Akash Kumar Kochhar vs State Of HP

Rakesh Kainthla, J

The petitioner has filed the present petition seeking regular bail in FIR No.245 of 2025, dated 27.07.2025, registered at Police Station Sadar Una, District Una, H.P. for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 61(2), 103, 111, 238, 249, 304(2), and 336(2) read with Section 3(5), Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023 and Sections 25 and 27 of Arms Act.

It was asserted that, as per the prosecution, Rakesh Kumar @ Gaggi had developed an enmity with a criminal gang led by Rajiv Kaushal, Sonu Kumar alias Monu Gujjar and Lovepreet @ Laddi. This gang was involved in organised crime, extortion and violent offences. Accused Rajeev Kaushal coordinated a conspiracy to eliminate the deceased through Internet-based encrypted applications. Accused Vipan and Abhinandan were chosen as shooters. The petitioner, Akash Kumar Kochhar, provided shelter to the accused Vipan at Kharar by arranging a rented room. He also procured and supplied the mobile phones and fake SIM cards to the shooters to conceal their identity. These allegations are false. The police have failed to collect any material against the petitioner to connect him to the commission of the crime. The police have completed the investigation, and the petitioner's custody is not required. The petitioner is aged twenty-three years and belongs to a poor family. The continued detention of the petitioner would adversely affect his studies. The petitioner would abide by the terms and conditions that the Court may impose. Hence, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail.

The petition is opposed by filing a status report asserting that the police were informed about a shootout at Jhalera on 27.07.2025 at about 2:20 p.m. The police visited the spot and found that Rakesh Kumar alias Gaggi was shot in Divine Saloon, and he was taken to the hospital. The informant Surinder Kumar stated that he was running the shop. Seven or eight boys entered the shop and started combing their hair. Two boys came on a motorcycle, entered the shop and shot at one of the boys who was combing his hair. The boy fell, and the assailant sped away towards Jhalera. The police registered the F.I.R. and recovered fired bullets, live and blank cartridges from the spot. The police checked the CCTV footage and recovered a motorcycle without any registration plates. The engine and chassis numbers of the motorcycle were also scratched. Two helmets were found at some distance. The police seized all these articles. The injured was identified as Rakesh Kumar alias Gaggi. The injured succumbed to his injuries, and as per the report of post-mortem examination, the cause of death was haemorrhagic shock due to rifled firearm injuries, which were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The police found during the investigation that Rajeev Kaushal, alias Guggu, used to demand ransom, and Rakesh Kumar, alias Gaggi (since deceased), objected to it. Two F.I.Rs. were registered against Rajiv Kaushal alias Guggu. The police checked the email ID and found that it was verified with phone numbers xxxxxxx289. The police checked the call detail record and found that Rajeev Kaushal, alias Guggu, was inside the jail but was in touch with other persons through Internet-based applications. The police arrested him. Rajeev Kaushal revealed during the interrogation that he was in touch with Vipan Kumar. The police arrested Vipan Kumar. Vipan Kumar showed the room, which was made available by Akash Kumar Kochhar, the petitioner, to him. Vipan Kumar also got recovered the registration plates thrown by him. Anil Kumar identified Vipan Kumar as the shooter. Vipan Kumar said that the weapon of offence was seized by the Punjab police. The police recovered the weapon from the Kharar police. The petitioner had made the phones available to the shooters. The petitioner was also in touch with Rajeev Kaushal alias Guggu, and this was confirmed from the dynamic IP. The IP was traced to Bhagat Singh, who revealed that he had rented the room to the petitioner, Akash Kumar Kochhar. Lovepreet Singh, the owner of the room where Vipan Kumar had stayed, also disclosed that the petitioner had rented the room. The police seized the various mobile phones. The photographs were sent to the SFSL, and as per analysis, the face of Vipan Kumar matched the face in the CCTV footage. The petitioner had an active role in the shootout. The police filed the charge sheet after the completion of the investigation on 29.11.2025. Hence, the status report.

