Allareddi Venkata Subbareddi and Another vs Allareddi Penchalamma and Others

Satyanarayana Raju J.

These second appeals raise a question as to the interpretation of S. 14 of the Hindu Succession Act.

For a better appreciation of the problem arising for decision in these appeals, it is necessary to state the material facts. One Allareddi Dasaradharamireddi, a bachelor, died in or about the year 1925, leaving him surviving his mother, penchalamma. On the death of her son, Penchalamma came into possession of his estate. On October, 20, 1954, she executed three settlement deeds, Exs. B. 1 to B. 3, whereunder she settled all the properties comprised in her son''s estate on her daughter''s daughters, reserving a life-interest for herself. The plaintiffs, two in number claiming that they and the 3rd defendant are the nearest reversioners to the estate of the last male holder, instituted the suits, out of which these appeals have arisen, for a declaration that the settlement deeds Exs. B. 1, B. 2 and B 3, executed by Penchalamma in favour of her grand-daughters, are not binding on them. Penchalamma was impleaded as the first defendant in the suits, while each of the three grand-daughters was impleaded as the 2nd defendant.

The 1st defendant and the settles resisted the suits on the following grounds: (1) that the plaintiffs and the 3rd defendant are not the nearest presumptive reversioners; (2) that the last male holder executed a will on 12-9-1925, bequeathing all his properties in favour of his mother with absolute rights; and (3) that under S. 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, the 1st defendant became the full owner of the property

The courts below concurrently held that the plaintiffs and the 3rd defendant were the nearest presumptive reversioners to the estate of the last male holder; and that the will relied upon by the 1st defendant had not been proved to be the last will and testament of Dasaradharami Reddi; and these findings are no longer in controversy. On the question as to whether the 1st defendant became the full owner by virtue of the provisions of S. 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, the trial court held that she did not, while the lower appellate court came to a contrary conclusion. The lower appellate court held that under S. 14 of the Act, the 1st defendant''s limited interest was enlarged into an absolute estate and thereby put an end to the rights of the presumptive reversioners to seek the declaration sought for by them, and on this conclusion the suits were dismissed.

It will be convenient at this stage to set out the relevant provisions of the Hindu Succession Act. Section 14 reads as follows:

Any property possessed by a female Hindu, whether acquired before or after the commencement of this Act, shall be held by her as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner.

Explanation: In this sub-section ''property'' includes both movable and immovable property acquired by a female Hindu by inheritance or devise, or at a partition, or in lieu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance, or by gift from any person, whether a relative or not, before, at or after her marriage, or by her own skill or exertion, or by purchase or by prescription, or in any other manner whatsoever, and also any such property held by her as stridhana immediately before the commencement of this Act.

Nothing contained in sub-section (1) shall apply to any property acquired by way of gift or under a will or any other instrument or under a decree Or order of a civil court or under an award where the terms of the gift, will or other instrument or the decree, order or award prescribed a restricted estate in such property.

It is contended for the appellants that S. 14 of the Hindu Succession Act confers absolute rights on women holding limited estates under the Hindu Law and it does not cover the case of a life-estate holder, and the 1st defendant having already created a vested interest in favour of her grand-daughters, S. 14 did not operate to enlarge her interest. It is further contended that by reason of the restricted estate "acquired" under the settlement deeds, she cannot claim the benefit of S 14 of the Act.

Now, under the Hindu Law in operation prior to the coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act, a female Hindu-a mother or widow who succeeded to the estate of her son or husband - did not take a mere life estate in the property. In Janaki Ammal v. Narayanaswami Aiyer, ILR 39 Mad 634: (AIR 1916 PC 117) their Lordships of the Privy Council have defined the nature of her estate as follows:

The rule of the Hindu law with regard to the nature of the widow''s estate may have been subject to various forms of expression, but in substance it is not doubtful. Her right is of the nature of a right of property, her position is that of owner; her powers in that character are, however, limited, but, to use the familiar language of Mayne''s Hindu Law'' paragraph 625, page 870, ''so long as she is alive no one has any vested interest in the succession'' .

The rights of the reversioners have also been laid down by their Lordships in the following terms:

The law as to the situation of the reversionary heirs is also in substance quite clear; there is, as stated, no vesting at the date of the husband''s death; and it follows that the questions of who is the nearest reversionary heir or what is the class of reversionary heirs fall to be settled at the date of the expiry of the ownership of life or lives......

The important words in S. 14(1) are "any property possessed by a female Hindu" and not any property possessed by a limited owner, though the expression ''full ownership'' is used in the section in the context of property possessed by a female Hindu. The expression must, therefore, receive its natural meaning.

There has been considerable diversity of judicial opinion as to the meaning and effect of the phrase "possessed" by a female Hindu, "whether acquired before or after the commencement of this Act". On the one hand the view has been taken that the meaning of the word ''possessed.'' in the context of property acquired before the commencement of the Act, cannot be confined to the present" tense in the sense that the possession contemplated is possession at the date of the Act coming into force and it has been held that the word implies past possession as well as possession at the date of the commencement of the Act According to this view the limited interest of the female was enlarged into absolute interest in property acquired and possessed by her at any time before the commencement of the Act. This view has been taken by Patna and Allahabad High Courts. On the other hand, it has been held by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh that though S. 14 is retrospective in so far as it enlarges a Hindu woman''s limited estate even in respect of property inherited or held by her as a limited owner before the Act came into force, its operation is confined to property in the possession of the female when the Act came into force. The High Courts of Madras, Bombay, Calcutta, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa and Kerala have also taken the same view.

