Ajikumar vs State Of Kerala

C.S.Sudha, J.

This appeal under Section 374(2) Cr.P.C. by the sole accused in S.C.No. 801/2016 on the file of the Court of Session, Kollam has been filed through the Superintendent, Central Prison and Correctional Home, Poojappura, Thiruvananthapuram under Section 383 Cr.P.C. challenging the conviction entered and sentence passed against him for the offences punishable under Sections 324 and 302 IPC.

The prosecution case as stated in the charge sheet is - deceased Sarojam, is the mother of PW1 and the accused. The accused, the elder brother of PW1 along with their parents were residing in house bearing no.IV/276, Thrikkaruva Grama Panchayat belonging to PW1. While so, the accused on 18/07/2015 abused his mother. The mother rebuked/scolded the accused for the same. Due to this enmity, the accused on the said day at 12:30 p.m. with the intention of murdering his mother, tried to beat her with MO.1 iron pipe at which time PW1 intervened and prevented the assault. The accused then took MO.2 knife from the kitchen and attempted to attack his mother with the same. Again PW1 intervened and when he tried to ward off the attack, he sustained a cut injury on his right hand. The accused cut/hacked PW1 on his left hand and left shoulder causing injuries. At this time when the mother carrying the eight month old child of PW1 ran into the courtyard of the house, the accused pursued/followed her and with MO.1 iron pipe beat her on her head. Seeing this, when PW1 pulled away his child from the arms of his mother, the accused again tried to beat him with MO.1 pipe, which PW1 warded off. The accused beat his mother several times with MO.1 iron pipe on her head and other parts of the body causing grievous injuries. Sarojam succumbed to the injuries sustained while being taken to the hospital. Hence the accused is alleged to have committed the offences punishable under Sections 324 and 302 IPC.

Based on Ext.P1 FIS of PW1 recorded by PW13, SCPO, Crime no.1048/2015, Anchalummoodu police station, Kollam, that is, Ext.P10 FIR was registered by PW12, the then Sub Inspector of the aforesaid police station. The investigation was conducted by PW14, Circle Inspector, Kollam West. PW15, the Inspector who thereafter took charge verified the investigation and submitted the charge sheet before the court.

On the final report being submitted, the jurisdictional magistrate after complying with the statutory formalities, committed the case against the accused to the Sessions Court concerned, which court took the case on file as S.C.No.801/2016. On appearance of the accused before the Court of Session, he was furnished with the copies of all the prosecution records. On 01/11/2017, the trial court framed a charge for the offences punishable under Sections 324 and 302 IPC, which was read over and explained to the accused to which he pleaded not guilty.

The prosecution examined PWs.1 to 15 and got marked Exts.P1 to P14 and MO.1 to MO.3. After the close of the prosecution evidence, the accused was questioned under Section 313(1)(b) Cr.P.C. regarding the incriminating circumstances appearing against him in the evidence of the prosecution. The accused denied all those circumstances and maintained his innocence.

As the Sessions Court did not find it a fit case to acquit the accused under Section 232 Cr.P.C., he was asked to enter on his defence and adduce evidence in support thereof. DW1 and DW2 were examined and Exts.D1 and D2 were marked on the side of the accused.

On a consideration of the oral and documentary evidence and after hearing both sides, the trial court by the impugned judgment found the accused guilty of the offences punishable under Sections 324 and 302 IPC and hence convicted and sentenced him to imprisonment for life and to a fine of ₹5,000/- and in default of payment of fine, to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of one month for the offence punishable under Section 302 IPC; and to simple imprisonment for a period of three months and to a fine of ₹1,000/- and in default of payment of fine to simple imprisonment for a further period of fifteen days for the offence punishable under Section 324 IPC. The fine amount if realized, ₹5,000/- has been directed to be paid to the legal heirs of deceased Sarojam, excluding the accused, as compensation under Section 357 (1) (b) Cr.P.C.

The only point that arises for consideration in this appeal is whether the conviction entered and sentence passed against the accused by the trial court is sustainable or not.

