Akil Ahmad vs State Of U.P.

B. Amit Sthalekar, J.—The petitioner in this writ petition is challenging the order dated 30.06.2005 whereby punishment of withholding of two increments with cumulative effect has been awarded and also awarding him adverse entry in his service record.

Aggrieved, the petitioner preferred a departmental appeal which was rejected by the order dated 20.04.2006 and thereafter the petitioner preferred a revision which was rejected by the District Magistrate on 01.07.2006 and the petitioner''s representation has also been rejected by order dated 16.01.2010.

Briefly stated the facts of the case are that the petitioner was working on the post of Assistant Clerk under the Block Development Officer, Uruwa and he was asked to give charge of the post by order dated 09.05.2000. This order was received by the petitioner on 09.05.2000 itself but it is stated that he was holding the charge of three posts and therefore he started preparing the charge lists but on 11.05.2000 he was placed under suspension.

However, he had delivered the charge of Storekeeper and Urdu Translator on 09.05.2000 itself and by letter dated 10.07.2000 he informed the District Development officer about the handing over of charge. So far as the post of Accountant is concerned, the petitioner approached the concerned Clerk from 04.07.2000 to 06.07.2000 but he was not available in the office and on 07.07.2000 the said

Clerk refused to take charge. Again on 12.07.2000 when the petitioner approached him the Clerk refused to take charge. In the meantime, the personal account of the petitioner was ceased due to which the salary of the month of April and May was not paid to the petitioner. On 22.07.2000 the suspension order was revoked and the petitioner was reinstated in service. However, on 01.02.2001 he was again suspended.

Aggrieved, the petitioner filed a Writ Petition No. 11571 of 2006. The Court by its order dated 29.03.2001 directed that the order of suspension shall be kept in abeyance and the petitioner shall be reinstated in service within 15 days but the departmental enquiry may be concluded as early as possible. The petitioner was reinstated in service by order dated 25.04.2001. It is however, stated that after 4 years a charge sheet containing 12 charges was issued to the petitioner on 15.05.2004 (Annexure-12 to the writ petition). The petitioner submitted his reply to the charge sheet on 08.06.2004 denying all the charges. The enquiry officer, however, by his report, Annexure-14 to the writ petition held that 9 charges stood proved against the petitioner. The enquiry report was never served upon the petitioner nor was he given any opportunity to file his reply to the said enquiry report.

It is however, stated that on 05.10.2004 the District Development Officer gave a show cause notice to the petitioner finding all the charges as proved against him and proposed the punishment of;

(i) Non-payment of subsistence allowance,

(ii) Withholding of two permanent increments;

(iii) Adverse entry.

The petitioner submitted his reply to the show cause notice on 27.10.2004 denying all the charges. However, on 27.10.2004 itself the District Development Officer appointed the Block Development Officer, Belghat as enquiry officer and asked him to initiate a fresh enquiry and furnish a fresh enquiry report in regard to the charge sheet dated 15.05.2004.

In paragraph 18 of the writ petition, the petitioner states that no notice was ever served nor the date of fresh enquiry was communicated to the petitioner nor any enquiry was held in which the petitioner was involved nor any reply was demanded from the petitioner to the charges framed against him. However, on 31.05.2005 an enquiry report was furnished by the Block Development Officer, Belghat in which, 8 charges were held to be proved against the petitioner. The District Development Officer accepted the enquiry report and thereafter passed the impugned order dated 30.06.2005 awarding him the penalty of withholding of two increments with cumulative effect as well as adverse entry to be noted in his service record, as already referred to hereinabove.

In para 19 of the writ petition the petitioner has specifically alleged that an enquiry report dated 31.05.2005 was again furnished by the Block Development Officer, Belghat behind the back of the petitioner without associating the petitioner in any manner in the said enquiry.

The reply of the respondents to the categorical averments of para 18 and 19 of the writ petition are given in para 15 of their counter affidavit which reads as follows:

That the allegations in paragraph nos. 18 and 19 of the writ petition are wrong and are denied. The enquiry report dated 31.05.2005 was given on the existing materials in accordance with law.

A mere bald denial without meeting the categorical averments and allegations made by the petitioner is no denial and instead amounts to an admission of the facts alleged. The averments made in para 15 of the counter affidavit of the respondents are deliberately evasive.