I have heard Mr Sanjeev Kumar Suri, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr Jitender K. Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General, for the respondent/State.

Mr Sanjeev Kumar Suri, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the petitioner is innocent and he has been falsely implicated. There is no material to connect the petitioner to the commission of a crime. The police are relying upon the inadmissible evidence, which is not sufficient to connect the petitioner to the commission of the crime. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail. He relied upon the judgment of this Court in Nisha Devi vs. State of H.P. 2025:HHC28898 in support of his submission.

Mr Jitender Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondent/State, submitted that the petitioner had provided full support to the shooters. He was identified by the owner of the room, where Vipan Kumar had stayed. He was found to be in touch with the main accused. The petitioner would indulge in the commission of a similar offence in case of his release on bail. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed.

I have given a considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.

The parameters for granting bail were considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Pinki v. State of U.P., (2025) 7 SCC 314: 2025 SCC OnLine SC 781, wherein it was observed at page 380:

(i) Broad principles for the grant of bail

InGudikantiNarasimhulu v. High Court of A.P., (1978) 1 SCC 240: 1978 SCC (Cri) 115, Krishna Iyer, J., while elaborating on the content of Article 21 of the Constitution of India in the context of personal liberty of a person under trial, has laid down the key factors that should be considered while granting bail, which are extracted as under: (SCC p. 244, paras 7-9)

"7. It is thus obvious that the nature of the charge is the vital factor, and the nature of the evidence is also pertinent. The punishment to which the party may be liable, if convicted or a conviction is confirmed, also bears upon the issue.

Another relevant factor is whether the course of justice would be thwarted by him who seeks the benignant jurisdiction of the Court to be freed for the time being. [Patrick Devlin, "The Criminal Prosecution in England" (Oxford University Press, London 1960) p. 75 - Modern Law Review, Vol. 81, Jan. 1968, p. 54.]

Thus, the legal principles and practice validate the Court considering the likelihood of the applicant interfering with witnesses for the prosecution or otherwise polluting the process of justice. It is not only traditional but rational, in this context, to enquire into the antecedents of a man who is applying for bail to find whether he has a bad record, particularly a record which suggests that he is likely to commit serious offences while on bail. In regard to habituals, it is part of criminological history that a thoughtless bail order has enabled the bailee to exploit the opportunity to inflict further crimes on the members of society. Bail discretion, on the basis of evidence about the criminal record of a defendant, is therefore not an exercise in irrelevance." (emphasis supplied)

In Prahlad Singh Bhati v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2001) 4 SCC 280: 2001 SCC (Cri) 674, this Court highlighted various aspects that the courts should keep in mind while dealing with an application seeking bail. The same may be extracted as follows: (SCC pp. 284-85, para 8)

"8. The jurisdiction to grant bail has to be exercised on the basis of well-settled principles, having regard to the circumstances of each case and not in an arbitrary manner. While granting the bail, the court has to keep in mind the nature of accusations, the nature of evidence in support thereof, the severity of the punishment which conviction will entail, the character, behaviour, means and standing of the accused, circumstances which are peculiar to the accused, reasonable possibility of securing the presence of the accused at the trial, reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being tampered with, the larger interests of the public or State and similar other considerations. It has also to be kept in mind that for the purposes of granting the bail the legislature has used the words "reasonable grounds for believing" instead of "the evidence" which means the court dealing with the grant of bail can only satisfy it (sic itself) as to whether there is a genuine case against the accused and that the prosecution will be able to produce prima facie evidence in support of the charge." (emphasis supplied)

This Court in Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh, (2002) 3 SCC 598: 2002 SCC (Cri) 688, speaking through Banerjee, J., emphasised that a court exercising discretion in matters of bail has to undertake the same judiciously. In highlighting that bail should not be granted as a matter of course, bereft of cogent reasoning, this Court observed as follows: (SCC p. 602, para 3)