Heard Ms.Sajitha M.J., the learned counsel for the appellant and Ms.Sheeba Thomas, the learned Public Prosecutor for the respondent.

The prosecution relies on the testimony of PW8 and Ext.P7 post-mortem report to substantiate the case that death of Sarojam was infact a case of homicide. PW8, Medical Officer, Department of Forensic Medicine, Medical College Hospital, Thiruvananthapuram on 19/07/2015 had conducted postmortem on the body of Sarojam. According to PW8 there were 12 ante-mortem injuries and the cause of death was due to the blunt injuries sustained on the head. The postmortem certificate has been marked as Ext.P7. The testimony of PW8 has not been challenged. However, we note with concern the incorrect procedure followed by the learned trial judge in marking Ext.P7 without PW8 deposing regarding the injuries noted by him. As held by the Apex Court in Nagindra Bala Mitra v. Sunil Chandra Roy, AIR 1960 SC 706, a medical witness who performes a postmortem examination is a witness of fact, though he also gives an opinion on certain aspects of the case. The value of a medical witness is not merely to check upon the testimony of eyewitnesses; but it is also independent testimony, as it may establish certain facts, quite apart from the other oral evidence. In the case on hand, to prove the ante mortem injuries sustained by the deceased and the cause of death, the prosecution examined PW8. In his deposition there is no mention about any of the injuries sustained by the deceased. A postmortem certificate like a wound certificate is only a previous statement in writing of the doctor who prepared it. It is not substantive evidence. It is a piece of evidence that may be used for corroboration under Section 157 or for contradiction under Section 145 Evidence Act unless it is covered by Section 32 of the Evidence Act. A party should be allowed to adduce corroborative evidence only after he has adduced substantive evidence. PW8 should have been asked to depose to the ante-mortem injuries noted by him, which would have been the substantive evidence and only thereafter the postmortem certificate should have been allowed to be tendered in evidence. After marking the postmortem certificate, PW8 was never asked to depose regarding the injuries noted by him. The result is that there is no substantive evidence. Tendering corroborative piece of evidence without adducing substantive evidence in a futile exercise. The learned trial judge went wrong in admitting the certificate in evidence. (See Krishnankutty v. State of Kerala, 2015 (2) KHC 322 and Joseph Mathai @ Jose v. State of Kerala, 2019 KHC 934).

Be that as it may, the prosecution case of assault by the accused with MO.1 iron pipe and MO.2 knife resulting in causing injuries to Sarojam, to which she later succumbed, is not disputed by the accused. The case of the accused is that he is entitled to the benefit of Section 84 IPC. Before we go into the materials on record, let us examine Section 84 IPC and the precedents on the point.

Section 84 IPC says that nothing is an offence which is done by a person who, at the time of doing it, by reason of unsoundness of mind, is incapable of knowing the nature of the act, or that he is doing what is either wrong or contrary to law. The settled position of law is that every man is presumed to be sane and to possess a sufficient degree of reason to be responsible for his acts unless the contrary is proved. (State of M. P. v. Ahmadulla, AIR 1961 SC 998). A distinction has to be made between medical insanity and legal insanity. As held in Hari Singh Gond v. State of M. P., AIR 2009 SC 31, Section 84 IPC lays down the legal test of responsibility in cases of alleged unsoundness of mind. There is no definition of 'unsoundness of mind' in the Penal Code. The term 'insanity' has no precise definition. It is a term used to describe varying degrees of mental disorder. Every person who is mentally diseased is not ipso facto exempted from criminal responsibility. In dealing with cases involving a defense of insanity, distinction must be made between cases, in which insanity is more or less proved and the question is only as to the degree of irresponsibility, and cases, in which insanity is sought to be proved in respect of a person, who for all intents and purposes, appears sane. In all cases, where previous insanity is proved or admitted, certain considerations must be borne in mind. Whether there was deliberation and preparation for the act; whether it was done in a manner which showed a desire to concealment; whether after the crime, the offender showed consciousness of guilt and made efforts to avoid detection; whether after his arrest, he offered false excuses and made false statements. It has also been pointed out that these tests are good for cases in which previous insanity is more or less established.

