ALCHEMY BIOTECH PVT. LTD. vs M/S. MAHALAKSHMI PAINTS

By this First Appeal, under Section 19 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (for short "the Act"), the Opposite Party in the Complaint under the Act calls in question the legality and correctness of the order dated 30.01.2015, passed by the Rajasthan State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission at Jaipur (for short "the State Commission") in Complaint Case No. 05/2011. By the impugned order, while allowing the Complaint, preferred by the Respondent/Complainant, the State Commission has directed the Appellant to pay to the Complainant a sum of 9,85,000/-, received by it towards machine and raw material, along with interest @ 9% p.a. from the date of the Complaint, i.e. 31.01.2011, besides paying a sum of 5,00,000/- as compensation for mental agony etc. as well as litigation costs.

Allured by the advertisements got published in the National newspapers by the Appellant, on 01.04.2008, the Complainant entered into an agreement with it and also made a total payment of 9,85,000/- to it for license to sell paints. In order to commence the trade, besides issuing advertisements, involving expenditure of 2,00,000, the Complainant had also purchased a plot of 1000 sq. yard and arranged for electricity/water connections, labour at large scale etc., for which it had to spend a sum of 8,00,000/-. After starting the trade, when the Complainant supplied the paints, manufactured with the raw material/machines provided by the Appellant, the same was returned to it by the shopkeepers with the complaints made by the customers. Due to the same, the Complainant suffered loss and issued a registered letter to the Appellant in the matter on 18.01.2010, demanding indemnification of the loss suffered. However, neither the Appellant gave any response to the same nor made good the loss suffered. Then, the Complainant got issued a legal notice to the Appellant on 14.01.2011 but of no avail. In the said background, alleging deficiency in service on the part of the Appellant and the resultant loss suffered by it, the aforesaid Complaint, praying for appropriate reliefs, came to be filed before the State Commission.

Despite service of notice, including by publication, there was no representation on behalf of the Appellant before the State Commission. Hence, the State Commission proceeded to dispose of the Complaint in its absence.

On analysis of the evidence adduced by the Complainant before it, including the laboratory test report dated 05.04.2014, issued by the National Testing Laboratory Pvt. Ltd., Delhi, the State Commission found force in the submission of the Complainant and consequently, as noted above, while allowing the Complaint, issued the afore-noted directions to the Appellant. Hence, the present Appeal.

It is pointed out by the office that the Appeal is barred by limitation, inasmuch as there is a delay of 627 days in filing the same. An Application, praying for condonation of the said delay, has been filed along with the Appeal. In paragraph no.3 of the same, the Appellant has furnished the following short and crisp explanation: "3. It is stated that the learned State Commission without jurisdiction and beyond limitation, and without even serving notice upon the appellant herein, has passed the impugned order and hence, the appellant herein primarily was unaware of the same and only after the receipt of information during November, 2016, as to the issuance of bailable warrants dated 28.01.2016 and 09.09.2016. Only after the service of the bailable warrant, he became aware of the impugned order and immediately thereafter is filing the above appeal."

In our view, the explanation furnished by the Appellant is absolutely unsatisfactory. The sole ground, sought to be urged by the Appellant for condonation of the delay caused in filing the Appeal is that it learnt about the impugned order dated 30.01.2015 only in November, 2016, when it learnt that bailable warrants dated 28.01.2016 and 09.09.2016 had been issued by the Executing Court. It is evident from the documents on record that office address of the Appellant, as mentioned in the Complaint, preferred by the Complainant, and the present Appeal, preferred by the Appellant, is the same. Before passing the impugned order the State Commission had issued notice to the Appellant at the same address. There is no reason to believe that it was not delivered at the given address. Thereafter, as is apparent from the copy of the impugned order, placed on record, the "first copy" thereof was issued to the Appellant by post on 27.02.2015 on the address mentioned in the memo of parties name. It is not the case of the Appellant that his address mentioned in the Complaint was not correct. Yet, the Appellant did not bother to respond to the notice or on the order passed against it. As is apparent from the afore-extracted explanation, it was only in November, 2016, after service of bailable warrants, issued by the State Commission, that the Appellant woke up and filed the present Appeal. If the state of affairs was in fact so, we fail to fathom any reason how the Appellant could apply for a certified copy of the impugned order on 19.09.2016, i.e. about two months before the alleged date of knowledge of the impugned order. Except for the bald plea that before November, 2016, it had no knowledge about the impugned order, no convincing explanation as regards the delay is forthcoming from the Appellant. It seems that the Appellant was not bothered by the directions issued to it by the State Commission and woke up only when it received warrants in the Execution proceedings initiated by the Complainant for execution of the order passed in its Complaint. In any case, the fact remains that the present Appeal has been filed with an inordinate delay of 627 days, over and above the statutory period of 30 days, as provided under the Act. We are convinced that in fact the Appellant has nothing to say as regards delay and is only interested in protracting the matter on one pretext or the other.

In view of the above, we are of the opinion that apart from the fact that the Application is not bonafide, the Appellant has failed to make out any cause, much less a "sufficient cause" for condonation of inordinate delay of 627 days in filing of the present Appeal and in the event the said unexplained delay is condoned and the Appeal is entertained, the Complainant, which had invested a considerable amount towards procurement of raw-materials/machines as also other arrangements, and had been granted appropriate relief by the State Commission, would be put to further harassment.

In coming to the aforesaid conclusion, we have also kept in mind the observations of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in Anshul Aggarwal vs. New Okhla Industrial Development Authority [(2011) 14 SCC 578], to the effect that while deciding an application for condonation of delay, the Court has to keep in mind that the special period of limitation has been prescribed under the Act for filing appeals and revisions in consumer matters and the object of expeditious adjudication of the consumer disputes will get defeated if belated petitions filed against the orders of the Consumer Foras are entertained.

Consequently, the Appeal is dismissed on the short ground of limitation.