Ajit Singh vs State of Haryana

Harmohinder Kaur Sandhu, J.

On August 5, 1986, Shri Sat Pal Malik, Food Inspector, Faridabad took a sample of coriander powder from Ajit Singh petitioner when the petitioner was found in possession of 4 kgs. of said powder, which was meant for public sale. The sample was got analysed and the Public Analyst, Karnal reported that the sample contained ash 8.4 percent and ash insoluble in dilute HCI 1.80 per cent as against the minimum prescribed standard of 7.0 per cent and 1.6 per cent respectively. The same contravened the provisions of Section 7 punishable under Section 16(1)(a) (i) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act (the Act for short). A complaint was filed in the court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Faridabad for trial of the petitioner for that offence.

The petitioner''s presence could not be procured for about a period of 2 years after the filing of the complaint and he appeared in court only on 12.9.1988. On 31st October, 1988 in the presence of the petitioner Chief Judicial Magistrate, Faridabad passed an order whereby he thought it fit to try the case as a warrant case. After recording precharge evidence, the trial Court framed a charge on 8th January, 1991 for the offence under Section 7 read with Section 16(1)(a)(i) of the Act. The petitioner filed a Revision Petition against the order vide which he was charge sheeted but it was dismissed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Faridabad vide his judgment dated 19.3.1991. By way of present petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure the petitioner has assailed the order dated 8th January, 1991 passed by Chief Judicial Magistrate, Faridabad Annexure P1 and order dated 19th March, 1991 passed by Additional Sessions Judges, Faridabad Annexure P2 and has prayed for quashment of these orders.

The petitioner pleaded that mandatory provisions of the Act had not been complied with, according to which the case should have been tried as a summary case and not as a warrant case. No notice was given to the petitioner before ordering the trial of the case as warrant case. It was wrongly recorded by the trial Court that the petitioner had no objection if warrant case procedure was followed as petitioner had not made any statement to that effect. It was further averred that the petitioner was facing agony of trial for the last more than 5 years and this delay in trial was a denial of justice. Proceedings were liable to be quashed on this ground alone.

In the return filed by the respondent, the allegations made in the petition were controverted. It was alleged that the trial Court had given reasons for adopting warrant case procedure and it was not necessary to record the statement of the petitioner that he had no objection if the case was tried as a warrant case before the order was passed.

I have heard the learned counsel for the parties.

The main contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that before adopting the procedure for trial of his case as a warrant case the trial Court had not given any notice to the petitioner nor recorded his statement that he had no objection if the case was tried as a warrant case, so the procedure followed by the trial Court was illegal and vitiated the trial. This contention of the learned counsel is without any merit. It is correct that under Section 16 of the Act the petitioner was to be tried in a summary manner but the trial Court exercising the powers under proviso to the Section could convert it into a warrant trial either at the initial stage of trial or pending trial. The proviso to the Section referred above empowered the Magistrate to adopt the procedure of a warrant case if it appeared to him that the nature of the case was such that a sentence of imprisonment for a term exceeding one year may have to be imposed or that it was for any other reason undesirable to try the case summarily. The Magistrate, then after hearing the parties could record an order to that effect. A perusal of the order darted 31st October, 1978 shows that the order was passed in the presence of the Government Food Inspector and the petitioner. The trial Court was of the opinion that in the event of conviction, the petitioner could be sentenced to imprisonment for a term exceeding one year. So he though it expedient to try the case as a warrant case. At that time the petitioner did not make any objection. The order was passed at the commencement of the trial in the presence of the petitioner and thereafter the case was tried as warrant case. No objection was raised till the petitioner was charge sheeted. It is not a case where the Magistrate has not applied his mind before adopting the warrant case procedure. The impugned orders are therefore quite valid.

So far as the delay in the completion of the trial is concerned I find that although the complaint was filed in court on 19.9.1986, the presence of the petitioner could not be procured for a sufficiently long time. It was only on 12.9.1988 that the petitioner appeared in the court with his counsel when he was released on bail vide order Annexure R1. Thereafter he filed a revision against the order dated 8th January, 1991 and the present petition. Proceedings in the trial Court remained stayed at the instance of the petitioner. The trial was not delayed due to any fault of the prosecution and the petitioner cannot get any benefit out of the same. The proceedings are not liable to be quashed on the ground of delay when the petitioner himself is responsible for creating hindrance in the smooth course of trial.

For the above reasons I do not find any merit in this petition and dismiss the same.