12.1. In Bapu v. State of Rajasthan, (2007) 8 SCC 66, it has been held, Section 84 embodies the fundamental maxim of criminal law, i.e., actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea (an act does not constitute guilt unless done with a guilty intention). To constitute an offence, the intent and act must concur; but in the case of insane persons, no culpability is fastened on them as they have no free will (furiosi nulla voluntas est). The Section itself provides that the benefit is available only after it is proved that at the time of committing the act, the accused was labouring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or that even if he did not know it, it was either wrong or contrary to law, then this section must be applied. The crucial point of time for deciding whether the benefit of this section should be given or not, is the material time when the offence takes place. In coming to that conclusion, the relevant circumstances are to be taken into consideration, it would be dangerous to admit the defense of insanity upon arguments derived merely from the character of the crime. It is only unsoundness of mind which naturally impairs the cognitive faculties of the mind that can form a ground of exemption from criminal responsibility. The law recognizes nothing but incapacity to realize the nature of the act and presumes that where a man's mind or his faculties of ratiocination are sufficiently dim to comprehend what he is doing, he must always be presumed to intend the consequence of the action he takes. Mere absence of motive for a crime, howsoever atrocious it may be, cannot, in the absence of a plea and proof of legal insanity, bring the case within this section.

12.2. In Sheralli Wali Mohammed v. State of Maharashtra, (1973) 4 SCC 79 : AIR 1972 SC 2443 it has been held that the mere fact that no motive has been proved why the accused committed the murder or the fact that he made no attempt to run away, would not indicate that he was insane or that he did not have necessary mens rea for the commission of the offence. Mere abnormality of mind or partial delusion, irresistible impulse or compulsive behaviour of a psychopath affords no protection under Section 84. Behaviour, antecedent, attendant, and after the event, may be relevant in finding the mental condition of the accused at the time of the event, but not that remote in time. It is difficult to prove the precise state of the offender' s mind at the time of the commission of the offence, but some indication thereof is often furnished by the conduct of the offender while committing it or immediately after the commission of the offence. A lucid interval of an insane person is not merely a cessation of the violent symptoms of the disorder, but a restoration of the faculties of the mind sufficiently to enable the person soundly to judge the act; but the expression does not necessarily mean complete or perfect restoration of the mental faculties to their original condition. So, if there is such a restoration, the person concerned can do the act with such reason, memory, and judgment as to make it a legal act; but merely a cessation of the violent symptoms of the disorder is not sufficient.

12.3. The standard to be applied is whether according to the ordinary standard, adopted by reasonable men, the act was right or wrong. The mere fact that an accused is conceited, odd, irascible and his brain is not quite all right, or that the physical and mental ailments from which he suffered had rendered his intellect weak and had affected his emotions and will, or that he had committed certain unusual acts in the past or that he was liable to recurring fits of insanity at short intervals, or that he was subject to getting epileptic fits but there was nothing abnormal in his behaviour, or that his behaviour was queer, cannot be sufficient to attract the application of this section.

12.4. As far as burden of proof is concerned, it has been held in Dahyabhai Chhaganbhai Thakkar v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1964 SC 1563, that it is fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that an accused is presumed to be innocent and, therefore, the burden lies on the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution, therefore, in a case of homicide, shall prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused caused death with the requisite intention described in S.299 IPC. This general burden never shifts, and it always rests on the prosecution. Under S.105 of the Evidence Act, read with the definition of ‘shall presume' in S.4 thereof, the court shall regard the absence of such circumstances as proved unless, after considering the matters before it, it believes that the said circumstances existed or their existence was so probable that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the particular case, to act upon the supposition that they did exist. To put it in other words, the accused will have to rebut the presumption that such circumstances did not exist, by placing material before the court sufficient to make it consider the existence of the said circumstances so probable that a prudent man would act upon them. The accused must satisfy the standard of a ' prudent man'. If the material placed before the court, such as oral and documentary evidence, presumptions, admissions or even the prosecution evidence, satisfies the test of 'prudent man' the accused will have discharged his burden. The evidence so placed may not be sufficient to discharge the burden under S.105 of the Evidence Act, but it may raise a reasonable doubt in the mind of a judge as regards one or other of the necessary ingredients of the offence itself. It may, for instance, raise a reasonable doubt in the mind of the judge whether the accused had the requisite intention laid down in Section 299 IPC. If the judge has such reasonable doubt, he must acquit the accused, for in that event the prosecution will have failed to prove conclusively the guilt of the accused. There is no conflict between the general burden, which is always on the prosecution, which never shifts, and the special burden that rests on the accused to make out his defense of insanity.

