is not

trivial in nature, employer may

cancel candidature or terminate

services of the employee.

(c) If acquittal hasalready

been recorded in a case involving

moral turpitude or offence of

heinous/serious nature, on

technical ground and it is not a

case of clean acquittal, or benefit

of reasonable doubt has been

giving, the employer may consider

all relevant facts available as to

antecedents, and may take

appropriate decision as to the

continuance of the employee.",

5,"In a case where the employee has

made declaration truth fully of a

concluded criminal case, the

employer still has the right to

consider antecedents. And cannot

be compelled","vH;FkhZ }kjk vijk/k dk

mYys[k vuqizek.ku QkeZ

esa fd;k x;k gS] ijUrq

vH;FkhZ }kjk yxkrkj

fd;s x;s vijk/kksa esa ls

,d vijk/k esa uSfrd

v/kksiru ds vk;ke 'kkfey

gS ,oa yxkrkj fd;s x;s

vijk/kksa ls vH;FkhZ dh

vkijkf/kd izd`fr

n`fâ€​""Vxr gksdj] Hkfo"";

esa iqu% vijk/k nksgjk;s

tkus dh izcy

,"to       Â

appoint          Â

the candidate.","laHkkouk izrhr gksrh

gSA ;?kfi vH;FkhZ dks

U;k;k- }kjk vkjksi

izekf.kr ugha ik;s tkus ij

nksuks vijk/kksa ls

nks""keqDr fd;k x;k gS

fdUrq ,slh nks""keqfDr

Clean or Honourable

Acquittal dh Js.kh

esa ugha vkrh gSA

vr% vH;FkhZ dks

'kkldh; lsok ds v;ksX;

ik;k x;k gSA

6,"In case when fact has been

truthfully declared in character

verification form regarding

pendency of a criminal case of

trivial nature, employer, in facts

and circumstances of the case, in

its discretion may appoint the

candidate subject to decision of

such case.","mDr vijk/k lkekU; vijk/k

dh Js.kh esa ugh vkrk

gSA vr% mDr fcUnq bl

izdj.k esa ykxw ugha

gksrsA

7,"In case of deliberate suppression

of fact with respect to multiple

pending cases such false

information by itself will assume

significance and an employer may

pass appropriate order cancelling

candidature or terminating services

as appointment of a person against

whom multiple criminal cases were

pending may not be proper.","vH;FkhZ ds fo:) izkIr

tkudkjh ,oa nLrkostksa

ds vuqlkj uSfrd v/kksiru

dk 01 vijk/k gksuk ik;k

x;k gSA

mijksDr fo""k;kUrxZr ys[k gS fd vkids }kjk fn;s x;s fuokl ds ftys ds iqfyl v/kh{kd ls pfj= lR;kiu djk;s tkus ij ftyk Xokfy;j esa fuEukuqlkj vijkf/kd fjdkMZ",,

ik;k x;k gSA,,

1& vijk/k dzekad 155@06 /kkjk 323] 324] 504] 34,,

HkknfoA,,

 2& vijk/k dzekad 61@15 /kkjk 147] 148] 149],,

294] 323] 324] 336]506&ch Hkknfo,,

mijksDrkuqlkj vkijkf/kd fjdkMZ ik;s tkus ls iqfyl eq[;ky; fo'ks""k 'kk[kk dh Nkuchu lfefr }kjk ekuuh; mPpre U;k;ky; }kjk esgj flag fo:) dfe'uj vkWQ iqfyl",,

fnYyh ,oa vorkj flag fo:) Hkkjr la?k esa ikfjr fl)kUrksa ds vkyksd esa fnukad 16-05-17 dks vk;ksftr cSBd esa leh{kk dh xbZ ftlesa vkidks iqfyl lsok ds",,

fy, v;ksX; ik;s tkus dk fu.kZ; fy;k x;k gsA",,

¼/kesZUnz pkS/kjh½,,

iqfyl v/kh{kd,,

fofn'kk,,

Contention on behalf of the petitioner is that having been exonerated of the charges levelled against the petitioner, there was no stigma against the",,

petitioner as would have created any impediment in his appointment to the post of Constable(GD). It is urged that the Screening Committee grossly,,

erred in arriving at a conclusion that the petitioner is not a fit person to be taken in the services of disciplined force. Reliance has been placed on the,,

decisions in Gorelal Sharma vs. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors: W.P.No.6151/2013(s) decided on 19.08.2016 and in State of M.P. vs. Gore Lal,,

Sharma: W.A. No.102/2017 decided on 13/04/2017, in Tahseeldar Singh Vs. State of M.P. W.P.No.7412/2014 decided on 14/12/2015, in Kailash",,

Chandra Sirvi vs. Home Department & Ors: W.P.No.2778/2015 decided on 24/08/2016, in Dinesh Singh Parihar Vs. State of M.P. & Ors.:",,

W.P.No.896/2014 decided on 18/06/2014 and in Sandeep Pandey vs. State of M.P. and Ors.W.A. No.367/2015 decided on 17/12/2015. As regard to,,

decision in Sandeep Pandey(supra), it is stated on behalf of the respondent that the operation of said order has been stayed by the Supreme Court on",,

07/11/2016 in Special Leave to Appeal (c) No.20522/2016.,,

The respondents, on their turn, have opposed the relief sought. It is urged that it is the sole discretion of the employer to engage or not to engage for",,

reasons that an incumbent will not be suitable for the service for which he is considered. It is contended that in the case at hand the Screening,,