Aggrieved, the petitioner filed Writ Petition No. 3774 of 2006 which was disposed of by this Court by order dated 19.01.2006 with liberty to the petitioner to file an appeal under Rule 11 of the U.P. Government Servant (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1999 and with a direction to the appellate authority to decide the same in accordance with law by a reasoned and speaking order. The appeal of the petitioner was thereafter considered and dismissed by the appellate authority, i.e. the Chief Development Officer by order dated 20.04.2006 and all the charges were held proved against the petitioner but the quantum of punishment remained the same.

The petitioner has, however, alleged that by Government Order dated 20.09.2003 the appointing authority of the petitioner was changed and therefore, any proceedings initiated by the District Development Officer would be without jurisdiction and therefore null and void. It is also stated by the petitioner that against the appellate order, the petitioner on wrong advice filed a representation before the District Magistrate which was rejected by the impugned order dated 01.07.2006. It is also sated that after the petitioner became aware of the Government Order changing the disciplinary authority, he filed an appeal under Rule 11 of the U.P. Government Servant (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1999 before the Commissioner, Gorakhpur Division, Gorakhpur, who rejected the same by order dated 16.01.2010 as not maintainable.

I have heard Sri Gulrez Khan, learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Standing Counsel for the State-respondents.

It has been submitted by Sri Gulrez Khan that in the so called enquiry which was held, no documentary evidence was led, the charge sheet also did not mention any document relied upon nor there was any documentary evidence led during the enquiry nor was the petitioner made aware of any documentary evidence. He submits that from a perusal of the enquiry report the charges which are said to have been held to be proved have been so held on the ground that the petitioner was in charge of the Balika Samridhi Yogana and that he did not hand over the charge on 09.05.2000 and instead charge was taken over by one Sri Shabuddin, Urdu Translator on 09.08.2000 after three months.

As regards charge no. 2 the allegation is that the petitioner issued Cheque No. SB/B 140608 dated 30.03.2000 for a sum of Rs. 74,772/- to the Project Director Zila Gram Vikas Abhikaran, Gorakhpur although there was a sufficient balance amount in the Account to meet the said payment. Such a charge has been held to be proved without producing the Cheque or the passbook for verification by the petitioner to ascertain that there really was not sufficient balance in the account.

Charge no. 3 has been held to be not proved.

Charge no. 4 has been held to be not proved.

As regards charge no. 5, it is alleged that for the month of February, 2000 a salary amount of Rs. 5750 and for the month of March, 2000 a salary amount of Rs. 5625/- was drawn by the Assistant Development Officer (Agriculture) drawn out by the petitioner and allowed to be withdrawn by him but neither the salary bill of February nor of March, 2000 was produced during enquiry for examination and verification by the petitioner.

Charge no. 6 has been held to be proved and the charge is that the petitioner prepared the travelling allowance bill of one Sri Shambhu Nath Gupta, Assistant Development Officer (Panchayat) on bill no. 2 dated 06.05.1999 for Rs. 1,148/- but the same was never sent to the treasury office as a result the said bill lapsed but in this regard also, neither the travelling allowance bill was produced in the enquiry nor any papers were shown to the petitioner.

Charge no. 7 has also been held to be proved in which it is alleged that the petitioner prepared bills in bill book nos. 10, 11, 12 dated 18.06.1999 for Rs. 252/- payable to Sri Virendra Pratap Singh Village Development Officer, Rs. 1,017/- payable to Sri Kanhaiya Prasad, Village Development Officer, and Rs. 760/- payable to Sri Phool Chand Assistant Development Officer (I.S.B.) but the same were never presented in the office of the District Development Officer, Gorakhpur and thereafter the Bills disappeared. These findings of facts are based on documents and records which have not been produced in the enquiry nor even marked as relied upon documents in the chargesheet.

Charge no. 8 has also been held to be proved against the petitioner in which it is alleged that the salary bill no. 7 dated 13.08.1999 for a sum of Rs. 5,975/- was prepared for the salary of Sri Tribhuvan Datt Dubey, Gram Vikas Adhikari for the month of July, 1999 and entry in this regard has also been made in register 11-C but the same was never submitted in the office of the competent authority and has disappeared.

Charge no. 9 which has been held to be proved is that the petitioner prepared the salary bill of one Sri Manant Singh, Gram Panchayat Raj Adhikari for the month of October, 1999 twice, one bill no. 10 dated 25.10.1999 for Rs. 5,795/- and again bill no. 15 dated 04.01.2000 for Rs. 5,795/-.