12.5. Explaining the above decision, the Apex Court in Bhikari v. State of U.P., AIR 1966 SC 1, held that if upon the evidence adduced in the case whether by the prosecution or by the accused, a reasonable doubt is created in the mind of the court as regards one or more of the ingredients of the offence including mens rea of the accused he would be entitled to be acquitted. This is quite different from saying that the prosecution must also establish the sanity of the accused at the time of commission of the offence despite what has been expressly provided for in Section 105 of the Evidence Act.

12.6. In T.N. Lakshmaiah v. State of Karnataka, AIR 2001 SC 3828, it has been held that under the Evidence Act, the onus of proving any of the exceptions mentioned in the Chapter lies on the accused though the requisite standard of proof is not the same as expected from the prosecution. It is sufficient if an accused is able to bring his case within the ambit of any of the general exceptions by the standard of preponderance of probabilities, as a result of which he may succeed not because he proves his case to the hilt but because the version given by him casts a doubt on the prosecution case.

12.7. In State of U.P. v. Ram Swarup, AIR 1974 SC 1570, it has been held that the burden which rests on the accused to prove the exception is not of the same rigour as the burden of the prosecution to prove the charge beyond a reasonable doubt. It is enough for the accused to show, as in a civil case, that the preponderance of probabilities is in favour of his plea. (See also Rabindra Kumar Dey v. State of Orissa, AIR 1977 SC 170).

Applying the aforesaid principles, let us now examine the materials on record to decide whether the accused is entitled to the benefit of Section 84 IPC. In Ext.P1, PW1 the younger brother of the accused says thus- on 18/7/2015 at 12:30 p.m. the accused abused his mother and then his mother in turn rebuked the former (…......അമയ  അന വശ  പറയകയ , അമ വഴക … പറഞപ  ള ...........). The accused then took MO.1 iron pipe kept under a cot and tried to beat his mother at which time he intervened and prevented the assault. The accused then went into the kitchen, took MO.2 knife and tried to hack his mother with the same. PW1 again intervened and tried to ward off the attack and in the course of the said attempt, he sustained a cut injury on his right hand. The accused then cut/hacked him with MO.2 knife on his left hand and shoulder. He ran out into the courtyard. The accused followed him outside to the courtyard. At that time his eight month old daughter was being carried by his mother. The accused beat his mother on her head. He then pulled away his child from the arms of his mother and while doing so the child also received a beating on her head. The accused continued to assault his mother by beating her several times on her head and body with MO.1 iron pipe. His mother fell down due to the assault. He then ran with the child into the road, at which time his neighbour Radhakrishnan came by in a Scooter. Radhakrishnan took him and his child to the hospital. In the morning his wife Anju had left for her job. Thereafter he along with his child, his parents and the accused were at home. By 11:00 a.m, his father had left for bringing back Manju, the wife of the accused, from her house. The accused was residing with his wife and daughter in the house of his wife at (പ ടന  പണ  മ നസ ക അസഖ Kureepuzha. Two days back the accused left his wife's home after assaulting her. His parents came to know that the accused was in the police station at Ochira, so they went there and brought him home. From the said day, the accused has been staying with him in his house. PW1 has further stated that his brother, the accused, had undergone treatment for mental illness in a hospital near Ammachiveedu and High School junction. Recently the symptoms have again surfaced.(വന അമച  വ!ട നടതള ആശപത   ല  ഹ+സള മക ല    ക ത നടത  അസഖ പ0ദമ  ത ണ .  ഈ അടത ദ വസങള ല ണ  വ!ണ  ഇങയന തടങ  ത ..... ).  It was without any particular reason, the accused had assaulted and injured his mother as well as assaulted him and his child.

