Ajith Kumar K vs State Of Kerala Represented By The Additional Chief Secretary

Muralee Krishna, J

The applicant in O.A.No.2162 of 2023 on the file of the Kerala Administrative Tribunal, Thiruvananthapuram (the ‘Tribunal’ for short) filed this original petition invoking the supervisory jurisdiction  of  this  Court  under  Article  227  of  the  Constitution  of India,  challenging  Ext.P1  order  dated  28.11.2025  passed  by  the Tribunal in that original application.

Going  by  the  averments  in  the  original  application,  the petitioner is a member of the Scheduled Caste community. While working  as  Assistant  Sub  Inspector  (Grade)  at  the  Kollam  East Police station, he was arrayed in Crime No.687 of 2011 of Kollam East Police station registered under Sections 324, 326, 302, 201, and 34 of the Indian Penal Code. The petitioner was placed under suspension, and an oral  enquiry was ordered. After oral  enquiry, Annexure AI PR minutes was submitted by the enquiry officer, who found the petitioner to be at fault. Thereafter, the petitioner was removed from service vide Annexure A3 order dated 07.08.2012 of the 2nd respondent. Annexure A4 appeal filed by the petitioner was rejected by the appellate authority through Annexure A5 order  dated  20.06.2013.  In  the  criminal  case  registered  against the petitioner, he was acquitted by the Sessions Court as per the judgment dated 31.10.2017, after a full trial. The petitioner submitted Annexure A7 review petition before the 1st respondent, which was directed to be decided by the Tribunal, vide order dated 24.10.2018  in  O.A.No.1956  of  2018.  The  1st respondent  issued Annexure A8 Government Order dated 22.03.2019, rejecting the review  petition  filed  by  the  petitioner.  The  petitioner  moved  the Tribunal, which pronounced Annexure A9 order dated 26.05.2022 in O.A.No.1729 of 2019, whereby Annexure A8 Government Order was set aside, and the Government was directed to consider the review petition afresh with particular attention to the contentions of  the  petitioner.  Upon  reconsideration,  the  1st respondent  has now issued Annexure A10 order dated 05.07.2023, rejecting the review petition of the petitioner. The reasons stated in Annexure A10 are illegal and liable to be set aside in judicial review. Rule 10 of the Kerala Police Departmental Inquiries, Punishment and Appeal Rules and Section 101(8) of the Kerala Police Act, 2011 are mandatory provisions and cannot be ignored by any authority. With these pleadings, the petitioner approached the Tribunal with the original application filed under section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, seeking the following reliefs;

“1. Call for the records leading up to Annexure A10 and quash it.

Call for the records leading up to annexures A3 and A5, and quash them.

Declare that the removal of the applicant from service is illegal.

Direct the respondents to regularise the period from 07.08.2012  to  30.05.2016  wherein  the  applicant  was  kept out of service, as duty for all purposes, and grant notional promotion  to  the  post  of  Sub  Inspector  of  Police  from  the date of his eligibility.

Direct the respondents to grant all consequential benefits including seniority, salary arrears, pension, commutation of pension,  DCRG,  earned  leave  surrender  etc.  within  a firm time limit.

Direct  the  6th respondent  to  authorise  payment  of  the terminal benefits due to the applicant within a firm time limit”.

In the original application, on behalf of the 1st respondent, a reply statement dated 24.05.2024 was filed, opposing the reliefs sought for. Similarly, on behalf of the 3rd respondent, a reply statement dated 28.12.2023 was filed in the original application opposing the reliefs sought for. The 2nd respondent adopted the reply statement filed by the 3rd respondent by filing a memo dated 09.02.2024. After hearing both sides, the Tribunal, by the impugned Ext.P1 order, dismissed the original application.

Being aggrieved, the petitioner is now before this Court with this original petition.