"3. Grant of bail, though being a discretionary order, but, however, calls for the exercise of such a discretion in a judicious manner and not as a matter of course. An order for bail bereft of any cogent reason cannot be sustained. Needless to record, however, that the grant of bail is dependent upon the contextual facts of the matter being dealt with by the court and facts do always vary from case to case. While the placement of the accused in society, though it may be considered by itself, cannot be a guiding factor in the matter of grant of bail, the same should always be coupled with other circumstances warranting the grant of bail. The nature of the offence is one of the basic considerations for the grant of bail - the more heinous is the crime, the greater is the chance of rejection of the bail, though, however, dependent on the factual matrix of the matter." (emphasis supplied)

In Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, (2004) 7 SCC 528: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1977, this Court held that although it is established that a court considering a bail application cannot undertake a detailed examination of evidence and an elaborate discussion on the merits of the case, yet the court is required to indicate the prima facie reasons justifying the grant of bail.

In Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee, (2010) 14 SCC 496: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 765, this Court observed that where a High Court has granted bail mechanically, the said order would suffer from the vice of non-application of mind, rendering it illegal. This Court held as under with regard to the circumstances under which an order granting bail may be set aside. In doing so, the factors which ought to have guided the Court's decision to grant bail have also been detailed as under: (SCC p. 499, para 9)

"9. ... It is trite that this Court does not, normally, interfere with an order passed by the High Court granting or rejecting bail to the accused. However, it is equally incumbent upon the High Court to exercise its discretion judiciously, cautiously and strictly in compliance with the basic principles laid down in a plethora of decisions of this Court on the point. It is well settled that, among other circumstances, the factors to be borne in mind while considering an application for bail are:

(i) whether there is any prima facie or reasonable ground to believe that the accused had committed the offence;

(ii) nature and gravity of the accusation;

(iii) severity of the punishment in the event of conviction;

(iv) danger of the accused absconding or fleeing, if released on bail;

(v) character, behaviour, means, position and standing of the accused;

(vi) likelihood of the offence being repeated;

(vii) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being influenced; and

(viii) danger, of course, of justice being thwarted by grant of bail." (emphasis supplied)

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One of the judgments of this Court on the aspect of application of mind and requirement of judicious exercise of discretion in arriving at an order granting bail to the accused is Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC 497 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170, wherein a three-Judge Bench of this Court, while setting aside an unreasoned and casual order (Pappu Kumar v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat 2856 and Pappu Singh v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat 2857) of the High Court granting bail to the accused, observed as follows: (Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC 497 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170]), SCC p. 511, para 35)

"35. While we are conscious of the fact that liberty of an individual is an invaluable right, at the same time while considering an application for bail courts cannot lose sight of the serious nature of the accusations against an accused and the facts that have a bearing in the case, particularly, when the accusations may not be false, frivolous or vexatious in nature but are supported by adequate material brought on record to enable a court to arrive at a prima facie conclusion. While considering an application for the grant of bail, a prima facie conclusion must be supported by reasons and must be arrived at after having regard to the vital facts of the case brought on record. Due consideration must be given to facts suggestive of the nature of crime, the criminal antecedents of the accused, if any, and the nature of punishment that would follow a conviction vis-à-vis the offence(s) alleged against an accused." (emphasis supplied)

Hon'ble Supreme Court held in State of Rajasthan v. Balchand, (1977) 4 SCC 308: 1977 SCC (Cri) 594: 1977 SCC OnLine SC 261 that the normal rule is bail and not jail, except where the gravity of the crime or the heinousness of the offence suggests otherwise. It was observed at page 308:

The basic rule may perhaps be tersely put as bail, not jail, except where there are circumstances suggestive of fleeing from justice or thwarting the course of justice or creating other troubles in the shape of repeating offences or intimidating witnesses and the like, by the petitioner who seeks enlargement on bail from the Court. We do not intend to be exhaustive but only illustrative.