Charge no. 10 which is also held to be proved is that the petitioner instead of making deduction in the G.P.F. Account No. 51037 of Sri Shabuddin Ahmad, Junior Clerk made a deduction of Rs. 40,000/- for the months from October, 1999 to April, 2000 and the same was deposited in some other account against which Sri Shabuddin Ahmad filed a complaint dated 25.3.2000.

Charge no. 11 has been held to be not proved.

Charge no. 12 is that the petitioner did not deposit a sum of Rs. 1,000/- in the treasury in respect of Weaker Sections Housing Loan Scheme and has embezzled the same. Thus the charge no. 12 has also been held to be proved.

From a perusal of the charges, it is noticed that all the charges proved as well as those not proved are based upon document any evidence and none of these documents were listed as relied upon the documents with the chargesheet nor were they produced in the enquiry for verification by the petitioner so as to enable him to admit or deny the same. What is even more relevant is that all these charges relate to the period 1999 and 2000 whereas the chargesheet was itself issued on 15.05.2004 and therefore, it could not be humanly expected of the petitioner to remember the bill book number or cheque number or the amounts which have been mentioned in the chargesheet in respect of the various charges which have been held to be proved against him.

Thus, the entire findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer stood vitiated on the denial of a reasonable and adequate opportunity of hearing to the petitioner to meet the specific charges levelled against him. No doubt the petitioner has tried his best to give some reply which is recorded by the Enquiry Officer but when it is his specific case that not a single document was listed with the charge sheet as relied upon document, and that even in the enquiry no documents were produced nor was he given any opportunity to examine any of those documents the petitioner would be seriously prejudiced by any findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer holding the petitioner guilty of the charges.

From a reading of the charge sheet it is noticed that every single charge out of the 12 charges, proved or not proved relate to some document or other. There is also a charge of embezzlement against the petitioner. In such circumstances, if documentary evidence was not supplied to the petitioner and thereafter his reply not called for, the entire enquiry proceedings relying upon documentary evidence available with the respondents was nothing but a sham enquiry and seriously prejudiced the rights of the petitioner to have a free and fair and a reasonable opportunity to defend himself in the departmental proceedings held against him. No findings could have been recorded by the Enquiry Officer bringing home a finding of guilt against the petitioner referring to various cheques or bill registers or salary bills or bank accounts or registers or ledgers without providing copies of the said documents to the petitioner or without producing the same in the enquiry and allowing the petitioner to examine the same. Such a procedure as adopted in the present case gravely vitiated the enquiry and no findings of guilt could have been brought against the petitioner unless the petitioner was confronted with the documents referred to in each of the charges and given an opportunity to rebut the same. The disciplinary authority accepted the enquiry report and thereafter proceeded to pass an order of punishment dated 30.06.2005 imposing the penalty of withholding of two annual increments of the petitioner permanently besides ordering that the petitioner would not be entitled for salary for the period of suspension and also that adverse entry be recorded against the petitioner in his ACR.

Sub rule (ii) of Rule 3 of the U.P. Government Servant (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1999 deals with penalties and provides for withholding of increments for a specified period and is listed under the head of "minor penalties." However, sub rule (i) of Rule 3 also provides for withholding increments with cumulative effect as a penalty under the head of "major penalties".

In the present case, the penalty imposed against the petitioner is of withholding of two annual increments permanently thus this penalty is not for a specified period and does not fall within the categories of minor penalties. It is a major penalty falling under sub clause 1 of rule (3) and therefore, such a penalty could be imposed only after holding a full fledged enquiry as provided under Rule 7 of the Rules, 1999 for imposing major penalties.

From a perusal of the documents on record of this case, it is noticed that the Enquiry Officer has held the charges proved against the petitioner by merely issuing him a chargesheet and a show cause notice and inviting the reply of the petitioner and has thereafter proceeded to record his findings proving the guilt of the petitioner. No witness was produced nor were any documents listed in the chargesheet although there is a reference to a complaint of one Sri Shabuddin Ahmad, Junior Clerk but that complaint is not mentioned as a relied upon document. In the charge sheet there is an allegation that salaries of certain persons were drawn twice but these persons were also not produced in the enquiry, in short the findings of guilt have been recorded against the petitioner on a mere presumption that the petitioner was in charge of the Balika Samridhi Yojana and also that he was the Assistant Clerk (subsequently re-designated as Assistant Accountant) under the Block Development Officer, Uruwa by Government Order dated 30.09.2003 and therefore everything was in his knowledge. Thus, it is noticed that the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer are based upon mere presumption and suspicion.