13.1. PW1 when examined more or less stands by the case narrated by him in Ext.P1. However, he feigned ignorance when asked about the mental illness of the accused. PW1 denied that the accused had any mental illness. However, on further questioning, PW1 admitted that all what he had stated in Ext.P1 is true and that he did state to the police that the accused had undergone treatment for mental illness. PW1 also admitted that there was no reason for the accused to harbour any feelings of enmity either against his mother or against him or his child. He also admitted that it was for no reason that the accused had attacked him, his child as well as his mother.

13.2. PW2, a neighbour, cited as an eyewitness denied having seen the incident. As he denied the prosecution case, permission was sought by the prosecutor under Section 154 of the Evidence Act read with the Second Proviso to Section 162 to put questions as put in the cross examination, which request was allowed by the trial Judge. In the cross examination by the defence counsel, PW2 deposed that accused, who is like his son is generally calm. (അജ കമ   എ യറ മകയന പപ യല  ണ . യപ തയവ ശ ന സA0 വക രന   രന. See page 6 of his deposition). PW2 admitted that he knows that the accused has been under treatment for mental illness. He also deposed that from the time he is seeing the accused, the latter has been under treatment. According to PW2, though the accused is a mental patient, he could recognize people. He was fully convinced that the accused had mental illness. He does not know whether two days before the incident, the accused had assaulted his wife and had left her house. He knows that the accused had been brought from Ochira. The police had informed that the accused was violent and that he has to be taken to the hospital. It was pursuant to the same, the accused had been brought to the house of PW1. When the accused was brought home from Ochira, he was violent. PW2 also deposed that he was under the impression that the accused had been admitted in the hospital. PW2 did not give any answer when it was suggested to him that the accused was completely unsound when the incident had happened.

13.3. PW3, attestor to Ext.P2 scene mahazar, in the cross examination admitted that two days before the incident the accused had left his wife's home after assaulting her. He also knows that the accused had been restrained by the people of the area who had informed the police, pursuant to which the police took the accused to the police station. PW3 deposed that he does not know whether the accused had been restrained by the people as the accused had tried to assault the people of the locality. PW3 stated that he knows that the Ochira police had taken away the accused on complaint received. The accused was brought home as he required treatment for his mental illness. According to PW3, he is convinced that the accused is completely unsound. He knows that even before the incident, the accused had mental illness. He also knows that the accused had been treated for mental illness at a hospital near Ammachiveedu. PW3 admitted that it was without any specific reason, the accused had assaulted PW1 and attacked his mother and injured her. He also admitted that at the time of the incident, the accused was mentally unsound as a result of which he was unable to understand or comprehend the consequences of his act.

13.4. PW4, attestor to Ext.P3 inquest report, deposed that she had heard that the accused was under treatment for mental illness.

13.5. PW5, a close relative of the deceased is the person to whom the dead body of Sarojam had been handed over. In the cross examination, he deposed that he does not know whether the accused had any mental illness or whether the accused had been under treatment for the same.

13.6. We also refer to the testimony of DW1 and DW2. DW1, Assistant Surgeon, District Hospital, Kollam deposed that on 19/07/2015 at 03:30 p.m, she had examined the accused and issued Ext.D1 certificate. In Ext.D1, she has recorded that the accused has psychiatric problems. In the cross-examination, DW1 deposed that she cannot say whether the accused was completely incapable of comprehending things when she had examined the latter. In the re-examination, DW1 deposed that while she had examined the accused, she understood that the accused had mental issues. DW2, Consultant Psychiatrist, Government Mental Health Centre, Thiruvananthapuram, deposed that Ext.D2 is the treatment records of the accused and as per Ext.D2, the accused has Bipolar Mood Disorder. The accused was discharged on 07/10/2015. Thereafter he was again admitted on 21/12/2017 and discharged on 06/01/2018. DW2 deposed that constant medication is required for Bipolar Mood Disorder. In the cross examination, DW2 deposed that on 18/07/2015 he had not treated the patient. He had seen the accused for the first time on 21/12/2017. On 19/07/2015 also he had not examined or treated the accused and therefore he does not know what was the mental condition of the accused on the said day.