On  02.02.2026,  when  this  original  petition  came  up  for admission, we  directed  the  learned  Senior  Government  Pleader to make available for perusal of this Court the entire files relating to the disciplinary proceedings initiated against the petitioner. Pursuant to the said direction, on 02.03.2026, the learned Senior Government Pleader made available the entire files pertaining to the disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner and on perusal of the said file, we notice that the charges against the petitioner are  serious  in  nature.  The Enquiry  Officer  conducted  a detailed enquiry  and,  on  the  basis  of  evidence  of  the  witnesses  recorded by  him,  found  the  charges  against  the  petitioner  as  proved.  The Tribunal also re-appreciated the evidence adduced in the disciplinary  proceedings  as  well as the  findings  in  the  Sessions Case, while dismissing the original application. It would be appropriate to extract paragraphs 6 to 13 and the last paragraph of that order for better appreciation of the reasoning given by the Tribunal for dismissal of the original application, which read thus;“6.Learned Government Pleader reiterated the contention that the Memorandum of Charges and the Statement of Allegations have not been produced but they are independent of the criminal charges and the PR Minutes in which the charges are proved has also not been challenged in this OA. The applicant cannot claim the benefit of acquittal from the criminal charges for pleading innocence in the disciplinary proceedings as the acquittal was due to several failures of the prosecution to prove the charges. One Ajithan  was  examined  as  PW6  in  the  oral  enquiry  and  he had  proved  that  the  applicant  was  a resident  of  Quarters No.6,  but  he  was  not  arrayed  as  a witness  in  the  criminal case is one such example.

Rajasekharan Nair who was working as Sub Inspector of Police at the AR Camp Pathanamthitta died at the hospital on 15.06.2011, due to grievous injuries suffered by him on 14.06.2011. The incident took place in Quarters No.6 of the Police Quarters. Rajasekharan Nair was a resident of Quarters No.4. The applicant was arrayed as first accused in the criminal case and one Shajilal @ Shaji was the second accused and he passed away before the trial. The applicant contends  that  no  witnesses  have  seen  Rajasekharan  Nair entering his house, the finger print experts had recovered only the finger print of Shaji from the scene of occurrence, none of the witnesses saw the incident and it was not proved that the Quarters wherein the incident occurred was occupied by the applicant. The Sessions Court acquitted him.

The applicant himself has admitted in Annexure A4 that he  was  the  occupant  of  the  quarters  wherein  the  incident occurred.  It  is  true  that  the  Sessions  Court  had  acquitted the applicant from the criminal charges. Relevant portions of the observations made in the Judgment are the following :

XXXX

Though the prosecution cited and examined so many  witnesses  before  this  court,  there  is  no  direct evidence to prove the alleged offences committed by the accused.

xxxxx

Though a police official died in this case at 11.20 AM on 15.06.11 in an incident happened at about the midnight of 15.06.11 the police officials registered the FIR only at 1 PM on 15.06.11 and reached the place of  occurrence  only  after  5.10  PM  on  15.06.11.  Even the Investigating Officer, PW15 the then Circle Inspector visited the place of occurrence at 5.10 PM

on 15.06.11 he did not take any steps to preserve the scene of occurrence by taking necessary steps to guard the scene of occurrence. Though he had taken a spade and other material objects which were alleged to be used for committing the crime there is no scientific report in respect of those articles. XXXX

Though blood stain and teeth were recovered from the sit out and hall room of the first accused the scientific  evidence  is  not  supporting  that  the  blood, teeth, gum etc. belong to Rajasekharan Nair. The scientific  evidence  produced  before  this  court  is  not sufficient to come to a conclusion that deceased Rajasekharan Nair sustained injuries from the quarters of the first accused ........

It was thereafter that the court came to the conclusion that the circumstantial evidence collected and produced by the prosecution were very  week  and on the basis of the available evidence then came to a conclusion that the prosecution could not succeed in proving the alleged offence was committed by the applicant. The applicant was acquitted granting the benefit of doubt.

Evidently the investigation was not fool-proof and this has contributed to the acquittal of the applicant. It is a settled legal position that in a disciplinary proceedings, preponderance  of  probabilities  is  adequate  as  against  the rigorous standard of beyond reasonable doubt required in a criminal proceedings

While disposing the earlier OA No.1729 of 2019 filed by the applicant, this Tribunal had made the following observations:

But  the  learned  counsel  for  the  applicant  relies  on the findings arrived at by the Sessions Court that there is no material to connect the applicant with the alleged incident. He relied on paragraph 31 of Annexure A6 judgment  wherein  it  has  been  stated  that  "Except  the oral  testimony  of  PWs  2 and  3 there  is  nothing  before this court to show that the first accused was in that quarters  along  with  the  second  accused  and  deceased Rajasekharan Nair. Though the prosecution succeeded in proving the finger prints in the material objects recovered from that quarters they could not produce any evidence to show that  any of the materials recovered contain the finger print of the first accused." The Sessions Court concluded that the circumstantial evidence collected and produced by the prosecution are very weak and on the basis of the available evidence it can be concluded that the prosecution could not succeed in proving the alleged offence committed by the 1st accused. Merely for the reason that  the Sessions Court ultimately ordered that the first accused is entitled to the benefit of doubt, the review authority should not discard the entire evidence before the Sessions Court.