Committee after giving personal hearing to the petitioner and taking into consideration the charges levelled against him, gave the opinion that he will",,

not be a suitable person for service in a disciplined force. It is urged that the discretion having been judiciously exercised after affording an opportunity,,

of hearing, the same cannot be faulted with.",,

Considered the rival submissions.,,

The issue as present one came up for consideration before Full Bench of our High Court in Ashutosh Pawar Vs. High Court of Madhya Pradesh &,,

Another (Writ Petition No.5865/2016 Order dated 12.01.2018), wherein following questions were dwelt upon:-",,

“1. Whether in all cases, where an FIR lodged against a person for minor offences has been quashed on the basis of a compromise arrived at",,

between the parties or a person has been acquitted on account of a compromise between the parties, the character of the person applying for",,

appointment thereafter, has to be treated as Good and such a person cannot be held ineligible for appointment under the Rules of 1994 ?",,

2.

Whether the High Court in exerciseof its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, can step into the shoes of the Appointing Authority",,

and determine as to whether the person concerned is fit for appointment or whether the High Court on finding that the Authority concerned has,,

wrongly exercised its discretion in holding the candidate to be ineligible should, after quashing the order, remit the matter back to the authority",,

concerned for reconsideration or for fresh consideration as to the eligibility of the person ?,,

3.

Whether the High Court whileallowing such a petition in exercise of its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can issue a further,,

direction to the authority to appoint the person concerned on the post from the date his batchmates were appointed and to grant him back dated,,

seniority and all other benefits or whether the High Court should simply remit the matter back to the authority for taking a decision in this regard ?,,

4.

Whether the high standards ofadjudging the good character of a candidate for appointment as a Judicial Officer, which has been adopted and",,

followed by the State under the Rules of 1994 till the decision in the case of Arvind Gurjar (supra) were and are right and proper or whether in view,,

of the decision in the case of Arvind Gurjar (supra), the same should be considered to be relaxed to the extent that in all cases the character of a",,

person should be treated to be good where he has been acquitted for minor offences on the basis of a compromise?,,

5.

Whether the decision in the case ofArvind Gurjar (supra) lays down the correct law ?,,

6.

Any other question that may arisefor adjudication or decision in the dispute involved in the present petition and which the Larger Bench thinks,,

appropriate to decide ?â€​,,

Dwelling on Questions No.1, 4 and 5, it is held:",,

“32. Therefore, in respect of the Questions No.1, 4 and 5 we hold that decision of criminal Court on the basis of compromise or an acquittal cannot",,

be treated that the candidate possesses good character, which may make him eligible, as the criminal proceedings are with the view to find culpability",,

of commission of offence whereas the appointment to the civil post is in view of his suitability to the post. The test for each of them is based upon,,

different parameters and therefore, acquittal in a criminal case is not a certificate of good conduct to a candidate. The competent Authority has to",,

take a decision in respect of the suitability of candidate to discharge the functions of a civil post and that mere acquittal in a criminal case would not be,,

sufficient to infer that the candidate possesses good character. In this view of the matter, we find that the judgment in Arvind Gurjar's case (supra)",,

holding that it cannot be held that candidate does not have a good character, is not the correct enunciation of law. Consequently, the judgment in",,

Arvind Gurjar's case (supra) is overruled.,,

In regard to questions No.2 and 3, it is held:-",,

“40. In view of the law laid down in above said judgments, there is no doubt that in exercise of power of judicial review under Article 226 of the",,

Constitution of India, this Court only examines the decision-making process and does not substitute itself as a Court of appeal over the reasons",,

recorded by the State Government. We find that the decision of the State Government holding that the petitioner is not suitable, is just, fair and",,

reasonable keeping in view the nature of the post and the duties to be discharged.,,

41.

Even if the High Court finds that the decision of the State Government is suffering from some illegality, the jurisdiction of the High Court in a writ",,

petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is to remit the matter to the Authority for reconsideration rather than to substitute the decision of,,

the competent Authority with that of its own. The Supreme Court in a judgment reported as (1994) 4 SCC 448 (State of Haryana vs. Naresh Kumar,,

Bali) was examining a question: as to whether there could be a direction to appoint a candidate, who sought appointment on compassionate ground.",,

The Supreme Court held as under:-,,

16.

With regard to appointment on compassionate ground we have set out the law in Life Insurance Corpn. of India v. Asha Ramchhandra Ambekar",,

(1994) 2 SCC 718. The same principle will clearly apply here. What the High Court failed to note is the post of an Inspector is a promotional post. The,,

issuing a direction to appoint the respondent within three months when direct recruitment is not available, is unsupportable. The High Court could have",,

merely directed consideration of the claim of the respondent in accordance with the rules. It cannot direct appointment. Such a direction does not fall,,

within the scope of mandamus. Judicial review, it has been repeatedly emphasised, is directed against the decisionmaking process and not against the",,

decision itself; and it is no part of the court's duty to exercise the power of the authorities itself. There is widespread misconception on the scope of,,

interference in judicial review. The exercise of the extraordinary jurisdiction constitutionally conferred on the Apex Court under Article 142(1) of the,,

Constitution can be of no guidance on the scope of Article 226.â€​,,

The impugned order when is tested on the anvil of the law laid down by the Full Bench, no interference is warranted.",,

Consequently, petition fails and is dismissed.",,

No costs.,,