The trial court rejected the plea of the accused that he is entitled to the benefit of Section 84 IPC relying on the testimony of PW1 and PW5 as well as the conduct of the accused in taking MO.1 iron pipe from under a cot in the house of PW1 and thereafter taking MO.2 knife from the kitchen and assaulting and attacking PW1 and his mother. According to the learned trial judge, the very fact that the accused knew that MO.1 iron pipe was beneath the cot, shows signs of sanity. Two weapons were used for the crime, which also indicate that the accused was quite aware of the surroundings. The court also relied on the testimony of PWs.1 and 5 to conclude that the accused was not suffering from any mental unsoundness either at the time of the incident or before the same. We think that the said reasonings and conclusions of the learned trial judge are erroneous and incorrect. The trial court has only referred to the testimony of PWs.1 and 5, but has completely ignored the testimony of PWs.2 and 3. PW2 though hostile, in the cross-examination by the defence counsel has clearly admitted that the accused was mentally unsound and that he had undergone treatment before the incident. PW3 also supports the case of the accused that the latter had been treated for mental illness before the incident and that the accused was completely unsound and hence not in a position to distinguish between what is right and what is wrong. There is no re-examination or clarification on the said aspect deposed by PWs.2 and 3, which would mean that the defence case stands unchallenged or that it is not disputed.

Further, PW1 though initially feigned ignorance of the mental condition of his brother, admitted on further cross-examination that all what he had stated in Ext.P1 is true. In Ext.P1 itself PW1 has clearly stated that his brother had undergone treatment earlier for mental unsoundness. We have already referred to in detail the testimony PW1, PW2 and PW3 which would substantiate the case of the accused. Their testimony coupled with the testimony of DW1 and DW2 and Exts.D1 and D2 would indicate that the accused was infact of unsound mind. PW1 admits that there was absolutely no reasons for the accused to have assaulted and attacked his mother as well as injured him. He also admits that the accused was not in inimical terms either with himself or with his mother or with his child. A normal person without any motive or reason or enmity will not commit acts as done by the accused in this case. So what was the reason for the accused to act in the manner as he did resulting in causing injuries to PW1, his brother, as well as injuring his mother leading to her death ? Even according to PW1 the accused had no reason for the same. This coupled with the testimony of PW1 and PW2 and Exts.D1 and D2 do probabilise the case of the accused that he was mentally unsound at the time of commission of the offence.

From the records we find that in the remand report dated 19/07/2015 submitted by PW14 before the jurisdictional magistrate, it is stated that accused is showing signs of mental illness and that if he is released on bail, there is every possibility of the accused committing offences of the like nature. Therefore it is clear that the investigating officer was aware of the fact that the accused did have some mental issues. As held by the Apex Court in Bapu (Supra), it is the duty of a honest investigator to subject the accused to medical examination immediately and place the evidence before the court and if that is not done, it creates a serious infirmity in the prosecution case and that in such cases the benefit of doubt must be given to the accused. PW14 has not discharged this duty cast on him. Further, as held in the decisions hereinabove referred to, the onus of proving any of the exceptions mentioned in Chapter IV of IPC, lies on the accused though the requisite standard of proof is not the same as expected from the prosecution. It is sufficient if the accused is able to bring his case within the ambit of any of the general exceptions by the standard of preponderance of probabilities, as a result of which he may succeed not because he proves his case to the hilt but because the version given by him casts a doubt on the prosecution case. In the case on hand, the incident took place on 18/07/2015. On the very next day, the accused was admitted in the Mental Health Centre, Thiruvananthapuram. The testimony of PWs.1 to 3 show that even before the incident the accused had undergone treatment for mental unsoundness. Two days' before the incident it appears that the accused again started showing signs of mental illness and the materials on record show that he was also violent. The accused committed the crime apparently with no motive or reasons. This certainly raises doubts in our mind as to whether the accused had the required mens rea as contemplated under Section 299 IPC. Hence in these circumstances we find that the accused is entitled to the benefit of Section 84 IPC.