It is a well settled principle of service jurisprudence that in a departmental enquiry suspicion cannot be the foundation of the order of punishment. The purpose of holding enquiry proceedings is to elicit the truth and if the findings of the enquiry officer necessarily point towards certain documents which form the foundation of the enquiry, the delinquent employee must be confronted with those documents and any finding recorded to the prejudice of the government servant without complying the basic requirement of this principle would result in infraction of the basic rules of natural justice.

From a reading of the enquiry report it is noticed that the findings have been recorded by the enquiry officer on a presumption that the petitioner was the Accounts Clerk/Assistant Accountant and therefore, the various facts alleged which form the charges against the petitioner were within the knowledge of the petitioner, clearly shows that the findings have been recorded by the Enquiry Officer on mere presumption and suspicion. Suspicion cannot form the basis for bringing home a finding of guilt in an enquiry proceedings.

The supreme Court in Calcutta Dock Labour Board Vs. Jaffar Imam and Others, has held as follows:

There can be no doubt that when the appellant purports to exercise its authority to terminate the employment of its employees such as the respondents in the present case, it is exercising authority and power of a quasi-judicial character. In cases where a statutory body or authority is empowered to terminate the employment of its employees, the said authority or body cannot be heard to say that it will exercise its powers without due regard to the principles of natural justice. The nature or the character of the proceedings which such a statutory authority or body must adopt in exercising its disciplinary power for the purpose of terminating the employment of its employees, has been recently considered by this Court in several cases, vide the Associated Cement Companies Ltd. V.P.N. Sharma & Another,(1) and Lala Shri Bhagwan and Another v. Shri Ram Chand & Anr.(2) and it has been held that in ascertaining the nature of such proceedings with a view to decide whether the principles of natural justice ought to be followed or not, the tests laid down by Lord Reid in Ridge v. Baldwin & Others(3) are relevant. In view of these decisions, Mr. Sen has not disputed this position and we think, rightly.

But the question which we have to consider in the present appeals is of a different character. A citizen may suffer loss of liberty if he is detained validly under the Act; even so, does it follow that the detention order which deprived the citizen of his liberty should also serve indirectly but effectively the purpose of depriving the said citizen of his livelihood? If the view taken by the appellant''s officers who tried the disciplinary proceedings is accepted, it would follow that if a citizen is detained and his detention is confirmed by the State Government, his services would be terminated merely and solely by reason of such detention. In our opinion, such a position is obviously and demonstrably inconsistent with the elementary concept of the rule of law on which our constitution is founded. When a citizen is detained, he may not succeed in challenging the order of detention passed against him, unless he is able to adduce grounds permissible under the Act. But we are unable to agree with Mr. Sen''s argument that after such a citizen is released from detention, an employer, like the appellant, can immediately start disciplinary proceedings against high and tell him in substance that he was detained for prejudicial activities which amount to misconduct and that the detention order was confirmed by the State Government after consultation with the Advisory Board, and so, he is liable to be dismissed from his employment. It is obvious that the Advisory Board does not try the question about the propriety or validity of the citizen''s detention as a Court of law would; indeed, its function is limited to consider the relevant material placed before it and the representation received from the detenu, and then submit its report to the State Government within the time specified by s. 10(1) of the Act. It is not disputed that the Advisory Board considers evidence against the detenu which has not been tested in the normal way by cross-examination-, its decision is essentially different in character from a judicial or quasi-judicial decision. In some cases, a detenu may be given a hearing; but such a hearing is often, if not always, likely to be ineffective, because the detenu is deprived of an opportunity to cross examine the evidence on which the detaining authorities rely and may not be able to adduce evidence before the Advisory Board to rebut the allegations made against him. Having regard to the nature of the enquiry which the Advisory Board is authorised or permitted to hold before expressing its approval to the detention of a detenu, it would, we think, be entirely erroneous and wholly unsafe to treat the opinion expressed by the Advisory Board as amounting to a judgment of a criminal court. The main infirmity which has vitiated the impugned orders arises from the fact that the said orders equate detention of a detenu with his conviction by a criminal court. We are, therefore, satisfied that the Court of Appeal was right in taking the view that in a depart-mental enquiry which the appellant held against the respondents it was not open to the appellant to act on suspicion, and inasmuch as the appellant''s decision is clearly based upon the detention orders and nothing else, there can be little doubt that, in substance, the said conclusion is based on suspicion and nothing more.

