Ajit Kumar Sinha vs Anil Kumar Yadav and Others

B.P. Jha, J.—This civil revision petition has been filed against an order dated 16th June, 1984. By the impugned order, the court below rejected that part of the written statement in which the defendant had contested the prayer of the plaintiffs for eviction of the defendant on the ground of personal necessity.

Where a suit is contested on the ground of personal necessity, a special procedure has been laid down in section 14 of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1982 (hereinafter referred to as ''the Act'').

It is also stated in section 13 of the Act that the provision of section 14 will have overriding effect in respect of other portions of the Act provided it is inconsistent with section 14 of the Act.

In the present case, leave was granted to the defendant on 21st November, 1983 u/s 14(6) of the Act; in other words, leave was granted up to 6th December, 1983, for filing a written statement. On 6th December, the petitioner (defendant) applied for extension of time for filing the written statement u/s 14(6) of the Act. On 6th December, 1983, the court extended the time for two days at the risk of the defendant. On 8th December, 1983, the defendant filed his written statement u/s 14(6) of the Act.

The question is: Whether the court below had the power to extend the time in filing the written statement or not?

The answer must be given in the affirmative. The court has power to extend the time under Order 8, rule 1 of the CPC (hereinafter referred to as ''the Code''). The court can also extend the time u/s 148 of the Code.

Now, the question is: Whether the provisions of the Code apply to the cases following u/s 14 of the Act. The answer must be given in the affirmative. It is relevant to quote sub-section (6) of section 14 of the Act which reads as follows:

When leave is granted to the tenant to contest the suit, the latter may, within fifteen days from the date of the order, pray after filing the requisite court-fee, required for a written statement that the affidavit may be treated as the written statement or it he chooses to file a separate written statement he may do so within fifteen days of the grant of leave to contest the suit and if he does not file the written statement within the period he shall not be allowed to do so later. The Court shall thereafter commence the hearing of the suit as early as possible.

On a perusal of section 14(7) of the Act, it is clear that the procedure of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887 (hereinafter referred to as the ''S.C.C. Act'') will apply to the proceedings u/s 14 of the Act. Section 17 of the S.C.C. Act provides that the procedure prescribed in the Code will be followed in a case falling under the S.C.C. Act. In this circumstance, it is clear that the provisions of Order 8, rule 1 and section 148 of the Code will apply to a proceeding u/s 14 of the Act. If it is so, the court had power to extend the time under Order 8, rule 1 as well as u/s 148 of the Code. In this view of the matter, the court has no authority to reject the written statement in respect of the allegation of the plaintiffs for eviction of the defendant on the ground of personal necessity. I, therefore, set aside the first part of the order as mentioned in paragraph No. 14 of the judgment. I affirm the finding made by the court below in paragraph No. 13 of the order. Hence, the order of the court below in refusing to accept that part of the written statement wherein the defendant has challenged his eviction on the ground of personal necessity is set aside. In the result, the petition is allowed so far as the order in paragraph No. 14 of the judgment is concerned. In other words, the petition is allowed to the extent mentioned in the present order of this court. The trial should proceed in accordance with law. The parties shall bear their own costs.