Having  considered  the  totality  of  the  situation,  I find  that  the  contentions  raised  by  the  applicant  that there were no evidence against him either in the criminal case or in the disciplinary proceedings and his further contention that the order of dismissal from service was issued in violation of Rule 10 of KPDIP & A Rules have not been properly considered by the review authority.

Though the Memorandum of Charges is not produced before us, the PR Minutes, Show Cause Notice and the Final Orders in the disciplinary proceedings would indicate that it was not the criminal case per se that was the subject matter of the disciplinary proceedings. Dereliction of duty and misconduct were the subject matters of the disciplinary proceedings, which was proved in the PR Minutes. The applicant had availed all opportunities to defend his side, as part of disciplinary proceedings as well as by way of Appeal and Review Petitions. The contention  of the  applicant  that the  criminal  case  and  disciplinary  proceedings  are  on  the same set of facts is not found to be sustainable. Protection of Rule 10 under KPDIP&A Rules is available to the accused only when the matter is sub judice. In this case the criminal case was charged before the Sessions Court much after the disciplinary proceedings were finalised. Therefore the applicant cannot get the benefit of this Rule.

The leaned counsel for the applicant has placed reliance on the judgment in Ramlal v. State of Rajasthan [2023 KHC 1018]. Paragraph 26 and 27 of that judgment read as follows;

We  are  satisfied  that  the  findings  of  the  appellate judge in the criminal case clearly indicate that the charge against the appellant was not just, "not proved" - in fact the charge even stood "disproved" by the very prosecution evidence. As held by this Court, a fact is said to  be  "disproved"  when,  after  considering  the  matters before it, the court either believes that it does not exist or considers its non - existence so probable that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the particular case, to act upon the supposition that it does not  exist.  A fact  is said  to  be  "not  proved"  when  it  is neither "proved" nor "disproved" (See Vijayee Singh and Others v. State of U.P.[(1990) 3 SCC 190].

We are additionally satisfied that in the teeth of the finding of the appellate Judge, the disciplinary proceedings  and  the  orders  passed  thereon  cannot  be allowed to stand. The changes were not just similar but identical and the evidence, witnesses and circumstances were all the same. This is a case where in exercise of our discretion, we quash the orders of the disciplinary authority and the appellate authority as allowing them to stand will be unjust, unfair and oppressive. This case is very similar to the situation that arose in G.M.Tank (supra).

Evidently the facts and circumstances of this case are different from that of the above case.

In the light of the above findings we do not find the contentions in this Original Application is sustainable. Accordingly the Original Application is dismissed”.

Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Senior Government Pleader.

The learned counsel for the petitioner would argue that, as per Annexure A6 judgment dated 31.10.2017, the petitioner  was  acquitted  in  the criminal case  registered  against him for the offences punishable under Sections 324, 326, 302 and 201  read  with  Section 34 of  the  Indian Penal Code.  From the findings arrived at by the learned Sessions Judge in Annexure A6 judgment, it is discernible that the acquittal of the petitioner was not merely by giving the benefit of doubt alone, but it is, in effect, an honourable acquittal. Therefore, the petitioner is entitled to the reliefs  sought  in  the  original  application  in  view  of  the  principles laid down by the Apex court in Ramlal [2023 (7) KHC SN 21]. The  learned  counsel  further  submitted  that  one  of  the  witnesses examined by the Enquiry Officer is involved in several other criminal cases, and another witness was the wife of the deceased. It was  relying  on the  evidence  of these  witnesses,  the  Enquiry officer gave a finding against the petitioner, and consequently, the disciplinary authority took action against him.