Even in regard to its employees who may have been detained under the Act, if after their release the appellant wanted to take disciplinary action against them on the ground that they were guilty of misconduct, it was absolutely essential that the appellant should have held a proper enquiry. At this enquiry, reasonable opportunity should have been given to the respondents to show cause and before reaching its conclusion, the appellant was bound to lead evidence against the respondents, give them a reasonable chance to test the said evidence, allow them liberty to lead evidence in defence, and then come to a decision of its own. Such an enquiry is prescribed by the requirements of natural justice and an obligation to hold such an enquiry is also imposed on the appellant by clause 36(3) of the Scheme of 1951 and cl. 45(6) of the Scheme of 1956. It appears that in the present enquiry, the respondents were not given notice of any specific allegations made against them, and the record clearly shows that no evidence was led in the enquiry at all. It is only the detention orders that were apparently produced and it is on the detention orders alone that the whole proceedings rest and the impugned orders are founded. That being so, we feel no hesitation in holding that the Court of Appeal was perfectly right in setting aside the respective orders passed by the two leaned single Judges when they dismissed the three writ petitions filed, by the respondents.

The Supreme Court in Rajinder Kumar Kindra Vs. Delhi Administration through Secretary (Labour) and Others, has held that a finding recorded by the Enquiry Officer which is based on no evidence is a perverse finding. Paragraph 15 of the said judgment reads as follows:

In Paragraph 1 to 5, the history of the dispute and the charges framed against the appellant have been set out by Mr. Kakkar. Paragraph 6 deals with what the enquiry officer did. Paragraph 7 reproduces the contentions on behalf of the appellant. Paragraph 8 summarises the contentions on behalf of the employer. Paragraphs 9, 10 and 11 deal with the manner in which the enquiry was held. Paragraph 12 refers to the written arguments submitted on behalf of the employer. In the concluding paragraph 13, Mr. Kakkar states that the circumstances of the case and the evidence produced by the parties before the enquiry officer as well as in the present proceedings and on the consideration of the documents filed and proved, it is held as therein stated. He then recorded his ipse dixit not discussing the evidence or the total absence of it. It may be pointed out that in the course of the enquiry held against the appellant by Mr. U.K. Soni, enquiry officer, the employer had examined 4 witnesses namely Shri O.D. Sharma, Shri G.L. Kapur, Shri V.K. Malhotra and Shri Nandan Singh. No witness was examined before Shri G.C. Jain and the employer relied upon the report of the enquiry officer and the evidence of the four witnesses recorded by the enquiry officer. When the matter came up before Mr. Kakkar, the employer had not examined any witness but had submitted the report of the enquiry officer and the evidence of the aforementioned witnesses. Therefore when it was contended before the arbitrator that even accepting the evidence of the four witnesses, as if unchallenged, no reasonable man could ever come to the conclusion that the misconduct imputed to the appellant in charges No. 1, 2 and 3 could be said to be proved, it was incumbent upon him to examine the evidence. We invited Mr. P.K. Jain to point out to us which evidence is being relied upon in support of the charge of embezzlement and the charge relating to alleged misappropriation of funds. He could not lay his hand on any piece of evidence. Conceding that there is no evidence in support of the charge of embezzlement and misappropriation of funds simultaneously conceding that charges No. 1 and 2 are not proved, he repeatedly emphasised that the only conducts of which appellant is guilty is that the appellant had so deliberately left his cheque book unattended as to be accessible to anyone who may misuse it and this constitutes negligence in performance of duty. Even at the cost of the repetition, we must point out that keeping one''s private cheque book in any manner is no par. Of the performance of the duty of the employee. To say the least the charge apart from being frivolous is ludicrous and could not have even framed. Even if the allegation in the charge is left unquestioned it does not constitute misconduct. The employer could not have framed such charges without any evidence in support of them yet Mr. Kakkar holds them proved. Therefore Mr. Kakkar accepted the findings of the enquiry officer which were per se perverse. Not only Mr. Kakkar did not apply his mind to the submission of the appellant that the findings were perverse but he merely recorded his ipse dixit without any manner analysing or examining or applying his mind to the evidence only to find out whether there was any evidence to substantiate the charge and whether any reasonable man would arrive at the conclusion which the enquiry officer had reached. The award of Mr. Kakkar, apart from the fact that it is based on no legal evidence suffers from the additional infirmity of total non-application of mind. Any finding of misconduct based on total absence of evidence must fail.