It is not necessary to undertake a detailed examination of these decisions, for in a recent decision, rendered by the Supreme Court Gummalapura Taggina Matada Kotturuswami Vs. Setra Veeravva and Others, their Lordships have, after a scrutiny of the divergent views, indicated their approval of the view taken by this Court, that the word ''possessed'' in S. 14 is used in a broad sense and in the context means the state of owning or having in one''s hand or power. It may also be noted that their Lordships quoted with approval the opinion of Mookherjee, J., as to the meaning of the words "any property possessed by a female Hindu", expressed in Gostha Behari Bera and Others Vs. Haridas Samanta and Others, in the following words:

The opening words ''property possessed by a female Hindu'', obviously mean that to come within the purview of the section the property must be in possession of the female concerned at the date of the commencement of the Act They clearly contemplate the female''s possession when the Act came into force. That possession might have been either actual or constructive or in any form recognized by law, but unless the female Hindu, whose limited estate in the disputed property is claimed to have been transformed into absolute estate under this particular section, was at least in such possession, taking the word ''possession'' in its widest connotation, when the Act came into force, the section would not apply.

Sri Chinnappa Reddy, learned counsel for the appellants has, however, argued that the question as to the exact import of the expression ''limited owner'' used in contra-distinction with ''full owner'' occurring at the end of sub-section (1) of S. 14 did not fall for consideration or decision by their Lordships and that therefore, the contention now raised by him is not covered by that decision. It is, however, to be noted that the facts of the case decided by their Lordships of the Supreme Court bear a close analogy to the facts of the instant case..There, one Kari Veerappa, who was the last male owner of the estate, executed a will under which he authorised his wife, Veeravva to adopt a son for the purpose of continuation of his family as he had no issue. After the testator''s death his widow made two attempts to adopt a son in accordance with his will. The first attempt did not accomplish the purpose of the will as the person alleged to have been adopted, died, veeravva thereafter adopted another boy and in connection with that adoption two documents came in to be executed. The first of them was a registered ante-adoption agreement the second also a registered document, was described as the deed of adoption.

The appellant, claiming to be the nearest reversioner of Kari Veerappa, filed a suit for a declaration that the adoption of the boy (2nd defendant) by Veeravva was invalid and not binding on the appellant or the other reversioners to the estate of the late Kari Veerappa. The suit was dismissed by the District Court of Bellary, and the decree of dismissal was substantially affirmed by the High Court of Madras. When the appeal came on for hearing before their Lordships of the Supreme Court, a preliminary objection was raised on behalf of the respondents that the suit filed by the reversioner must in any event fail having regard to the provisions of S. 14 of the. Hindu Succession Act. It was contended on behalf of the respondents that either there was a valid adoption or there was not. If there was a valid adoption and the decisions of the High Court and the District Judge on this question were correct, then obviously the suit of the appellant must be dismissed. If, on the other hand, it was found that the adoption of the second defendant by Veeravva was either invalid or, in, fact, had not taken place, then under the provisions of S. 14 of the Act, Veeravva became the full owner of her husband''s estate and was not a limited owner thereof, and therefore, the appellant''s suit was not maintainable.

The preliminary objection taken by the respondents was considered by the Supreme Court on the assumption that the adoption of the 2nd defendant was invalid. Their Lordships held that on the death of Kari Veerappa, veervva came into possession of the estate and she remained in possession at least till 1942, when the adoption of the 2nd defendant was said to have taken place, but even after the adoption of the 2nd defendant the agreement to adopt provided that Veeravva was to remain in possession of her husbands estate during her life-time in spite of the adoption. Their Lordships held that by reason of the aforesaid provision in the ante-adoption agreement, she had been in sole possession of the property up to the date of the adoption and although she had adopted the 2nd defendant, it was subject to rentention of the enjoyment, possession and management by her of her husband''s property during her life time. On these facts, the Supreme Court held that the provisions of S. 14(1) operated to enlarge her life estate into an absolute estate. Having regard to the wider connotation given to the opening words of S. 14, viz. "any property possessed by a female Hindu", which would mean that to come within the purview of the section, the property must be in the possession of the female concerned at the date of the commencement of the Act, the life estate held by the present 1st defendant under the settlement deeds must be held to have been transformed into an absolute estate under S. 14. The first of the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the appellants must therefore be negatived.

There remains a subsidiary contention that under S. 14(2), the 1st defendant having acquired a restricted estate, she cannot invoke in her favour the benefits of S. 14(1) of the Act. This argument proceeds on a fallacy. It is not under the settlement deeds that any interest was created in favour of the 1st defendant. The first defendant was in possession and enjoyment of the properties of her deceased son as a limited owner and he purported to give a vested interest in the properties in her enjoyment after her life time in favour of her grand daughters reserving for herself a life interest. Therefore sub-sec. (2), which is in the nature of an exception to sub-section (1), cannot apply. On a plain reading of that sub-section, we are clear that it would apply only to properties acquired by way of gift or under a will or under any other instrument. Such is not the case here. Indeed, the learned counsel for the appellants has made no serious attempt to substantiate this contention.

Having regard to the conclusions reached by us, the decrees of dismissal passed by the lower appellate court must be affirmed. In the result, these second appeals must fail and are accordingly dismissed with costs of respondents 1 and 2.