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Ajit Singh vs State Of Haryana & Others

Punjab And Haryana At Chandigarh · Decided on 26 February 2020 · Citation: (2020) 02 P&H CK 0223

HON’BLE JUDGES
Augustine George Masih , J
ACTS & SECTIONS REFERRED
Punjab Civil Services Rules, Volume 1 — Rule 7.2, 7.3, 7.5 · Indian Penal Code, 1860 — Section 34, 302
RESULT
Dismissed
CASE NUMBER
Regular Second Appeal No. 5630 Of 2014
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Judgment

86 paragraphs · 1,941 words

Augustine George Masih, J

1.

This Regular Second Appeal has been preferred by the appellant â€" plaintiff, who was appointed as Mali-cum-Chowkidar with the respondents

and had joined duty on 09.11.1995. During the course of his employment, he was involved in a criminal case i.e. FIR No.349 dated 20.11.1997, under

Sections 302/34 of the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter referred to as 'IPC'). The appellant â€" plaintiff was convicted vide judgment dated 26.10.1999

and sentenced vide order dated 27.10.1999 to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life for offence committed under Section 302 IPC read with Section

34 IPC with fine of `2000/- with default stipulation. In pursuance to the said judgment of conviction and order of sentence, he was placed under

suspension and thereafter, vide order dated 20.10.2000, dismissed from service, although his appeal against the conviction and sentence was pending

before the Division Bench of this Court. The Division Bench of this Court, in appeal, acquitted the appellant â€" plaintiff and another co-accused

Satish by giving them benefit of doubt vide judgment dated 10.09.2008, however, qua the other co-accused, conviction and sentence was upheld. After

the acquittal, appellant â€" plaintiff submitted an application for reinstatement in service. Vide order dated 20.10.2010, dismissal order was revoked

and he rejoined the service. He served a notice upon the respondents for granting him the benefit of full pay and allowances. Respondent â€

department had, after considering the application/ representation, reinstated him in service w.e.f. 20.11.1997 vide order dated 18.09.2009 and decision

regarding arrears was to be taken later. The said aspect was decided by the respondents by granting him the subsistence allowance for the period of

his suspension. The period between 20.11.1997 to 12.11.2000 was treated as duty period and the period from 13.11.2000 (the date of his conviction) to

17.09.2009 (the date of his reinstatement) as extraordinary leave. Appellant â€" plaintiff is claiming the benefit of full pay and allowances for the

period of his suspension i.e. 20.11.1997 to 12.11.2000 and thereafter, the period between 13.11.2000 to 17.09.2009 along with interest.

2.

The Civil Judge (Junior Division), Bhiwani, decreed the suit of the appellant â€" plaintiff vide judgment dated 27.02.2012 by holding the order dated

19.02.2010 passed by the respondents rejecting the back-wages as referred to above, as illegal, null and void with a declaration that the appellant â€

plaintiff is entitled to full back-wages from 10.11.1997 to 17.09.2009. This judgment and decree was challenged by the respondents before the District

Judge, Bhiwani, in an appeal, who allowed the same vide judgment and decree dated 28.05.2014 and dismissed the suit of the appellant â€" plaintiff

relying upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ranchhodji Chaturji Thakore Vs. The Superintendent Engineer, Gujarat Electricity Board,

Himmatnagar (Gujarat) & another {1997 (2) R.S.J. 695 (SC)}, Union of India & others Vs. Jaipal Singh, {2004 (2) R.S.J. (63) }and Smt. K.

Ponnamma Vs. The State of Kerala & others, {1997 (3) R.S.J. (32).} This appeal has been filed challenging the judgment and decree passed by the

lower Appellate Court reversing the judgment and decree passed by the Civil Judge (Junior Division), Bhiwani, dated 27.02.2012.

3.

It is the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that as per Rule 7.2 of the Punjab Civil Services Rules, Vol. 1 (as applicable to the State

of Haryana), the appellant â€" plaintiff, in the light of the fact that he has been acquitted in the criminal case which was registered against him leading

to his conviction because of which, he was initially suspended and thereafter, his services were dispensed with, would be entitled to not only

reinstatement in service but also the all consequential benefits including full pay and allowances for the said period, for which period he was not able to

perform his duties because of no fault of his, firstly, he being under suspension and thereafter, on his dismissal from service because of his conviction

till his reinstatement. In support of this contention, he places reliance upon the judgments passed by the Division Bench of this Court in Hukam Singh

Vs. The State of Haryana & another {2001 (1) RSJ 201}, Shashi Kumar Vs. Uttri Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam & another, {2005 (1) RSJ 718}, CWP

No.16192 of 2010, titled as 'Sukhchain Singh Vs. State of Punjab & another', decided on 18.03.2013, CWP No.15977 of 2012, titled as 'Piara Singh

Vs. State of Punjab & others', decided on 26.04.2013, which has been upheld by the Division Bench of this Court in LPA No.1634 of2013, titled as

'State of Punjab & others Vs.Piara Singh', decided on 19.09.2013. He, thus, contends that the judgment and decree passed by the lower Appellate

Court cannot sustain and deserves to be set aside and the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court restored.

4.