In : 1987 (supp) 165, State of U.P. Vs. Dr. S.P. Saxena and Another, the Supreme Court has held that the failure to supply the report of the assessors to the delinquent employee resulted in violation of natural justice.

We agree with the reasoning and conclusion of the High Court. The report of the assessors was not supplied to respondent 1 notwithstanding the requirement of Rule (1) of the U.P. Disciplinary Proceedings (Administrative Tribunal) Rules, 1947. Failure to supply the report resulted in violation of Natural Justice in any case. This failure has been considered to be fatal to the departmental proceedings so as to vitiate the order of dismissal passed against respondent 1.

We see no reason to interfere with the order passed by the High Court. The appeal, therefore, fails and is dismissed with no order as to costs. The interim orders passed by this Court are vacated. The High Court''s order shall be complied with within four months from today.

In Kuldeep Singh Vs. The Commissioner of Police and Others, the Supreme Court held as follows:

It is no doubt true that the High Court under Article 226 or this Court under Article 32 would not interfere with the findings recorded at the departmental enquiry by the disciplinary authority or the Enquiry Officer as a matter of course. The Court cannot sit in appeal over those findings and assume the role of the Appellate Authority. But this does not mean that in no circumstance can the Court interfere. The power of judicial review available to the High Court as also to this Court under the Constitution takes in its stride the domestic enquiry as well and it can interfere with the conclusions reached therein if there was no evidence to support the findings or the findings recorded were such as could not have been reached by an ordinary prudent man or the findings were perverse or made at the dictate of the superior authority.

In Nand Kishore vs. State of Bihar, it was held that the disciplinary proceedings before a domestic Tribunal are of quasi-judicial character and, therefore, it is necessary that the Tribunal should arrive at its conclusions on the basis of some evidence, that is to say, such evidence which, and that too, with some degree of definiteness, points to the guilt of the delinquent and does not leave the matter in a suspicious state as mere suspicion cannot take the place of proof even in domestic enquiries. If, therefore, there is no evidence to sustain the charges framed against the delinquent, he cannot be held to be guilty as in that event, the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer would be perverse.

The findings, recorded in a domestic enquiry, can be characterised as perverse if it is shown that such a finding is not supported by any evidence on record or is not based on the evidence adduced by the parties or no reasonable person could have come to those findings on the basis of the that evidence. This principle was laid down by this Court in State of Andhra Pradesh vs. Sree Rama Rao. in which the question was whether the High Court, under Article 226, could interfere with the findings recorded at the departmental enquiry. This decision was followed in Central Bank of India vs. Prakash Chand Jain, and Bharat Iron Works vs. Bhagubhai Balubhai Patel & Ors. In Rajinder Kumar Kindra vs. Delhi Administration. It was laid down that where the findings of misconduct are based on no legal evidence and the conclusion is one to which no reasonable man could come, the findings can be rejected as perverse. It was also laid down that where a quasi-judicial tribunal records findings based on no legal evidence and the findings are his mere ipse dixit or based on conjectures and surmises, the enquiry suffers from the additional infirmity of non-application of mind and stands vitiated.

Normally the High Court and this Court would not interfere with the findings of fact recorded at the domestic enquiry but if the finding of "guilt" is based on no evidence, it would be a perverse finding and would be amenable to judicial scrutiny.

Thus, neither the Chief Development Officer nor the District Magistrate deciding the petitioner''s representation dated 01.07.2006 nor the Commissioner who has rejected the petitioner revision considered these facts of the matter which were also specifically raised by the petitioner in the memo of appeal dated 27.12.2005 as ground nos. 2, 5, 9 and 11 Annexure-24 to the writ petition. This point has not been considered by any of the authorities and therefore, in view of the specific findings recorded hereinabove and the law laid down by the Supreme

Court, the impugned order dated 30.06.2005, appellate order dated 20.04.2006, order dated 01.07.2006, and the revisional order dated 16.01.2010 are absolutely illegal, arbitrary and perverse orders and are accordingly quashed.

The writ petition stands allowed.