From the materials on record we find that the accused has committed the act of causing the death of his mother and also injuring PW1. However he is entitled to be acquitted under Section 334 Cr.P.C., as he is entitled to the benefit of exception contained in Section 84 IPC. Section 335 Cr.P.C. gives two options to the court to deal with persons who are acquitted on the ground of mental unsoundness. As per clause (a) to sub-section (1) such person shall be ordered to be detained in safe custody in such place and manner as the court thinks fit, or as per clause (b) he may be ordered to be delivered to any relative or friend of such person. Sub-section (3) says that no order for the delivery of the accused to a relative or friend shall be made under clause (b) of sub-section (1) except upon the application of such relative or friend and on his giving security to the satisfaction of the Magistrate or Court that the person delivered shall- (a) be properly taken care of and prevented from doing injury to himself or to any other person; (b) be produced for the inspection of such officer, and at such times and places, as the State Government may direct. Sub-section (4) of S.335 provides that the court shall report to the State Government, the action taken under sub-section (1) S.336 of Cr.P.C. gives the power to the State Government to empower the officer in charge of the jail in which a person is confined under the provisions of S.330 or 335 to discharge all or any of the functions of the Inspector General of Prisons under S.337 or S.338 of the Code. S.338 deals with the procedure where the prisoner with mental illness is detained under the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 330 or Section 335 and such Inspector General or visitors shall certify that, in his or their judgment, he may be released without danger of his doing injury to himself or to any other person, the State Government may thereupon order him to be released, or to be detained in custody or to be transferred to a public lunatic asylum if he has not been already sent to such an asylum; and, in case it orders him to be transferred to an asylum, may appoint a Commission, consisting of a judicial and two medical Officers. Sub-section (2) provides that such Commission shall make a formal inquiry into the state of mind of such person, take such evidence as is necessary, and shall report to the State Government, which may order his release or detention as it thinks fit. S.339(1) of Code provides that whenever any relative or friend of any person detained under the provisions of S.330 or S.335 desires that he shall be delivered to his care and custody, the State Government may, upon the application of such relative or friend and on his giving security to the satisfaction of the State Government, that the person delivered shall-(a) be properly taken care of and prevented from doing injury to himself or any other person; (b) be produced for the inspection of such officer, and at such times and places, as the State Government may direct.

In the result, we set aside the conviction and sentence entered against the appellant under Section 302 IPC. We find that the appellant/accused has committed the act of causing the death of his mother with MO.1 iron pipe and causing injuries to PW1 with MO.2 knife. We acquit the appellant/accused under Section 334 CrPC on the ground that, at the time at which he committed the offence, he was, by reason of unsoundness of mind, incapable of knowing the nature of the act alleged, or that it was contrary to law. We direct the appellant/accused to be kept in safe custody for the present as provided under S.335 Cr.P.C. Sub-section (2) of S.335 provides that the order for detention shall be in accordance with the rules framed by the State Government under the Indian Lunacy Act, 1912. As the Indian Lunacy Act, 1912 has been repealed and the relevant Act in force is the Mental Healthcare Act, 2017, we find that the latter Act is applicable in this case. We, therefore, direct that the appellant/accused to be detained in one of the mental health establishments in the State in accordance with the rules, if any, framed by the State Government. A copy of this judgment shall be sent to the Director General of Prisons and the Secretary, Home Department, Government of Kerala in terms of S.335(4) for taking further action in terms of Sections 338 and 339 of the Cr.P.C.

In the result, the Criminal Appeal is allowed. The conviction and sentence imposed against the appellant by the trial court for the offences punishable under Sections 324 and 302 IPC are set aside. As stated in paragraph 18 of the judgment, the accused stands acquitted subject to S.335(1)(a) Cr.P.C.

Interlocutory applications, if any pending, shall stand closed.