On  the  other  hand, the  learned  Senior  Government Pleader would submit that the disciplinary proceedings as well as the  criminal  proceedings  stand  on  a different  footing. After  the conclusion of the disciplinary proceedings, the petitioner was acquitted in the criminal case, giving him the benefit of doubt, and it was not an honourable acquittal. The petitioner had purposefully not  produced  the  charge  memo  issued  to  him  in  the  disciplinary proceedings before the Tribunal, as it would enlighten the Tribunal regarding the seriousness of the offence alleged against the petitioner.  According  to  the  learned  Senior  Government  Pleader, there is no illegality in the impugned order of the Tribunal.

Article  227  of  the  Constitution  of  India  deals  with  the power of superintendence over all courts by the High Court. Under clause (1) of Article 227 of the Constitution, every High Court shall have superintendence over all courts and tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction.

In Estralla Rubber v. Dass Estate (Pvt.) Ltd [(2001) 8 SCC 97], the Apex Court held thus;

"The scope and ambit of exercise of power and jurisdiction by a High Court under Art.227 of the Constitution of India is  examined  and  explained  in  number  of  decisions  of  this Court.  The  exercise  of  power  under  this  Article  involves  a duty on the High Court to keep inferior courts and tribunals within the bounds of their authority and to see that they do duty expected or required by them in a legal manner. The High Court is not vested with any unlimited prerogative to correct all kinds of hardship or wrong decisions made within the  limits  of the jurisdiction  of the  courts  subordinate  or tribunals. Exercise of this power and interfering  with the orders of the courts or tribunal is restricted to cases of serious dereliction of duty and flagrant violation of fundamental principles of law or justice, where if High Court does not interfere, a grave injustice remains uncorrected. It is  also  well  settled  that  the  High  Court  while  acting  under this Article cannot exercise its power as an appellate court or substitute its own judgment in place of that of the subordinate court to correct an error, which is not apparent on the fact of the record. The High Court can set aside or ignore  the  findings  of  facts  of  inferior  court  or  tribunal,  if there is no evidence at all to justify or the finding is so perverse, that no reasonable person can possibly come to such a conclusion, which the court or Tribunal has come to."

In Shalini Shyam Shetty v. Rajendra Shankar Patil [(2010) 8 SCC 329] the Apex Court, while analysing the scope and  ambit  of  the  power  of  superintendence  under  Article  227  of the Constitution, held that the object of superintendence, both administrative and judicial, is to maintain efficiency, smooth and  orderly functioning of the entire machinery of justice in such a way as it does not bring it into any disrepute. The power of interference under Article 227 is to be kept to the minimum to ensure that the wheel of justice does not come to a halt and the fountain of justice remains pure and unpolluted in order to maintain public confidence in the functioning of the tribunals and courts subordinate to the High Court.

In Jai Singh v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi [(2010) 9 SCC 385], while considering the nature and scope of the powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the Apex Court held that, undoubtedly the High Court, under Article 227 of the Constitution, has the jurisdiction to ensure that all subordinate courts, as well as statutory or quasi-judicial tribunals exercise the powers vested in them, within the bounds of their authority. The High Court has the power and the jurisdiction to ensure that they act in accordance with the well-established principles of law. The exercise of jurisdiction must be within the well-recognised constraints. It cannot be exercised like a 'bull in a china shop', to correct  all  errors  of  the  judgment  of  a court  or  tribunal,  acting within the limits of its jurisdiction. This correctional jurisdiction can be  exercised  in cases where orders have been passed in grave dereliction of duty or in flagrant abuse of fundamental principles of law or justice.

In K.V.S. Ram v. Bangalore Metropolitan Transport  Corporation  [(2015)  12  SCC  39] the  Apex  Court held that, in exercise of the power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court can interfere  with  the  order  of  the  court  or  tribunal  only  when  there has been a patent perversity in the orders of the tribunal and courts subordinate to it or where there has been gross and manifest failure of justice or the basic principles of natural justice have been flouted.

In Sobhana Nair K.N. v. Shaji S.G. Nair [2016 (1) KHC 1] a Division Bench of this Court held that, the law is well settled by a catena of decisions of the Apex Court that in proceedings  under  Article  227  of  the  Constitution  of  India,  this Court cannot sit in appeal over the findings recorded by the lower court or tribunal and the jurisdiction of this Court is only supervisory in nature and not that of an appellate court. Therefore, no interference under Article 227 of the Constitution is called for, unless this Court finds that  the lower court or tribunal has committed manifest error, or the reasoning is palpably perverse or patently unreasonable, or the decision of the lower court or tribunal is in direct conflict with settled principles of law.