It is true that the gravity of the offence involved is likely to induce the petitioner to avoid the course of justice and must weigh with us when considering the question of jail. So also, the heinousness of the crime...."

The present petition has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court.

Co-accused Vipan Kumar was identified by the eyewitness. He was also identified in the CCTV footage. He got recovered the weapon of offence and the registration plate thrown by him. Lovepreet Singh, the owner of the room where Vipan Kumar had stayed, identified the petitioner as the person who had taken the room on rent. The petitioner was found in possession of the mobile phones, which were used to contact the main accused, Rajeev Kaushal alias Guggu and the shooters. The dynamic IP used to call Rajeev Kaushal, alias Guggu, was traced to the room that was rented to the petitioner by Bhagat Singh. These allegations, prima facie, connect the petitioner to the commission of a crime.

In Nisha Devi (supra), it was held that the accused had not caused actual injury and her further detention was not justified. In the present case, the petitioner had facilitated the commission of a crime by providing support before and after the crime. Therefore, the petitioner is not an innocent bystander who had no role in the commission of the crime but was actively in touch with the main accused and the shooters. Therefore, the cited judgment will not help the petitioner.

The police have filed the chargesheet, and the charges have not been framed. The statements of the witnesses are yet to be recorded, and there is a force in the submission of Mr Jitender Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General, that the petitioner can intimidate the witnesses in case of his release on bail. Therefore, granting bail to the petitioner will compromise the fair trial.

Prima facie, the petitioner was a conspirator in the commission of murder, which is punishable with the extreme penalty of death or life imprisonment. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. Public Prosecutor, High Court of A.P., (1978) 1 SCC 240: 1978 SCC (Cri) 115: 1977 SCC OnLine SC 327 that when the punishment is severe, the person is not entitled to bail. It was observed at page 244:

"6. Let us have a glance at the pros and cons and the true principle around which other relevant factors must revolve. When the case is finally disposed of and a person is sentenced to incarceration, things stand on a different footing. We are concerned with the penultimate stage, and the principal rule to guide release on bail should be to secure the presence of the applicant who seeks to be liberated, to take judgment and serve a sentence in the event of the Court punishing him with imprisonment. In this perspective, the relevance of considerations is regulated by their nexus with the likely absence of the applicant for fear of a severe sentence, if such be plausible in the case. As Erle. J. indicated that when the crime charged (of which a conviction has been sustained) is of the highest magnitude and the punishment for it assigned by law is of extreme severity, the Court may reasonably presume, some evidence warranting, that no amount of bail would secure the presence of the convict at the stage of judgment, should he be enlarged. [ Mod. Law Rev. p. 50 ibid., 1852 I E & B 1] Lord Campbell, C.J., concurred in this approach in that case, and Coleridge J. set down the order of priorities as follows: [Mod. Law Rev. ibid., pp. 50-51]

"I do not think that an accused party is detained in custody because of his guilt, but because there are sufficient probable grounds for the charge against him as to make it proper that he should be tried, and because the detention is necessary to ensure his appearance at trial It is a very important element in considering whether the party, if admitted to bail, would appear to take his trial; and I think that in coming to a determination on that point, three elements will generally be found the most important: the charge, the nature of the evidence by which it is supported, and the punishment to which the party would be liable if convicted. In the present case, the charge is that of wilful murder; the evidence contains an admission by the prisoners of the truth of the charge, and the punishment of the offence is, by law, death."

It is thus obvious that the nature of the charge is the vital factor, and the nature of the evidence also is pertinent. The punishment to which the party may be liable, if convicted or conviction is confirmed, also bears upon the issue.

Thus, the nature of the offence and the severity of the punishment would disentitle the petitioner from the concession of bail.

No other point was urged.

17 In view of the above, the present petition fails, and it is dismissed.

The observations made hereinabove are regarding the disposal of this petition and will have no bearing whatsoever on the merits of the case.