On the other hand, learned counsel for the State has placed reliance upon the various judgments passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court to contend

that an employee, who has been initially placed under suspension after his conviction and after some time, dismissed from service, is not entitled to

back-wages on he being acquitted and reinstated in service especially when the criminal proceedings, which have been initiated against him, are not at

the behest of the department. In support of this contention, he has placed reliance upon the judgments of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases of

Ranchhodji Chaturji Thakore, Smt. K. Ponnamma and Jaipal Singh (supra)S, tate of U.P. & others Vs. Mahindra Nath Tiwari {2010 (2) SCC 252},

Corp. Mithilesh Kumar @ Mithilesh Singh Vs. Union of India & others {2010(13) Scale 98}S, tate Bank of India & another Vs. Mohammed Abdul

Rahim {2013 (11) SCC 67}, Civil Appeal No.3339 of 2019, titled as 'Raj Narain Vs. Union of India & others, decided on 01.04.2019. Reliance has

also been placed upon the judgments of this Court in Darshan Singh Vs. The Punjab State Warehousing Corporation & another {2017 (4) RSJ 179},

Harbajan Singh Vs. State of Punjab & others {2017 LIC 2732}, Randhir Singh Vs. State of Punjab {2018 (1) S.C.T. 592}, wherein, it has been held

that no absolute right vested on a delinquent employee to full pay and allowances for the period under suspension or dismissal except when the

Competent Authority records findings to the effect that detention of the employee is unjustified or the liability having arisen from circumstances

beyond control. This Court has further held in these judgments that if the employee was involved in a criminal case on a private complaint and was

convicted, on acquittal in appeal, no fault can be attributed to the employer and the State exchequer cannot be burdened to compensate the employee

for the period he was not working with the employer for no fault of the employer, however, in case of acquittal, if the delay occurs in deciding his

representation, the same would be attributable to the employer and for this period, he would be entitled to all consequential benefits from the date of

his representation for reinstatement, as submitted.

5.

I have considered the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties and with their assistance have gone through the records of the case

including the judgments cited by them.

6.

The judgments on which reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the appellant â€" plaintiff are those, in which the judgments given by

the Hon'ble Supreme Court which have been referred to by the learned counsel for the respondents had not been taken into consideration as it

appears that they were not brought to the knowledge of the Court. The latest judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, after the passing of the

various judgments by this Court, lays down clearly that the claim for back-wages from the date of termination would only be maintainable where the

criminal charges, which were levelled against the employee, were at the instance of the employer, which resulted in his acquittal and similarly, where

the Competent Authority records findings as regards the detention of an employee to be unjustified or the liability having arisen from circumstances

beyond control.

7.

Those judgments, therefore, have to prevail especially when the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the judgments referred to above such as Ranchhodji

Chaturji Thakore, Smt. K. Ponnamma and Jaipal Singh, Mahindra Nath Tiwari, Corp. Mithilesh Kumar @ Mithilesh Singh, Mohammed Abdul Rahim,

Raj Narain's cases (supra) has laid down the above law. Meaning thereby, the employee, if was, facing criminal prosecution arising out of a complaint

of private nature leading to his suspension or dismissal on account of his conviction, the action of the department cannot be held to be wholly

unjustified, which would bring the claim of the employee for full salary and allowances for the period from the date of his suspension to the date of his

reinstatement within the scope of Rules 7.3 and 7.5 of the Punjab Civil Services Rules, Vol.-1 Para 1.

8.

However, the above law, as has been settled upto the Hon'ble Supreme Court, would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case and to

assess whether it would fall within the parameters and the situations covered by the said judgments, the case has to be assessed on facts.

9.

Present is a case where the appellant â€" plaintiff along with co- accused was arrested in an FIR, which was registered against them under Section

302 IPC read with Section 34 IPC, for which, the trial was ensued, wherein he was convicted along with others vide judgment dated 26.10.1999 and

sentenced vide order dated 27.10.1999 to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life for the offence punishable under Section 302 IPC read with Section

34 IPC with fine of `2000/- with default stipulation. It is, after that conviction, the appellant â€" plaintiff was placed under suspension on 20.11.1997.

He preferred an appeal against his conviction and sentence before the Division Bench of this Court, where the conviction was not stayed leading to

the order of dismissal being passed by the department against him on 20.10.2000. He, however, along with one Satish, was acquitted by giving them

the benefit of doubt by this Court vide judgment dated 10.09.2018, however, qua the other co-accused, the judgment of conviction and order of

sentence was upheld. He submitted an application for his reinstatement to the Competent Authority for revoking his dismissal order dated 20.10.2000

and reinstating him in service, which was accepted and he was reinstated in service w.e.f. 17.09.2009.

10.

In view of the above facts, it is apparent that the department had no role to play so far as the initiation of the criminal proceedings against the

appellant â€" plaintiff are concerned. In fact, it was a private complaint on the basis of which the FIR was registered, where he was put on trial and

found guilty. No fault, thus, can be attributed to the respondent â€" department and therefore, the State exchequer cannot be burdened to compensate

him for the period he was out of service. Fault, if any, would be attributed to him alone. That apart, it is not a case where the allegations against him

have been found to be false or motivated as he has been given the benefit of doubt. His claim, therefore, for full back wages and treating the period

10.11.1997 to 17.09.2009 as on duty period for all intents and purposes cannot be accepted.

11.

In view of the above, the appeal as preferred by the appellant â€" plaintiff cannot be accepted, rather the judgment and decree as passed by the

lower Appellate Court, dated 28.05.2014, being in accordance with law, does not call for any interference by this Court. Therefore, the appeal stands

dismissed.