In view of the law laid down in the decisions referred to supra,  the  High  Court,  in  exercise  of  its  supervisory  jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, cannot sit in appeal over the findings recorded by a lower court or tribunal. The supervisory jurisdiction cannot be exercised to correct all errors of the order  or judgment  of a lower  court or tribunal,  acting  within the limits of its jurisdiction. The correctional jurisdiction under Article  227  can  be  exercised  only  in  a case  where  the  order  or judgment  of  a lower  court  or  tribunal  has  been  passed  in  grave dereliction of duty  or in flagrant abuse of fundamental  principles of  law  or  justice.  Therefore,  no  interference  under  Article  227  is called for, unless the High Court finds that the lower court or tribunal has committed manifest error, or the reasoning is palpably perverse  or  patently  unreasonable,  or  the  decision  of  the  lower court or tribunal is in direct conflict with settled principles of law or  where  there  has  been  gross  and  manifest  failure  of  justice  or the basic principles of natural justice have been flouted.

In Ramlal [2023 (7) KHC SN 21], the allegation against the delinquent was that he altered his date of birth in his 8th standard mark list with a view to projecting himself as having attained majority at the time of recruitment. After finding him guilty in the departmental proceedings, the delinquent was dismissed from service. Though in the criminal trial initially he was punished  for  the  offence  under  Section  420  of  the  Indian  Penal Code, the Additional District and Sessions Judge allowed the criminal  appeal  and  acquitted  the  delinquent. Subsequently,  he filed a writ petition for quashing the dismissal order when his representation for reinstatement was rejected by the authority concerned.  The  learned  Single  Judge  dismissed  the  writ  petition by holding that the standard of proof in a criminal proceeding and a departmental  proceeding  is  different.  The  writ  appeal  filed  by the delinquent was also ended in dismissal, confirming the finding of the learned Single Judge. The aforesaid judgments were challenged  by  the  delinquent  before  the  Apex  Court.  Paragraphs 26  and  27  of  the  judgment  of  the  Apex  Court  in  Ramlal  [2023 (7)  KHC  SN  21]  are  extracted  by  the  Tribunal  in  the  impugned order.

In  G.  M.  Tank  v.  State  of  Gujarat  [(2006)  5 SCC 446] which was relied in Ramlal [2023 (7) KHC SN 21], the Apex Court while considering the Special Leave Petition filed by the appellant therein against the judgments of the learned Single Bench  and  the  Division  Bench  of  the  High  Court  confirming  the dismissal of the appellant therein from service on finding him guilty in a departmental proceedings on the charges of accumulation of disproportionate income and whereas the appellant therein was honourably acquitted by the Special  Judge for the offence under Section 5(l)(e) read with Section 5 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 held thus;

“20. It is thus seen that this is a case of no evidence. There is no iota of evidence against the appellant to hold that the appellant is guilty of having illegally accumulated excess income by way of gratification. The respondent failed to prove the charges levelled against the appellant. It is not in dispute  that  the  appellant  being  a public  servant  used  to submit  his  yearly  property  return  relating  to  his  movable and immovable property and the appellant has also submitted  his  return  in  the  year  1975  showing  his  entire movable and immovable assets. No query whatsoever was ever raised about the movable and immovable assets of the appellant. In fact, the respondent did not produce any evidence in support  of and  / or  about  the alleged  charges levelled against the appellant. Likewise, the criminal proceedings were initiated against the appellant for the alleged charges punishable under the  provisions of the PC Act on the same set of facts and evidence. It was submitted that  the departmental proceedings and the criminal case are  based  on  identical  and  similar  (verbatim)  set  of  facts and evidence. The appellant has been honourably acquitted by the competent court on the same set of facts, evidence and  witness  and,  therefore,  the  dismissal  order  based  on the same set of facts and evidence on the departmental side is liable to be set aside in the interest of justice.

