Ajit Singh vs Chet Singh (died) and ors.

G.R. Majithia, J.—This revision petition is directed against the order of the Executing Court dated January 15, 1986 rejecting the Objection Petition under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure (for short, the ''Code'') filed by the judgmentdebtors.

The facts : Chet Singh (since deceased) and Norata, respondents (hereinafter referred to as the decreeholders) filed a suit for preemption. The suit was decreed on July 11, 1969. The execution of this decree was deferred till R.S.A.No. 607 of 1970 pending in this Court, where the question whether the preemptor/tenant on the land qua which he was claiming the right of preemption, was finally adjudicated upon by this Court. This Court decided the regular second appeal on March 1, 1982, the preemptor took out the execution. The defendants in the suit for preemption (who are Objectors) filed Objection Petition under Section 47 of the Code on January 19, 1985 on the ground that the Punjab Preemption Act had since been repealed rendering the decree inexecutable and the execution application was beyond limitation.

The executing Court framed the following issues :

(1) Whether the decree is nonexecutable as alleged in para 2 ? OPJD.

(2) Whether the decree is time barred ? OJD.

(3) Whether the decree is vague and indefinite ?

(4) Relief.

It answered all the issues against the judgmentdebtor and in favour of the decreeholders.

The judgmentdebtor have come up in revision against the order of the Executing Court and the learned counsel for the petitioner has precisely raised the same submissions as were raised before the Executing Court. I find no merit in this petition. Exhibit DHX is a copy of the decreesheet passed in the preemption suit. In the title of the decreesheet, full particulars of the land measuring 70 kanals 12 marlas are mentioned and in the later portion it is mentioned that a suit for preemption for 12 kanals of land out of the land mentioned in the title was decreed. It is further mentioned that the decree will be executed after the decision of the regular second appeal pending in the High Court.

There is no dispute that the decision in R.S.A. No. 607 of 1970 was rendered by this Court on March 1, 1982. The decree became effective the moment it was passed. Its execution was postponed to a later date, which is permissible in law. A consent decree is effective in the same manner as a decree after contest. A judgment by consent or default is as effective as a judgment whereby the Court exercise its mind in a contested case. A consent decree does not stand on a different footing than a decree rendered after contest. I do not think that the consent decree is not executable. The decree is not vague. Out of the total land mentioned in the title of the decree, suit for preemption was decreed qua 12 kanals of land. The decree will be deemed to be a decree for joint possession of 12 kanals of land out of the total land measuring 70 kanals 12 marlas. The decreeholders are entitled to get symbolic possession from the civil Court and actual possession in partition proceedings by moving an application under Section 111 of Chapter IX of the Punjab Land Revenue Act. The repealing of the Punjab Preemption Act does not in any way render a decree, which had been passed when the Act was in force, a nullity. The decree was a good decree when it was passed. The subsequent repealing of the Punjab Preemption Act will not affect its validity.

For the reasons aforementioned, I do not find any merit in this petition. The same is dismissed. However, the parties are left to bear their own costs.