xxxx xxxx xxx

The judgments relied on by the learned counsel appearing for the respondents are distinguishable on facts and on law. In this case, the departmental proceedings and the criminal case are based on identical and similar set of facts and the charge in a departmental case against the appellant and the charge before the criminal court are one and the same.  It  is  true  that  the  nature  of  charge  in  the departmental proceedings and in the criminal case is grave. The  nature  of  the  case  launched  against  the  appellant  on the basis of evidence and material collected against him during enquiry and investigation and as reflected in the charge sheet, factors mentioned are one and the same. In other words, charges, evidence, witnesses and circumstances are one and the same. In the present case, criminal and departmental proceedings have already noticed  or  granted  on  the  same  set  of  facts,  namely,  raid conducted at the appellant's residence, recovery of articles therefrom. The Investigating Officer Mr V. B. Raval and other departmental witnesses were the only witnesses examined by the enquiry officer who by relying upon their statement  came  to  the  conclusion  that  the  charges  were established against the appellant. The same witnesses were examined in the criminal case and the criminal court on the examination  came  to  the  conclusion  that  the  prosecution has not proved the guilt alleged against the appellant beyond  any  reasonable  doubt  and  acquitted  the  appellant by its judicial pronouncement with the finding that the charge has not been proved. It is also to be noticed that the judicial pronouncement was made after a regular trial and on hot contest. Under these circumstances, it would be unjust and unfair and rather oppressive to allow the findings recorded in the departmental proceedings to stand.

In our opinion, such facts and evidence in the departmental as well as criminal proceedings were the same without there being any iota of difference, the appellant  should  succeed.  The  distinction  which  is  usually proved between the departmental and criminal proceedings on the basis of the approach and burden of proof would not be applicable in the instant case. Though the finding recorded in the domestic enquiry was found to be valid by the courts below, when there  was an honourable acquittal of  the  employee  during  the  pendency  of  the  proceedings challenging  the  dismissal,  the  same  requires  to  be  taken note of and the decision in Paul Anthony case (1999 (3) SCC 679) will apply. We, therefore, hold that the appeal filed by the appellant deserves to be allowed.

In the instant case, the appellant joined the respondent in the year 1953. He was suspended from service on 8-2- 1979 and got subsistence allowance of Rs 700 p.m. i.e. 50% of the salary.  On 15-10-1982 dismissal order was  passed. The appellant had put in 26 years of service with the respondent i.e. from 1953-1979. The appellant would now superannuate in February 1986. On the basis of the same charges and the evidence, the department passed an order of dismissal on 21-10-1982 whereas the criminal court acquitted him on 30-1-2002. However, as the criminal court acquitted the appellant on 30-1-2002 and until such acquittal, there was no reason or ground to hold the dismissal to be erroneous, any relief monetarily can be only w.e.f.  30-1-2002.  But  by  then,  the  appellant  had  retired, therefore, we deem it proper to set aside the order of dismissal without back wages. The appellant would be entitled to pension”. (underline supplied)

It is trite that the departmental proceedings and the criminal proceedings initiated against a delinquent employee stand  on  a different  footing. Mere  acquittal  by  a Criminal  Court will not confer on the employee a right to claim any benefit, including reinstatement. Only if the charges in the departmental enquiry and the Criminal Court are identical or similar and if the evidence, witnesses and circumstances are one and the same, then the matter requires a different dimension. When the delinquent  is  acquitted  in  the  criminal  proceeding  merely  on  the ground of the benefit of doubt, since the prosecution has failed to prove  the  guilt  of  the  delinquent  beyond  reasonable  doubt,  the same cannot be equated with that of the departmental proceedings, to give the benefit of acquittal in the criminal proceedings, to the delinquent. The proof that is required in a criminal trial is more onerous than that of the departmental proceedings. In departmental proceedings, it is the preponderance of  probabilities  that  will  lead  to  the  decision  in  favour  or  against the delinquent employee. While going through Annexure A6 judgment of the Sessions Court in S.C.No.952 of 2014, the acquittal of the petitioner cannot be said as honourable acquittal. In the Sessions Case the prosecution relied on circumstantial evidence against the petitioner. Since the circumstantial evidence was not proved beyond reasonable doubt, or in other words, without any break in the chain of circumstances, the Sessions Court acquitted the petitioner. As  discussed above, the facts of Ramlal  [2023  (7)  KHC  SN  21] and G.  M.  Tank  [(2006)  5 SCC  446]  are  entirely  different  and  hence  not  applicable  to  the case.

Having considered the pleadings and materials on record and the  submissions  made  at  the  Bar  in  the  light  of  the  judgments referred to supra, we find no ground to hold the impugned order of the Tribunal is perverse or patently illegal, which warrants interference by exercising supervisory jurisdiction.

In the result, the original petition stands dismissed.